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
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ANTI-TOOKE;

OR AN

ANALYSIS

OF

THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE

OF

LANGUAGE,

EXEMPLIFIED IN THE

ENGLISH TONGUE.

By JOHN FEARN.

VOLUME SECOND.

"BY THE WORD OF THE LORD WERE THE HEAVENS MADE; AND
"ALL THE HOST OF THEM BY THE BREATH OF HIS MOUTH."


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1827.



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ANTI-TOOKE;

OR,

AN ANALYSIS, &c.

CHAPTER III.

SECTION THIRD.

OF ETYMOLOGICAL PROOFS, CO-INCIDING WITH THE FORE-GOING PROOFS FROM NECESSARY PRINCIPLES, THAT ALL LEGITIMATE SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS ARE MINOR VERBS.

Introduction.

IN entering upon the topics which form the matter of the present section, it may perhaps be expedient to repeat the intimation which was conveyed at the close of the preceding volume,—namely—that the nature of the labor is now, for some space, to undergo a change.—It will therefore be for readers to observe that, the investigation, during the existing stage of the inquiry, cannot consist in a prosecution of analysis, in that sense of the term hitherto understood; but must take on, during the remainder of this chapter, the character of a certain species of *Natural History*; whose evidence, consequently, even when it is perfectly true and certain, can be no other than what is

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logically dominated *probable only*, in contradistinction to that which is called NECESSARY; and whose special nature is farther burdened with the two grand imperfections of being (unlike the results of Natural History in general) neither, in the case of any Language, permanent in its laws, nor characteristically certain in its inductions.

As for the necessity which appears for such a procedure; it will hereafter be recorded, as forming no light charge against the intellectual character of the age, that the results of strict reasoning should essentially, or at least in point of fact, require the aid of an appeal to a far inferior kind of evidence. In this case, it must, for the present, be consolatory to know that, Philosophy will assert her own right whenever a sufficient number of eyes shall be open to the INCONSISTENCY of affecting a character of strict ratiocination, and logical precision, in other and related departments of knowledge; while even the most enlightened individuals, of the reading community, are exhibiting, in the DEPARTMENT OF GRAMMAR, an incipency of reason, and a lack of understanding, for which an adequate simile can hardly be found when the fact is contrasted with the undoubted state of their general advancement. In the mean time, it is certain that the course of inquiry must be accommodated to the nature of the case; that is, to the state of public opinion. And there cannot be a question that, the great bulk of readers, under the government of a very natural prejudice, would at this moment rather look for

the Principles of Universal Grammar in the quaint and mishapen idioms, and preposterous verbal expedients, of those early Tribes whose Philosophy pitched no higher than to the worship of THOR and WODEN, and who have *never for a moment been supposed* to be our Models in ANY OTHER Art, or Science ; than expect to find them in the ungrotesque, and therefore unenchanting, grammatical figures and results of strict and consecutive reasoning. As a sufficient test of this state of the public mind ; we need only appeal to the testimony of Mr. Tooke himself : Who professes to have formed and perfected his own System of Grammar from Principles of reasoning *a priori* : But affirms that, he was fain to labor, collaterally, in the recesses of Etymology, for the sake of carrying conviction to the minds of others. What *sort, or magnitude*, of Treatise, of ANY KIND, Mr. Tooke's work could have exhibited to the world, had the *whole of the Etymological part of it been withheld* ; and the Demonstrative—the reasoning *a priori*—alone presented ; I shall not here stop to comment upon : Although the bare consideration of this, alone, might serve to show, in a very striking manner, whether or not the Philosophy of Language has ever seen the light in his speculations. But in one point, at least, I am virtually agreed with him in opinion ;—namely—that, the Writer who should, in the present state of the public mind, advance far beyond the popular views of the age, into a Region of Demonstrative Grammar ; without at the same time having re-

course to Etymology, as a clue by which the great mass of readers might be enabled to follow him ; would find himself, if not indeed in the dark, at least in a predicament of equivalent uselessness, by being completely out of sight of those whom he had designed to draw forward, in the same course.

But the great preliminary objection, which there is a necessity to lay against the course that Mr. Tooke adopted ; and which he has led all succeeding Philologists, without exception, to adopt after him ; is his having erected Etymology into an authority of *paramount and exclusive* worship. It has already been pointed out, in the early part of this work, that he even did much more against the rights of Philosophy than those who have come after him : For, conforming, with a wonderful inconsistency, to the old adage, of *looking one way and rowing another*, he invoked the Sanctions of Reason, but followed only the supposed dictates of Etymology. This Etymology was the THOR of Mr. Tooke's Grammatical Idolatry. And, by the novelty, no less than the certainty, of that portion of light which his genius had let in from this source, he has succeeded in erecting his Idol into the Philological Divinity of our Modern TEUTONES. All men have bowed the knee to the Graven Image which the Philologist of Purley hath set up. And, instead of any farther attempts being made, or thought of, in order to solve the Problem of Language by researches into the Structure of our Ideas and

into the Necessary Relations between them, the Philologists of Britain have been content to receive, at his hands, and with implicit veneration, the cimmerian dictum that,—“ *Many of the most learned and judicious Grammarians, disgusted with absurdity and contradictions, have prudently contented themselves with remarking the differences of words; and have LEFT THE CAUSES OF LANGUAGE TO SHIFT FOR THEMSELVES.*”¹—I trust it is already manifest, and will still be rendered more so in the investigation of the remaining Parts of Speech, that those Grammarians CANNOT have been the MOST JUDICIOUS, OR MOST PRUDENT, who had thus relinquished all research into the Structure of our Thoughts with a view to erect the Science of Language: Although I altogether agree in the justice of the COMPLAINT, upon which Mr. Tooke has founded his opinion,—namely—that, “The very same game has been played over again with *Ideas*, which was before played with *Things*.” and that—“No satisfaction, no agreement, has been obtained; but all has been dispute, diversity, and darkness.”—This memorable dictum of the Great Leader of Inductive Etymologists—this erecting of WORDS above REASON—ought to be held up, (as it now is,) as a beacon to the Philologists of this Country; who have, with one consent, voluntarily and pre-

¹ An Edition of the Diversions of Purley, in octavo, having been published since the commencement of my grammatical labors; I give notice that all the quotations from Mr. Tooke, in the present Work, are taken from his Quarto Impression.

fessly turned their backs upon the Philosophy of Language. And if it should prove, in the result, that these will turn on their track ; this desirable event could not have come about, except through a combination of accidents which was not in the least to be expected. Other Philologists, indeed, besides Dr. Murray, have dissented from the derivations assumed by Mr. Tooke, "*in many particular instances*:" But no one has ever so much as thought of raising the standard of revolt against his GENERAL assumptions ; under the effusions of which, the public only consider that the once-approved system of his celebrated Predecessor lies buried ; without ever supposing that the most glittering portion of the materials which have been thrown up, with such noise and corruscation, over the specious erections in HERMES, are but the volatile matter of a literary volcano, and must pass away ; although, indeed, the laudable labors of Harris, in this direction, must, for the greater part, pass along with them.

Here, therefore, it may be of essential service, in exciting the attention of readers, that we should pause for a moment, and ask, What have been the fruits of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, as manifested in the spirit or tenor of our English Grammars, since those Speculations first appeared ? It is now the Third Part of a Century since they first burst upon the public notice, with all the eclat that could be expected to attend upon a new light of such a description, let in by both a *cultivated* man, a *clever* man, and a *party* man :

And one certain consequence of this has been that, of all the Grammars of the English Language, great and small, which have issued from the press since the epoch in question, there is perhaps not one that has not deemed its very existence dependent upon the *mention*, and the *praise*, of Mr. Tooke's discoveries ; both which, (I most willingly bear testimony,) are highly fit and proper to be inserted in every Grammar that has been published since he gave his System to the world. But the question which remains, for the Philosopher of Language to propound, and to be answered ;—the question, also, which every one can answer, the moment it is proposed ; is—WHAT ALTERATIONS OF GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE have been produced ? or, What is the NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMPROVEMENT to be found, in any of the Grammars which have received and acknowledged Mr. Tooke's Philological Theory ? The answer is that, So far are we from finding any change, EITHER OF STRUCTURE OR OF NOMENCLATURE ; or any effect of the Purleian System ; (if we except the mention of some small innovations, in a way which we would speak of any thing that is curious and to be admired for its texture, but which cannot be brought into any utility ;) that we have, IN THIS REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF NEW STRUCTURE, a manifest evidence that the System in question is absolutely *sterile* ; and is *incapable of being APPLIED to the PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR in any of the more IMPORTANT parts of this Science* : Although I do not mean to deny, but am rather

forward to assert, that the suggestions which he has conveyed in the Department of ABBREVIATIONS, open a wide field for the facilitating and the mellowing of Verbal Communication : Which part of his labors furnish him with distinguished claims to consideration ; though it cannot be denied that these are of a *subordinate* nature, being EXTRINSIC TO THE INTEGRAL PART OF THE FABRIC OF LANGUAGE. In a word ; it cannot be dissembled that, the face of every English Grammar, of the present day, affords an evidence that Mr. Tooke has presented its author with a cup out of which he has not been enabled to drink ; but whose contents, however attractive to the eye, have become evanescent the moment an attempt has been made to embrace them. The *exceptions*, if enumerated, could serve only to render the want more striking and serious, in the conclusions which they induce. I shall therefore be content to point out the fact, thus adverted to, as a most important consideration for all those who are intent on the advancement of this branch of Science ; and to leave every reader to decide for himself the question,—HOW FAR THE GRAMMAR OF LOWTH has been left behind, by ANY GRAMMAR which has been constructed after the Principles of TOOKE ;—always admitting, as I here do, that Lowth has been left behind in SOME DEGREE ?

It remains now only, upon the other hand, to point out and inculcate that, it is NOT THE USE OF

Etymology, but only its PERVERSION, that is meant to be decried in the foregoing observations. THAT THOR, whose *real* attributes, perhaps, may have claimed a deathless veneration of mankind; and might have proved of important utility, through a succession of ages, in holding up for imitation the example of human virtues exerted for the general good, becomes an object of humiliation and revolt, only when we reflect on the state of our ignorant Ancestors, as having been once sunk in the adoration of him, with the assignment, to this Idol, of CELESTIAL ATTRIBUTES. In like manner ETYMOLOGY, with all its claims, and all its faults, must be an Object of great and varied interest, so long as it shall be cultivated and regarded FOR WHAT IT IS—namely—for a Walk of NATURAL HISTORY, *of a peculiar and qualified Nature*. It can be reprehensible only if we should attempt to erect its Inductions, (even when these happen to be indubitably ascertained,) into THAT AUTHORITY which alone can sanction our Grammatical projects, or conclusions. On the contrary, if I mistake not, it will indeed be proved that, in this field of research are to be traced some very important points of truth, which have never yet been ascribed to it by its own votaries. It was intimated, in the close of the preceding volume that, it is the design of the present section to *reconcile* Etymology with the Grammar deduced from Necessary Principles. And if any reason had occurred, in the interim, to convey a doubt that I should not be enabled to accomplish the object

thus proposed, the predicament of adverse health would have afforded me a real and a sufficient plea for leaving the task unfinished in this, or in any other of its parts. It may therefore be concluded that, after a period of protracted deliberation, I advance with at least a strong persuasion that the truths now in question may be elicited from ETYMOLOGY, when she shall be duly cross-examined. But, along with this, I would particularly point out the manifest fact that, if the result should prove to the satisfaction of readers, ETYMOLOGY *could hardly have cross-examined* HERSELF: and it must have been *first suspected in* REASON, that the Former has held these truths in concealment; or else, in all probability, they would have been passed over by every succeeding Philologist, as they have been by every preceding one.

As a single example of the truth of this last remark, I observe that, a certain string of quotations which have been furnished by Mr. Tooke; and upon which I have been happy to seize, as being of great value for the purpose of proving that the So-called INFINITIVE and the So-called PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPLE, in the English Language, were at one period IDENTICAL as a Word in ING; (from which fact I propose to deduce undeniable evidence that our PREPOSITIONS ALSO, of the same Period, are Words in ING;) has been recorded in his speculations for the *sole and exclusive purpose of showing the* AWKWARDNESS AND POVERTY of the Language, in not

being furnished with certain Abbreviations (since introduced into our Dialect,) which he calls PARTICIPLES, such as the Words AMIABLE, MEMORANDUM, &c.,—Words which, indeed, are equally convenient and elegant as Abbreviations, although they are vastly foreign to the nature of PARTICIPLES; but his attention to which at the moment has, I conceive, called his discernment entirely off from the *real and great* importance of the extracts in question. It is in such cases as THESE that the guidance and sanction of a previous REASON can enable us to draw, from Etymology, some truths of the highest value; which would otherwise remain in utter and lasting obscurity. And it is for us also duly to observe that, whenever She is happily found to possess such truths, She has these *only through a fortunate co-incidence*; and She must hold them SUBORDINATELY to the Principles of that Reason which alone can sanction her adoptions.

Let Etymology, therefore, when She would be appealed to as being of paramount authority, go on toward the solution of her own appropriate Problems, namely Problems in *Other and Collateral Histories*.—These are, undeniably, of a real importance, the magnitude of which cannot be gainsaid, or contemned. And the learning, patience, and perseverance, which must be presupposed in the attainment of any eminence in this pursuit, must entitle the successful votary to a high estimation among spirits of an intellectual cast. *But let the Department and Labors of the*

INDUCTIVE ETYMOLOGIST *be, henceforward, recognised as being completely distinct and different from those of the* UNIVERSAL GRAMMARIAN. And, while I would accord to the former every tribute that can with justice be rendered to its claims; I must presume to separate from it a Department of Science which, owing to the well-known certainty of human ignorance in all barbarous ages, it never could, and never can, comprehend. UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR is usually assumed as being a System of the Grammatical Principles that are COMMON TO ALL LANGUAGES. But so far is this assumption from being true, that, Universal Grammar, if it shall ever exist at all, must consist, IN GREAT PART, of Principles which NOT ONLY WERE NEVER COMMON TO ANY PLURALITY of Languages; but, also, were NEVER EXISTENT IN ANY ONE Language, *as Languages have been hitherto interpreted*: though, indeed, the Science in question must consist in Principles that OUGHT TO BE common to all Languages.

It may be proper to intimate, in this place, that, after the conclusion of the present chapter, the work will resume its general analytical form, unless any special occasion should occur, to deviate from it.

It may, moreover, be merely added here, that, while a considerable portion of space must now, in the first place, be allotted to the investigation of certain points, which to an ordinary observer

may appear in themselves to be of no very great Grammatical extent; but which, however, have undeniably presented a profound mist and a source of continual disagreement between Philologists; the research and its objects cannot fail to be admitted as being of sufficient importance provided we shall succeed in removing the difficulty. Along with which, especially if the result prove satisfactory, much collateral light must incidentally be let in upon the Structure of Language, *altogether beside the* PRIMARY object of the whole speculation, which is that of showing the REAL ETYMOLOGICAL NATURE OF SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS, as they have actually existed and been employed at certain periods, WITH INDUBITABLE CONTINUATION UNTIL THIS DAY in our dialect.

SUBSECTION I.

Of the So-called Infinitive Mode and its Signs.

IN proceeding to consider that Grammatical Symbol which has been called the INFINITIVE MODE, I deem it expedient, in the first place, to transcribe what has been written by Mr. Tooke, in his view of this part of Language. I shall afterwards submit what has appeared to myself to be the real nature of the Subject. And to this I shall subjoin the result of Dr. Murray's speculations in the same direction; with intent to show the bearings of his very enlightened etymological researches, upon those views which, previously to

my having had any knowledge of his opinions. I had deduced from what appeared to me to be the REASON of the thing.—The proximate design, of the immediate inquiry, is to throw etymological light upon the cause, or reason, why many of our So-called Prepositions have been mistaken by Mr. Tooke and other writers for IMPERATIVES; whereas, in reality, the words in question have formerly borne, and ought still to bear, the Identical Form of the SO-CALLED INFINITIVE MODE: which, also, (it will be clearly shown,) has heretofore, in our Language, been,—with the exception only of its Prefix,—*One Same Form, or Word*, as the SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPLE.—The investigation, necessary for the intended purpose, being of some extent, will explain the reason why I did not enter into any consideration of the So-called Infinitive Mode when treating of the Verb: to which department of Language, *in certain situations*, it is an APPENDAGE; although it is *then no integral part of the Verbal Mass*.

In the *First Volume* of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, page 351, Mr. Tooke has expressed himself in the following terms.

“ The Infinitive, therefore, appears plainly to
 “ be what the Stoics called it, the very Verb itself;
 “ pure and uncompounded with the various acci-
 “ dents of *mood*, of *number*, of *gender*, and (in
 “ English) of *tense*; which accidents are, in some
 “ Languages, joined to the Verb by variety of *ter-*
 “ *mination*; and in some, by an *additional word*

“signifying the *added circumstance*. And if our
 “English Grammarians and Philosophers had
 “trusted something less to their reading and a
 “little more to their own reflection, I cannot help
 “thinking that the very awkwardness and imper-
 “fection of our own Language, in this particular
 “of the *Infinitive*, would have been a great bene-
 “fit to them in all their difficulties about the
 “**VERB**: and would have led them to understand
 “and explain that which the perfection of more
 “artificial and improved languages contributed to
 “conceal from others. For I reckon it a great
 “advantage which an English Philosopher has,
 “over those who are acquainted with such lan-
 “guages only which do this business by *termina-*
 “*tion*. For though I think I have good reason
 “to believe, that all these *Terminations* may like-
 “wise be traced to their respective origin; and
 “that, however *artificial* they may now appear to
 “us, they were not at first the effect of premedi-
 “tated and deliberate *art*, but separate words by
 “length of time corrupted into a coalescency with
 “the words of which they are considered as the
 “termination; yet this was less likely to be sus-
 “pected by others.”

As a passing observation upon this extract, by
 the way, I remark in the first place; (in case it
 should be thought that the Definition of the Verb
 which I quoted in a former place, as being that of
 Mr. Tooke, is not sufficiently decisive of his
 meaning;) that of itself alone it affords a striking
 and conclusive evidence of the truth of what I

have in the early part of this work asserted with regard to Mr. Tooke's doctrine of the Essential Nature of the Verb,—namely,—that he conceived it to consist in A WORD UNASSOCIATED,—that is a Word, (*whether simple or complex,*) WITHOUT THE CO-OPERATION OF AN ACCUSATIVE NOUN, or even of a NOMINATIVE, to serve as its Supporter ; and far less as requiring the Support of BOTH of these Piers or Abutments of a Verb, between which it must perform the Office of a Bridge of Logical Connection. Upon such a doctrine of the Verb, as that of Mr. Tooke and the Stoics, I shall, at this stage of the inquiry, only remark that, in asserting it, those Greek Grammarians and the Philologer of Purley ; together, also, with that later and far more luminous Etymologist so repeatedly quoted and praised in this work ; have alike exhibited to the world a manifestation of darkness, in the Logic of Signs, so profound, and so completely at the Foundation of the Structure of Language, as forbids it to be for a moment affirmed that the Philosophy of Speech has ever dawned in their Speculations—a fact which, when we duly reflect on the extent of light, such as it is, which has been let in by the latest etymological researchers, most decisively marks out, and stamps, from henceforward, the Different Departments of the MERE INDUCTIVE ETYMOLOGIST and of the PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMARIAN, as has already been suggested.

But, to proceed.—In the place already referred to ; Mr. Tooke, complaining loudly of

the procedure of Grammarians, with regard to the Part of Speech in question, expresses himself as follows :—"For of all the points which they endeavour to shuffle over, there is none in which they do it more grossly than in that of the Infinitive."

"Some are content to call To, a *mark* of the Infinitive Mode. But *how*, or *why*, it is so, they are totally silent. Others call it a *Preposition*. Others, a *Particle*. Skinner calls it an *Equivocal Article*. And others throw it into that common sink and repository of all heterogeneous unknown corruptions,—the *Adverb*. And when they have given it a name they hope you will be satisfied."

"There is one mistake however, from which this Prefix To ought to have preserved them; they should not have repeated the error of insisting that the *Infinitive* was a mere *Noun*; since it was found necessary in English, to add another word (*viz.*) To, merely to distinguish the *Infinitive* from the *Noun*, after the Infinitive had lost that distinguishing *Termination* which it had formerly."

The extract, now given, will sufficiently explain the actual state of the Subject when Mr. Tooke first engaged in it. This Writer then goes on to assert, in some detail, that the Words To and Do are in point of fact virtually only one and the same Sign. And he shows that, in different circumstances (that is under different modifications of the expression of any Verb,) the Sign To, or

the Sign *Do*, becomes, respectively, appropriate in the English Language. In which assumption I consider him to have concluded, in general, justly; although I deem it clear that, he has *not at all discerned the REASON* of its being just; but has only adverted to what is the *mere fact* in the enunciation of our dialect.

A little farther back, (*in page 350.*) he says, “The opposition of *To* to the Preposition *FROM*, “resides singly in the Preposition *To*. Which “has not *perhaps* (for I am not clear that it has “not) precisely the signification of *End* or *Termination*, but of something tantamount or equivalent. The Preposition *To* (in Dutch written “*TOE* and *TOT*, a little nearer the original,) is “the Gothic substantive—*Act*, *Effect*, *Result*, “*Consummation*. Which Gothic substantive is in- “deed itself no other than the past participle of “the Verb—And what is *done*, is *terminated*, *ended*, “*finished*.”

If I mistake not, there is, along with some etymological light, much Philosophical darkness, exhibited in this Derivation by Mr. Tooke. It will be seen, hereafter, that Dr. Murray resolves, or traces, the Sign of the Infinitive, in *most Languages*, into the Noun *WORK* or *ACT*: And in this state, I shall argue, it is very fit to perform the Office in question. But, if in reality it has, at any time, or by any people, been *considered as the So-called PAST Participle* of ANY VERB *WHAT-EVER*; (which Doctrine, however, of *PAST Participles employed infinitively*, Dr. Murray has also

affirmed of various Ancient dialects;) then, I affirm that, it never could, *except in the utterance of a deplorable jargon*, be regarded as the Sign of a Verb: because a Verb is, of necessity, a Sign of Action PRESENT; and NOT of Action PAST; and because, not only is this true in the Nature of the Thing, but, also, Grammarians have virtually acknowledged it, by admitting BOTH FUTURE AND PAST *Infinitives*, besides PRESENT *Infinitives* whose Nature we are now investigating.

Mr. Tooke, however, has added a farther exposition of his views on the Subject, in the following words; which are duly to be transcribed to his credit.—“ After this derivation, it will not appear in the least mysterious or wonderful that we should, in a peculiar manner, in English, prefix this same word To to the Infinitive of our Verbs. For the Verb, in English, not being distinguished, as in other Languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being sometimes impossible to distinguish them by their *place*; when the old termination of the Anglo-saxon was dropped, this word To (*i. e. Act*) became necessary to be prefixed, in order to distinguish them from *Nouns*, and to invest them with the Verbal character: for there is no difference between the NOUN *Love*, and the VERB *TO love*, but what must be comprised in the prefix To.”

Now, as for the “*necessity*” which Mr. Tooke conceives there exists, for some such device as that of the Sign of the So-called Infinitive, “*in order to invest a simple Noun with the Verbal character*;”

I may state it here, as an observation by the way; that I do not discern this: Because, although it is true that there is no difference, *in point of FORM*, between the NOUN LOVE and the VERB TO LOVE, but what must be comprised in the Prefix TO, *when each of these Signs stands isolated, i. e. out of Every Chain of Language*; yet, I believe it must generally happen that, the Words with which it must be associated, in Any Chain of Language, will always proclaim to which Part of Speech the Word in question belongs, without the aid of Any Verbal Sign, or Annexation, for this purpose. Over and above which effect, of the associating of Words, I observe that although, if a boy were desired to DECLINE *love*, he would certainly treat it as a NOUN; yet if, upon the other hand, he were desired to CONJUGATE *love*, he would as infallibly consider it as a VERB, without even requiring to be prompted by the expression of the Sign TO; and this the more especially if it had previously become the *usage*, in our Language, to drop the Prefix of the So-called Infinitive. Nevertheless, however, I believe it to be true that, it has been from a *supposed* necessity, of the nature assumed by Mr. Tooke, that the Verbal Sign in question has, under some one modification or another, been adopted in our own, as well as in other Languages.

Adopting, therefore, from the Etymology of Mr. Tooke, the Word TO, and equally the Word DO, as importing ACT; (an import which I was led to attribute to these Words from a certain

REASON of the thing which shall presently be assigned, coming strongly in aid of the derivations which have been since fully confirmed by the Etymological researches of Dr. Murray ;) I proceed immediately to submit what has appeared to myself to be the Logical construction of this Sign, —I mean that construction which, *under a Logical Necessity*, we are bound to put upon it, *quite independently of Any Etymological consideration whatever*.

In a word, then, I conceive, the Word *To* ;—and, equally, the Word *Do* ; when either of these is prefixed to the Name of a Verb, in reality imports no other than *THE GENERIC Name of ALL Action*, prefixed to *Some Specific Name of Action which it comprehends, and is expressed as comprehending*.

In order to explain more fully the conception now suggested, I put it also in the following shape. It was known to all ; and, consequently, was no object of research to any Grammarian ; that the Sign—*To*,—in English, served not only, in one view, as a So-called *Preposition* ; but, also, in another, as the *Sign of a Verb*. To this vague knowledge, Mr. Tooke has added the suggestion that, the *literal* meaning of the *Sign of the Verb* is —the *Noun Act*. And, he has farther shewn that, the Word *Do*,—while it means the very same thing,—namely—the *Noun ACT*,—serves also,—and in some of our Idioms serves *exclusively*, or *peculiarly*,—as the Sign under consideration. But, still, a very important step in the Logic of Signs

lies altogether hidden : For the question remains ;—
WHY is the Word **ACT**, under *Any Modification thereof*, employed, in preference to **Any Other Signal**, in order to impart the Verbal Character to any Noun to which it is annexed : And, *Under What figure* ; or, *With What strict logical import and operation* ; is the **ONE Name of an Action associated with the OTHER**, in the case in question ?
 If once this question were truly answered with regard to our own Dialect ; we should thereby remove a notable blot from the Science of Language ; And, more than this, we might, perhaps, thus be led to some general light, upon the Nature of the Sign of the So-called Infinitive in other Tongues. Upon this supposition, therefore, I have above suggested, what if admitted places the Subject in a Categorical predicament ; which, if it had been earlier adverted to, must have saved all the contending opinions and conclusions, of those writers which have been quoted, or alluded to, with regard to it.

To illustrate the view of the subject which is thus proposed, I shall at present merely observe that, according to it, the following passage—

—namely—

To die ; | *to sleep* : | *to sleep* ; | *perchance to dream* ; | —

I consider as importing—

ACT-die ; | **ACT-sleep** : | **ACT-sleep** ; | *perchance ACT-dream*. | —

Which last form of expressing the sense in question amounts to the same as if we had said—

The **ACT of dying** ; | the **ACT of sleeping** : | the **ACT**

of sleeping ; | perchance the ACT *of dreaming*. |

Again, as another example,

To *see* the Sun is pleasant,

—means—

ACT-*see* the Sun is pleasant :

Which is equivalent to saying—

The ACT-*seeing* (which we call the ACT OF *seeing*) the Sun is pleasant.

It is only necessary to be discriminated, here, that, in expressing the sense by the *Grammatical Medium* of a So-called Preposition, we name the ACT as an ACT-*offspringing seeing* :—Whereas, if we take the matter in a MERE CATEGORICAL view ; the *Specific Act called seeing* is the offspring of, or at least is a *Species comprehended under*, the GENUS *called ACT or ACTION*. This inversion of terms, inasmuch as its cause is here explained, will perhaps be readily allowed for.

Such was the conclusion, with regard to the Logic of this Part of Grammar, to which I *had come, previously* to my having seen the speculations of Dr. Murray concerning it. And, naturally leaning to the opinion of Mr. Tooke, that the *Termination* of the Infinitive, in other Languages, must be some distinct Word which time and use has coalesced with the radical ; I conjectured that Etymology would show, that the Word in question, in most, if not in all Languages, is equivalent to some Modification of the Word ACT, inso-much as *to leave little or no difference between the supposed peculiar English Infinitive and the Infini-*

tives of other Dialects, except the circumstance that, in all other Languages it is **AFFIXED**, whereas in English it is **PREFIXED**.

While I was in this state of curiosity with regard to it; and before I had an opportunity of satisfying myself in other directions; the posthumous publication of Dr. Murray's Work was put into my hands; and from it I subjoin the following extract.

" All the infinitives of the active voice are
 " Nouns formed with the consignificatives **MA**,
 " *make* ; and **NA**, *work* ; which give an adjective
 " or participial nature to the radical ; for every
 " infinitive is merely a verbal Noun ; and, as
 " verbal nouns may be formed by any consigni-
 " ficative, the varieties of the infinitive are conse-
 " quently numerous in the different dialects. The
 " Teutones used **MA**, *make* ; as **LAGAMA**, *laid*,
 " the act of laying. The infinitives of the Teu-
 " tonic dialects, therefore, ended in, **AN**, **EN**, **ON**.
 " The Celts used the consignificatives **AG**, or **ACH**,
 " *work*, or *act* ; and **ADH**, or **IDH**, a variety of **DI**,
 " *done*, or *do*."

The passage now quoted affords a very satisfactory confirmation of the conjecture of Mr. Tooke that, the Sign of the Infinitive, in every Tongue, has once been a distinct Word. And, I apprehend, confirms, in a manner equally satisfactory, my own conclusion—namely—that this procedure has arisen from a truly **LOGICAL PRINCIPLE** of *expressing* the **GENERIC**, along with the *Specific* Name of Action, whenever the Noun in question

was meant as denoting a Verb. At the same time, it is to be observed that, although Dr. Murray thus notices the FACT, of the *annexation* of One Name signifying Action to Another Name significant also of *Some Modification* of Action: And though he thence truly observes that, the effect of this is to “give an *Adjective* and” (as he says) “a *Participial* Nature to the RADICAL:” Still, he is far from taking up that view of the Subject which I have ventured to suggest—namely—that the Two Nouns together form, and ought to be considered as, a GENERIC NOUN *annexed to and comprehending a Specific Noun*. We find, indeed, on the contrary, that he indulges a *very loose consideration* of the DIFFERENT MODIFICATIONS under which Any Action MAY be expressed, in the case in question: For he mentions “ADH, or IDE, “as a variety of DI, *done*, or *do* ;” whereas, I must object that, DONE and DO can never be used convertibly for each other, since the One expresses PAST and the Other PRESENT Action. In the same view of the question, he has expressed himself by saying that, “The Teutones used NA, *make*, as “LAGANA, laid, the *act of laying*.” But, against this I object that,—LAID and THE ACT OF LAYING are Two Expressions of VASTLY DIFFERENT Grammatical imports: And it is certain that, the *confounding* of the two, in the present case, could never lead us in the road to conceive the real Logical mystery of the So-called Infinitive Prefix, or Affix, in any Language whatever.

And here, while I confess that, so far as ap-

pears to me, the mystery of the device consists, almost altogether, in that mist only which has been thrown over it by the commentaries and mistakes of those who have been misled by Etymology; (since, I conceive, the thing itself is no less obvious than simple;) it is not the less necessary to entertain the Subject in detail, in order to set the question at rest by showing, incontestibly, what are its real and whole merits. Hence I deem it indispensable to subjoin the following observations.

It is manifest, from the general tenor of reasoning in the foregoing part of this work; and will be rendered still more so by what is to follow; that no objection is to be laid against what Dr. Murray calls, and all other Grammarians also would call, the "*Participial*" Nature of One of the terms in the Infinitive, in so far as regards the So-called Participle in PRESENT Time: As, for example, I observe, there can be no objection to saying—*Act-dying*; *Act-sleeping*; instead of *Act-die*; *Act-sleep*: On the contrary, I shall all along insist that, the termination in *ING* is the *Pure Essential Form* of the Verb; while it is, manifestly, *One Same Form* as the *So-called Present Participle*. But a very different result must follow, if we were to suppose the So-called PAST Participle put, instead of the So-called PRESENT: As, for example, it would present either a gross absurdity, or, at the best, a very different meaning from what was intended, if the speaker of the celebrated soliloquy, which has been quoted above, had

been made to express himself in the following terms :

ACT-DIED ; ACT-SLEPT ; &c.

Or, again, if he had said—

ACTED DIED ; ACTED SLEPT ;

Or, again—

ACTED *die* ; ACTED *sleep*.

To show, here, how necessary it is to advert to, and to counteract, the effects of that laxness of reason, of thus confounding the Forms of the Present and the Past time ; which, we are to observe, appears to have prevailed most extensively in the Early Dialects ; I deem it requisite to quote and to remark upon the following passage from Dr. Murray's work.

“ The Indians, Persians, and Slavi, used to
“ affix the Word *DA*, the sign of the Preterite, to
“ the root, which produced a verbal noun ; thus
“ *LAG*, lay ; *LAGATE*, *layed*, *laid*, and, by common
“ use, *to lay* : *SARP*, *creep* ; *SARP-TUN*, *to creep*,
“ literally the *act of having crept*, or the *creeping* :
“ *KHOR*, *eat*, *chew* ; *KHORDEN*, the *having ate*, the
“ *eating*, or *to eat*.”

Upon this passage, I have to remark that, as the most unlettered persons, in the present day, would not, for a moment, tolerate such a confusion of the Past and the Present Forms of Speech, as is exhibited in the extract just transcribed ; it cannot fail to serve as a beacon, to warn us against trusting to the ancient methods of expression, *especially in all our etymological researches after the Nature of SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS* : For we

cannot miss to perceive, in this indefensible licence of Speech, *how easy—how equally easy*—it must be, according to the equivocal procedure of those early dialects, to construe a disguised Preposition as either a Present or a PAST Participle; by which last-mentioned construction we should, in so far as the precedent extended, plunge the whole Real Nature of So-called Prepositions into utter darkness. One cannot help being surprised that, Dr. Murray should have offered no commentary, in furnishing such glaring evidences of the laxness and violation of reason, of making the Sign of Past Action stand for that of Action Present. But we must at least receive it as a test of his etymological fidelity that, he has rendered to us the HISTORY of the Subject, in all its native deformity: Although it can never cease to be asked, *What becomes of the* DISTINCTIONS OF TENSES IN GRAMMAR, about which Grammarians, in all enlightened times, have kept up such ado?—Or, What becomes of ANY DISTINCTION AT ALL, between Any Two Signs in Language, IF THE SAME EXPRESSION may be interpreted to import EITHER PAST or PRESENT Action, without discrimination?

From all that has been shown of the Etymological views of the Subject, it ceases to be matter of much wonder that Grammarians, one and all, should have stumbled and disagreed so very remarkably, as they have done, with regard to the Nature of the So-called Infinitive. I shall leave it therefore, now, to be pronounced, (upon the

evidences and reasonings adduced,) whether we may not warrantably conclude that, the suggestions of Natural Logic have led some of the Earlier Inventors of Language to form what is called the Infinitive Mode by an Annexation of the NAME OF ACTION IN GENERAL, to the *Name of Some Specific Action* comprehended under it.

It is agreeable with experience to imagine that, if once this Device had taken place on rational ground, it would travel into Other Tribes, and Other Dialects; wherein the REASON of the thing would be *first unattended to*, and *subsequently lost*; and the FORM ALONE,—and this Form *varied and adulterated as in the example of the PAST Tense*,—would be conserved from age to age.

In drawing this conclusion, we are at the same time to observe that, the device in question will be *equally logical, which-ever* of the Two Component Terms of the Infinitive be made the PREFIX. And it will be shown, hereafter, in treating of Nouns, that All So-called *Adjectives* are associated with their *Substantives* upon an *Analogous Principle* to that now suggested.

That neither *both*, nor yet *one*, of the Component Terms of the Symbol in question can be in PAST Time; is a matter upon which I insist, under a LOGICAL NECESSITY. And I humbly conceive that, the true LOGICAL, if not the true HISTORICAL, REASON of the annexation stands perfectly manifest, in what has been here submitted.

As for the *So-called Infinitives of the FUTURE* and the *PAST Tense*,—the “ TO BE ABOUT to

“*love*,” and the “TO HAVE LOVED:” Or, in other words, the stringing together of a Chain of Language, consisting of a *Number of Alternating Constructive Nouns and Verbs*, and calling this Series of Different Parts of Speech an INFINITIVE OF ANY ONE Verb:—it exhibits a confusion of Logical Objects, so intolerable, that, the bare mention of the absurdity must be sufficient to explode it from the page of Rational Grammar. And the only atoning consideration that regards them, if such it can be called, is their bearing conclusive testimony to the fact that, *Grammarians themselves*, by thus instituting a Past and a Future Infinitive, impliedly admit it to be a gross absurdity to suppose a PAST Participle *can ever serve for a PRESENT Infinitive*.

Upon the whole, then, with reference to the opinion of Mr. Tooke and the Stoics that, “*the Infinitive is the VERY VERB ITSELF* ;”—I am led to conclude that, when this Same Signal is exhibited at the top of a So-called Verb, as it is laid out in the So-called Paradigms of our Grammars, *it is no more an integral part, or any part at all, of the Verb that is said to be conjugated below, than a FLEECE, or a WOOLPACK,—(even if it were a REAL Fleece, or Woolpack,)—over the shop-door of a Clothier, would form ANY PART OF THE STOCK IN TRADE that is exhibited IN THE ROOM TO WHICH IT DIRECTS THE ATTENTION OF THE PASSENGER.*

In fine. It cannot be denied that, the Sign of the So-called Infinitive has been a most refractory Point of Grammar: Nor has Etymology, even

with its best light, led us at all to the Philosophy of the Subject. And if what has here been suggested should be admitted to have removed the difficulty ; it would justify the occupation of more space, than has been allotted for this purpose.

SUBSECTION II.

Of the Identicalness of the So-called Infinitive Mode and the So-called Progressive Participle, as deduced from both the Form and the Sense of these expressions at different periods of our Language, in agreement with reasoning from Necessary Principles.

IN the course of the present investigation it is my intention to show that, during the period of the English Language in which the Old Form of the Infinitive—in EN—was in use, the great bulk of our So-called Prepositions; and the Same Words when employed Adverbially, at the end of a Sentence; were of the then existing Form of the So-called Infinitive. And, previously to this, (although it is an inversion of the order of events,) I propose, as forming the principal object of the present speculation, to show that, at a most critical and important era of our Dialect,—namely—that in the course of which the *Form of the Infinitive was changing, and became changed*, from having a characteristic *Termination*, as it has in other Languages, to being signified by the presently existing

Prefix To,—The *Form of the Infinitive* was at one time, in a most remarkable manner, *absolutely One and the Same as that of the So-called Progressive Participle* of the time being, with the sole exception of the *Prefix*. This last is the object which I chiefly desired to effect, in order to prove, ETYMOLOGICALLY, that the Nature of our deformed and disguised So-called Prepositions, (except only such as are *Pretended and Not Real Ones*,) is that of our So-called Progressive Participles: Which purpose, when effected, will serve the end which I designed to accomplish with regard to the GENERAL ETYMOLOGICAL character of the Part of Speech in question, preparatory to my going into an investigation of the nature of some few of our most disguised and hitherto refractory *particular* So-called Prepositions, as was proposed in the outset.

The first observation, therefore, which I shall offer upon this topic, is to remark a manifest inconsistency in the Doctrine of Grammarians, with regard to the respective natures of the So-called Infinitive Mode and the So-called Progressive Participle; which is this: Grammarians do not admit that either the one or the other of these Signs implies *Assertion*: And, yet, they affirm the Former to be an integral, and even the radical, part of the Verb; while they exclude the Latter, merely because they affirm that it cannot assert.—The truth of the matter, nevertheless, is that, both these Signs are equally and completely the Names of Action: and each of them equally

and completely asserts whenever it is interposed between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun. What is more; it is a fact, which will be fully proved by examples in the sequel, that the Prefix To, of the Infinitive, was at one period of our Language usually inserted *between the Verb and its Nominative*; although this, being proved to be a redundant form of expression, is now laid aside.

That the import of the Infinitive and that of the Progressive Participle is in some cases one and the same; is a fact already admitted by writers in general. But what I propose to assert is, that it is so in ALL cases. At the same time, I shall produce etymological proofs, that the Forms of these Nominally-Two Parts of Speech were, at one time, absolutely identical in the popular utterance of our Tongue.

As for the fact that the Progressive Participle DOES assert; I observe that, independently of its being true in such expressions as have been strangely denominated the "CASE ABSOLUTE"—namely—such as when we say—"He BEING dead, " we shall live,"—I shall here merely remind the reader that, in the English Language,—(as well as in the great Hindostannee,)—men *affirm continually, exclusively, and of necessity*, in what is called the Participial Form;—*although Englishmen are never aware that they do so*. For it has been rigorously demonstrated; and, henceforward, will never admit of a dispute; that, the Verb AM or BE has NOTHING—NO PART WHATEVER—in the affirmation of ANY ADJECTIVE Act: On the con-

trary, for example, the expression *I am eating Bread*—means—*I exist in Space (or in Any Place) eating Bread*.—With regard, therefore, to the FACT OR OFFICE OF ASSERTING ; I say, the So-called Infinitive and the So-called Progressive Participle are here conclusively shown to be only One and the Same Sign ; that is, to convey one and the same import ; as I shall presently show they do, and must do, in every other case whatever.

Having placed this popular and universal illusion of the Speakers of English, with regard to the Office of the Verb Substantive, again in the recollection of the reader ; I proceed to offer some remarks upon the History of our Language, at that period of it during which it assumed the Form and Structure which I proposed to cite, as being applicable and effectual to the ultimate object in view.

In the first place, therefore, I observe, it is manifest from the writings of Chaucer that, the Form of the So-called Infinitive and that of the So-called Progressive Participle, in the English Language, was established in his time, identically the same as that which we find it is at present, differing only sometimes a little in point of orthography : Nor does it affect this assertion although, in innumerable instances, for the sake of convenience to his Verse, that Writer introduces the Form of the Old or Anglo-saxon Infinitive, and very often combines this Old Form with the modern Prefix—*To*—annexed to it, as in the following examples :

“ To WEDDEN me, as sone as ever I may.”

“ But ther as ye HAN profred me to-day,”

“ To CHESEN me a wif, I you relese.”

“ THE CLERKE’S TALE.”

The same fact, of the state of our Language at that period, is also evinced, in general, in the text of Barbour, who lived contemporary with Chaucer : although Barbour, I think, almost continually makes use of the Anglo-saxon Participle in **AND**, instead of the English in **INGE**, or **ING** ; as may be seen in the following lines :

“ And gret men gang tharby **DRAWAND**,”

“ The wynd them helpyt that wes **BLAWAND**.”

PINKERTON’S BRUCE, *Boke 15*.

It is observable, indeed, that whereas Chaucer very often employs both the Saxon and the Mixed **INFINITIVE** ; and, I believe, never, or very seldom, the Saxon **PARTICIPLE** ; Barbour, on the other hand, is almost always found with the Saxon Participle whenever he employs it as a **VERB**, although he constantly terminates it with **ING** when he employs it as a **NOUN** ; and rarely, if ever, employs the Saxon **INFINITIVE**. From the Writings of both these Primitive Authorities for the present English Language, however ; (for although it may be, and has been affirmed that, the English and the Scottish are two different Dialects, it is indisputable that their Genius and Structure are one and the same to all intents and purposes of this investigation ;) it is clearly manifest that, the last relicts of the Anglo-saxon Idiom were, in their day, merely existing in *occasional* use ; and

the English Tongue was then, upon the whole, perfected in its present shape.—And here it is to be acknowledged that, in this Shape, we find an express difference between the Form of the Infinitive and that of the Progressive Participle; the Former Wanting that *Terminating Syllable* which is characteristic of the Latter, as, for example, in the two expressions—LOVE—and LOVING :—And this difference, we observe, existed wholly beside the PREFIX of the Infinitive—To.

SECONDLY. But the attention of the reader is now solicited to *Another Period* of the English Language ; Or, otherwise, to a great *Schism*, which must have existed between the *literary Speakers* of English in the time of Chaucer ;—an event not seemingly very probable ; while, on the other hand, there will be brought forward what I consider to be internal evidence, in the nature of the thing itself, to show that, the fact to which I am going to advert has been no less than a **DISTINCT STAGE** of the Language, in so far as regards the Form of the Infinitive, and a stage somewhat *prior* to that at which Chaucer left, or found it. The matter in question appears to me to be of extreme importance, in its application to that etymological view of our Language which I proposed to take, with intent to reconcile its Genius,—or, rather, merely to explain its Real Structure, so as to show it clearly to be accordant to that Structure of Speech which I have ventured to assert in the foregoing pages, as founded upon reasoning from Necessary Principles.

The fact, then, is that, somewhere about the time in which Chaucer and Barbour and Wiclif lived, a certain Translation of the New Testament into the English Dialect appears (as Mr. Tooke asserts) to have been very widely, although surreptitiously, circulated : In the examples, that he has furnished, of which translation, I have been struck by observing the curious fact that, the *Form of the Infinitive* and the *Form of the Progressive Participle* is ONE AND THE SAME, with exception only of the Sign To, as prefixed to the former.

Before I proceed to offer any observations upon this occurrence, I shall here transcribe that string of examples of it, which has, although with a very foreign intention, been afforded to the general reader by Mr. Tooke. I adopt this step because I have not access to the original Work ; nor can I, in the present state of my health, seek beyond the materials at present within reach. In default of this, the number of examples which have been furnished by Mr. Tooke amount to a very sufficient induction of the *general fact* ; and prove that, *the thing in question has not been a mere accidental deviation from the usage of Chaucer, or of the writers of that period.* At the same time, it is very remarkable that, Chaucer *almost never* makes use of the Same Form of the Infinitive which I am thus proposing to cite : Although it may be important to state that, in *one or two* instances, I have found it in his writings, as in the following example, in THE FRERE'S PROLOGUE—" To PRE-
" CHING, and to scole eke of clergie : " which in-

stances amount to a *recognition of the Form* ; although it evinces its having in his time become either obsolete, or unfashionable.

The extracts, now proposed for consideration, are taken from the *Second Volume* of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, pages 509, 10, and 11.

“ Generaciouns of eddris, who shewide to
“ you to fle fro wraththe TO COMYNGE?”—*Matt.*
cap. 3. (verse 7.)

“ Art thou that art TO COMYNGE, ether abiden
“ we an other?”—*Matt. cap. 11. (verse 3.)*

“ And if yee wolen resceyue, he is Elie that is
“ TO COMYNGE.”—*Matt. 11. (verse 14.)*

“ This it was whom I seide, he that is TO CO-
“ MYNGE aftir me, is maad bifore me.”—*John 1.*
(verse 15.)

“ Ether the world, ether lyf, ether deeth, ether
“ thingis present, ether thingis TO COMYNGE.”—
1 Corinth. 3. (verse 22.)

“ Ihesu that delyueride us fro wrathtle TO
“ COMYNGE.”—*1 Thessal. 1. (verse 10.)*

“ Agabus signifiede by the spirit, a greet hungir
“ TO COMYNGE in al the rowndnesse of erthis.”—
Dedis. 11. (verse 28.)

“ Crist Ihesu that is TO DEMYNGE the quyke
“ and deed.”—2 *Timoth.* 4. (*verse* 1.)

“ He ordeynide a day in whiche he is TO DE-
“ MYNGE the world in equitye.”—*Dedis.* 17. (*verse*
31.)

“ By feith he that is clepid Abraham, obeide
“ for to go out in to a place which he *was* TO TAK-
“ YNGE in to eritage.”—*Ebrewis* 11. (*verse* 8.)

“ Forsothe whanne Eroude *was* TO BRINGYNGE
“ forth hym, in that nigt Petir was slepyng bi-
“ twixe tweyne knytis.”—*Dedis.* 12. (*verse* 6.)

“ Thei fallinge on the nek of Poul, kissiden him,
“ sorewyng moost in the word that he seide : for
“ thei weren no more TO SEYNGE his face, and
“ thei led den him to the ship.”—*Dedis.* 20. (*verse*
37. 38.)

“ Sotheli there the ship *was to puttyng* out the
“ charge.”—*Dedis.* 21. (*verse* 3.)

“ Centurioun wente to the tribune and tolde to
“ hym, seyinge, what art thou *to doynge*? forsothe
“ this man is a citeseyn romayn.”—*Dedis.* 22.
(*verse* 26.)

“ Anoon thei that *weren to tormentinge* him, de-
“ partedden away from hym.”—*Dedis.* 22. (*verse*
29.)

“ Sum of the Jewis gaderiden hem, and maden
 “ a vow, seiynge hem nether *to etynge* nether *drink-*
 “ *ynge*, til thei slown Poul.”—*Dedis*. 23. (*verse* 12.)

“ I gesse me blessid at thee, whanne I am to
 “ DEFENDYNGE me this day, moost thee wytynge
 “ alle thingis that ben at Jewis.”—*Dedis*. 26. (*verses*
 2, 3.)

“ Drede thou nothing of these which thou art
 “ TO SUFFRYNGE. Lo the deucl *is* TO SENDYNGE
 “ sume of you into prisoun.”—*Apocal*. 2. (*verse* 10.)

“ The dragon stode bfore the womman that *was*
 “ TO BERINGE child ; that whanne she hadde born
 “ child, he shulde deuoure hir sone.”—*Apocal*. 12.
 (*verse* 4.)

Concerning that Translation of the New Testament from which Mr. Tooke has furnished these extracts ; I think, he makes first mention of it in page 276 of the Same Volume ; where he says, (addressing his friend and fellow dialogist B,)—
 “ In that Translation of the New Testament which
 “ was very much, though surreptitiously, circulated
 “ in the reign of Edward the Third and afterwards,
 “ (and of which many other manuscripts remain,
 “ beside the curious one which you have given to
 “ me,) we have,” &c.

Afterwards, in page 480, speaking with reference to the same Translation, he says,—“ And
 “ accordingly we find in your manuscript of the

“ New Testament which (whoever was the translator) I suppose to have been written about the time of Edward the Third ; in that manuscript we find an explanation accompanying the words of this sort which are used in it : And this circumstance sufficiently informs us, that the adoption was at that time but newly introduced.”

Of the *Sort of Words*, to which Mr. Tooke here alludes, an example is afforded in the following expression :—“ *I do thankings give to God, upon the UNERRABLE, OF THAT MAY NOT BE TOLD gifte of him.*”

Now, while an insurmountable barrier is placed between me and all diversion of labor in order to search into the history of the Subject ; And while I have, all along, been peculiarly unhelped by any of those aids, or advantages, which Mr. Tooke possessed for obtaining information in this direction ; Owing to which, I must leave the full illustration of the matter to be effected by some other hand ; I regret this want the less, inasmuch as I hope it will stimulate some duly qualified person to take up the illustration of it.* But, in the interim, I confess, it appears to me to be good internal evidence of the fact that, the usage of the Form of the Infinitive, now in question, must have PRECEDED the time of Edward the Third, that the “ *Sort of Words*,”—(such as the Word UNERR-

* On the latest consideration, I am better pleased to leave this office to any profess Etymologist, who may be inclined to do it full justice, than to avail myself of any light upon the Subject which may be within my practicable research.

ABLE,)—which stand *explained* in the Translation that employs the said Infinitive,—*is to be found current in CHAUCER (who flourished all the time of Edward the Third) without any explanation at all.*

Collaterally with this, we are also to observe that, the said Form of the Infinitive is curtailed (it may be said invariably) in the writings of Chaucer and his contemporaries, either by the *Whole Syllable terminating in YNGE*, or by the *shortening* of that Syllable : Which curtailing was, very probably, brought about for the sake of the convenience of such abbreviation, especially in the composition of VERSE, wherein it must have been very inconvenient to retain such lengthened forms of expression as “TO TORMENTYNGE,” or, “TO DELIVERYNGE.”

In a word ; it appears most naturally, from the *known tendency of the pronunciation* of Language, that the Infinitive in YNGE should become changed to EN, or AN, or N, according to the sound of the Verb. And here we have the fact expressly in evidence that, it actually did so change ; as we find in Chaucer, and in his Contemporaries, that they not only departed altogether, or with hardly an exception, from the Infinitive YNGE of the “TRANSLATION,” and made use of EN and of its modifications ; but that, for the greater part, they *cut off every vestige of a Terminating Syllable* from their Infinitive, and perfected the English Language, in this particular, in that far more wieldy Form in which we now find it. Thus, for example, the expression, which in the “TRANS-

"**LATION**" would have been—**TO WEDDYNGE *me***,—stands in Chaucer "**TO WEDDEN *me***." And, at the same time, we know that Chaucer, if it had suited his purpose, would as readily, or more readily, have written it—**TO WEDDE *me***, as we ourselves would write it at this day.

In fine; It appears to be conclusive evidence that, the Infinitive of the "**TRANSLATION**" must have obtained at a stage of our Language *prior* to that of the Curtailed Form: because it would be contrary to the whole law of experience that the Speakers of our Language could *ever have gone back*, to the clumsy and unwieldy Form in **YNGE**, after they had once tasted the convenience of employing that ellision which renders it at once so palatable and so portable: **ALTHOUGH I** must here advert to it, as an indisputable fact, that the Form terminating in **YNGE**, or **ING**, is the **TRUE PHILOSOPHICAL FORM OF OUR INFINITIVE**; and that, the *Modern Form*, without the **ING**,—is an **ABSURDITY**, if it be not understood as an **ELLIPTICAL EXPRESSION**. Admitting therefore, (as I here do,) that the amputation of the final **YNGE**, of the So-called Infinitive, was an improvement on the score of *convenience*; I, at the same time, embrace the **FACT**, OF **THIS FORM'S HAVING BEEN SHEWN TO HAVE ONCE EXISTED IN OUR DIALECT**, as an example of the superior claims to **Philosophicalness** of the English Language; *since*, BY IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH THE THEN EXISTING FORM OF THE SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPLE, it presents a **MODEL OF THIS PART OF GRAMMAR**, such as, I

believe, is not to be found in the Structure of any other Language.

Here, then, we have established, UPON INDUCTIVE AND ETYMOLOGICAL GROUND, the once existent identicalness of these *Nominally or Esteemed* TWO PARTS OF SPEECH; which I had previously argued, from Necessary Principles, to be ONLY ONE AND THE SAME SIGN. And, in this case, the Philosopher of Language will have to mark, how curiously, and most satisfactorily, Etymology and Philosophical Grammar go hand in hand: While he cannot fail to be struck with the manifest certainty that, I could have had *no anticipation, from authority*, of finding so remarkable a coincidence in the History of our Language, when I was forming my own views upon the Subject.

It is well worthy of observation, indeed, to note in this place, as was mentioned by way of example in the Introduction to this volume, the VERY DIFFERENT USES to which the *Materials of Etymology* are, or may be, turned, by the different minds who dig them up, or contemplate them. The only use which Mr. Tooke has made, of the very estimable string of examples of the Infinitive, which he has quoted; and the only purpose for which he quoted them; was to show the AWKWARDNESS and POVERTY of the English Language. It is manifest, therefore, that I could have received *no hint from* MR. TOOKE'S project, to enable me to convert his examples to my own purpose: And it is very certain I was not aware of his examples, when I first digested my own views of Language: Which

facts I point out here ; not for the sake of taking credit to my own discernment ; but *in order to impress, strongly, upon readers, the certain result of investigating the Structure of Language* PRIMARILY UPON THE DEMONSTRABLE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN IDEAS ; and the making ETYMOLOGY *always to wait as handmaid upon* REASON, in the SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR.—Whensoever these Two Authorities are found to agree ; it is a *fortunate coincidence*. And whensoever they do NOT agree ; ETYMOLOGY (*which is only another NAME FOR THE DIFFERENT DIALECTS OF BARBARIANS OF EARLY TRIBES*) is the *Inferior*, and the *Dependent* ; and it *must conform*.

I proceed now to observe that, As was the identicalness, both of FORM and of IMPORT, of the So-called Infinitive and the So-called Progressive Participle, at the vaguely-known period of our Language from which the foregoing examples have been taken ; So, precisely, is the Identicalness of IMPORT of these *Nominally Two* Signs, in the present stage of it : the only difference between the two, in any case, being that, the So-called Infinitive is occasionally employed in an ELLIPTICAL EXPRESSION ; in which case, while this So-called Infinitive, (IN ITSELF,) means *absolutely nothing other* than is meant by the *Participle in ING* ; it is, in certain associations of Words in our Vernacular Tongue, KNOWN AS AN INDICATION *that the expression is ELLIPTICAL*, and that some Verb, not expressed, must be understood, as preceding and governing the said Infinitive.

Thus, for example, if both Sentences be taken strictly to the letter, there is no difference between the two expressions—*He came* PREACHING ;—and —*He came* TO PREACH.—But it is known, as an Idiom of our Language, that the latter of these Two Sentences is ELLIPTICAL : And the full sense intended to be conveyed is—*He came intending, or proposing, or determined, or ordained, to PREACH.*

In all such cases it is obvious that, although each of the expressions, alike, asserts the existence of an Action in *Present Time* ; yet, in the case of the employment of the *Infinitive*, the Action expressed by it is THROWN INTO FUTURITY BY THE OPERATION OF SOME VERB UNDERSTOOD ; which is effected upon the Same Principle as that by which ALL OUR FUTURE TENSES ARE (*and must be,*) INDICATED THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF AUXILIARY VERBS. For it has been shewn, in a former place that, SUCH IS THE PARAMOUNT POWER OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION, *over All the Expressions of Language*, that it is impossible so much as to FEIGN the expression of ANY FUTURE, any more than of ANY PAST Action, by ANY IMMEDIATE OR DIRECT Sign : And the only means we have of making up for this impossibility ; or to INDICATE, OR HINT, that Any Expression of Present Action is meant to stand for Action Future ; is to EXPRESS SOME OTHER ACTION which, as it must of necessity express *its Relatively Present Existence*, thereby throws the Action whose Sign follows it into a TIME FUTURE to its

own existence. It hardly needs to be repeated, here, that the Necessity of this Law consists in the Necessity that All Relatives and Relations must, either in *reality* or by *supposition*, EXIST TOGETHER—that is must CO-EXIST—during Any Thing which we can predicate of them: which is a Fundamental Principle of Logic so primary, that even All the Relatives and Relations of TIME are such *only in an ANALOGOUS sense*; although, certainly, a REAL sense.

From what has been shewn of the Nature of So-called Prepositions, it will appear, satisfactorily, that; when One of these Words precedes an Infinitive, either expressly or as understood;—as, for example, in the expression,—*What went ye out TO SEE?* which means *What went ye out FOR to see?* the *So-called Preposition*, understood, is in reality a VERB—a *True and Efficient VERB*,—and the expression means—*What went ye out FORING (i. e. FRONTING) seeing?* In strictness, indeed, the Minor Verb—“FOR”—probably refers to TIME, rather than to Space;—meaning—*What went you out ANTECEDING (OR FORING IN POINT OF TIME) the Occasion, or Fact, of seeing?*—I shall argue, in its proper place, that the Word—FOR—does not primarily possess any meaning, except that of *fronting in place*. And I imagine it to be for no other reason than this—its primary import—that, it has come, by consent, to be employed as the Sign that the Noun which follows it, and is its regimen, is the *Final Cause* of the Action expressed by the Verb which immediately precedes it, as in

the expression—*He sent FOR you*.—Accordingly, therefore, I think, when the Word—FOR—is employed, EVEN AS A CONJUNCTION, it is, in fact, a REAL SO-CALLED PREPOSITION; and it never can be separated from this last-mentioned Part of Speech. The expression—“FOR *I say unto you*”—is both *elliptical* and *inverted*: And it means—*I say unto you* FRONTING,—OR IN THE PRESENCE OF,—OR KEEPING IN VIEW, WHAT WENT BEFORE.—The expression—*I will go FOR all that*—means—*I will go* FRONTING (*i. e.* INNING THE FACE OF) *all that*.—In both of these expressions, also, (we discern,) the *Minor Verb*—*fronting*—depends upon the MAJOR VERB which precedes it, as it ought to do.

In fine. It is now evident that, the only reasons for having a FORM of the So-called Infinitive, *different* from that of the So-called Participle or Verb, is its *supposed necessity in order to stamp a Noun with a certain character; which fits it to stand over the top of a* SO-CALLED PARADIGM *of a Verb*; and fits it, also, to be the Sign of an ELLIPTICAL EXPRESSION, in which *Some Verb*, not expressed, is to be understood. And here I confess that, the difference; (for, of course, I had long been looking for the evidence of some *very material and logical difference*;) between the Two Nominal Parts of Speech in question; had, for a length of time, presented a seeming film to my sight, such as I have not met with in the case of any other Part of Grammar: Because I had continually supposed that there must be some farther cause of the

assumed distinction, than I had discerned; especially, as the matter has ever been entertained with a shew of so much grammatical importance. But every conjecture, which I have been able to form with regard to it, has resolved itself into what has been stated above; and it amounts to this, *viz.*

The SO-CALLED INFINITIVE MODE, in *our Language*, is Nothing but THE GENERIC Name of Action or Acting, PREFIXED to SOME SPECIFIC Name of Action or Acting: While the *So-called Progressive Participle* is, in a perfectly correspondent manner, SOME SPECIFIC Name of Action or Acting, with the GENERIC Name of acting, (*although in an inverted order,*) SUFFIXED to it.—In other words; I say, When the *Former*, for example, is *Act-love*, which means the Compound Noun—ACTING-loving; the *Latter* is *loving*, which means *love-ACTING*, or *loving-ACTING*,—which is, like the former, a Compound Noun. And the INTENTION of employing this DIFFERENCE OF ORDER, IN THE FORM, appears to be merely that of rendering the *Latter* a Sign which is, or may be, employed as a SO-CALLED ADJECTIVE; whereas the ORDER of the *Form of the Infinitive* indicates that, it is only to be employed as a SUBSTANTIVE, whenever it is not put between Two Nouns as a VERB.

Other Nations, we find, have been far less logical, in forming the correspondent device, than the English is even at the present day, in their having made a *much wider Difference*, between the Form of their Infinitive and that of their Progres-

sive Participle, than they need : And they have thereby buried the Identicalness, of these Nominally Two Signs, in profound darkness. There is, in fact, NO NECESSITY to employ Any Difference at all : which truth the English Language, during its most logical period, has experimentally proved.

It hardly needs being distinguished here, by any express comment upon what has been advanced, that, when we signify the So-called Infinitive, in its strict Form, as in the expression—**ACTING-loving** ;—this expression is not at all to be taken in the sense of **ACTING A PLAY**, or **ACTING RICHARD** : Either of which last-mentioned expressions, *if Some Nominative be understood, exhibits a Verb together with its Accusative Noun*. The **INFINITIVE**, on the contrary, is merely a **COMPOUND NOUN** ; although, when strictly expressed, each of the Two Simple Nouns in this Compound is exhibited in the **CONCRETE FORM**—*i. e.* in Some Form terminating in **ING** ; in contradistinction to terminating in the **ABSTRACT FORM**, as expressed by **ACT-love** or **ACTION of love**. In supplying this remark, it would be unjust to overlook the striking Philosophicalness of the English Language in this particular, during that stage of it when Chaucer and his Contemporaries had established it in its present Form in almost every respect, *except this of expressing the Names of Actions in Abstract*, which they very logically avoided. On this account, therefore, the following observations are subjoined.

It was argued, in its proper place, that, contrary to the uniform assumption of Grammarians, there is, and can be, **NO SUCH THING IN LANGUAGE AS AN ABSTRACT TERM**. And, in proof of this, it was shewn that Every Abstract Term in Language must be *understood* as being preceded by Some Annexed Concretive Sign, whenever such sign is not expressed; by virtue of which Concrete Term the **ABSTRACT TERM IS CONVERTED INTO A CONCRETE**. Thus, although there are **INNUMERABLE MEN** in the world; there is **NO such Thing in the World as MAN**: because the Abstract Term—**MAN**,—as it must have a *Concrete Term understood*,—means **ALL Men**. And, in like manner, although there are **INNUMERABLE ACTINGS** in the World, there is **NO such thing in the World as ACTION**: because the Abstract Term—**ACTION**—means—*either* **SOME ONE OR MORE ACTINGS**, or, else, **ALL THE ACTINGS** which can be predicated in the world. Upon this Principle, it follows that, the **ONLY THEATRE OF ABSTRACT TERMS IN THE WORLD is a LEXICON**; wherein All the Words are Abstract Terms, and may be compared to **STONES IN A QUARRY**, *already hewn, and shaped out, ready to be transported, to form any of the particular parts of the Structure of Language, but not yet removed, and, consequently, not yet forming any part of that edifice*.

Now, perfectly and very remarkably in agreement with this Principle, we find that the Sister Dialects of England and Scotland, during the time of Chaucer and Barbour, exhibit constantly,

and I believe with hardly any exception, the Names of All Sorts of Actions in the CONCRETE FORM. Thus we have, in each of these writers, the continual recurrence of such Terms as—*“fechting,—answering,—waimenting,—disparying,—opynnyng,—knowledging,”*—and, in short,—of EVERY VARIETY OF ACTING, that is made the Subject of discourse. And while I would not contend, or argue, that the curtailing of the Concrete Names of Action, and the substituting of Abstract Names for them, is not, for the greater part, an improvement in Language on the score of *Abbreviation*; and, perhaps, in some cases, of *Sound also*; I would here point out the fact, of the former exclusive use of Concrete Names, as a proof that *a Language which proceeds from a Natural Logic entertains NO ABSTRACT TERMS*; but is strictly conformable to the Principle which I had laid down, and which involves the conclusion that, *SOME CONCRETIVE TERM, either express or understood, must invariably precede Every Abstract Word we employ.* Nor must I omit to observe that, *Any Word in ING*; although it thus far wears the livery of a Concrete Term, and sufficiently shews the intention of those who spoke in this Form; *is still an Abstract Term* until we express, or understand, *Some Concretive, i. e. Some Individuating Term*, (such, for example, as—*THE fighting,—MANY fightings,—MORE fightings,—or, ALL THE fightings,*)—annexed to it: I say, this is the fact *unless the Word in ing is CONVERTED INTO A VERB, by being interposed between Two Nouns: In*

which last case, it becomes a Concrete by virtue of its ANNEXATION *to the Two CONCRETE Nouns which must form its Nominative and its Accusative.* And, under the Same Law, EVERY VERB IN LANGUAGE IS A CONCRETE TERM.

These concluding observations, if they can be called in any degree a digression from the Principal Subject, will at least, I trust, not be deemed irrelevant, or useless in their ultimate bearing.

SUBSECTION III.

Suggestion and Proofs that, the So-called Prepositions, in those Two Prime Authorities for the Present English Language—CHAUCER and BARBOUR—are disguised Words in ING—namely—are disguised (and often NOT disguised) INFINITIVES,—equivalent to SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPLES,—in concurrence with what has been maintained herein throughout.

THE application which is now to be made of the foregoing inquiry ; and the conclusion which will accrue from following out the Subject ; will arise from a consideration which is now to be submitted for particular notice. Mr. Tooke having possessed himself with the delusive opinion that, the Tribe of English Prepositions in BE are IMPERATIVES of the *Anglo-saxon Verb to be* ; And the present existing Forms of a Large Tribe of our Ordinary Compound Prepositions being for most part fa-

vorable, upon a superficial view, to his opinion ; It becomes an object of material importance, in an *etymological* inquiry into the Subject, to show that, his assumption, although specious and plausible, has not any foundation in reality.

If it were not that a strong and natural popular prejudice, in the minds of English readers, is to be done away ; which prejudice has been originally let in by a *vicious pronunciation, for the sake of convenience, of the First Syllable* of these Compound Prepositions ; and which First Syllable *was in early times* **BI**, but has long degenerated, in many cases, into **BE** *as pronounced*, and in some cases into the Same *as spelt* in our Orthography ; it ought to be fully sufficient, in order to explode this enchanted castle of Mr. Tooke concerning his supposed Imperative Prepositions, to observe that, the Very Same Tribe of these Words, which in English begin with **BE**, are found in the Sister Dialect of Scotland beginning with **A**. Thus, **BE-yond** ;—**BE-hind** ;—**BE-fore** ;—&c. ; are, in the Scottish Tongue, **Ayont** ;—**Ahint** ;—**Anent** ;—&c. Now it is ascertained and agreed, beyond controversy, that, the **A**, in these examples, means **ON** : So that, **Ayont** means **ON-ing** (*i. e.* **ONE-ing**) the yont : And the like holds good of all the others. To which fact, also, is to be added that, *even in English*, a Number of these Words in **BE**—*exist likewise in A* : as, for example,—**ASTRIDE**, instead of **BESTRIDE** ;—**Aside**, instead of **BESIDE** ;—and—**Afore**, (a *Nautical* Preposition) instead of **BEfore**.

But it is certain that very strong prejudice re-

quires very powerful and extraordinary evidence to eradicate it. And Mr. Tooke has certainly possessed himself (not without good reason) of the imagination of every English reader on the Subject of Language. I apprehend, therefore, that it will justify the full measure of evidence, which I intend to adduce with regard to it, to shew, in a circumstantial and conclusive manner, that he has been as much deceived in his view of the Words now in question ; as he has, according to the testimony of Dr. Murray, in other and similar assumptions.

FIRST, then, I observe that, Although the Form of the So-called Progressive Participle has, (in time and owing to its utility, or necessity, either real or supposed,) been changed, so as to differ, both at former stages of the Language and at present, from that of the So-called Infinitive ; yet, as their *Import* has been shewn to be, and their *Form* most certainly at one period has been, One and the Same ; it follows that, if we can shew the General Form of our So-called Prepositions, at Any period of our Language, has been that of the *Infinitives of the Same Period*, we shall thereby identify such Prepositions with So-called Progressive Participles, upon the same ground that, if A be equal to B,—and B equal to C,—then is C equal to A.

SECONDLY, therefore, I have now to introduce the mention of the fact that, we CAN shew this desired Identicalness of the So-called Infinitive

and So-called Prepositions, that is we CAN SHEW IT LARGELY AND MOST SATISFACTORILY, in the Text of those Writers who are justly regarded as being the Principal Authorities for our present English Language. The fact in question is that, in the time of Chaucer, while the Old Form of the Infinitive—in EN—still endured, but which was then fast giving place to the Form without any Termination at all ;—and while the Form of many of our Prepositions was equally changing, to One which had No Terminating Syllable ; these Very Same Prepositions occur, very frequently, WITH a Terminating Syllable, *being precisely that of the Termination of the Infinitive employed, as frequently, at that period of our Language ;* the termination of each, alike, being the adjunct EN ; so that, in strict truth, the Infinitive and the Participle are ONE SAME FORM in these examples, with exception of the Prefix—TO—which characterises the *Infinitive*. At the same time, we can readily discern that, Chaucer's having indulged in both the Forms, of both these Signs, commixed, was the greater convenience it afforded to his expressing himself in VERSE. Along with this, moreover, it is satisfactory to observe the fact that, As the Form of the Infinitive fluctuated, So that of the Prepositions now in question (both being of the Very Same Import, that is each importing *Some Word in ING,*) did the same.

I proceed, therefore, without farther preface, to furnish examples of this fact: *First*, of the Form of the INFINITIVE ; and *Secondly*, of that of PRE-

POSITIONS : Which examples I have taken from Mr. Tyrwhitt's *Second Edition* of CHAUCER'S TALES.

OF THE INFINITIVE.

Page 32. "Ye SHAPEN you TO TALKEN and to play."

Again.

"To RIDEN by the way dombe as the ston."

Again.

"And therefore wold I MAKEN you disport."

Again.

"Now for TO STONDEN at my jugement."—

PROLOGUE.

And so on, in innumerable other instances; wherein the Infinitive is signified by EN; and, sometimes, according to the nature of the Verb, by AN, or N, as in the following examples;

274. "To HAN me foule and old til that I dey."

275. "This is TO SAYN, ye bothe faire and
"good." WIF OF BATHES TALE.

"To DON that any wight can him devise."

KNIGHTES TALE.

And here, by the way, I observe that, Whether

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this Old English Infinitive—in EN;—and its modifications;—have been the immediate offspring of the Infinitive—in YNGE—of that Translation of the New Testament already quoted; which, I confess, does not upon the face of it, or from its orthography, appear to be the most probable supposition: Or, Whether it proceeds, rather, immediately from the Anglo-saxon Infinitive—in *an*; which seems to be the more likely consequence: *The conclusion must be virtually the same.* Because, from every thing that has appeared in this work, as well as from the researches of Dr. Murray into the actual fact of usage in Languages, there cannot exist the shadow of a doubt that, EACH of the three Terminations—AN,—EN,—and YNGE,—ALIKE, import PRESENT ACTING. Thus,—*fight-AN,—fight-EN,—and fight-YNGE,—mean, each alike, fight-ACTING, or FIGHTING acting:* And this conclusion, therefore, is a sure foundation, for all that we can have to rest upon it.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

Page 3. “ABOVEN alle nations in Pruce.”

Again.

32. “Hold up your hondes WITHOUTEN more
“speche.” PROLOGUE.

Again.

47. “To forther me, as I have told BEFORNE.”—
KNIGHTES TALE.

With regard to the example here last exhibited, I hardly need remark that, the ADVERB (*in virtue of place*)—"BEFORNE"—is no other word than the PREPOSITION—"BEFORE"—placed at the end of a Sentence. And it is to be observed that, ALL our Prepositions are thus convertible into Adverbs by virtue of place, as the existing practice with regard to most of them plainly shews;—this practice, with regard to *some* of them, never having obtained, merely because they are never, or very rarely, called for in the Adverbial Office, or, for some other reason of convenience, which does not, and cannot, affect the GENERAL PRINCIPLE of the Conversion of ALL *Prepositions into Adverbs by virtue of ASSOCIATED POSITION.*

Again.

49. "BETWIXEN Theseus and him Arcite."—
KNIGHTES TALE.

Again.

158. "For THERBEFORN he stale but curteisly."

Again.

163. "ABOUTEN midnight wente they to rest."
THE REVES TALE.

With regard to this last example, (*i. e.* that from page 163.) and to all the others that are here exhibited, I observe that, the inquiry is bounded within this certain limit,—namely—they are EITHER INFINITIVES, which, I insist, are equivalent

to PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPLES :—or, else, they are *Imperatives* :—or, else, *Past Participles* :—There can be *No Fourth supposition*. Now it is plain that, to say, in the last example, BE-OUT *midnight wente they to rest* ;—or, yet, BE-OUTED *midnight wente they to rest* ;—would be a manifest absurdity which could not be favored with a moment's toleration. Whereas, to say ABOUTING (*i. e. rounding, i. e. one-ing either side of,*) *midnight wente they to rest*—is, most certainly, the sense which the author meant to convey. I offer this observation by the way, chiefly for the sake of satisfying readers that, the Word in question cannot be a PAST PARTICIPLE ADDED TO AN IMPERATIVE ; which, it is most certain, it cannot be in the present example ; Although, otherwise, from the *Form* of the Words, there might indeed exist some doubt on the Subject, since the Old or Anglo saxon Past Participle—in EN—is occasionally, though I think comparatively very seldom, employed by Chaucer. And I would have this remark applied to *Every Other* example of the kind, which occurs either in the *Canterbury Tales*, or elsewhere. As for Mr. Tooke's GENERAL supposition, of *Imperatives* ; I observe that, from the SENSE of the expression in the above example, it is totally out of the question. Besides which, it is material to state that, the FORM OF THE IMPERATIVE, in Chaucer, is almost constantly in ETH ; which would require the Word in question to be ABOUTETH ; and so on, of other Prepositions ; which is strikingly contrary to the general tenor of Chaucer's expression.

Again.

“ APOUN the glocist blude, guhan as fast by.”

Again.

“ And UPON the morrow tooke their journey.”

Again.

“ Right soin the morning AFORE day he mette.”

Again.

265. “ Againe” (*i. e.* against or before) “ this Knight this olde wif gan arise.”

Again.

357. “ AGEIN his doughter hastily goth he.”

It must be quite evident that, the VARIETY of So-called Prepositions, which can be exhibited for the present purpose, can be ONLY LIMITED, and must be confined to such Prepositions as are of a *Compound Structure*: Although I do not know, nor at all care, whether, or not, I have exhausted this variety: Because, at the period of our Language in question, the *Forms* were fast changing; and a great number of Prepositions were already shorn of their characteristic terminating Syllable; insomuch that, I believe; every one of the Words already appealed to is to be found, in Chaucer, much more frequently in a *curtailed* state, than in the Form herein exhibited. Thus, in the Canterbury Tales, we have, all along, a repetition of such Words as—“ ABOVE,”—“ WITHOUT,”—

* BEFORE,"—" BETWIXE,"—" AROUTE,"—" UP-
 " ON,"—" AGAINST,"—&c. And in this process
 we perceive the *actual fact of the gradations*, by
 which the LEAST-HACKNIED of our Prepositions
 have, within the scope of indubitable research,
 PUT OFF their *Original Form*, and PUT ON a *shape*
which veils their real grammatical character in utter
darkness. But, although the VARIETY is thus
 limited; the RECURRENCE OF THESE WORDS IS SO
 FREQUENT, as to amount to a most complete in-
 duction of the *General Fact*. And it will appear,
 most satisfactorily, that BARBOUR not only alto-
 gether confirms, but even in some cases very re-
 markably *out-goes*, CHAUCER in furnishing exam-
 ples of this fact.

As for our SIMPLE Prepositions—namely—those
 MOST-HACKNIED Prepositions for whose recurrence
 there is a continual necessity in Language; they
 have (doubtless at a period long antecedent to the
 remotest verge of record) been so completely worn
 down to the last vestige of their Original Form,
 that it cannot in the least be expected we should
 succeed in ascertaining what that Form in reality
 has been, unless by some special mode of enquiry :
 Which last, however, I shall put in practice, in
 the case of two, or three, of these words.

It remains, now, to suggest the Three following
 considerations; and to furnish their proofs; in
 order to establish, conclusively, the General Ob-
 ject which I have in view in the present specula-
 tion.

FIRST, therefore, I affirm that, NOT ONLY THE FORM,—but ALSO THE SENSE,—of those Prepositions in Chaucer, to which I have just referred, is, in a multitude of instances of their occurrence, so manifestly that of an INFINITIVE,—i. e.—that of a Word in ING,—that, a palpable absurdity would be involved by supposing such Words, for a moment, to be IMPERATIVES.

SECONDLY, And although it is, at the same time, here freely admitted that, in *some* instances of the occurrence of such Words, if the FORM of them did not forbid the supposition of their being Imperatives, the SENSE would be a *tolerable Sense*, though *certainly a VERY DIFFERENT Sense* from that of Any Preposition : And although in a *very few instances* such Word, if interpreted as an Imperative, would convey a Sense containing a sufficiently logical accuracy and propriety ; (which concessions I make most willingly, and without any fear of consequences ;) Yet, I affirm, it would be a very rare occurrence that, we could assume such Word to be an Imperative, (putting its FORM altogether out of consideration here,) without its following that, the best Sense, which we could then give to it, must be *forced, unnatural, and awkward*, when contrasted with the *rationality, precision, and elegance*, which must result the moment we assume it to be a Word in ING. In assuming which last, moreover, we are, (at the close of the experiment,) to recollect that, We ONLY OBEY *the dictate which its FORM conveys to us*.

THIRDLY. But it is still farther to be asserted

that, in all those instances, whatever be their number, in which the Word in question may, with some color ; or, even, if it were with the utmost degree of propriety ; be assumed to be an IMPERATIVE, (although this *can only be done in contradiction of its FORM*,) then, I affirm, Such Word is thereby shewn to be (*i. e.* under the existing assumption) NOT A PREPOSITION : for, on the contrary, it becomes an IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTION—OR DIRECTING SPEECH ; which is a So-called Part of Speech whose Office is Vastly Different from that of Any Preposition. As, therefore, an illustration of this last-mentioned fact may be of service, in this place ; I shall, before proceeding farther, supply the following example of it, from a passage in Chaucer.

“ *Then wol I BE BENETHE BY my crown.*”

Here, if any person should be hardy enough to affirm that, the Word—“ BY,”—in this example, is an IMPERATIVE ; then, I say, the meaning of the Word is Vastly different from what it would be if it were interpreted as a PREPOSITION. Thus, in the *first* case, the meaning must be—“ *Then wol I be benethe BE my crown ;*” *i. e.* EXIST my crown, OR, GRANT *that my crown shall EXIST*. But, in the *second* case, it must mean,—*Then wol I be benethe, BY my crown ; i. e.* Then wol I be benethe, I *swear* BY (*i. e.* I *swear* TOUCHING) my crown. And here I hardly need remark that, No Nation, that is advanced in logical discernment beyond the level of the most Barbarous

Tribes, will ever admit Two Such Different Meanings, as these, as being One and the Same: Although it is true, that a speaker may, sometimes, in the same situation, make use of *either* the *one* expression or the *other*: in which case, however, I leave it to the reader to judge, which of the two expressions is the most natural to use.—When men SWEAR *by* their *Honor*, their *Head*, or their *Foot*; Which of the two things do they mean,—that their *Honor*, their *Head*, or their *Foot*, MAY EXIST;—or, that they SWEAR-*touching*—SWEAR-*regarding*,—or—SWEAR-*pledging*—the member, or attribute, in question? And, in either case, Will any person for a moment affirm that, the *One* of these expressions does not differ vastly in import from the *Other*?—I repeat, therefore, that, while the ONE Word is a PREPOSITION, the OTHER is an IMPERATIVE CONJOINER. And perhaps I need not offer a stronger example, than this, in order to illustrate the Difference between the Two Elements of Speech in question: Although I shall have to insist farther upon this point, in treating appropriately of CONJOINERS.

To pass on, now, to another consideration of the Subject. Having duly conceded the fact, that an Imperative may, in *some cases*, be employed instead of a Preposition; (although, I repeat, this must be always with a Very Different import;) And desiring, here, that this concession may be carried as far as it will go; I have next to observe that, in INNUMERABLE INSTANCES, the

result of interpreting such Word as an Imperative would be *not merely awkwardness, or a forced and unnatural sense*; but it would be a MANIFEST AND GROSS ABSURDITY, which must be rejected the moment it is exposed: Of this fact, I offer the following string of examples.

First.

243. "I brought it so ABOUTEN by my wit."

Here it is impossible that Chaucer could mean—"BE OUT BE MY WIT."

Again.

294. "And specially ABOVEN every thing."

Here it is impossible that this expression can mean—"BE UP" (*i. e.* BE OVER) "EVERY THING," or "Every thing BE OVER:" Because it manifestly means that, *Some One Thing* is here considered as being HIGHER THAN,—*i. e.* as "ABOVING," every thing.

Again.

288. "Let us go forth ABOUTEN our viage."

It is impossible this can mean "BE OUT, or BE OUTED, our viage:" Because it evidently expresses a desire to STIR IN the matter of their viage; *i. e.* "Let us go ABOUTING our viage." And here, I observe, we have a VERB and a *Minor Verb* duly expressed, the *One* depending from the *Other*,—namely—"Let us go *abouting* our viage," *i. e.* Let us GO *rounding* (*i. e.* on every side of) the business of our viage.

The examples now offered ; (which, I conceive, are as many as are necessary of their kind ;) the reader will observe, are of So-called Prepositions which do NOT BEGIN with B : In all which Numerous Tribe of Words Mr. Tooke's assumption, of Prepositions being IMPERATIVES OR DIRECTING SPEECHES, appears to be more NARROW, SHALLOW, and VISIONARY, *than can well be resembled by any comparison.* But we shall now proceed to afford some examples, in which the Preposition—BY—is the Principal Term ; which kind are the *most favorable* to Mr. Tooke's doctrine.

Again.

42. "Two yonge knightes ligging BY and BY."

and

163. "Right in the same chambre BY and BY."

In these two examples, in which the sense is manifestly TOUCHING and TOUCHING, it would be the grossest absurdity to suppose it to be EXIST and EXIST.

Again.

"BY no way that he shulde BY her *be*."

In this example we have the PREPOSITION—TOUCHING—and the IMPERATIVE—EXIST—put very remarkably in a juxtaposition of contrast ; each with its own distinctive and indisputable meaning.

Again.

42. "Thus passeth yere BY yere, and day BY day."

It must be quite unnecessary to multiply these

examples. The DIFFERENCE OF SENSE, which they convey, must be strikingly manifest to every one : While it is equally evident that, the *sense* of every one of the PREPOSITIONS, in all the examples, is that of a Word in ING. Any person, who will take the trouble of running his eye over the *Canterbury Tales*, with a view to this Principle, will be satisfied that nothing could be more visionary, or absurd, than an attempt to interpret the Word BY, OR BE, (*in general*;) as an Imperative ; unless, indeed, it were an attempt to interpret it as a PAST Participle.

With regard to this observation, moreover, it is very material to call again, to the recollection of the reader, the fact that, the *Tribe of Prepositions* in B, simple and compound together ; (which are the ONLY Prepositions in which Mr. Tooke's assumption of their being Imperatives does not at the first blush proclaim its own fallacy ;) is found in the SCOTISH Dialect expressed in A, instead of B. Thus, in Scotland, they say—A-HINTE ;—AFORE ;—ANENT ;—AYONT ;—ASIDE ;—ANETHE ;—&c. While it has been already sufficiently shewn that, these Scottish Prepositions mean ONE-ING the *Hint or Hind* ;—ONE-ING the *Fore* ;—ONE-ING the *Front* ;—ONE-ING the *Yont or Yond* ;—ONE-ING the *Side* ;—ONE-ING the *Nethe or Nedder* ;—and so on.

And here I conceive that, by a very allowable and requisite accommodation to the present state of the English Language, we might certainly transform the Words, now in question, into—*hindING* ;—*foreING* ;—*frontING* ;—*yonderING* ;—*sidING* ;—

*neder*ING ;—&c. And I suppose it would be equally eligible, and fit, to proceed thus with the INTERPRETATION ; although perhaps *not with the EXPRESS FORM* ; of our ORDINARY PREPOSITIONS IN GENERAL.

Having done with the evidence of CHAUCER, in the foregoing quotations ; it remains that I should merely touch upon that of BARBOUR ; especially as I have already said that, the latter concurs with, and even goes beyond, the former, in the specimens which he has presented of the English Language. With regard to this last-mentioned authority, it may be observed that, *in general*, the Forms of his Prepositions prove neither less, nor more, than the Forms of those in Chaucer. But, to this general observation there is at least One very remarkable and important exception ; which consists in this :—namely—that, Whereas there is not, I believe, in Chaucer a single instance in which we have Any Preposition EXPRESSLY *in* ING ; (all Chaucer's *most developed* Prepositions being ONLY IN EN, *equivalent to* ING ; and the Same is to be said of Barbour, *in general* ;) Yet, there is ONE Preposition, which occurs in Barbour CONTINUALLY IN ING ; which Word, therefore, stands out, a striking and curious monument of that general fact which I have thus far labored to put in evidence. In so far as regards my *own* conviction, indeed, this example does not contribute the smallest additional weight to the mass of evidence which has gone before it. But to others,

I apprehend, the case may possibly be somewhat different : And, at least, the introduction of it can do no harm in this place. The thing in question, moreover, is the more remarkable, and valuable; inasmuch as Barbour, I think, curtails his Prepositions in general of their final EN, or N, much more than is done by Chaucer : Although it is perfectly manifest that, both writers employ the very Same Prepositions, under these different Forms. The following examples are taken from Mr. Pinkerton's Edition of THE BRUCE.

“ Then schippyth thai, FOROWTYN mar,
 “ Sum went till ster, and some till ar.”

Book 3. Verse 575.

“ And in Donabardyne dayis three
 “ FOROWTYNE mar than duellyt he.

Ver. 677.

“ Inrest FOROWTYN barganging.—*Book 4. Ver. 2.*

“ FOROWTYN pité, or mercy.—*Ver. 31.*

“ That bataillyne WITHOUTYN doubt.—*Ver. 136.*

“ That strak on thaim, FOROWTYN sparing.

Book 8. Ver. 483.

“ Yhis”—said the King—“ WITHOUTYN weer.”

Book 9. Ver. 230.

It would be needless to swell the number of

these examples : But they occur continually throughout Barbour's Work. The following two, or three, are given merely to shew the GRADATION *by which this Same Preposition has been worn down, by attrition* ; FIRST, in BARBOUR HIMSELF ; and, SUBSEQUENTLY, as we find it NOW, in our present English "WITHOUT."

"FOROUT tynsail, eschapen haid."

Book 19. Ver. 811.

By the way, it would seem that, the "*tyn*," in this example, is separated through oversight from the Preposition "FOROWT."

"FOROWT noyis, sa fer he raid."

Book 19. Ver. 535.

In fine ; As the induction of the former existence of this So-called Preposition—FOROWTYN, *i. e.* *Forowt*ING, (answering to our WITHOUT,—) in the Scottish Language, is here altogether complete ; that is when we consider the innumerable instances of its recurrence in Barbour, in this shape ; I apprehend, we are fully warranted, by analogy, to conclude that OTHER Prepositions, also, of a Similar Structure, have ONCE possessed the Termination in ING ; although they have since certainly lost this to our direct research. Of Similar Prepositions, therefore, I now offer the following examples, from the same author.

"TOWART Rauchryne, be se to far."

Ver. 680.

“TOWART a rycht stalwart castell.”

Book 3. Ver. 732.

“TOWART the king than gan thai ga.”

Book 12. Ver. 154.

I shall not multiply these examples ; conceiving, as I do, that their evidence is altogether sufficient to show, in a very satisfactory manner, that the Two Prepositions in question have not been the only ones which have been thus curtailed.

In case, however, that any person could be found prejudiced enough to suppose that, the Termination—YN, or YNE—*may not* be our—ING, —I supply the following instances ; wherein Barbour has the Termination spelt both in the new way and in the old.

“Tharfor I trow that gud *ending*.

“Sall folow till our BEGYNNYNG.”

Book 12. Ver. 190.

“Schaip we as tharfor in the MORNYNG

“Swa that we, be the sone *rysing*.”—*Ver. 211.*

“That had Pyrrus in gowernyne.”

Book 20. Ver. 532.

In Mr. Pinkerton’s Gloss, moreover, he says—
“DOUBTYNE, — *doubting*.” But, assuredly, the evidence of these examples must be unnecessary ; although I have chosen to indulge them.

At this stage of the inquiry, the interests of the Subject indispensably demand of us that we should, with whatever reluctance, turn back for a moment, and contemplate the claims which are exhibited in Mr. Tooke's device, which has been already in part examined in the foregoing part of the analysis—namely—that which is embodied in his celebrated example of

“ *A House WITH a Party Wall :*”

and,

“ *A House WITHOUT a Roof :*”

Wherein he asserts that, the WITH and WITHOUT are IMPERATIVES ; and affirms that, the USE OF THESE,—AND OF ALL OTHER PREPOSITIONS,—is that of DIRECTING SPEECHES, which instruct us either to ADD *One Idea*, or *Parcel of Ideas*, to Another ; or, else, to TAKE AWAY One Idea, or Parcel of Ideas, from Another.

Upon this Scheme, therefore, I observe that, if it appear to be unfounded and intolerable in the *single example* which has thus been selected in order to give it any degree at all of plausibility ; How poor does it become when we would *extend it to ALL OTHER PREPOSITIONS* ?

Why, then, (we are here entitled to ask,) did not Mr. Tooke apply his Theory, or extend it, to such Prepositions as do NOT begin with either WITH or BY ?—Why did he not *at least attempt* to show us in what manner such Words as IN—FROM—TO—OF,—ON,—AT,—and a host of Other

Such Prepositions,—CAN, OR EVER COULD, PERFORM THE OFFICE OF DIRECTING SPEECHES, *i. e.* —of IMPERATIVES? And, as he confidently insists that *Some of these Prepositions are NOUNS*; Why did he not make some attempt to show us in what manner a NOUN can do the Office of a Directing Speech? Upon the whole, then; Are we not bound, by the allegiance we owe to Reason or Philosophy, to ask, even in the most candid and liberal mood, Was such a legerdemain as THIS example—of *A House WITH a Party Wall*—ANY THING LIKE COMMENSURATE with the Subject which it was brought to explain? Or, WAS IT SO MUCH AS AT ALL IN THE DIRECTION of that Desideratum, or Object, which the Philologists of Britain ought to embrace, or to look for, as being the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE?

To conclude, now, the GENERAL etymological investigation, which I had proposed to make, into the Nature of that Part of Speech which has hitherto been called the PREPOSITION; I humbly conceive, it has been shewn, from a very complete and satisfactory induction; (that is to say complete and satisfactory when we include not only the various strings of examples which have been given in this work, but also all the examples of a similiar nature that may be found in those authors from which these extracts have been taken;) that, the GENERAL CHARACTER of Prepositions, in our First-Rate Authorities for the present English

Language, is that of Words in ING. And, although it is not at all here denied, that, in some instances, *either* an IMPERATIVE or a PAST Participle may occur in these authorities; which a reader, at first sight, may suppose is meant for a Preposition; and which, perhaps, the Writer himself, at the moment of writing it, might suppose he put Prepositionally; Still, I confidently and conclusively affirm that, ANY SUCH WORD, whenever it occurs, is NOT A PREPOSITION; but *can be demonstrated to be the Elliptical and Abbreviated Representative of SOME WHOLE SENTENCE, or PHRASE*; whereas a PREPOSITION IS INVARIABLY, AND OF NECESSITY, A SINGLE WORD—namely—a VERB, and *never can be elliptical, nor can REPRESENT Any Word whatever.*

In a word: Although Philologists have never yet been awakened to the fact; it could not manifest less advancement in general knowledge, nor could it be at all more preposterous in a Judge, or Man of Education, to confound the MORAL Properties and Efficacy of the PARCHMENT or PAPER which consigns a prisoner to the power of the Headsman, with those VASTLY DIFFERENT Properties and Efficacy of the AXE which is the PHYSICAL Privative of his life; than it does in the Grammarian to confound what may well be called the PHYSICO-grammatical Efficacy of a PREPOSITION, with that Vastly Different and MERELY MORAL Grammatical Efficacy of an IMPERATIVE, or a PAST-PARTICIPIAL CONJOINER. And it only remains to say, that, to rescue the Subject

itself; and, along with it, the general pretensions of Human Intellect; from the deplorable depth of darkness, of confounding the Two Parts of Speech in question; (which Two Parts of Grammar have been so signally confounded by Mr. Tooke, as well as by all other Grammarians;) is one of the various desiderata which I have labored to supply in these speculations. But the character of CONJOINERS will be more appropriately insisted upon, in the Chapter allotted for their investigation.

Considering, then, the ETYMOLOGICAL investigation which has been submitted, to be in one sense a continuation of the ANALYSIS of So-called Prepositions; and viewing the mass, of the two parts combined, as forming, in a certain sense, but one same argument;—the whole tending, and I confidently trust *amounting*, to One Same Conclusion; I shall now add an appeal, which I had all along designed to institute, as being, I conceive, in a very striking manner decisive of every question which could possibly arise, with regard to the Nature of this Part of Speech: Although I certainly do not think that the *general* question, upon this ground, has remained in any degree unanswered. But, at any rate, the test which I shall here propose, *if it answer the demand which I intend to make upon it*, must, I think, be admitted as being altogether conclusive.

Referring, therefore, Every Reader to his own experience; I affirm here, and leave the judg-

ment of the matter to his own decision ; that, if we suppose him to have read All the Books and Writings in the English Language, he NEVER DID, and NEVER CAN, meet with ANY instance of the employment of a So-called Preposition ;—(I mean if it be *really and legitimately* One of those Words that are entitled, according to the Old Scheme, to be called Prepositions, and is NOT A SPURIOUS OR MERE PRETENDED PREPOSITION ;—) but, in Every Such Case, the Word in question would be *most rationally, and elegantly, interpreted by SOME WORD IN ING, considered as a VERB between the TWO NOUNS OR WORDS* which forms the *Nominative* and the *Objective Case* to the So-called Preposition in question.—And, if any Speaker, or Writer, employ Any Legitimate So-called Preposition ; but *not the proper* Preposition which the occasion demanded ; then, I affirm, his mistake may be remedied, in the most accurate manner, by the substitution of SOME OTHER Word in ING.

In offering this ultimate and universal Test of the Nature of MINOR VERBS ; I have to desire it may be particularly observed, I design to stamp, in the judgment of readers, the vastly important consideration that, in PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR THERE ARE NO ANOMALIES ; Whereas, in VERNACULAR GRAMMAR, on the contrary, ANOMALIES CHARACTERISTICALLY EXIST, AND ABOUND. Thus, As there are NO DIFFERENT SPECIES OF MAJOR VERBS ; —THIS GENUS OF SIGN being ALL OF ONE SPECIES, and comprehended under the Same Neces-

sary Laws : So, there are NO DIFFERENT SPECIES IN MINOR VERBS OR SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS ; which last, moreover, differ NOT *from Major Verbs in SPECIES ; but are ONLY A VARIETY OF VERBS*, as they differ merely in the *circumstance of depending and defining*. And to this observation I may add, that, it will be partly in the BANISHING OF ALL ANOMALIES, AND ALL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VERBS ; *and in the FINDING OF VERBS IN ALL SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS ;* that I suppose the Philosophy of Grammar will first see the light, in the productions of popular Grammarians. AN ANOMALY *is death to a GENERAL LAW* : And it can exist only in a System that is imperfect,—that is a System in *Some degree below a Science of Pure Reason*. If, therefore, I should find any Department of Universal Grammar that is burdened with such a defect ; I shall not hesitate to acknowledge it as such.

It follows, from all that has been advanced in the foregoing parts of this work, that EVERY VERB IN LANGUAGE, so often as it *immediately follows Any Other Verb*, possesses All the Properties of One of those Signs which Grammarians have heretofore agreed to call PREPOSITIONS. Thus, for example, in the Two following Expressions—I *sit writing* Grammar ;—and,—I *try to learn* Grammar ;—Each of the Expressions—“ *writing* ”—and “ *to learn* ”—is fully as much entitled to be called a Preposition, as Any Word in the World can be. And the Same is to be said of All Other Verbs similarly situated.

The task which I had prescribed to myself, with regard to the GENERAL nature of that Part of Speech now under consideration, is as far completed as was in my power to accomplish it. I shall pass on, therefore, to an investigation of the Nature of those Particular Words, of this class, to which I have already alluded, as being a matter which I deem fit to form so many Distinct Individual Objects of inquiry, with a view to throw a special light, not only upon themselves, but, also, upon the GENERAL SUBJECT OF SPEECH : In the course of which, if the investigation prove at all satisfactory, I have little doubt that a considerable mass of light must, *incidentally*, be let in, upon the Nature of Language.

SUBSECTION IV.

Of the Derivation of certain Deformed and Disguised So-called Prepositions or Minor Verbs—namely—the Minor Verbs IN,—WITH,—FROM,—and BY ;—together with Grammatical Considerations involved in this research.

IN entering upon the Derivation of some of the most obscure and refractory of our So-called Prepositions ; I desire to signify my confident persuasion that it could not, in the least degree, tend to shake, or affect, the foregoing general reasonings, if it should be thought, or even were had in proof, that I have been mistaken in the virtual History which I shall attempt to furnish of *any*, or

OF ALL, of the Words in question : So conclusively do I apprehend the Nature of Prepositions IN GENERAL to be established, upon the double basis of NECESSARY REASONING *a priori* and of the GRAMMATICAL SENSE which I have ascribed to this Part of Speech in all situations whatever. With regard to this avowal, however, I request it may be understood that, I do not hereby intend to weaken the belief which I think may be reposed in the amount of evidence that will be submitted. At the same time, it is proper to observe with regard to the *Number, or Variety*, of the Words now selected, that, not only would it be extraneous to the scope and design of the present work, to go into a voluminous investigation of the nature of ALL the particular Words heretofore recognised as English Prepositions ; but, also, that it is out of my power, even with regard to the Words that are proposed for present consideration, to do more than supply such lights, and suggestions, as had occurred to me while my health admitted of a better attention to the Subject. I shall leave it to others, therefore, to enlarge in this direction ; or to set me right, in whatever I shall do in it : Only presuming that, the GENERAL clue which I have already afforded, with regard to the Nature of this Part of Speech, may enable them to avoid *particular* fallacy themselves, or to correct my particular fallacies with safety and effect.

It being one of my objects, in this undertaking, to accomplish the desired purpose with every possible brevity, consistent with that completion at

which I have aimed throughout ; I proceed, without farther preface, to the Particular Words proposed for investigation.

MINOR VERB—IN.

Among the deformed and disguised So-called Prepositions in the English Language, there is, perhaps, not one which carries less of the So-called Participial (*i. e. in reality the VERBAL*) Form, than the Word IN : Nor is there any Word, of this Class, that has been held, by the concurrent voices of the best Etymologists, more hostile to the General Analysis of Prepositions furnished in the foregoing pages, than this one ; it being held, unanimously, that the Preposition—In,—in every sense and derivation in which it has been rendered, is a Word derived from a NOUN. It will doubtless, therefore, be admitted that, I could not have chosen a Word more favorable to the General Doctrine that is opposed to me ; nor one more searching, as a test of my own principles ; than that now in question. Along with this, it is to be observed, there is no So-called Preposition that is of more frequent or hacknied recurrence in Speech ; nor of more importance, to ascertain its real grammatical and logical meaning, than this one : And, hence, there is none more fit to take the lead, among those Words, of this Species, concerning whose derivation I propose to inquire.

Mr. Tooke, with unusual expressions of caution,

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has excused himself from accounting for the Word **IN** and Several Others of our most hacknied Prepositions. But, at the same time, he has furnished some hints with regard to the Derivation of this Word; which it is due to him to transcribe here. In a NOTE, in *page 457* of his *First Volume*, he says,—

“ In the Gothic and Anglo-saxon, **INNA** means *uterus, viscera, venter, interior pars corporis*; (**IN** na, inne, is also, in a secondary sense, used for *Cave, Cell, Cavern*). And there are some etymological reasons which make it not impossible that **OUT** derives from a Word originally meaning skin. I am inclined to believe that **IN** and **OUT** came originally from two Nouns meaning those two parts of the body.”

Farther on, in *page 524*, Mr. Tooke says,—“ In Anglo-saxon **AN** means **ONE**, and **ON** means **IN**: which word **ON** we have in English corrupted to **AN** before a vowel; and to **A** before a consonant.”

In this account, (as appears from the following confirmation of it given by Dr. Murray,) Mr. Tooke has been more fortunate than in many others of his derivations. Dr. M., in his *Second Volume*, *page 31*, says—“ There was no original name for the relation **IN** except **ANA** or **ON** already described. Accordingly, **HE IS ON HUS**, he is in the house, is more common in Anglo-saxon than any other phrase of similar import. **INN** is merely a corruption of **ANN**, *on*, the usual form in the Celtic dialects. In those very

“ ancient varieties we find many lights on this intricate Subject. In them *oc*, or *EAC*, from which “ is written *o*,” &c. &c. “ are excellent illustrations of the other prepositional forms.” Moreover, as a gloss upon this account, in *Note E*, page 345, Dr. M. says, “ The Word *AN* is written “ *AEN*, *ANE*, *ONE*, *o* ; and *AE* before consonants.”

After this exposition of its history, given from the researches of the writer last quoted, there can hardly remain a doubt that the Word—*IN*—came originally from the *Numeral Adjective Noun ONE*. More than this, it appears far from being impossible that, *by a certain ellision of a Preposition*, (which ought to have accompanied it,) the Word—*IN*,—*even in its character of a NOUN*, may have passed, for ages, as being a Preposition ; although the absurdity of so considering it is as demonstrable as any Theorem in Geometry. At the same time, upon the other hand, I shall produce positive evidence that, at one period of our Language, we had a *VERB TO INN*. And, therefore, for the sake of our Ancestors, it is but fair to suppose that the Word *INN* had passed into the Verbal use, before it was employed as a Preposition ; and that, the Preposition in question is the *So-called Participial INNING*. For my own part, I am perfectly indifferent as to which of the two opinions any reader may chuse to adopt ; since, if he embrace the latter, he will only save the Logical credit of our Forefathers ; and, if he chuse the former, I shall completely demonstrate *their absurdity* in this matter.

The requisite discussion, I conceive, may be of material service to the general subject, far beyond the light it may cast on the particular nature of the Word under consideration. *We must not, therefore, look upon the present inquiry as being exhausted merely upon the merits of the Word—IN:—*but must apply its reasonings, analogically, to OTHER Words, or Pretended Prepositions, which may not admit of more *direct* evidence.

FIRST, then, I observe that, while Relations of Place and of Time are, for obvious reasons, in one sense the FOUNDATION of our *most requisite and most frequently repeated* Prepositions; which Words, also, we employ, in a figurative sense, to express ANALOGOUS MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL Relations; the Relation which we signify by the Word—IN—is distinguished, from all the others, by very remarkable peculiarities. If we signify One Thing as being *under*, or *over*, or *beside*, or *without*, Another; or, express *Any Other Relation of* EXTERNEITY; we signify the Former as existing (*in point of locality*) DISTINCT from the Latter; and the SEVERALTY of the Two Things is manifest and obvious, even in the case of any of those Relations which imply a CONTACT: But, if we say that One Thing is IN Another; our affirmation can be strictly true, or logically just, *only in so far as the One Thing PENETRATES, and in point of locality* MELTS INTO AND ACTUALLY IDENTIFIES ITSELF WITH, Another; so that, in virtue of the Preposition, the Two THINGS be-

come **ONE SAME THING**, while yet they must, for certain intents and purposes, still be considered as being **TWO DIFFERENT THINGS**. Thus, for example, a **FOX** is **IN** his **HOLE**; or, a **BIRD** is **IN** its **NEST**; no farther than its body or volume **PENETRATES**, and **FILLS** or **OCCUPIES**, that part of the cavity, or bulk, which we call its **HOLE**, or **NEST**. In a word; Any One Thing can be **IN** Another (in the local sense of this term,) *only in so far as it becomes* **LOCALLY ONE** with That Other. Moreover, we are to observe, that *penetrating, filling, or occupying*,—how long soëver it endures,—is an **ACTION** — a **TRUE LOGICAL ACTION**.—Hence, therefore, if a Congregation of Philosophers, instead of Barbarians, had sat down to invent a Sign for this Relation; I think, they could not, when all circumstances are considered, have fallen upon a more logical way of expressing it, than by speaking in the following idiom:—The **FOX ONES** his **HOLE**;—The **BIRD ONES** her **NEST**, —The **MAN ONES** his **HUT**;—and The **CHILD** (or **FŒTUS**) **ONES** its **MOTHER**.

But it is at the same time true; and Language has provided for this truth; that there is a still more definite, or explicit, manner of expressing this Sort of Relation, than simply by the Word — **IN**. In logical strictness, this Word ought to be employed only in those cases in which an *absolute and complete identification* of Two Things is meant. In short; the Word—**IN**—is the Sign which, in every sense, *except a grammatical sense, annihilates One Thing*, of Any Two that are

thus associated: It is the Sign expressive of a UNION of Two or More Things, in the strict sense of this Word: Hence it can be strictly applicable in such cases only as when we say—*Science consists IN a Rule*;—*The Rule consists IN this*;—*Man is IN life*;—*He is IN trouble*;—*He is IN pain*;—*He is IN doubt*.—Upon the other hand, as contradistinguished from this actual identification; when we desire to signify Any One Thing as being *only distinctly and without confusion* ENVELOPED in Another; the established Idioms of our Language express this Relation between the Two Things, very properly, by such terms as the following:—The kernel is INSIDE OF the shell;—The Man is WITHIN,—i. e. WITHIN *his House*;—The Fox ran INTO his Hole.—In these examples, we are to observe, the *additional* terms, to the simple term IN, are expressive of our meaning that the One Thing is *not actually absorbed or lost* in the Other; but that the One *exists* DISTINCTLY ENVELOPED BY the Other. Hence, therefore, in logical strictness, it is certainly more proper to say that, a Fox is WITHIN his Hole; or an Unborn Child WITHIN its Mother; than to employ the phraseology which was used in the first examples. But here we readily discern that, the CIRCUMLOCUTION of such phrases as — “The Man is WITHIN his House:”—“The kernel is INSIDE OF the Shell;”—would quickly cause these Idioms to be laid aside, except in certain special cases, wherein we find they actually obtain in our Language to this day, but, as we might naturally expect, are very far

from being the most common or general forms of expression: As, for example, we usually ask if the *Master of the House* is WITHIN: But we never say; —He is WITHIN *London*; WITHIN *the Navy*; or, WITHIN *good luck*:—On the contrary, the USUAL form of expressing these last-mentioned Relations is by the simple Sign—IN.

SECONDLY. The Next consideration to be entertained, here, is to ascertain, if possible, the real fact In what manner the Relation in question has been signified by our Teutonic and Anglo-saxon Forefathers: And, What was the *Logical Principle*, upon which they so expressed themselves. And here I am by no means inclined to take any thing of Etymology, by supposing that, in the very first stages of Language, (I mean especially that stage in which the Relation—IN—was *first* signified by the Numeral Adjective Noun ONE,) this Relation was expressed in either of the two ways above described. On the contrary, I think it far more probable that the Primitive Savages of Germany had, at first, not a more rational way of signifying that a Beast was in its Hole, or a Man in his Hut, than by stringing together the three Nouns,—*Fox ONE Hole*;—*Man ONE Hut*. But, if the Savage Inventor of this Sign had been more advanced in rationality; and had actually expressed himself by saying—*Fox ONE WITH Hole*; *i. e.* *Fox ONE TYING or JOINING Hole*;—I hesitate not to believe that, in a very short time; owing to the known gross slovenliness, laziness, and negligence, of all

uncultivated men in matters of Speech ; the ultimate addition of the Word—WITH—would be dropped, as being circumlocutory and troublesome ; and the expression—FOX ONE HOLE—would reign onwards, without any deviation or exception.

At this rate, then, we have the NOUN—ONE,—*i. e.* IN,—invested with all the admitted authority of a PREPOSITION. And I am quite willing to record my belief that, in all probability, *it did actually thus obtain*, INSTEAD of a Preposition, for many ages, in our Parent Dialects. Such, therefore, is ONE of the NOUN PREPOSITIONS of Mr. Tooke and Dr. Murray. But, in the name of Reason, it may be asked, CAN THIS BE CALLED LANGUAGE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE ? Is the pitiable stringing together of a number of NOUNS, (*considered at the moment syntactically AS NOUNS,*) *without the intervention of any Verbal Sign*, to be tolerated for a moment, by any Nation advanced one step above the level of Sylvan Barbarism ? Can we for a moment endure the signifying of an ACTION—(that of OCCUPYING, PENETRATING, or FILLING, for example,) between One Thing and Another, by stringing together the NAMES OF THREE SUBSTANTIVE THINGS, WITHOUT NAMING ANY ACTION AT ALL ? In order, however, *to measure the exact magnitude of this Absurdity* ; we have only to suppose an attempt to be made to express SOME OPERATION IN ALGEBRA by a Formula consisting of the Signs of ANY TWO, or THREE, or MORE, QUANTITIES,—such as A,—B,—C,—

or 3, 5, 8,—WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF OPERATION BETWEEN them.—I am quite ready to grant that, One Savage might, from practice, come very well to understand another's MEANING, in this, or in many other cases of equally revolting jargon. But, with undiminished force, I would ask ; Are Such Effusions, as these, to be *held in value as precious materials*, raked up from the depths of Etymology, wherewith, without alteration of shape or structure, we are to repair the supposed once fair and symmetrical, but now mutilated and defaced, Temple of Language ? But, to have done with questioning ; I venture to condemn the matter, here, as being, when viewed in its real merits, one of the grossest absurdities that ever shed ridicule upon human understanding. And I cannot help feeling confident that, no person, who shall understand WHAT is a VERB,—WHAT a MINOR VERB,—WHAT a RELATIVE,—and WHAT a RELATION,—(according to the Nature which I have ventured to ascribe, respectively, to these Things, in the course of the foregoing treatise,) will ever, for an instant, endure the proposal of THIS, or of ANY OTHER NOUN, for a PREPOSITION.

It is in this place, at the same time, to be acknowledged, that the view which I have thus far taken of the Word—IN—goes to justify Mr. Tooke and Dr. Murray, as ETYMOLOGISTS : While, upon the other hand, it makes demonstrably against them as PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMARIANS ; or rather, shows the Two Different walks of inquiry in question to be in this instance utterly

hostile to each other. And, here, while I am exposing the palpable absurdity of imposing upon our understanding the jargon of a STRING OF NOUNS, FOR A CHAIN OF LANGUAGE; I deem it a fit opportunity to exhibit an example of one of those OTHER SORTS of jargon, which have been embalmed, and held up, as MODELS of Ancient Idiomatical Phraseology. In the *Second Volume* of Dr. Murray's Work, page 26, we have the following passage.

"Thus LIUHT UF MELAN meant light under
 " a bushel, that is LIGHT LIFT BUSHEL;—MANN
 " UF SKADAU, man under the shadow, man TAKE
 " OF shadow;—MANN UF HROT MEIN, man below
 " my roof, man (LIFT) my roof."

From the specimen of Language, now afforded, we learn two things;—namely—*First*, that an IMPERATIVE *i.e.* an ELLIPTICAL COMPLETE WHOLE SENTENCE,—and this a COMPLEX Sentence,—often served the Ancient Tribes as a substitute for that PROPER SIMPLE VERBAL LINK which connects Any Two Nouns, in a strict Grammatical Concatenation: And that, in many cases, NOT ONLY an IMPERATIVE OR WHOLE SPEECH; BUT THIS AND a PREPOSITION TO BOOT (as in the example "TAKE OFF") WERE BOTH EMPLOYED to serve *instead of the Simple Preposition or Link now called—"UNDER!"* And, *Secondly*, we find that, the Relation which we now signify by the Word—UNDER;—was signified by the SPEECH WHICH DIRECTS US TO LIFT: And the same Relation—of UNDER—was, in other cases, expressed by the COMPOUND DIRECTING SPEECH—"TAKE OFF."

That this, and a great deal more of such half-intelligible and altogether revolting jargon was a frequent manner of expression, of the Tribes in question; there cannot be a doubt. And, in this Idiom Mr. Tooke may find his *etymological justification*; or, at least, APOLOGY, (such as it is;) for having supposed the Preposition—"WITH"—to mean the IMPERATIVE—JOIN. But, I conceive, its own native deformity must, to every intelligent reader, be more effectual in causing us to turn off from it, than any length of commentary which could be offered with this intention.

Imagination, indeed, might figure a world of awkward and ridiculous consequences from the employment of such Idioms, had they endured, or been ripened into the tolerated phraseology of the present day. What surprise, for example, would it not have excited, had a stranger to these Idioms heard any one utter either of the following exclamations — *I saw the Lady's FACE TAKE OFF her Bonnet: I saw her GLOVE LIFT the Table: !—?* Assuredly, the device of signifying (or, rather of SUGGESTING, *for it is NOT SIGNIFYING,*) the Relation which we call UNDER, by such opposite Signs as that of a DIRECTING SPEECH INSTRUCTING US TO TAKE OFF SOMETHING THAT IS OVER, was an expedient *as unphilosophical, as slovenly, and as ignorant, as Barbarism itself could have invented.* And the very import of the terms amount to presumptive proof that, they have ORIGINATED IN A QUAINTESS OF CONCEIT, rather than in any *direct, or serious attempt at logical expression.* Those who

may have happened to notice, in any degree, the whimsical expressions of this nature to which persons in the lowest classes of life are prone, may easily recollect various quaint expressions, to which the Idiom now in question might have served as a fit companion ; especially among persons of any profession or calling which entertains an appropriate phraseology, as is the case, for example, of Sailors and the Inhabitants of Sea Ports. So truly is this the case, that, if the lost and revived Idiom, which has thus been rescued by Dr. Murray from oblivion, were now to be fairly planted at Rotherhithe, or Greenland Dock ; I have not a doubt that it would *again take root*, and flourish, among that Class of Persons with whom it is congenial, as much as it is probable it ever did among the worshippers of Thor, or Woden.

The truth however is ; and we are duly to note it here, as a *redeeming* truth ; that the Ancient Nations, now in question, at the same time that they exhibited such examples of quaint and affected Idioms as that above quoted, *possessed, when they chose to employ it, a FAR DIFFERENT AND TRULY LOGICAL AND GRAMMATICAL MANNER OF EXPRESSING RELATIONS ; I mean by PREPOSITIONS,—a method precisely the same as that which I have all along insisted upon, as being the only one in which this part of Grammar can be rationally effected.* In the very same page of Dr. Murray's Work (for example) that contains the disgusting specimens of expression already considered, we have the fol-

lowing compensating examples ; which I need make no apology for introducing here, although they are quoted, also, in another place.

“ The verb AG, *go*, produced the oldest of the
“ Prepositions.—With BA, the second consigni-
“ cative, AG, formed AGBA, by contraction ABA,
“ *moving, touching, going at or on* ; hence it is
“ synonymous with AD, for AF TAIHSWOM SI-
“ TAN, at the right hand to sit, is the same with
“ AD DEXTRAM SEDERE. The idea is to SIT
“ ADJOINING OR TOUCHING the right hand.”

Again, in the next page, He says,—“ I come
“ from the field, and I come off the field, ori-
“ ginally implied close conjunction—I COME
“ TOUCHING the field.”

I have quoted these very important Words in Large Capitals, for an obvious reason ; being in order to stamp them, effectually, in the recollection of readers. For it is in THESE examples,—and in SUCH AS THESE,—that we are to recognise both the USE and the FORM of REAL So-called PREPOSITIONS : Which, whensoever they occur, *must be no other than* VERBS, significant of Some Dependent or MINOR ACTIONS. The So-called Prepositions—“ ADJOINING” and “ TOUCHING”—in the above examples, are worthy to be classed with that estimable company of Prepositions in ING which have been enumerated by Mr. Tooke, and more than once cited in this work.

THIRDLY. To return, now, to the Word IN ; It has been rendered conclusively evident, *First, That,*

Either this Word is No Preposition at all ; which, if it be considered as a Noun, it most certainly is not : OR, *Secondly*, If it is a Preposition, which I affirm it is, and the most necessary, perhaps, of any in Language; then, it must, at some period of our Language, have *passed from its NOUNAL import*, (both Adjective and Substantive,) and have been employed as a VERB, of which the curtailed Sign — IN,—formerly written INN,—and INNE,—is a vestige of the *Progressive Participial Form*.

Now it happens that, we have the *certain proofs* of A VERB TO IN having formerly existed in our Language;—a curious vestige of which Verb, in the said Participial Form, has been, by an accident as curious, preserved IN USE DOWN TO THE PRESENT day. I shall place this fact before the reader, previously to offering any farther observation with regard to it.

In the *Second Volume* of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, page 418, Mr. Tooke himself has quoted the following passage :

“ He that Eres my land, spares my teame,

“ And giues mee leaue to INNE the crop.”

ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL. Page 233.

Upon this extract it is proper to remark that, it was far from being with the present intention that Mr. Tooke cited it: On the contrary, he brought it forward only with intent to illustrate the import of the Word—“ERE.”—I have there-

fore distinguished the Word—"INNE"—by Capitals; which he, of course, has not done: and I have taken his quotation, without consulting the original.

As another example of the use of this Verb, at a period of our Language long antecedent to that last in question; we have, in the CANTERBURY TALES, the following instance:

"Whan he had brought hem into his citee,
"And INNED hem, everich at his degree."

KNIGHTES TALE. Page 87.

At the same time, it is to be observed that, the Verb—TO INNE—occurs only very seldom, at any period of our Language, so far as I am aware. But its former existence therein is here had in proof, beyond all question: And a very cogent reason may be assigned, why it has not prevailed *much* in the Language. Any person, who will try the experiment of *repetition*, will find that this Verb is *sensibly awkward to pronounce*. And I have no doubt that this cause alone was fully sufficient to have occasioned its popular disuse; although I cannot affirm that this has been the only cause of it.

It is corroborative of the general argument that, we have in the Language what may be called an ANTAGONIST Verb—namely—the VERB TO OUT: Which we have indisputably; although its Orthography is *modified into* OUSTED; the cause of which, moreover, appears to be a certain awkwardness

that attends the pronunciation of the Verb **TO OUT**. And here it matters not, if the Verb **TO OUT** should be said to have any different origin : For certain it is, we employ this Verb *as the Verb TO OUT*, in the English Language.

In fine ; I have now to advert to the fact, that a **VESTIGE** of the Verb in question is **STILL PRESERVED** in our Language, in a well-known term appropriate to one of our Popular Games :—I mean that of **CRICKET** ; wherein the parties who are in possession of the “*wicket*” are said to have their “*INNINGS*.” I do not overlook the fact that, the Word **INNINGS** is in this case syntactically employed as a **NOUN** : I only design to show that, **THIS NOUN EXISTS AT PRESENT IN THE SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE PARTICIPIAL FORM** ; which is proof positive that it has been derived from **VERBAL EMPLOYMENT**, at a former period of our dialect.

I am here perfectly indifferent, as to which way any reader may be inclined to decide ; Whether our Ancestors had the good sense to take the **Preposition IN** (at least when the English Language had put on nearly its present shape) from the Verb **TO INNE** ; Or, Whether he shall conclude that Englishmen have, with true Midasian misconception, been content to express themselves **AT ALL TIMES** by uttering **WHOLE UNMIXED STRINGS OF NOUNS**, *syntactically considered AS NOUNS*. For my own part, however, when I consider how large a portion of reason distinguishes the Structure of the English Language,

as we find it existed in the days of Chaucer ; and other reasons, which I shall mention ; I cannot suppose that all Englishmen, during those days, could fall into such an absurdity as that of believing they were uttering a Syntactical Noun, when they were employing the Word—IN. Hence, I conceive, those Etymologists, (how luminous soever they may be in other respects,) who have thought to enlighten us by proving that this Word WAS ONCE A NOUN ; and who therefore maintain that it is STILL TO BE INTERPRETED as a Noun ; have only, in so far as the example extends, in itself or in its influence, enveloped the Real Structure of Language in a very mischievous darkness.

It may indeed, at first sight, appear strange, and therefore improbable, if the Word—IN—has been used as the Verbal—INNING, at any period of our Language ; (especially, at any stage of it later than that in which we may suppose it to have been employed barbarously as the NOUN ONE, instead of a Preposition ;) that this, its VERBAL import, could have been afterwards lost in popular apprehension. *But the whole history of English Prepositions and Conjunctions proves the contrary ;* since it is quite certain that the Grammatical import of each of these PARTS OF SPEECH,—the import which its Words actually possessed in popular acceptance so low down as the days of Chaucer, and lower still, became SO COMPLETELY BURIED IN OBLIVION, that, we know it demanded the genius of a TOOKE to awaken even the LEARNED part of the community

to a knowledge that they HAD EVER BELONGED TO EITHER OF THE ORIGINAL AND INTEGRAL PARTS OF LANGUAGE ; The Preposition INN, therefore, MAY *certainly* have been formerly recognised for the *Verbal—inning* ; although this acceptance of it has been long lost to the Speakers of English.

To these remarks is to be added a consideration which, though apparently slight, must, I think, be allowed to carry considerable weight with it. We are to observe that, in the Verb TO INNE, INNE is the *Form of the Infinitive*. And I have shewn at large, from actual induction that, at one period of our Language the *Form of the Infinitive* was also that of the *Progressive Participle*. The *Preposition* INNE, therefore, (since become IN) is no more curtailed from the Participial Form INNING ; than the Verb TO INNE has been (when the form of Verbs was changed) curtailed from the Verb to INNINGE : In which last Form, we cannot doubt, it once existed.

In fine ; I affirm, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR STANDS WHOLLY UNCONCERNED, with regard to the result. If the Word IN is STILL a NOUN ; (to which supposition I make no sort of objection) then, IT IS NO PREPOSITION, but is purely the *Numeral Adjective* ONE, employed SUBSTANTIVELY in an ELLIPTICAL IDIOM, in which SOME REAL PREPOSITION IS IMPLIED, THOUGH NOT EXPRESSED : Thus, He is IN his House, would mean He is *One Man* WITH his House. If, on the other hand, the Word—IN—is a Real So-called Preposition ; (which I hope for the sake of human

rationality it will be estimated;) it is then the VERBAL ONEING: Thus, He is IN his House,—means—He is ONEING his House, *i. e.* MAKING *himself* ONE WITH his House.

The sense in which we must interpret the Word —IN—when employed ADVERBIALLY, affords an additional illustration of the absurdity of supposing it to be a NOUN, *unless we suppose the Speech to be ELLIPTICAL*. Thus, in the following examples from Chaucer.

“ Lo Greenwich, there many a Shrew is INNE.”

and

“ Hire to deliver from woe that she was INNE.”

Here, I observe, it would be neither “stiff” nor “affected;” but, on the contrary, equally expressive and elegant; to interpret these examples into—many a Shrew is INNING;—and woe that she was INNING. While, on the other hand, it would be a Jargon of absurdity, worthy only of “Peter the Wild Boy,” to suppose the meaning to be—many a Shrew is ONE;—and—woe that she was ONE; UNLESS *we add, or understand as added, the PREPOSITION WITH*, which would make—many a Shrew is *One* WITH;—and—woe that she was *One* WITH,—*i. e.* *One* TYING,—*i. e.* *Oncing* TYING,—the Thing in question.

In alluding, as I have just now done, to the circumstance, whether, or not, such expressions as that in question would be STIFF OR AFFECTED; I have had an eye to an assertion of Dr. Murray, which

cannot be passed over in silence, here, inasmuch as the thing is, in point of fact, a sort of *watch-word*, or *salvo*, that is employed, when need requires, by the generality of Grammar Writers. In order to meet it, therefore, and put it down for ever, I shall first transcribe what Dr. Murray has affirmed upon the Subject, which may be found in *page 169*, of his *Second Volume*.

“ Every Conjunction and Preposition may be translated by a Verb,—Adjective,—Noun,—or Participle ; though, in established Languages, this translation would often be stiff, unusual, and affected.”

Upon this passage I am under the necessity to observe, in the first place, that, to interpret ANY So-called Preposition by an Adjective, a Noun, or a PAST Participle, would be not merely STIFF, or AFFECTED ; but it would be a DOWNRIGHT AND VERY GROSS ABSURDITY, as has already been demonstrated. But, to interpret ANY (*i. e.* EVERY) So-called Preposition as a VERB, *i. e.* as a SO-CALLED PROGRESSIVE Participle, would be so FAR from being either stiff, or affected, that I insist, with the fullest confidence, upon its being universally and without a single anomaly *most elegant, as well as most rational*. And I should be doing culpable injustice to the Subject, were I not to express this truth in the strongest possible terms for the consideration of readers ; which truth, I have no doubt, will be granted the moment we turn to contemplate the procedure of Subordinate Writers, or rather of All Writers, with

regard to it. When these feel that *some explanation ought* to be offered, of the manner in which a NOUN (for example) can possibly perform the *office of connecting Two OTHER NOUNS TOGETHER*; (which Office *they know to be that of a Preposition*;) the *answer*, if *not the explanation*, is ready at hand: "IT WOULD BE STIFF, UNUSUAL, "and AFFECTED,"—were they to let us into this secret! It is to be hoped that the value of such an answer may be fully appreciated, in all time to come. PREPOSITIONS, (*i. e.* ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTS OF SPEECH,) if interpreted in *their TRUE import*, would make a Language STIFF, and AFFECTED!!! The bare assertion of this proposition is a conspicuous manifestation of the most profound darkness in the Philosophy of Signs.

There is one concluding observation, which I have purposely reserved for this place, and which, if I mistake not, will throw a strong and satisfactory light upon the Nature of the dark and refractory Word—IN.—It will sound extraordinary, or paradoxical, after what has been advanced concerning it, when I affirm that Englishmen,—I mean *Ordinary* Englishmen—*always have* IN ONE SENSE UNDERSTOOD, and DO NOW UNDERSTAND, perfectly well, the true Logical and Grammatical import of the Word—IN,—when employed Prepositionally. The fact, however, I shall shew to be indisputable. To decide the matter; I propose, Let a Foreigner ask any Englishman, What he means, when he says that *Any One Thing* is

IN *Another*. In this case, then, I affirm, it would be out of the power of the person, so asked, to make any other than ONE SORT of answer :—and this answer he would make most readily.—He must say that, to be IN *Another Thing*, is, *in mathematical strictness*, TO EXIST *filling* that thing ; but, at any rate, TO EXIST (*i. e.* TO BE) *penetrating, pervading, possessing, or occupying*, the Thing in question. Now *Every One of these Words, alike*, is a VERBAL, *converted by associated position into a VERB, i. e. a MINOR VERB* : NOR CAN the Word —IN—be interpreted by *Any Word except SUCH A VERBAL*. Hence, then, we may ask, By what enchantment, or wonderful contradiction in natural reason, has it come to pass, that the PREPOSITION—IN ;—AND PREPOSITIONS, ONE AND ALL ;—have, during so many ages of the most enlightened portion of our History, been esteemed as Words that are Signs of NO IDEA ; and the imagined imports of which have furnished, in the minds of different Grammarians, nothing but a succession of the most ridiculous conceits, which the reader may find curiously embalmed in the sarcastic animadversions of Mr. Tooke ?

In a word ; I humbly conceive, the whole evidence adduced is as complete and satisfactory as could be at all desired that, whatever may have been the conception, or misconception, of Englishmen at all, at any of the different stages of our Language, from its earliest origin until the present hour, with regard to the Grammatical Import of the Word—INNE ;—it ALWAYS OUGHT TO

HAVE BEEN, AND NOW MUST BE, translated by the Word INNING, which means ONE-ING, which means that the *Noun or Co-agent* which precedes this So-called PREPOSITION—(i. e. this MINOR VERB)—is PERFORMING THE ACTION OF MAKING ITSELF ONE WITH the *Noun or Co-agent* which follows it. Nor are we here to forget, with regard to this most useful and most important perhaps of all So-called Prepositions, that, although the ACTION OF ONE-ING must, according to our conception, destroy the *Physical Severalty and Plurality* of the Two Co-agents concerned ; yet, by the *Logical Fiction of this Act*—ONE-ING,—this *Bridge*,—this *Link, of Logical Connection between Two Things*,—we PRESERVE THE GRAMMATICAL and LOGICAL Severalty and Plurality of the Two, as completely as if they had been Two Different Stars, or Systems.

Here it only remains to be recollected that, the present discussion is not to be understood as having been gone through for the sake, merely, of the Preposition INNE. For there is no reader, who shall assent to the views which it entertains, but will warrantably apply them to the case of OTHER dubious Words of this class, if no more direct light can be had with regard to them. The *nature and consequence* of the speculation, now concluded, is this : If I had failed in my object ; the failure could regard ONLY the *Simple Preposition*—INNE : —But, if I be admitted to have succeeded ; the History of this Individual is etymologically unveiled, and is therefore DECISIVE OF THE WHOLE

SPECIES TO WHICH IT BELONGS : For it would be to the last degree unphilosophical to suppose that, ANY ONE Preposition can differ from Another, in its **GENERIC PRINCIPLES**. I suppose, therefore, that the Nature of All So-called Prepositions would be etymologically manifested in that of the Word **INNE**, without any reference to any of the general and particular reasonings which have gone before.

THE MINOR VERBS—WITH,—FROM,—AND—BY.

The Three Words proposed for present consideration are so decidedly explained, by Dr. Murray, to have proceeded from the Progressive Participial Form, that, in order to show their etymological claim to the nature of Verbs, (*i. e. Verbs when duly associated between two Nouns,*) I have only to quote what he has advanced concerning them, respectively, with regard to this point. And when this *etymological* test is coupled with the *sense* which these Words *must* bear, in any sentences in which they are found ; and, also, with what has been advanced, in the way of reasoning *a priori*, concerning the Nature of Prepositions generally ; I trust that I need proceed no farther, in this direction, for any of the purposes which I had in view. Some part, of what is now to be cited, has been incidentally quoted before. But I think there is as little of repetition, throughout the work, as could well have been provided ;

and that, in this, as well as in other instances, the existing repetition will to many readers be not unprofitable : besides that, I could not lose the benefit of the evidence in question, in this place.

First, therefore, I proceed to speak with regard to the Nature of the So-called Preposition—FROM.

In the “ HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN LANGUAGES,” *Vol. 2, page 24*, it is said that,—“ In Teutonic, FRAGM, or FRAM, means *originating, running, proceeding*. FROGMA, which is the derivation of FRAG, run, through the medium of the preterite, is in use for a root or beginning. The reader must recollect, that to begin is itself from BI, upon, and gan, to go : BI-GIN, BI-GANG, to set agoing.”

Here; then, with regard to the Word FROM ;—it must be sufficient to advert to this indisputable testimony of its having been “ originally” of that PARTICIPIAL FORM which fitted it, from the beginning, to be employed as a Preposition. And, although time and usage had converted it into an AGENT-Noun ; and Etymologists, (NOT AWARE OF THE NECESSITY, FROM REASONING *a priori*, that every Preposition must be a VERBAL,) have, in this instance, blindly taken it for granted that FROM, *regarded as an Agent-Noun*, is a Preposition ; yet, it is impossible we can fail, with this light, to discern the certain mistake into which Etymology has thus led those who have trusted to it alone, without any view to the Real and Necessary Structure of Human Ideas.

It is, indeed, a remarkable confirmation of what

I have here suggested ; and it renders it impossible that Dr. Murray could, consistently, have considered the PREPOSITION — FROM — as an AGENT-NOUN, that, (back in *page 21* of the Same Volume,) he expresses himself as follows: “ The morning was EAR, or air, from EAC. When this word was applied to time, it signified before and beginning ; to place, present or in front. FROM, or beginning at, was OR and ER, because the point of beginning is often the place, time, or object, out of which a thing arises.”

Here, then, we have it, in express terms, by Dr. Murray, that, “ FROM ” is the VERB “ BEGINNING at.” And we have, elsewhere, the most positive evidence of Dr. Murray that, AT means TOUCHING OR ADJOINING. So that BEGINNING AT, is BEGINNING TOUCHING. I may therefore ask ; Could *any* etymological evidence be desired to be more conclusive than this is, in order to satisfy us regarding the History and the Nature of the Word—FROM ?

Here it is material to impress upon the reader’s attention that, it is not the FORM of the Word in question, (however this may have been *modified*, at different stages of our Language, to serve for a Noun of this, or that, particular import, whether literal or figurative, such, for example, as the Forms—FRO,—FRA,—FROM,—) that we are to contemplate as being the PRIMARY Object of our consideration : On the contrary, it is the IDEA, of which the Word was *originally significant*, that is our Primary Object. Now THIS IDEA, we have

seen, is the IDEA OF AN EXISTING ACTION : And it is, moreover, only of *Secondary* consideration WHAT PARTICULAR Action it is, whether it be supposed here to be ORIGINATING,—RUNNING,—or PROCEEDING,—that is meant. The ONLY etymological fact which we had any primary anxiety to ascertain was that, the Word—FROM—was originally the Sign of a PROGRESSIVE ACTION or ACTING. And this is the Principle upon which I proceed in the case of all Other Such Words. We may therefore now pass on, to the Word—WITH.

Mr. Tooke has affirmed the Word—WITH—to be the IMPERATIVE of WITHAN, TO JOIN. But Dr. Murray has shewn the contrary of this, at length, in his exposition of it. The last-mentioned writer says—(*Vol. 2. page 30.*) “ WITHRA “ is the ordinary ancient form of WITH ; a noun derived from WIGD, *turning, going.*”

I must request of readers, therefore, to note, in this extract, the ORIGIN of this Word, as being that of a VERBAL. Here, then, we have Mr. Tooke’s assumption, of an IMPERATIVE ; and, with it, his example of—“ *A House JOIN a Party* “ Wall ;”—EXPLODED ETYMOLOGICALLY, without having recourse to any of the reasonings which I have brought against them : And all that can follow, with regard to this Word, can be only of secondary importance, in the present investigation.

Dr. Murray continues thus : “ Like FOR and “ GAN, this Word meant *close to, at, before,* and

“hence *opposite*.”—“By signifying *opposite*, it came to mean *returned, retorted, sent, or done again*. It is not directly from *WITHAN, to join*; and the reader must observe that, it never signified *WITH* until it had denoted *turned toward, before*; in opposition to conjunction. It was little used until *MID* became obsolete.”

From the whole account of the Word in question, afforded by the illustrious Etymologist from whom the above quotations are only partial extracts, we derive a very important lesson: which I must here recommend to the particular attention of readers, in order to show *how little can be trusted to the logicalness of expression in the Ancient Dialects*. The fact is this: We find in the present instance that, *One Same Word*, at different stages of Language, came to signify *SEVERAL MOST DIFFERENT IMPORTS*; although these are, all of them, imports of Relation. Nay, it may be offered for a general remark, on the authority which I am now citing, that, during the poverty of Language, the Same Word had, very usually, the *Two most opposite* meanings of Relation that can exist. In the place already referred to, and previously to the assertions which I have quoted, Dr. Murray says,—“*MID* and *GEMANG* are from *MAG, gather, compress, unite, mix*. *MIGD*, accordingly, signified joined, and, of course, in company.” After this (as we have seen,) he assigns to the Word—*WITHRA*—*all the very different significatives of turning, going, close to, at, before, opposite, returned, retorted, sent or done again*.

And, lastly, we are informed, by direct implication, that **WITH** came to mean the same as **MID**, "*i. e.* COMPRESS, UNITE, MIX : " because we are told that, " it was little used UNTIL **MID** became obsolete." In the same passage, it appears rather contradictory that, it is said,—"*it never signified* " **WITH**, until it had denoted *turned, towards, before ; in opposition to conjunction.*" But I have nothing here to do with the CONTRADICTIONS OF ETYMOLOGY. And it is sufficient to insist upon two indisputable considerations—namely—*First* that, the Word in question has, at various stages of the language, *gone through a complete vagary of different imports of Relation ;* and, *Secondly*, that, at length, it has come to denote that Sort of Relation, between Two Things, which appears to have been once expressed by the Word "**MID**,"—namely—"JOINED, *and of course,* IN COMPANY."

Now, as a requisite and necessary alteration, here ; I would only correct the Term "**JOINED**" by substituting **JOINING** ; as, we find, such a modification is not altogether unpractised by Dr. Murray himself, or by the Ancient Tribes whom he quotes : whom I have already cited, as making the Same Word signify BOTH PAST *and* PRESENT Action. And, then, I apprehend, we shall have nearly the true and proper import of the Word—**WITH**.

To this, however, is to be added the suggestion that, we have, in the present day, given rather a different import to this Word ; and have thereby

formed a very useful distinction, if it were but duly observed;—That is, in making **WITH** signify a **MORAL**, in contradistinction to a **MERE PHYSICAL**, Relation: because **WITH**, *in the strictest propriety of the English Language*, means a **MORAL** tying between Some Two Things; whereas a *Mere local Proximity*, without any Moral Tye, is signified *more properly* by the Word **BY**,—which means **TOUCHING** or **NEARING**. Nor is this the less true, although the propriety of the matter is sacrificed in very many instances of ordinary expression. Thus, it would convey two very different meanings, if it were deposed, in a Court of Justice, that one person *walked several miles* **BY** another person; and again, if it were said that, he had *walked several miles* **WITH** that person. Although, in the face of such proper expression, it is common enough to employ the Minor Verb **BY**, when **WITH** ought to have been used; as when we say—*BY the Help of God*; when it ought to be **WITH**, *instead of BY*. The Word—**WITH**—may, indeed, with propriety, be called our **MORAL** Preposition or Minor Verb, in the English Language. When we talk of standing **BY** a man; we intend that we will stand **WITH** him.

Besides this much of **CERTAIN** evidence; it is now to be observed that, *over and above the undoubted Verbal Origin* of the Word **WITH**, it is very probable there has, at a far later period of our Language, been a **VERB TO WITH**. We have, at this day, in our Provincial Speech, the **NOUN** **WITHE**; although, as is justly observed by Mr.

Tooke, this Noun “ is *not often* used in our books.” He has, in his *Notes*, furnished two, or three, examples of the employment of this Noun; to which the reader may refer: but almost every Englishman knows it is the Name of a **TYE**, made of any flexible Twig of a ligneous nature, such as baskets are made of.

The reason which I think renders it extremely probable that this Noun was employed as a Verb, and was afterwards lost as such, divides itself into two distinct considerations:—namely,—*First* that, the *pronunciation of this Word* as a **VERB** is attended with some organic inconvenience; owing to which, it would naturally, in time, come to give place to *some other Verb*, of similar import but of easier utterance: And *Secondly* that, we have actually another Verb, in the Language, which possesses *both these qualities*; which is the **VERB TO WATTLE**, which is a well-known English Verb, although, like the Noun **WITHE**, (to speak in the words of Mr. Tooke,) it is not often used in our books—it being a Verb expressive only of a very low occupation. But, *whether or not* this Word has, at any period of our Language, passed, from being of *Verbal Origin*, to being employed popularly as a Verb—and as the Minor Verb—**WITHING**,—is a matter of no consequence either to the General Subject, or to our estimation of the *Real* import of this Word. And, I suppose, we may be satisfied here, with regard to the Etymology of the Word—**WITH**. I shall, therefore, proceed to consider the Word—**BY**.

Mr. Tooke has asserted the Preposition—*By*—to be the Imperative of the Anglo-saxon Verb *BEON*,—*to BE*. I have already shewn, at large, the almost continual absurdity of SENSE which follows, when we attempt to interpret this Word as an Imperative, as often as it is employed either Prepositionally or Adverbially. And, if any thing more were wanting, in order to ascertain the fallacy of Mr. Tooke's assumption, we find Dr. Murray has given his *etymological* testimony conclusively against him.

In the *Second Volume* of the History of the European Languages, page 31, it is said, “*BIG, INN, and DU, are the last words of this order which require explanation. The one is from BIG, the diminutive of BAG, to work, and signifies touching, working on closely. The Verb BIG is almost coeval with the radicals in the sense of move, act, work, live or stay in a place. BIG is therefore a station or residence.*”

Again, in Dr. M.'s “*ILLUSTRATIONS,*” page 344, it is said, “*BIG or BI, close to.*”

Here I request the reader to observe that, Dr. Murray has talked (almost at the close of the *first* of these two passages,) of the “*VERB, BIG.*” And, here (in the *second* passage) he *identifies* *BIG* with *By* or *BI*.

Again, back in page 2 of his Text, he says, “*By, which originally meant at, often signifies beside, and, in a secondary sense, beside the other object; for example, by a road, mark, or line, which is equivalent to being off them.*”

Concerning the VERBAL nature of the Word—BY,—therefore, I apprehend, there cannot remain an ETYMOLOGICAL doubt.

And here it may be proper to remark that, in the course of the evidence which has been adduced from the authority of Dr. Murray, in different parts of this Work, it has incidentally appeared that, VARIOUS OTHERS of our most ordinary, and of course most hacknied and mutilated, So-called Prepositions, such as AT,—TO,—and OF,—have been equally shewn to proceed from a VERBAL ORIGIN. In the last-quoted extract, for example, we have the So-called Preposition—“OFF,”—(which was formerly spelt like the *Adverb* OFF,) identified with the Verbal—BY—: And the Same Word—BY—identified with AT.

In fine. Not only does it appear, in the most satisfactory manner, that the Four Words whose Nature has been thus investigated; and, also, Various other Prepositions, incidentally mentioned here; are VERBALS in the *So-called Progressive Participial Form*: but, if the reader should go over “THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN “LANGUAGES,” with a view to the fact; I conceive, he must be struck by observing HOW CONTINUALLY this Form of expression is shewn to be instrumental in the SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONAL, as well as in the VERBAL character.

SUBSECTION V.

1. *Of the French Pretended Preposition—CHEZ ; together with some Observations on the English Preposition—THROUGH—: General Grammatical Considerations involved in this discussion.*—2. *Final illustration of the Nature of So-called Prepositions or Minor Verbs, and of the Law of Alternation of these in Series.*—3. *Conclusion of the Analysis of Minor Verbs.*

THE Principal and indeed the only reason for going into an investigation of the Nature of the So-called French Preposition—CHEZ—; (more especially as this Word is altogether foreign to our Language;) is the fact of its having been, in a very conspicuous manner, selected by Mr. Tooke, in order to serve as an example, and in fact as a triumphant proof, of the truth of his General Assumption that, *No Word can become a SO-CALLED PREPOSITION until after it has undergone the process of CORRUPTION.* And, as I apprehend that nothing could be more conclusively demonstrable than the real nature of the Word—Chez;—And that, No Word could, in its real nature, serve for a more remarkable illustration of the truth of my own general reasonings on the Subject, than this one; I deem it peculiarly fortunate, for the sake of those readers who may have been more particularly biassed in favor of

Mr. Tooke's Theory, that he has chosen the Word in question as a Crucial Test of his doctrine.

Previously, however, to entering upon the consideration of the Word—CHEZ—itself, it is proper I should advert to my having, in a former place, intimated an intention of going into a similar inquiry with regard to the nature of the English So-called Preposition — THROUGH. Which Word Mr. Tooke has affirmed to be a NOUN: But concerning which, I intended to shew that, *if it is a NOUN*, it is then No PREPOSITION. But the trouble of so doing has been saved me by Dr. Murray; who has shewn, *etymologically*, that the Word—THROUGH—is NOT the Noun DOOR, GATE, or PASSAGE, as Mr. Tooke has confidently asserted; but is the Ancient ADVERB—ACROSS. “THAIRH, through, or over,” (says Dr. Murray, *Volume Second*, page 29,) “Thwairh is cross, from THWARIG, an “ adjective of THWAR, to turn.”—Such, according to the same authority, is the frequent fate of Mr. Tooke's particular Derivations.

But, although this Word—THROUGH—is thus disposed of; it may not be unprofitable, here, to shew HOW, or WITH WHAT SORT OF LOGICAL EFFECT, Mr. Tooke's exposition of it reads, when it is duly laid out. In his *First Volume*, page 335, he says,—“ Mr. Harris's instance (translated into “ modern English) stands thus :”

‘ *The splendid Sun—JOIN his beams — genially
warmeth— PASSAGE the air* ’—(or, the air being

the *passage* or *medium*) ‘the *fertile earth*.’—“ And “ in the same manner may you translate the preposition *Through* in every instance wherein *Thro*’ “ is used in English, or its equivalent preposition “ in any other language.”

With regard to the extract now furnished; and to the Doctrine which it embodies; I need only solicit the attention of the reader to the Two Forms of Expression which Mr. Tooke, in the character of a Philologist and Grammarian, deliberately lays down as being *synonymous and convertible*—namely—“ WARMETH PASSAGE THE AIR ”—and—“ THE AIR BEING THE PASSAGE.” And here it is not for a moment intended to be denied that, the former of these two expressions might serve as a Jargon, *to suggest the import of the latter to the mind of a Barbarian* who had not yet acquired any more rational method of Language. But, it may be asked; Can this fact, (even if we should go the length of supposing that the practice of it once actually existed among Barbarian Tribes,) Can Any Such fact as this, in the least degree, avail to render so revolting a jargon endurable among an enlightened people? I have already, as being a matter of the last degree of importance to the very existence of a Science of Language, depicted in the strongest terms the gross absurdity of stringing together a Number of Nouns, (considered at the moment *syntactically as Nouns*), and laying these down as a Sentence, or Speech, of Any Sort: And have, with this intent, resorted to the only method of illustration which

could serve to exhibit this absurdity in its real magnitude — namely — that of supposing an attempt to be made to express Any Operation in Arithmetic, by a Number of Signs of Quantities, such as A. B. C., or 3. 7. 9., *without Any Sign of Operation between them.* And here, more particularly, when we have before our eyes the actual fact of a Philologist, of no meaner reputation than that of Mr. Tooke, expressly laying down such a Formula in Verbal Grammar as that now under consideration, I feel the more imperatively called upon to hold up the matter, in the most conspicuous light, in order to secure the complete revolt of Philologists against a doctrine so deeply subversive of even our most humble pretensions to Rationality in the Department of Language. In fulfilment, therefore, of this intention, I have no hesitation in affirming that, if all the mistakes and blunders in *MODE and TENSE* for which boys have been whipped, through three thousand years, were made up into one parcel of error; it would form but a mole-hill, compared with the mountain-absurdity of stringing Nouns together to form a Speech or Sentence. And, if it were required to furnish an example which should transcend every other, in order to exhibit the preposterous inconsistency of mankind in some of their attempts to enlarge their Sphere of Knowledge; I think, nothing could serve, for this purpose, more effectually than the spectacle of beholding Teachers, and their Scholars, busied and turmoiled in all the phases of *CONJUGATION, INFLEXION, &c.*;

while this enormous absurdity, of NOUN **P**REPOSITIONS, is admitted, and looked up to, as one of the New **LIGHTS OF LANGUAGE**. It is on such an occasion as **THIS**, therefore, that the power of ridicule (if need were) ought to be called in, to serve the purposes of General Truth. And it is here that the unsparing lash of Mr. Tooke (*if he had happened to see the subject in the same light*) would have been wielded with keenest sarcasm, to irradiate a fallacy so monstrous.

I trust, indeed; and I expect to be told; that, a large proportion of readers might not require the matter in question to be shewn in any thing like so forcible a light, as that in which I have now placed it, in order to secure their complete revolt. And, in addition to this, it is easy to foresee that, the time will arrive, when it will become the wonder of all, that, at a period so late as the commencement of the Nineteenth Century, the Doctrine of Noun Prepositions was actually taught, and universally received, by Grammarians. But, along with this, there is no competent and ingenuous person, but must be aware that, among the large class of Philological readers who have imbibed the Grammatical Theory of Mr. Tooke, there are not a few who, *to much learning and classical research*, have not added any very deep concernment about the **STRUCTURE OF HUMAN IDEAS**, whether real or supposed; and who, therefore, will go but slowly into a due consideration of the Nature of these "**CAUSES OF LANGUAGE**," since they have been so signally scouted by their Master: While,

at the same time, these learned persons feel so satisfied with the Views which they have accepted at the hands of the Philologer of Purley, that nothing short of an exposure of the most monstrous absurdities in these views, and these absurdities placed in the most glaring lights, could be expected to do so much as ROUSE them from their sleep of security, and induce them to open their eyes upon the actual state of the prospect around them. There is no person, therefore, who has a serious desire for the advancement of the subject, but must discern that, every stress ought to be laid upon exhibiting the Defects of the Late System, in such forms as must render it impossible for the most prejudiced of its advocates, for a moment, to think of encountering the ridicule in which any attempt at defending it would inevitably involve him. I may add, indeed, that I proceed, here, upon the *actual knowledge of one* such instance of bias: Which, I apprehend, warrants the calculation that there may be more persons of this description.

The nature of the present topic induces me, in the close of these observations, to subjoin, as a general remark, that, in such Subjects as Grammar; or, as Metaphysics in many of its branches; it is vain to utter, as is very commonly done, an unqualified assertion that a writer ought to proceed with a straight-forward statement of his Principles, without digressing to discuss those of antecedent or opposed authorities. The certain consequence of such an attempt would be that,

any reader, with an imagination filled by authorities and prejudices, would be every moment disturbed by objections, which *he himself would be altogether unable to solve*, but which might be exploded for ever by being adverted to and discussed by the writer. In any such branch of research, therefore, it is the indispensable business of an author to *anticipate and provide for* every prejudice, and every objection, which is of such a magnitude as to induce any serious risk of its competing with his Principles, by influencing his readers.

OF THE FRENCH PREPOSITION—CHEZ.

In the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, Mr. Tooke says, “There is not (as far as I am aware) a
 “ Preposition in any Language, answering directly
 “ to the French Preposition CHEZ. Yet does it by
 “ no means follow, that the modern French do
 “ therefore employ any operation of the mind, or
 “ put their minds into any posture different from
 “ their ancestors, or from other nations; but only
 “ that there happens not to be in any other Lan-
 “ guage a similar corruption of some word corres-
 “ ponding precisely with CHEZ. Which is merely
 “ a corruption of the Italian Substantive CASA : in
 “ the same manner as *chose* is from *cosa*,” &c. &c.

After the reasonings, with regard to the Nature or Structure of Language, which have been submitted to the reader in the course of the foregoing Sections, I should here be strongly inclined to

pause, for a moment, and desire of him to contemplate the Climax of Doctrine which is exhibited in the passage that has just been transcribed—namely—that of **NOUN-PREPOSITIONS**, and of **PREPOSITIONS THAT ARE THE OFFSPRING OF CORRUPTION!** But I shall proceed, and let an exposition of the real and manifest nature of the Word—**CHEZ**—serve as the last commentary which could be offered upon the Doctrine in question.

FIRST, then, I observe, It is true that, when the French employ the Word or So-called Preposition **CHEZ**—they do not employ any operation of the mind, or put their minds into any posture, different from other Nations. But, with regard to Mr. Tooke's previous assertion—namely—that, There is not in any other Language a Preposition answering directly to the French Preposition—**CHEZ** ;—I must beg leave to risk the opinion that, there are, in the English Language, **SOME DOZENS** of Words, which are employed in a sense answering precisely, — *or with a most perfect equivalence*,—to that of the So-called French Preposition **CHEZ** :—Although no Literary Authority, in the English Language ;—nor, even, any obtrusions of Popular Conceit ;—has ever dreamt of introducing these Words into the Part of Speech called **PREPOSITIONS**.

SECONDLY. In order, therefore, to start upon common or assented ground, toward the exposition of this Word, or of its Grammatical Office rather, I here adopt, without hesitation, the deri-

vation and import which has been assigned to it by MR. TOOKE HIMSELF ; namely—that,—it is the NOUN—CASA ;—and it means no other than HOUSE. Hence, whatever may prove to be the Grammatical result of this fact, there is not a doubt, here, that the Word in question was, and is, and always must be considered or interpreted as, a NOUN : And thus far the views and exposition furnished by Mr. Tooke are established. The only question which now remains on the Subject, therefore, is, Whether, or not, this Noun DOES, or CAN, serve in the Office of a So-called Preposition, in the French, or in Any Other Language ? After what has been advanced, however ; and, especially, after what has been again suggested in adverting to the Word—THROUGH ;—the question, I think, can neither be doubtful, nor tedious in its solution.

Mr. Tooke, (I believe,) as well as Mr. Harris and All Other Grammarians, admits that a Preposition is the Sign of *Some Relation* between the Two Words which it connects. Had Mr. Tooke known, therefore, that a RELATION between Any Two Words, or Things, is (*in a logical sense*) an ACTION BETWEEN these Things ; He would instantly have admitted that a Preposition MUST BE A VERB ; because he knew that *No Word except a Verb can be the Sign of Any Action*. Besides, or collateral with this, also ; Had Mr. Tooke been aware of the Grand Fundamental error of Logicians, in their assuming that an ACTION is an Attribute of SOME ONE Agent ; (whereas, on the contrary, it is de-

monstrated to be a **DISTINCT LOGICAL LINK OR VINCULUM BETWEEN SOME TWO CO-AGENTS** ;) he might instantly have discerned that, **EVERY PREPOSITION IS PRECISELY SUCH A LINK OR VINCULUM BETWEEN SOME TWO NOUNS** ; and he would thus have perceived that, a *Preposition is a Thing in Language* PERFECTLY ANALOGOUS to an *Action in Logic*.

In case it might otherwise be incautiously supposed here, by some readers, that **EVERY Preposition is NOT a Connector of Two NOUNS** ; Or, in Other words, In case it should be supposed, for example, that, in the expression—*He WENT TO London*—the So-called Preposition—*To*—connects **NOT Two NOUNS**, but connects only a **VERB** and a *Noun* ; I deem it may not be inexpedient, here, to call to their recollection One of the **Primary Grammatical Principles** which have been advanced, and insisted upon, in these pages—namely—that, **EVERY VERB**, situated as the Verb—“*WENT*”—now is, becomes, for the time being, a **SYNTACTICAL NOUN**, and *is the NOMINATIVE* to the *Preposition which it precedes*.

Mr. Tooke having labored in one common mistake with all Logicians, with regard to the **Two Fundamental Truths**—namely—*First*—That **EVERY RELATION is, in a Logical Sense, an ACTION** ;—and, *Secondly*,—That an **ACTION**—(*i. e.* **EVERY ACTION**)—is a **PRINCIPAL GRAMMATICAL OBJECT**, **DISTINCT** from the **Two Co-AGENTS** which support it, precisely as a *London Bridge* is a **Principal Distinct Object** between the **Two Banks**

of the River which it connects, with this only difference, that, **EVERY ACTION is a SIMPLE Bridge** analogous to a Bridge of **ONLY ONE ARCH**; while London Bridge is **COMPLEXED of SEVERAL Arches**; the utter want of the smallest glimpse of light with respect to these **Two Principles**, (which form the very soul of the Genius of Language,) precluded the possibility that he could avoid falling into the most untenable conclusions, in his attempts to solve any of the real arcana of Grammar; and reduced him to stake his reputation to such expositions as that which I am about to quote.

After informing us (truly) that the Word — **CHEZ**—is the **NOUN CASA**;—Mr. Tooke gravely subjoins the following illustration of his views with regard to it.—“ For, *Je viens DE CHEZ VOUS*, “ is no other than *Je viens DE CASA À vous*.” Which exposition of his, when put literally into English, makes him affirm that the expression — *I come from HOUSE YOU*—means **AS MUCH, and THE SAME, as** — *I come from House TO you, i. e. from House FINISHING you*.

Now if Mr. Tooke had been speaking as an ordinary person, in any matter in which the equivalence of the two expressions in question were a fact to be ascertained,—or disputed; it would, then, have been *a fit and a true* assertion, to affirm their equivalence. But, altogether different from any such character, Mr. Tooke was speaking in the Office of a **GRAMMARIAN, LAYING OUT THE SCIENCE** of the **Two Different Expressions, AND**

AFFIRMING THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE TWO, CONSIDERED AS TWO FORMULAS OF SIGNS. The question to be decided, therefore, is—Whether the Expression—“HOUSE YOU”—can be considered as equivalent to the Expression—“*House* TO” (i. e. *finishing*) “YOU;” Or, Whether, while the latter is a strictly Rational Formula of Signs, the former is not an exhibition of absurdity utterly revolting to Every Principle of a SCIENCE OF SIGNS? And, although it is not here denied that the meaning of a speaker may be understood in the objectionable case; Yet, I would ask, Can Any Such Expression, as this, be more tolerable in a SCIENCE OF RATIONAL SIGNS, than the *Mewing*, or *Purring*, of an animal, (the GROSS import of which we perfectly understand,) could be TOLERATED FOR SUCH A FORMULA.

The question is soon decided; And this with no less than *mathematical certainty*, and *mathematical precision*. If we suppose a Professor of Algebra to sit down, in order to instruct a Boy in the NOTATION (as preparatory to teaching him the Laws) of that Science; and if we farther suppose this Professor to lay it down, as a maxim in this Kind of Notation, that the Expression—A—B—is equivalent to the Expression $A \times B$,—or $A + B$;—or, else, is equivalent to SOME Expression of A and B—WITH SOME OTHER SIGN OF AN OPERATION between them; Then, this Teacher of Algebraical Notation would be proceeding upon a Principle PRECISELY THE SAME as that upon which Mr. Tooke, AS A GRAMMARIAN, has laid it down

that,—“House You”—is equivalent to—“*House* “TO” (i. e. finishing) “*You*.”—And, if the supposed procedure of the Algebraist would be an affront to Human Understanding; then, the actual procedure of the Grammarian, as quoted in the present case, is *specifically* One and the Same: The two cases differ in nothing farther—than in being two individual cases of the same class.

And here, in this final appeal to the certain and indubitable ANALOGY—OR GENERIC IDENTITY RATHER—which exists, and MUST UNIFORMLY BE RECOGNISED AS EXISTING, of the Laws of Scientific Notation with those of Verbal Grammar, it may not be without use, especially to some classes of readers, to observe that, the *Signs* of OPERATIONS in Algebra, or Arithmetic, are in point of fact VIRTUAL VERBS, *inasmuch as they are* VIRTUAL PREPOSITIONS: Thus

6. *adding* 6. EQUAL 4. *adding* 8.

8. *subtracting* 4. EQUAL 12. *subtracting* 8.

6. *multiplying* 6. EQUAL 12. *multiplying* 3.

4. *dividing* 12. EQUAL 3. *dividing* 9.

Or, in the last example it might be said—

12. *dividing bying* 4. EQUAL 9. *dividing bying* 3.

And thus are the Nominally Two Kinds of Notation in question identified, beyond the reach of an objection, or a cavil. Indeed it is well known to every School-boy that, when he is *uttering* his Arithmetic, instead of writing it, he continually makes use of the PREPOSITIONS—TO,—FROM,—BY

and INTO : But the WANT is that, a School-boy ; or Any Grammarian for him ; entertains no conception that the Words—TO,—FROM,—BY,—and INTO,—are VERBS ; as it is certain, from all the demonstrated Principles of Grammatical Science in this work, EVERY SIGN OF AN ACTION OR OPERATION MUST BE.

To resume, now, with regard to the views of Mr. Tooke ; it would be an instance of trifling, altogether unworthy of the Subject, were any one here to attempt to defend his doctrine, upon a plea that, he only meant to affirm that the expression—“ *House You* ”—is an ELLIPTICAL expression ; and that, when the elided Sign is filled in, the whole becomes equivalent to the expression—“ *House to You.* ” This, indeed, Mr. Tooke *himself* has, (*most inconsistently with himself,*) affirmed, in his context. And it, assuredly, needed no profound expositor to inform any person that, the One Expression imports, *in some way*, the same as the other. But this exposition is only CUTTING the knot, with regard to the Character of the Word—CHEZ ;—and is NOT UNTYING it. And it is quite undeniable that Mr. Tooke, *altogether over and above the Principle of Ellision*, esteemed the Word—CHEZ—to have acquired, THROUGH THE PROCESS AND VIRTUE OF CORRUPTION, — *the Grammatical Character of a Preposition, in addition to its PRIMARY CHARACTER OF A NOUN* : for (we are to recollect) he deliberately affirms that, *the reason why* no other Language has a Preposition precisely answering to this One is, that, “there

“ happens not to be in any other Language a
 “ SIMILAR CORRUPTION of some word corresponding precisely with the word CHEZ. If either the French Grammarians, or Mr. Tooke for them, had viewed the Word—CHEZ—as being a MERE SYNTACTICAL NOUN; and as *requiring a Preposition* (such as FROM, or TO,) to be *understood along with it*, when such is not actually expressed; then, there could not have been any cause of difficulty, or discussion, in the Subject; and these Writers could only have had to remark, as a popular error, the calling of this Word—a PREPOSITION. But it is manifest that the Word — CHEZ — has involved its French expositors in insuperable embarrassment: and that, Mr. Tooke, in affirming it, truly, to be a NOUN, has NOT THE LESS *affirmed it to be at the same time a PREPOSITION*; and this upon the SOLE GROUND OF its having gone through the process of CORRUPTION.

In proof of what I now conclusively assert, I have extracted the following passage, from that part of Mr. Tooke’s Treatise which treats of the Subject. Speaking of the observations of the Abbé Girard upon the Nature of the Word—CHEZ—he says,—“ Neither could he have said”—
 ‘ Il s’agit ici de la permission que l’usage a accordée
 ‘ à quelques prépositions d’en régir d’autres en
 ‘ certaines occasions: c’est-a-dire, de les souffrir
 ‘ dans les complémens dont elles indiquent le rap-
 ‘ port; comme—‘ *Je viens DE CHEZ vous.*’—“ He
 “ would have seen through this grammatical mys-
 “ tery of one preposition’s governing another; and

“ would have said, that DE may be prefixed to
 “ the *Substantive* CHEZ (id est, CASA) in the same
 “ manner as to any other substantive. For,”—
 ‘ *Je viens DE CHEZ vous* ’—“ is no other than—*Je*
 “ *viens de CASA d vous* : or, (omitting the *Segnacaso*)
 “ *de CASA vous* ; or, *de CA vous*.”

“ DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, Vol. 1. page 303.”

Here, then, we have arrived at the upshot of Mr. Tooke’s doctrine of the Subject ; amounting incontestibly to this—namely—*First*, That, the Preposition—DE—may be prefixed to the SUBSTANTIVE CHEZ or CASA, in the same manner as to *Any Other* Substantive : which assertion is a truth that no Grammarian need have asserted, and hardly any child needed to be told :—And, —*Secondly*,—That, when *this prefixing takes place in the case of the NOUN CHEZ* ;—it is an example of “ ONE PREPOSITION’S governing ANOTHER.” Now it is in THIS LAST-MENTIONED assertion that, I affirm, Mr. Tooke, in the present case, speaks FROM THE BOTTOM OF AN ABYSS INTO WHICH NOT ONE RAY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE EVER SHOT. Although I have before suggested, as a most important Principle in Grammar ; and shall presently advert again to the fact ; that, ONE REAL PREPOSITION MAY, and *very frequently* DOES, govern ANOTHER REAL Preposition ; and this in *Series* of TWO, THREE, or MORE Prepositions, — each one governing that which next succeeds to it,—a matter which neither Mr.

Tooke nor any other Grammarian has ever suspected.

The real truth of the existing case is, that the foregoing expression—“*Je viens de CASA à vous*,”—amounting in English to—I come *from House* to You,—but which would be expressed in an idiom more familiar to us if we said—I come *from House* of You,—is as Grammatical a Structure as can appear in any Language. And, although the haste of popular pronunciation has occasioned the usual *ellision of the PREPOSITION* — (‘*the Seg-nacaso*’)—TO :—And popular inattention has thus suffered the NOUN—CHEZ—to PASS FOR A PREPOSITION in the French Language, until, at length, even French Grammarians, and English Grammarians also, have lost the Real Grammatical Character of this Word : Yet, it is not in the least degree less dark, or less deplorable for Human Reason, that such an exhibition in the PHILOSOPHY OF SIGNS should have reared its head in an age so generally enlightened as that in which we live. Mr. Tooke has called this exhibition—“the MYSTERY of *One Preposition’s governing ANOTHER*.”—MYSTERY, INDEED, it must appear to all those who do not discern that it is a MOST EGREGIOUS ABSURDITY : And yet, we have an additional lesson in the reflection which Mr. Tooke has expressed, in the conclusion of his doctrine with regard to the Word in question ; which I shall transcribe, here, for the benefit of those who may have occasion to apply it.

“ But thus it is that when Grammar comes at

“ length (for its application is always late) to be
 “ applied to Language ; some long preceding
 “ corruption causes a difficulty : ignorance of the
 “ corruption gives rise to some ingenious system
 “ to account for those Words which are con-
 “ sidered as original and not corrupted. Suc-
 “ ceeding ingenuity and heaps of misplaced learn-
 “ ing increase the difficulty, and make the error
 “ more obstinate, if not incurable.”

The only consolatory circumstances, in this view of the past, are that, Writers of Universal Grammar have been **VERY FEW** ; and that, these few, for the most part, have supposed their chance of success to consist in the **EMPLOYMENT OF MUCH LEARNING.** The reflection, upon this last mentioned head, which has been quoted by Mr. Tooke in another part of his Work, from Johnson's Preface, is equally just and important in this place :—

“ Junius appears to have excelled in extent of
 “ learning, and Skinner in rectitude of under-
 “ standing. Junius was accurately skilled in all
 “ the northern languages ; Skinner probably ex-
 “ amined the ancient and remote Dialects only
 “ by occasional inspection into dictionaries : But
 “ the learning of Junius is often of no other use
 “ than to shew him a track by which he may de-
 “ viate from his purpose ; to which Skinner al-
 “ ways presses forward by the shortest way.
 “ Skinner is often ignorant, but never ridiculous :
 “ Junius is always full of knowledge ; but his va-

“riety distracts his judgment, and his learning is
“very frequently disgraced by his absurdities.”

As a concluding observation, of vital importance here, I merely remark that, the present discussion is to be regarded, not as being for the sake of the Word—CHEZ—ALONE: but with a view to the GENERAL STRUCTURE of So-called Prepositions.

To pass on, now, to *Another* consideration of the Word—CHEZ.—That this Word, —*whether uncorrupted or corrupted*,—can never serve in any other Office than that of a NOUN, in any Syntactical Arrangement or Device whatever, unless when put as an ADVERB; is a truth which will, if possible, appear still more clearly in my redeeming of the pledge, which was given in the outset of this discussion, that there are in the English Language SOME DOZENS of Words that are perfectly equivalent to this one; although the English Grammarians, or even the English Vulgar, have never dreamt of introducing Such Words into the Part of Speech called Prepositions.

Nothing, indeed, could surprise me more, than that Mr. Tooke should have denied the existence of these Words; or, failed to advert to the *perfect specific identity* which exists in them and his supposed UNIQUE PREPOSITION. Nor does this, in the case of some of these Words, stop at all short of an INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, in point of

import. The matter of fact is as common, and as obtrusive upon our attention, as the cries of street merchandise.

Thus, in the *First* place, If we address a Letter — To Mr. *John Bull*, PORTLAND PLACE, *London*;—the COMPOUND NOUN—“PORTLAND PLACE,”—in this expression,—is *precisely as much* a PREPOSITION, as the French Word—CHEZ—is in any such situation. At the same time; there is not an English Letter-carrier, who does not understand that, such an Address means — To *Mr. John Bull*, IN (*i. e. innng*) PORTLAND PLACE, IN (*i. e. innng*) *London*.

Secondly. It is not altering the case, but is only stating it more immediately in the French Idiom, if we suppose the Letter addressed to *Mr. A.*—HOUSE—*Mr. B.*—Portland Place. And, though the London Letter-carrier would judge this to be rather what he would call an OUTLANDISH Direction; he would infallibly understand that *Mr. A. resides* IN the HOUSE OF *Mr. B. Portland Place*; and would deliver the Letter accordingly. And though this mode of superscribing a Letter has not yet been literally transplanted from the French, into the English Language; it is, nevertheless, a notorious fact that *Equivalent* Idioms to this obtain, in the English, in all the lower departments of commerce. As examples of this; we may take the expressions—*Port Wine*—PIPE—*No. 10*;—*Virginia Tobacco*—CASK—*No. 6*;—and—*Broad Cloth*—BALE—*No. 20*:—in which several expressions, the Words—PIPE—CASK—and—BALE—

are as GOOD AND PERFECT PREPOSITIONS, as the French Word—CHEZ—is in any situation whatever ; that is, they are NOT PREPOSITIONS AT ALL, but are MERE SYNTACTICAL NOUNS, each in its respective phrase.

In like manner, we have a great variety of *Other Words*, that is Other Nouns,—employed, by a very common and very vulgar Idiom, in the very same way ;—such, for example, as—BARREL,—STALL,—WARD,—BOAT,—BARGE,—COACH,—WAGGON,—DRAWER,—SHELF,—PIDGEON-HOLE,—&c. &c. &c.—Every One of which, when so employed, is as much a Preposition, as the Word —CHEZ.—Nor is the cause in the least degree doubtful, WHY, in the hurry of continual traffic, the *Vulgar* ;—*and, even, the writing and reading Vulgar* ;—such as Excisemen, Wine Coopers, and Custom-House Officers, should, for the sake of brevity, have thus curtailed the proper expression, and thereby rendered what they ACTUALLY DO express a mass of the grossest Grammatical Absurdity, *if we do not include the understanding of SOME PREPOSITION (Some REAL Preposition)* as interposed between the Nouns, in each of these Formulas.

Upon the same Principle, and for the same reason, I may observe that, although we do not address a Letter, in English, to *Mr. A.—HOUSE—Mr. B.*—yet, we do what is *perfectly equivalent* to this, even in the address of a Letter. When we say —*Mr. A.—No. 23—Portland Place* ; the *Numeral Noun*—“No. 23”—is precisely as much a

Preposition, as the Word — CHEZ — would be in the address of a French Letter.

There is yet remaining One Other consideration of the present Subject: In the course of which, will be introduced the last illustration, which I propose to furnish of the Nature of Minor Verbs or So-called Prepositions, with exception of that summary notice of them which will occur in the concluding chapter of the work. The thing to which I now allude is Mr. Tooke's having, in the place referred to, expressed himself concerning the "*mystery of One Preposition's governing another.*" This mystery, we have seen, according to the views heretofore entertained of the Subject, consists in a *Syntactical Noun's following a Preposition*, in the French Language,—*the said Noun also being itself interpreted as a Preposition.* It was (it must be confessed) *something*, in the way of atonement, to set down such an Expression for a MYSTERY. But the purpose for which a notice of it is here again requisite, is to prevent, upon the one hand, the possibility of this absurdity's being, by any person, confounded with that Law of the Governing of REAL Prepositions by Prepositions, which was suggested and illustrated in a foregoing part of this work; And, at the same time, equally to prevent, upon the other, the mistake of supposing that, in my opposition to Mr. Tooke's Doctrine and the French Doctrine of the Word CHEZ, I meant to deny ALL Governing of Prepositions by One-ano-

ther. And, although nothing short of a great degree of carelessness, or inattention, could enable any reader to fall into either of these mistakes ; yet, when it is considered that the Law, thus again brought to the attention of readers, is a thing altogether unknown and unsuspected in Accredited Grammar ; and the necessity there is, in going over new or untrodden ground, to impress a reader indelibly with the NATURE *and the SIGNS which proclaim it* ; it cannot be other than safe and expedient to advert to the present topic with particular care. Besides which, also, I have all along supposed that, an additional and concluding string of examples of the Nature of Minor Verbs, especially with regard to this very Law of their GOVERNING ONE-ANOTHER, is still wanting : which illustration, therefore, I had contemplated to supply, in this place.

The Grammatical Law under consideration, then, is that, All So-called Prepositions being universally and of necessity VERBS ; they must, as such, *conform to the LAW OF THE ALTERNATION OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE* : In consequence of which, it comes to pass that, So-called Prepositions MAY ; *and, in the perfection of Language*, VERY FREQUENTLY DO ; FOLLOW ONE ANOTHER IN SERIES, OF TWO, THREE, OR MORE ; Each One of them governing that which immediately succeeds it, in the series. The REASON, moreover, of the Law of the Alternation of a Verb in a Sentence, is laid down in the place where I

first delineated this Principle : Which will save the occupying of any room with explaining it at present. All, therefore, that remains to be done, at *this* stage of the Subject, is to furnish such concluding examples of the Law, as appear to be requisite in order to complete the analysis of Minor Verbs.

In the final execution of this part of my task, there are two considerations which I principally desire to impress in the apprehension of readers. The *First* of these is That, although the Law of the Alternation of a Verb is a matter altogether unrecognised, and unthought of, in Accredited Grammar, it is a Principle whose Operation is so comprehensive, and whose Utility is so great, that a due understanding of this Law may be said to be the KEY OF GRAMMAR. The *Second* is, That, the operation of this Law (which always takes place in the employment of Minor Verbs or So-called Prepositions in Series) *forms one of the most, if not quite the most, efficient means, which Grammar possesses, or can possess, FOR THE DISCRIMINATIVE PERFECTION OF LANGUAGE.* The string of examples, which will now be submitted for the illustration of these two truths, will, in their internal evidence, manifest the reality of the fact. And the fact itself consists in this ; that, BY REASON OF THE SAID LAW, we can DEFINE the expressing, or asserting, of ANY PRIMARY ACTION, BY THE EXPRESSING OF ONE, TWO, THREE, or MORE, MINOR OR DEPENDING ACTIONS, *which the occasions may demand should be DISCRIMINATED, and so*
Anal.

EXPRESSED, by Every People that is far advanced in General Knowledge; as contradistinguished from the case of any Barbarous People, who cannot express themselves better, or more discriminatively, than by the assertions, of ACTIONS UNDEFINED BY SUCH VARIOUS SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES IN THEIR MODIFICATIONS. In adverting to this perfection of Language, however, I do not bring it to notice as a device that is not already, to a certain extent, known and established in our Dialect. With regard to this, from the beginning, I have only intended to lay down and illustrate the GRAMMATICAL LAW OR PRINCIPLE UPON WHICH SUCH EXPRESSIONS ARE CONSTRUCTED, as being a Matter never, in the least degree, brought to light in Accredited Grammar, but which has hitherto been most deplorably misapprehended therein. The continued approach to perfection, or improvement, which must have operated in the Language of any enlightened People, could not fail, in process of time, to give existence to such Structures as that now under consideration, *as an expedient existing in actual practice.* BUT, *to understand the Logical Principle,* upon which this expedient has been built, is, certainly, quite another matter: And experience sufficiently proves that these two things are as completely different, as the Action of Speaking is different from a knowledge of the Mechanical Principles of the Organisation by means of which we do speak.

In Each of the examples which are now immediately to follow, therefore, the reader will have to

observe, **How MANY** Actions are expressed and discriminated by the employment of **ONE SINGLE MAJOR** Verb and a *following Series* of *Minors*; each succeeding Minor Verb depending upon that which immediately precedes it in the Character of a Syntactical Noun.

He **WAS** *preparing for going to France.*

He **WAS** *thinking of returning to England.*

He **THOUGHT** *of endeavouring to return by sea.*

He **TALKED** *of attempting to travel by land.*

He **PROPOSED** *to attempt passing under the walls.*

He **SUGGESTED** *to ride across the country.*

He **SPOKE** *of trying to surround the party.*

They **HESITATED** *at endeavouring to persuade him.*

They **INTENDED** *to go expecting (for) to see him.*

He **SUCCEEDED** *in coming (for) to meet them.*

It must be unnecessary to add to the number of these examples : because it is manifest that *Any Other Leading Nominative, or Final Accusative*, might be employed, instead of those above exhibited ; and that, the Different Combinations both of Major and of Minor Actions, which may thus be formed into Series and expressed, are altogether infinite ; insomuch that, Every Verb in Language may be introduced into them, to serve as well for Minor as for Major Verbs. And here we cannot fail to discern the great extent and convenience of such models of Expression : **IN WHICH, ALL CIRCUMLOCUTION OR UNNECESSARY ENUNCIATION OF SPEECH IS ACCURATELY AVOIDED.**

The first observation, therefore, which I shall offer upon this Principle, is to advert, here again, to its PROPERTY OF ALTERNATING the Grammatical Character or Office of the Words which are subjected to it. Thus, in the Series — He *was beginning to prepare for going to France* — the Major Verb — “*was*” — serves first AS A *Verb*, — and the Word — “*beginning*” — serves merely as a VERBAL NOUN and the Accusative Noun to the Verb *was* : — but, next, the Word — “*was*” — serves as a SYNTACTICAL NOUN and the Nominative to the Word — “*beginning*,” which last is now serving as a MINOR VERB, its Accusative being the Word — “*to*” — (*i. e. finishing*) serving at the moment as a Syntactical Noun : And so on, through the Whole Series, and through *Every Other* Series of Analogous Expressions. And thus, we see, EVERY VERBAL, in Any Series of Verbals, serves, and must serve, under a Necessary Law of the Category of Relation, ALTERNATELY AS VERB and AS SYNTACTICAL NOUN ; and must be PARSED accordingly.

To contrast, now, the Structure of Such Formulas as those furnished in the above examples, with the GRAMMATICAL PRINCIPLE *upon which they would be parsed in the existing or Accredited System* ; I observe that, the only tendency which that System has to recognise, or to speculate at, all upon, what I have called the PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATION OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE, is the usual Rule that, ONE VERB *governs* ANOTHER *in the INFINITIVE MODE* : and that

other Rule — namely — that a VERBAL *in* ING has the REGIMEN OF A VERB. Now the only profit which can be made of these Two Rules of Accredited Grammar; and which now stand monstrosly as two pitiable Anomalies in that System; is to adduce them *as an indubitable evidence, upon their own shewing*, that Grammarians have recognised the GERM, of the Principle of Alternation, (at least in their anomalous treatment of VERBALS IN ING :) Although it is here to be unceasingly kept in view that, I derive the Principle in question from a VASTLY DIFFERENT AND FAR HIGHER AUTHORITY *than* that of *Any Institution of Accredited Grammar*,—namely—from the NECESSARY AND IMMUTABLE STRUCTURE OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES AND RELATION, which is the ONLY FOUNDATION OF LANGUAGE. It forms, indeed, a beautiful test of the Paramount Authority and Operation of that Category, when we remark the Anomaly of Accredited Grammar, thus adverted to, as being the SMOTHERED GERM *of the Principle of Alternation*, peeping its head from beneath the clods and weeds which the blindness of Human Reason and the Institutions of Grammarians had heaped upon it, insomuch, that it was impossible it could ever *bud out* into a GENERAL Law of Grammar; (and far less into that GREAT AND COMPREHENSIVE LAW which it actually constitutes;) until we had recourse to the Necessary Constitution of Relatives and Relation, as above explained.

And, even in bearing evidence to the truth and

reality of the Principle of Alternation ; it is requisite to point out, here, that Grammarians have not, in the least degree, understood the Logic or Philosophy of their own Anomaly ; I mean, *so far as the Anomaly goes*. Of the truth of what I now affirm, the following considerations will furnish a proof.

First. Then, I observe, the Rule of Accredited Grammar asserts that, "ONE VERB governs ANOTHER in the Infinitive:" and it thereby means that, it governs AS A VERB ; and it does not, in the least, suppose that, in order to qualify it for this governing, the Word in question, FOR THE TIME BEING, LAYS DOWN ITS CHARACTER AND OFFICE OF A VERB, *and* MUST BE PARSED AS A SYNTACTICAL NOUN ; in which case of parsing, this Word is NO MORE A VERB, than JOHN, or PETER, is a Verb.

Secondly. With a darkness perfectly in keeping with that just now adverted to ; When the Accredited System asserts its Rule that, a VERBAL IN ING has the REGIMEN OF a Verb ; it does not, however, at all admit that the Verbal, in the moment of so governing, is a Verb.

How different is the prospect—How immeasurably different the view of *Logical Concatenation in Signs, considered as matter of RATIONAL SCIENCE*, when we turn from these two Anomalies of the Accredited System, and contemplate Innumerable Combinations of Actions in Series ; all of them expressed by Signs which, (*by an analogy corresponding with mathematical precision to the Grammatical Pro-*

portion of DEPENDENCE of the succeeding Actions,) exhibit to the ear, or to the eye, (as well as to the understanding,) the Spectacle of a CHAIN OF SIMPLE GRAMMATICAL BRIDGES,—or of ONE COMPLEX BRIDGE,—resembling the MAIN ARCH and *Half the DIMINISHING ARCHES* of our Westminster-Bridge,—Each *Succeeding Arch* LESSING in correspondence with its *Greater Dependence*, that is its *greater distance* from the *Principal Arch*.

And here we are to observe that there are TWO DISTINCT PRINCIPLES INVOLVED—namely—THE LAW OF ALTERNATION—and the PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPORTION OF GRAMMATICAL DEPENDENCE—OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE. In order to illustrate the last mentioned of these two Principles, therefore, I observe that, in the following Series—He *was beginning to prepare for going to France*—Not only is the *First Minor Verb*—“beginning”—a depending Verb upon its MAJOR—“was;”—but, in the progression of the Series, the *Second Minor Verb*—“to” (*i. e. finishing*) is, in like manner, depending upon the *First Minor Verb*—“beginning”—now serving as a *Noun* and as the *Nominative* to the Verb—“to”—: And so on, in the case of Every Succeeding Verb in the Series. In the construction of such a dependence, moreover, we are to observe that, we have no concern whatever with *any imagined, or any real, importance of Any of the Actions expressed, in any other sense, or on any other scale*, than in the sense and scale of its GRAMMATICAL Dignity, or Magnitude:

Which Magnitude is *ever in proportion to the SYNTACTICAL PLACE of the Action, in the Order of Expression*; the LEADING ACTION,—or its SIGN OR VERB,—being ALMOST ALWAYS THE MAJOR.

It is in thus turning from the Accredited System, (with its TWO ANOMALIES, of VERBALS governing *like* Verbs, and of ONE VERB governing Another in the Infinitive,) to the Universal Principle of the Alternation of Verbs in their Series, that I think we turn from profound darkness to the light of Grammar. But the contrast is now placed full in the view of Grammarians: And they are to judge for themselves.

There seems to remain hardly any other consideration, not already adverted to, in order to render this Part of the Structure of Language a matter of perfect Rational Science, not dependent upon the wind of opinion; or, even, upon any PHYSICAL cause in the change, or improvement, of Language; because this Structure is founded in those Eternal and Necessary Canons of Categorical Logic, which possess a stability in Reason that nothing, but a Subversion of Reason itself, can destroy. The only observation which appears to be wanting in this place; and, perhaps, this might have suggested itself to every reader who is at all *in the Subject*; is to remark that, IN SERIES OF VERBS, as already treated, EVERY VERB, when it *puts off the Office of a Verb*, and *takes on the Office of a NOUN*, in order to act as the NOMINATIVE to any

Verb which *follows* it, or as the ACCUSATIVE to any Verb that *precedes* it, in that moment, or for the time being, TAKES ON A GRAMMATICAL LIFE;—*i. e.* it becomes an AGENT—a CO-AGENT.—Thus, in the Expression—He PREPARED *for going to War*;—The Verb—“PREPARED”—*becomes, in its turn, an AGENT Noun*; and it is expressed as *performing the Action of FORING (i. e. FRONTING) the Action of Going*; which *Action of Going* (or its Noun) is, in this case, a CO-AGENT of the Action of FORING or FRONTING. And, *in this sense, EVERY VERBAL in Language, whenever it is performing the Office of a Syntactical Noun in Series, possesses as much a GRAMMATICAL VITALITY OR LIFE, as the Noun, John, or Peter does in a similar situation.*

The Structure of the VERBAL PART of Language, which has now been finally illustrated; and which has, all along, been treated as being of the NATURE OF A BRIDGE; contains a PECULIARITY OF FORM, which must distinguish it, IN POINT OF VARIETY, from that of an *Ordinary or Architectural Bridge*: Of the existence of which peculiarity, perhaps, a reader ought to be expressly apprised; although it is manifested in my reasonings, throughout. The matter to which I now allude is that, whereas, in *Any Architectural Bridge*, the ARCHES can only serve in the Office of ARCH, and can NEVER SERVE AS PIER, or ABUTMENT; IN LANGUAGE, on the contrary, the ARCHES (*i. e.* the VERBS) *must, when in Series, serve—ALTERNATELY—as Arch and as PIER, as has been sufficiently shewn and insisted upon.*

To this last intimation may be added the remark, that, AN ACTION IS NEVER (in this work) *supposed to be in STRICT resemblance with an Arch,—or Beam,—of Any Sort,—farther than in the GENERIC NATURE OF BEING A LINK OF LOGICAL CONNEXION between Some Two OBJECTS.* Every Action, on the contrary, has been demonstrated to be, IN STRICTNESS, a MEETING—*i. e.* A PARTITION OF CONTACT—between Some Two Things. But, although it is certain that, thus considered, *neither a Boat, nor a Bird* could be supposed to SAIL THROUGH BETWEEN Any Two Objects that are *logically considered as supporting Any Bridge of Action* between them: Yet, the IMAGE OF AN ARCHITECTURAL BRIDGE answers, with such full effect, to illustrate the Subject; and to impress it familiarly in the imagination; that, I have no doubt but *children may, hereafter, with much advantage, be initiated in the True Principles of Grammar by means of PLAY-THINGS IN THE FORM OF BRIDGES, constructed for this purpose.*

And here I bring to a close the supplementary examples, and arguments, which I had deemed it requisite to employ, in order to awake Philologists, and all the higher Classes of readers in the Department of Language, from that sleep of security in which they have enveloped themselves, in cherishing the opinion that the Philosophy of Language had begun to see the light in the speculation of Etymologists.

In doing which, the first observation which I desire to make is, that, if such of my readers as, to a competent knowledge of the Old System of Grammar, unite any cast to a Philosophical consideration of the STRUCTURE OF IDEAS, together with a portion of general acumen suitable to the occasion, shall suppose that less forcible, or less extensive, reasonings might have sufficed to show the real state of the Subject, than those which I have employed ; I would beg to remind them that, they overlook THE ACTUAL STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND OF EXISTING PREJUDICE, *at the moment I am writing*. In such case, it must be expected that, persons who are versed merely in LANGUAGE ;—without much cast to a Philosophical examination of its REAL “ CAUSES ;”—(nay — persons who, with Mr. Tooke, DO NOT ADMIT THE INTERFERENCE OF ANY SUCH CAUSES, AT ALL ;)—will struggle, or at least will *demur*, unless it be shewn, from the most unanswerable arguments, and to the most manifest peril of ridicule, that all struggle must be useless. I at least know of ONE such instance ; the statement of which, might furnish a very edifying example here : And I may therefore warrantably calculate upon there being more such. In general, I have felt such a uniform consciousness of suffering no sort of redundancy to carry me out of the road, according to my own conception of it, in all its real and necessarily great variety of considerations ; that, providing it be found, as I confidently believe it will, that my labor has resulted in determining, for ever, the True and Ne-

cessary Grammatical Laws of Language; I do not expect to be charged, by any competent person, with having introduced any topic, or observation, which could with expediency have been omitted. When any matter of Science becomes *generally known and established*; it is certain that, the ONUS *of not understanding it will* lie inevitably upon a READER: But, *in the original suggestion of it*, it is for its author to proceed upon the fore-knowledge that, the onus of not understanding it will as inevitably rest upon HIM. It is for this reason that, in order to render my reasonings and illustrations the more easily apprehended, I have, among other devices, followed the example of my predecessors—Mr. Harris and Mr. Tooke—in a copious employment of CAPITALS, *italics* and Capital Letters, as the occasion appeared to require. And, although I know not if I have dealt so largely, as either of those writers, in the resort to such aids; I approve of it, to the utmost extent, in the case of any Original and Difficult Excursion into the Regions of General Knowledge.

It now remains, only, to call the recollection of readers to the consideration, that, it is not the Theory of MR. TOOKE *alone, or in particular*, that is herein shewn to have never advanced at all in the direction of the Philosophy of Language: On the contrary, it is the Theory, alike, of Mr. Tooke and of all other Philologists that is herein opposed.

And here, whatever judgment shall be formed of the tone in which this task has been executed ; especially with regard to my animadversions on the views of other writers ; nothing, I trust, ought to be more clearly, or more liberally distinguished, than the difference there is between that sort of expression which arises from an earnest and confident belief in the Subject, and that dictation of over-weening which is the result of a contempt for the understandings of those whom we oppose. As for the case of Mr. Tooke, in particular ; I have always considered him as evincing a mind of unusual vigor and acuteness. But, although it was manifestly impossible that *any* vigor of understanding could solve the various Problems of Grammar ; or, even, lay so much as the FOUNDATION of its Philosophy ; *so long as that wonderful oversight of Logicians with regard to the CATEGORY OF RELATION was suffered to exist ;* yet, I think, we have abundant evidence that, setting out upon any ground whatever, Mr. Tooke's habitual neglect of circumspection (without seeking here for any other cause) would have exposed him to very serious oversights. If I may be allowed to express the image which he has always called up in my imagination ; it has been that of a strong man, who, exulting in the consciousness of his power, involves himself in the most disastrous consequences from not taking the trouble to care much about the nature of the stone on which he rests his foot. As a single example of this want of circumspection ; it may be asked : What as-

sumption (that could be entertained as a PHILOSOPHICAL one) could surpass in misfortune the assertion, with regard to the Nature of a PREPOSITION that, not only a NOUN MAY *be its FATHER*; BUT *also* that, CORRUPTION MUST *be its MOTHER*? This *combination*, into One Mass of Error, of the two most egregious absurdities in Grammar that it is possible to express, exhibits, I apprehend, a climax of unfounded doctrine, the bare mention of which, in the present stage of the enquiry, ought to be sufficient to rouse a salutary attention to its real merits. At THIS rate, it is plain that, if it had happened that Any Language had been so *philosophically contrived*, and so *philosophically spoken*, as never to have had a single CORRUPT Word in its whole mass; THIS PERFECTLY SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE *could have had, in that whole mass*, NOT ONE WORD *answering to what Grammarians call a PREPOSITION*!!!

Will it be DENIED, however, that this Doctrine—this GENERATING OF PREPOSITIONS OUT OF CORRUPTION—has been received with universal consent by Philologists? Or, Will it be denied—that this Doctrine, (which makes One of the Most Important Species of Signs in Language the Offspring of Corruption,) is ONE of the Most Prominent SO-CALLED “DISCOVERIES,” which have contributed to form the SUPPOSED PHILOLOGICAL GLORY of the *eighteenth*,—*nay, the nineteenth century*?

To rouse the Philologist, to a wholesome sense of the low—the pitiably low place—which **HIS** Walk of Research at this moment in reality occupies in the scale of intellectual attainment, amid the general exultation of advancing Sciences; (Whereas, in its Own Objects and Scope, it ought to comprehend one of the Highest Departments in Philosophy ;) is the manifest purpose of these observations : In suggesting which, I presume not to judge for those to whom they are addressed. I have merely contributed my offering of opinion ; and stated, as far as I was able, the Grounds upon which it rests. It remains for the Philosopher of Language to form **HIS OWN** judgment, upon the materials thus placed before him.

CHAPTER IV.

OF NOUNS.

SECTION FIRST.

OF THE GENERAL NATURE OF NOUNS.

IF the uttering of Speech be considered as the fabricating of a Complex Bridge made up of a Succession of Arches ; or, of a Chain of Simple Bridges, each consisting of only One Arch ;— then, NOUNS *are the* BANKS *and the* PIERS of Language, and VERBS *are the* ARCHES which connect them together.—In other words ; or to express the Same Truth in Terms perfectly analogous to this, and with reference to a branch of Pure Rational Science which we are compelled to take as our MODEL for that of Verbal Grammar ;— NOUNS, in Language, are the Same Kind of Things as the SIGNS OF QUANTITIES in Algebraical Notation ; and VERBS correspond to the SIGNS OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN those Quantities. This Concatenated Structure of Language has been demonstrated and explained in the foregoing chapters of the work : And the Nature of VERBS especially, in their ONLY VARIETIES of MAJOR *and* MINOR, have been determined and illustrated.

the Nature of NOUNS remains, herein, to be investigated.

And here, in the first place, it may be proper to serve, with reference to the analogy which has been mentioned, that NOUNS, in Ordinary language, are things so literally corresponding to the SYMBOLS *A, B, C*,—or 2, 4, 6,—in Scientific notation, that the Object which is represented by any Noun ;—such, for example, as that which we express by the Word—CHURCH,—STATE,—MAN, or PETER,—is as much of the Nature of a QUANTITY, (in the process of Any Reasoning which we carry on concerning it,) as can be said of Any thing in Arithmetic which we express by the Sign —4,—6.—The Two Subjects are, in fact, GENERALLY ONE AND THE SAME : And the Specific difference between the Two consists in the Difficulty, and for most part the Impossibility, of ascertaining the KINDS, SORTS, and what may be called the DIMENSIONS, of the Quantities of Ordinary language—the difficulty, for example, of *Precisely defining or Measuring* any such Logical Quantity is expressed by the Word—HEAT,—LIGHT,—MATTER,—or SUBSTANCE.

In thus entering upon the Nounal Department of Grammar by a re-assertion of the Specific Identicalness of Ordinary Language and Arithmetical expression, as being a Structure deduced from the NECESSARY CO-AGENCY OF ALL RELATED THINGS,—that is the Necessity—(agreed upon by all Logicians and which never was and never will be disputed)—that NOTHING CAN BE A RE-

LATED THING, except *during either the actual, or the supposed*, CO-EXISTENCE and LOGICAL CO-OPERATION of the Thing to which it is assumed as being related; I advert to it as a Fundamental Truth, by far the most momentous in importance of any that can be contemplated by the Philologists; since, ever after this Structure has once been apprehended and duly registered in the understanding of any person, who has been at all initiated into the habits of Scientific Reasoning, it must appear to him as monstrous, and intolerable, to admit any violation of it in Verbal Grammar, as to attempt the like in Algebraical Notation itself.

In asserting this ground, as being the Real and Strict Foundation of Language; we rest the Science of Grammar upon a basis perfectly One and the Same as that of the Mathematician, that is, as consisting of Disciplines which, though far more limited in their extent and variety, differ in nothing else from those of NUMBER, or MEASURE. It is of the first consideration, therefore, always to recognise Grammar as being founded in the NATURE, AND IN THE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE IN CONNEXION, *of* ALL RELATED OBJECTS CONSIDERED AS RELATED OBJECTS; *and, in the* CONSEQUENT NECESSARY PRODUCTION *of a* THIRD THING — (*which amounts to a* THIRD GRAMMATICAL OBJECT,) — *logically* INTERPOSED BETWEEN Every Two Related Objects, and which serves as a LINK OF LOGICAL CONNEXION between them,—the SIGN of which Link is that

Part of Speech which Grammarians have agreed to call the VERB.

And here, if adverting on the present occasion to the Structure of this Basis should be noticed, as being a *repetition* ; I would remind readers that, in all probability, no repetition could be more profitable, to a large proportion of persons, than this one. For, the imagination of Every Scholar, or Logician, who has lived in course of the last Two Thousand Years, being deeply impressed with the assumption THAT THERE IS NO LINK—NO THIRD OR MIDDLE OBJECT—subsisting between Any Two Related Objects ; it will therefore, in the case of a great proportion of readers, be found a very difficult matter to AWAKE THEIR ATTENTION FROM THAT SLEEP OF ERROR IN WHICH THEY ARE REPOSED, so as to enable them to shake off the illusory impression of the Old System: While, in the instance of every reader who does NOT shake off that impression, the case must be utterly hopeless ;, since there cannot exist a more fatal stumbling-block, or a more insuperable barrier to the apprehension of Grammatical Science, than that Erroneous Scheme of the Category of Relation which has heretofore obtained. On this account, indeed, I do not suppose it can be judged as redundant, to refresh the recollection of readers in this place, by the following momentary restatement of the Principles in question.

EVERY TWO THINGS OR OBJECTS, which CO-EXIST in the Universe, MUST PRODUCE BETWEEN THEM A THIRD THING OR OBJECT,

which is a LOGICAL LINK that CONNECTS these Two Correlated Objects. This PRODUCED THIRD OBJECT is, *in the strictest sense*, a CREATION; because this Third and Interposited Thing *exists not until the Two Related Objects CO-EXIST*, and because *it ceases to exist the moment EITHER of the Two Co-Related Objects ceases to exist*. This Created Third Object, moreover, is, of necessity, in a *Logical Sense*, AN INDIVIDUAL BELONGING TO THAT GENUS OF THING WHICH IS CALLED ACTION. Now, the importance of apprehending and attending to the Structure of this Category will be manifest when it is added that, TO EXPRESS OR SIGNIFY RELATED OBJECTS AND THE ACTIONS OR RELATIONS BETWEEN them is the SOLE OBJECT, USE, AND BUSINESS, OF LANGUAGE.

As a passing illustration of the truth of this last assumption, I may observe that, Whether Any Two Objects *strike* or *collide* One the Other;—or, Whether they *distance*, or *contact*, One the Other;—or, Whether they *love*, or *hate*, One the Other;—or, Whether they *excel*, or *fall short of*, One the Other in any quality or attribute;—or, in short, considering Any Two Objects as Related, in Any of the Infinite Species and Varieties of Logical Connexion;—Every One of these Connexions is (*considered in a Logical sense*) SOME ACTION between the Two Objects in question: And the Sole Business of Language is to *signify* THIS UNIVERSE OF ACTIONS, *together with* THE CO-AGENTS *which perform them*.

In order to prevent any misconception, here, I Observe that, it is no impeachment of this assumption that we *can*,—and *very usually* DO,—signify Actions by a MODIFIED Expression; which, to the mere general reader, might disguise the truth in question. Thus, for example, we often say that, *One Man* is WISER than *Another*. But the *Strict Logical* import of this expression is that, *One man* SURPASSES, or EXCELS, *Another* in the attribute of WISDOM: And the REASON WHY we modify the expression, from its literal logical import, is the meré desire of *brevity*,—and, sometimes, of *variety*,—in the business of communication. Here, moreover, it must be manifest, even to the dullest apprehension, that Any Two Men, or Beings, considered as Related One to the Other in the attribute of WISDOM, must be related by the ACTION OF EXCELLING,—OF FALLING SHORT OF,—OR OF EQUALLING, that Other. And, in like manner, when it is said that an Animal is OF a certain Form, or certain Species; this *logically*, as well as *literally*, imports that the Animal in question is performing the ACTION of OFF-SPRINGING a certain Form, or Species. And if we should VARY THE COMBINATIONS OF THE OBJECTS of Language, to infinity; there could not be a single instance that would not fall within the scope of this General Principle. I trust, therefore, that this short preface to the Nounal Department of Grammar; although it is, in part, a recapitulation of what has gone before; will be found far from being more than the occasion de-

manded, in order to provide against the consequences of negligence, or oversight.

THE VIRTUAL DEFINITION OF THE NOUN which I have embodied in the Simile of a BANK, or PIER, of a Bridge, as above expressed, serves better than any combination of words, that I know, to exhibit the Nature of this Part of Speech: By which, however, it is to be observed, I always mean *a Word that is performing the Office of a SYNTACTICAL Noun*, as contradistinguished from Every Other Word in Language; because, Every Word in Language, IN A GENERIC SENSE, is a NOUN OF SOME SORT, by which is meant a SIGN OF SOME OBJECT. The kind of Word that is here distinguished under the eminent title of THE NOUN, is manifestly that which Grammarians have hitherto agreed to call a NOUN SUBSTANTIVE: Which Appellation I shall occasionally retain, in order to avoid doing unnecessary violence to a denomination so long established by universal consent; Although it is absolutely requisite to point out here, that, in LOGICAL STRICTNESS, EVERY SO-CALLED NOUN SUBSTANTIVE, is in reality MORE THAN IT IS CALLED; because it cannot operate in Language in any less Office than that of a NOUN RELATIVE; and it *always* MUST *be* SO CONSIDERED.

From what has just been stated, it is manifest that NOUNS, considered as Signs of Objects, are equal in Grammatical Dignity and Importance to

those Other Signs that are denominated VERBS. Nor was this truth at all meant to be impeached when, in a former part of the work, I asserted that *none of the more important arcana of Language* lie within the limits of the Nounal Department. Considered, indeed, *as a Field to be cultivated, or a Region to be explored* ; the Nounal Department of Language, according to the views which I entertain with regard to it, will be found to contain as much of *new matter*, as has been exhibited in the analysis of the Verb. And, although the errors which have obtained with regard to the Noun are, certainly, not of a nature that involves such mischievous consequences in Logic, or Dialectics, as those which have grown, *and would continue to grow*, under the Illusory System concerning Verbs and Prepositions which formed the Accredited Scheme of Universal Grammar ; yet, it is not for a moment to be denied that, a reform of the Nounal Department of Language was a matter of first-rate importance, in the erecting of Language into a Rational Science.

The Grammar of the Nounal Department of Language, however, will occupy far less space than has been required by that of the Verb ; because there are much fewer points of opinion to be controverted ; much fewer considerations to be adverted to ; and much fewer examples, for illustration, to be stated.

Agreeably with the last of these preliminary remarks, we find, the Author of the DIVERSIONS OF

PURLEY has devoted (comparatively speaking only a very small part of that Treatise—(namely, little more than forty pages)—to the consideration of this Part of Grammar, including the large proportion of this space which he has occupied with the Subject of “ADJECTIVES.” And, in what he has advanced with respect to Nouns; together with the opinions of others, which he has cited upon the question; we have a sufficient portion of diversity in opinion: Which fact, from its own internal evidence, may fairly be taken as a proof of the existence of no small extent of darkness, or imperfection, in this department.

In addition to his own views of the Subject, Mr. Tooke has adverted to those of *Scaliger*,—*Wilkins*,—*Wallis*,—*Sanctius*,—*Scioppius*,—*Noscius*,—*Harris*,—*Lowth*,—*R. Johnson*, &c. If, however, the Real Nature of the Thing in question be such as I have been led to imagine; it appears not a little surprising that so much acumen has been employed upon it, with such *results* as have been recorded concerning it.

In order to furnish an evidence of the justice of this last remark, I shall, in the first place, quote the more material passages of the doctrines which I have here ventured to call in question. In the *First Volume* of the *DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY*, page 436, Mr. Tooke has quoted R. Johnson, to the following effect.

“It had been better, in the enumeration of the
“Parts of Speech, to have made the Substantive
“and the Adjective two distinct Parts of Speech:

“ and to have comprehended the Participle under
 “ the Adjective. For the Substantive and the
 “ Adjective are two very different Parts of
 “ Speech.” — And again. — “ The question is,
 “ Whether the Adjective be a *Noun or Name of a*
 “ *thing* ; that is, whether it be *equally* so with the
 “ Substantive? Now I suppose nobody will say
 “ the Adjective is *equally, or as much, the name of*
 “ *a thing*, as the Substantive.”

With reference, moreover, to the passage now
 quoted, Mr. Tooke himself, in *page 438*, says—
 “ Notwithstanding R. Johnson’s confident opinion
 “ that nobody would say so, I maintain that the
 “ *Adjective is equally and altogether as much the*
 “ *name of a thing*, as the Substantive.”

Again, in *page 452*, Mr. Tooke says,—“ They”
 (meaning the Messrs. De Port Royal) “ likewise
 “ make *Substance* and *Accident* the foundation of
 “ the difference between *Substantive* and *Adjective*:
 “ and that, I think, I have already confuted.”

Finally, in *page 430*, he says,—“ So the Ad-
 “ jectives *wooden* and *woolen* convey precisely the
 “ same ideas, are the names of the same things,
 “ denote the same Substances, as the Substantives
 “ *Wood* and *Wool*: and the termination in *en* only
 “ puts them in a condition to be joined to some
 “ other Substantives, or rather gives us notice to
 “ expect some other Substantives to which they
 “ are joined. And this is the whole mystery of
 “ simple Adjectives.”

The extracts, which are thus furnished, may
 serve as a specimen of the discordance which sub-

sists between the two authorities in question, with regard to the point in dispute. And the reader may find more of the same kind, if he chuse to consult Mr. Tooke's Treatise; who has enlarged, circumstantially, with regard to the merits of it, especially with reference to R. Johnson's opinion in the instance of the expression — "GOOD MAN."

With respect to the controversy, as it is herein exhibited; I have first to remark that, the Philologist of Purley is indisputably in the right: While we are at the same time to observe that, he stands also opposed to the concurrent and popular doctrines of Harris and of Lowth; which are involved in that of R. Johnson, an author for whom Mr. Tooke professes great general respect. But, although Mr. Tooke is herein *right in point of fact*; I must object that, the side he has taken; or, rather, the *manner in which he has treated it*; lets in no general light, of a Categorical Nature; and, assuredly, does any thing else than gain sight of the Philosophy of this Part of Grammar. In thus noticing his views of the Subject, however, it may be proper to quote what he has held up for exposure, of the doctrine which he has thus far justly impugned.

"Dr. Lowth tells us," — (says Mr. Tooke) "that Adjectives are very improperly called *Nouns*, for they are not the *Names of Things*." — "And Mr. Harris says," — 'Grammarians have been led into that strange absurdity of ranging Adjectives with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs:

‘ though they are homogeneous with respect to
 ‘ Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes* : and they
 ‘ are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as
 ‘ never properly denoting *Substantives*.’

Whether those Other Grammarians, whom Mr. Tooke has at the same time quoted as standing opposed to the views of Johnson, of Harris, and of Lowth, have done more toward the solution of the Subject than Mr. Tooke himself ; is a matter which may be judged of, here, from the extracts which he has given of their respective Doctrines ; and which I shall now cite from his work.

Speaking of Harris and Lowth ; he says,—
 “ These gentlemen differ widely from some of
 “ their ablest predecessors. Scaliger, Wilkins,
 “ Wallis, Sanctius, Scioppius, and Vossius, con-
 “ siderable and justly respected names, tell us far
 “ otherwise.”

“ Scaliger, lib. 4. cap. 91.”—‘ *Nihil differet
 ‘ concretum ab abstracto, nisi modo significationis,
 ‘ non significatione.*’

“ Wilkins, Part 1. chap. 3. Sect. 8.”—‘ The
 ‘ true genuine sense of a *Noun Adjective* will be
 ‘ fixed to consist in this ; that it imports this
 ‘ general notion of *pertaining to*.’

“ Wallis, pag. 92.” ‘ *Adjectivum respectivum est
 ‘ nihil aliud quam ipsa vox substantiva, adjectivè
 ‘ posita.*’

“ Page 127.” ‘ *Quodlibet substantivum ad-
 ‘ jectivè positum degenerat in adjectivum.*’

“ Sanctius,———.”

“ *DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY,*” page 428.

While Philosophical Grammarians have exhibited such differences of opinion, with regard to the Nature of SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES; which differences would at least lead one to conclude that, the True Principles of this Part of Grammar are no better than CONTINGENT; it is curious to observe, that, "ADJECTIVES," *no less than* VERBS, are formed under NECESSARY LAWS; and that, the true doctrine of them must constitute nothing short of a Portion of Strict Rational Science, which, as such, cannot, in its Structure, leave any matter of controversy. I shall proceed, therefore, in the first place, to suggest what I apprehend may serve for a passing Definition of this Element of Speech: And shall, subsequently, describe the use, and necessity, for its employment.

1. A SO-CALLED ADJECTIVE, then, is that Sign in Language BY WHICH ALONE WE CAN DISTINGUISH ANY INDIVIDUAL, *from* OTHERS *of its Own Species*; OR, ANY SPECIES, from its GENUS OR NEXT HIGHER SPECIES; that is to say, *unless we resort to the Signification of Such Thing by expressing it* AS PERFORMING SOME ACTION, instead of signifying it by ANY INHERENT ATTRIBUTE. Thus, if we would signify a SELFISH OR HEARTLESS *Man*, WITHOUT prefixing either of these *Specific Signs*, to THAT OF HIS WHOLE SPECIES; we must resort to *feign him as performing a certain Action* with regard to the Attribute of Heartlessness, by calling him a *Man* WITHOUTING (i. e. TYING OUT) *Heart*,—a Man WITHOUT Feeling. Or, we may

combine the Two ways of signification, in the same case, by saying—a *Man* VOID OF (*i. e.* EMPTY OFFSPRINGING) *Heart, or Feeling.*

2. SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES, therefore, are Signs in Language founded upon the GROUND AND SYSTEM OF CATEGORICAL LOGIC. And EVERY ADJECTIVE is the Name of *either* a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE *or* AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE: Which Name is always *thrown together with* that of the GENUS, or NEXT HIGHER SPECIES, of the thing in question, *express, or understood.*

One advantage, at least, (I humbly conceive,) is possessed by the above Definition;—namely—that it is UNIVERSAL. It comprehends, alike, the SUBSTANCES of the *Naturalist* and the ESSENCES of the *Logician*. And it, moreover, reduces, under One Same Grammatical Law, ALL ORDINARY SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES. The *only exception* to its complete universality consists in such an instance as the following: which anomaly arises not from any defect in the Definition; but from the *Insuperable Nature of Things*.—If we say—ALL MEN,—or ALL ANIMALS;—in *this* case, the So-called Adjective—ALL—*does* NOT denote a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE, it being an ELEMENT of the *Name or Sign of a GENUS*. The use of the Word ALL,—here,—(*and everywhere else,*)—is to CONVERT AN ABSTRACT GENERIC, into a CONCRETE GENERIC, Name: without which Prefix, (*express, or understood,*) the Generic Name, (as I have before explained,) *must be an ABSTRACT Name*, and, as such, *could not form a Part of the Fabric of Language,*

but must remain, like a stone hewn out in the quarry, a **MERE MASS OF LINGUAL MATERIAL**, *only cut into shape, and adapted to be taken into a Fabric of Language whenever it shall be required.* This **CONCRETING ADJECTIVE—ALL—**, therefore, (although there is a **Very Large Class of Other Concretizing Adjectives in Language**) is the *Only Adjected Simple Sign*, so far as I at present recollect, that does not denote either a **Specific** or an **Individuating DIFFERENCE**.

Upon a first view of the Scheme which is here proposed ; it will, in all probability, be affirmed that, it is founded in the **Same Considerations** as have been asserted by different preceding Grammarians, — namely — the **Considerations of “SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.”** Taken in a **PARTIAL EXTENT**; this is in reality the fact. But along with this it is to be observed that, in the very same extent, the **WHOLE CATEGORICAL SCHEME OF GENERA AND SPECIES**, in the Aristotelian Logic, is also founded Merely in **Substance and Accident** : And, yet, it would afford but a very pitiable account of the Aristotelian System of Classification, if any author had only informed us that, it is *Nothing but a System of SUBSTANCE and ACCIDENT*. I object, therefore, to those who have ascribed **SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES** to the consideration of Substance and Accident ; not as having built altogether upon a **FALSE foundation** ; but only as not having had any thing like a sufficiently enlightened view of the subject to

enable them to trace this Foundation to any tolerable approach to its Real Shape, or Extent: In doing which, they *must* have given to their Scheme *such a Categorical Arrangement and Illustration, as to have prevented the possibility of those lamentable discordancies, and blunders*, which have hitherto marked and discredited the labors of Grammarians, in this direction.

As a passing proof that the System of GENUS and SPECIES is not wholly,—or any thing near wholly,—resolvable into SUBSTANCE and ACCIDENT; (although it certainly consists in analogous considerations;) it is sufficient to observe that, MANY THINGS come under the Classification of the *Former*, that are HETEROGENEOUS to the *Latter*. Thus, VICE and VIRTUE are Things whose respective GENERA may be *Specified into Different Sorts, and these Individuated into Different Masses*: Yet, neither VICE nor VIRTUE is a SUBSTANCE in the apprehension of either the Naturalist or the Logician; Though it is duly to be noted, here; that both these things are Substantive in the apprehension of the GRAMMARIAN.

Had the necessity (which exists) that EVERY OBJECT, *belonging to EVERY GENUS OF THING*, which is expressed in Language, must be *either SPECIFIED AND INDIVIDUATED; or, at least, INDIVIDUATED*; by SOME ATTRIBUTE indicated by what is called an ADJECTIVE Sign, been any thing like clearly apprehended, together with its categorical consequences, in the expositions of the Subject afforded by those who ascribe the Substantive

and the Adjective to Substance and Accident ; we should not, in this case, have had exhibited to us the opinion of Harris, and of Lowth, that, the Adjective is NOT A NOUN ; or, yet, the assertion of R. Johnson that, an Adjective is NOT as much the Name of a Thing as a Substantive. Had the necessity been discerned, under which we are philosophically placed, to make the Signs and the Structure of Language, in the Present Department, conform strictly to the System of Categorical Logic ; we should, then, have had NO SUCH TERM—NO SUCH DENOMINATION—in Grammar, as that of “ ADJECTIVE,” any more than a SPECIES, in the Aristotelian System of Logic, has been called an ADJECTIVE *to its* GENUS, or its NEXT HIGHER SPECIES. I apprehend, therefore, that the DENOMINATIONS — “ NOUN SUBSTANTIVE ;” — “ ADJECTIVES,” or “ NOUN ADJECTIVES ;” — “ ARTICLE ;” — &c. as now employed in Accredited Grammar, are worthy only of a state of General Knowledge which must be estimated at an immense distance behind that which gave rise to the Logical Scheme of GENERA AND SPECIES. If we could suppose the System of Categorical Logic to have been invented *before* Language ; and Language formed after it ; then, I affirm, the *latter* ought to have been modelled in strict conformity with the *former* ; and, instead of the Denominations which now obtain in Grammar, we should have had NONE BUT CATEGORICAL Denominations therein, as will be explained in the course of what I have to suggest.

As for SO-CALLED “ ADJECTIVES ;” Not only would it have followed, in the case above supposed, that a ONE SOLITARY SAVAGE Tribe, or Nation, might have been quoted (as has been done by Mr. Tooke in speaking of the MOHEGANS) as possessing No Such Words in their Language; But the Same Thing would have happened to EVERY Language, and Nation; For we are to observe that, by the Mohegans having No ADJECTIVES, Mr. Tooke means that they have No Words with an APPROPRIATE ADJECTING TERMINATION, such as our English Words — *GOLDEN* — and *WOOLEN*: And it is quite manifest that such Words are absolutely useless in our own Language, unless for the sake of *variety in Sound*; because the Phrase—*GOLD Ring*,—for example, has driven that of—*GOLDEN Ring* completely out of use: and we say—*WOOLEN Coat*, instead of *Wool-Coat*, merely owing to something in the nature of the Organs of speaking, or of hearing.

For the reason at present under consideration, I observe that, the Division of the Parts of Speech by MR. HARRIS, in that Work once (*and this very lately*) so generally extolled and looked up to as a model of Grammatical Excellence, is equally at variance with the Logical Nature of the Subject. For, besides the *Grand Primary Consideration* that, *he ought to have ranked VERBS among the CONNECTIVES of Language*; of which Connective Signs, indeed, it is the Head and Principal; I must here object that, *HIS NOUNS-SUBSTANTIVE are NOT Anal.*

IN FACT NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE ;—HIS ATTRIBUTIVES *are* DEFINITIVES ;—*and* HIS DEFINITIVES *are* ATTRIBUTIVES. And, although the Two last mentioned Denominations involve no fallacy ; they certainly involve confusion and darkness. HIS NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE, however, as well as his Adjectives, and Articles and Definitives, are the Substantives, Adjectives, and Articles, of ALL GRAMMARIANS, both before and after him : And the objections, therefore, which I here suggest, are applicable to the whole Nounal Scheme of Accredited Grammar.

To submit, now, that View of the Subject, upon which the above objections rest ; I propose the following Denominations, as being manifestly founded upon the Categorical System of Logic.

First.

A SO-CALLED NOUN SUBSTANTIVE	is, in Logical Classification,	A NOUN GENERIC.
A SO-CALLED NOUN ADJECTIVE		A NOUN SPECIFIC.
A SO-CALLED ARTI- CLE OR DEFINITIVE		A NOUN PARTICULAR OR CONCRETIVE.

Upon this suggestion, therefore, we are to observe FIRST, that, THESE THREE NAMES — that is to say — A NOUN GENERIC,—A *Noun Specific*,—and a Noun Particular or Individuative,—TAKEN TOGETHER, *must go to form* A NOUN SUB-

STANTIVE OR SYNTACTICAL NOUN (*i.e.* a *Noun Relative*,) OF PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR.

SECONDLY.—It is to be observed that, A So-called Noun Substantive often *may*, or *must*, consist of a *Greater Number of Component Nouns* than the THREE above-mentioned : Because it is often necessary to distinguish, or define, an Object by *More than One Noun Specific*. But, upon the other hand, A Noun Substantive *may*, and *often does*, consist of ONLY TWO Component Nouns—namely—The NOUN OF THE GENUS OF Thing and a *Noun Particular or Individuative* ;—which latter CONVERTS THE ABSTRACT NOUN OF THE GENUS, into a *Concrete Particular Noun*.

As Examples, in illustration of the Structure now proposed ;—If we say—*The Black MAN* ;—*The White HORSE* ;—*The Tall Black MAN* ;—*A large White HORSE* ;—*That Tall Lean Old Black MAN* ;—*This Young Wild Milk White HORSE* ;—Each of these Several SERIES OF NOUNS FORMS—AND IS—A SO-CALLED NOUN SUBSTANTIVE.—Again ; if we say—*All MEN* ;—*Every MAN* ;—*Any MAN* ;—*One MAN* ;—&c. ; Either of these *Pairs of Nouns* form A Noun Substantive.

And the reason of this is founded in a manifest Necessity. Because, with regard to the *First Sort* of Examples ; we are under a frequent necessity to distinguish an Object, BEYOND ITS GENERIC Appellation, by *Some Specific* Appellation. And, very frequently, we are obliged to employ TWO, THREE, or MORE, *Specifics* ; *Each Successive One* of which is an *Inferior Noun Specific* to its *preceding*

Next One, as in the example—“*That Tall Lean Old Black MAN*,”—which Compound Expression is a NOUN SUBSTANTIVE *made up of the Name of the GENUS (i. e. a Genus in the present case) MAN*—and the Names of *Four Different Diminishing Specific Differences* of Man. For, IN GRAMMAR, Every Attribute of an Object that is *Distin-
guished by a Specific Name*, from that of its GENUS, amounts to a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE and makes that Object belong to a DISTINCT SPECIES: Nor can there be a doubt that Mr. Tooke was right, when he affirmed that, a So-called Adjective (*i. e. a Noun Specific*) is as much the Name of the Object to which it is applied, as a So-called Substantive: For, if we say—*That Tall Lean Old Black MAN* did it;—The *Whole Six Terms* of this Compound Expression, *including the Individuative Noun*—“*That*,”—form together THE NOMINATIVE to the Verb DID: And, most certainly, the Term—“*MAN*,”—by itself; or Any Number of these Terms, less than the Whole; is NOT THE GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT of whom we have affirmed the action in question.

With regard, upon the other hand, to Examples of the *Second Sort*, above mentioned; I observe, it very frequently happens that the Name of the GENUS of Thing, together with *Some Particular or Individuating*—(*that is Some CONCRETE*)—Noun, is sufficient for our purpose. Thus, we say—*All MEN* are Mortal.—*One MAN* cannot do it.—*The MAN* that hath not music in his soul,—&c. And, herein we express ourselves intelligibly,

and logically, *without the use of Any Specific Appellation*. But, along with this it is to be observed, that if, *instead of a Noun Concretive, Any Specific Noun or Appellative* had been employed in the above, or in any other case whatever; *Any Such Addition could not have been sufficient to Form a PORTION OF LANGUAGE, IF NO CONCRETIVE (that is NO INDIVIDUATING OR PARTICULAR) Noun had accompanied it.* For *Every Specific Noun* is AS TRULY AN ABSTRACT Sign, as ANY GENERIC NOUN is, or can be : AND NUMBER,—PARTICULARITY,—OR DIVISION,—ALONE,—IS THE LOGICAL SOLVENT—(if I ought not rather to say the Logical CONGELLANT) OF GENERA AND SPECIES. IN OTHER WORDS ; ANY NAME OF A NUMBER, or ANY WORD EXPRESSIVE OF DIVISION, or PARTICULARITY, IS ALONE AND EXCLUSIVELY CONCRETIVE. AND, HENCE, ALL SO-CALLED ARTICLES, DISTRIBUTIVES, NUMERALS, ORDINALS, &c. &c. *are logically the EXCLUSIVE CONCRETING SIGNS TO NOUNS.*

Of course, it is to be recollected here, that, in *Any Expression of Language*, the NOUN CONCRETIVE, if convenience should require its omission, *need not be EXPRESSED* : Although it *must invariably be understood* ; or, else, the assemblage of Words in question cannot refer to, or be significant of, *Any Thing that EXISTS, or HATH EXISTED, or SHALL EXIST.*

It may be added that, those Languages which entertain a PLURAL FORM of the Noun, do by that Idiom make an implied provision for the

Concretive Sign: because *Plurality is Indefinite Number*. But it would be more Philosophical if the Plurals of Nouns were not inflected; or, for example, that the Term — TEN MEN — were written TEN MAN,—as is the case in some Languages.

It may, perhaps, be of service, in this place, to enter somewhat farther into the Logic of the Subject. I deem it at any rate expedient to subjoin the following suggestions.

A **GENERIC, or a SPECIFIC, NAME**—is not, (as some Philosophers, and those too **NOMINALISTS** and of the best description have supposed,) a Thing analogous to a **GLOVE**, or a **STOCKING**, attached to the outside of a Paper of **SIMILAR ARTICLES WITHIN**: Because a **Glove**, or a **Stocking**, is a *certain Pattern of Object*, **REALLY EXISTING**; and, *whenever it is employed as a Sign, it implies the supposed existence of Other and Similar Objects*: Whereas, a **GENERAL NAME**, on the contrary, is a **MERE ARBITRARY SIGN**; whose Office is *to do nothing but call up a CONCEPTION of a Thing whose Attributes resemble those expressed in a DEFINITION*, without any reference to, or supposition of, the **EXISTENCE** of the Thing defined. For, *Every CATEGORICAL Genus is One and Universal: And Every CATEGORICAL Species is One and Universal*: And Neither of these refers to *Time*, or to *Space*, or to *Circumstance*: They are **ALL OUT OF THE PALE OF EXISTENCE**. General Truths are said to be true *at all Times, and in all Places*:

But, by this, Philosophers design to *exclude* ALL PARTICULAR Times and Places: And this is not only a gross and intolerable inconsistency; but it is, in its result, a most deplorable fallacy; because they are NEVER TRUE AT ALL, *except they are so* AT SOME PARTICULAR TIME, and IN SOME PARTICULAR PLACE: and, accordingly, we find that all the Subjects of Geometry are expressed CONDITIONALLY. It would be a most pitiable utterance of irrational sounds to affirm that, *MAN is Mortal, if Men were* NOT DYING CONTINUALLY, HERE, and THERE, and EVERY WHERE, *where Man exists*. The only exceptions to the General Principle, now in question, are in the cases of those Things which, *in a true literal sense, occupy or fill* ALL SPACE, and ALL TIME; such as we must conceive of the ESSENCE AND POWER OF THE CREATOR. And this case is EXPRESSED CONCRETIVELY, in Language, by the Term ALL, and likewise by the Phrase EVERY WHERE; Each of which signifies a CONCRETE UNIVERSALITY, in contradistinction to an ABSTRACT UNIVERSALITY.

There are, indeed, Two Different Ways, in which this Subject may be contemplated. *First*, according to the apprehension of the Natural or Untaught Man; and, *Secondly*, according to that of the Scholar, or Logician: But both these Schemes must terminate in One Same result. Thus, if an *uneducated* person hear the Name—MAN;—he never dreams of an ABSTRACT Man, *who exists No Where, and At No Time*: he never heard of

such a Chimera ; (or, if properly taken, such an Artificial and Rational Device :) He understands, by this Term, a REAL OBJECT—namely—*All the Men*, or *Some of the Men*, or *Some Individual Man*, who, (by supposition at least,) does, or did, or shall exist: And, accordingly, His *General Term*, although it is NOT AN ABSTRACT Term, is NECESSARILY QUALIFIED BY AN INDIVIDUATING SIGN. But, on the other hand, if a *Scholar or Logician* hear the Name—MAN;—he understands, thereby, NOT ANY REAL OBJECT ; but ONLY THE SIGN OF A DEFINITION. And, in order to CONVERT this SIGN OF A DEFINITION into the SIGN OF A REAL BEING, or Real BEINGS, (whether supposed as being *past, present, or to come,*) SOME CONCRETIVE SIGN is NECESSARY. Hence, the *SCHOLAR is obliged to BRING HIMSELF DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF THE RUSTIC*, and to employ the *Very Same Means* which the Peasant had done before him, by employing the CONCEPTIONS, and, consequently, the SIGNS of NUMBER or PARTICULARITY, such as the Words—*All,—Every,—Any,—Some,—This,—That,—One,—Two,—First,—Last,—&c.*

It is upon this ground that I have suggested in a former place, and now conclusively insist, contrary to the uniform assumption of all Grammarians, that there can be NO SUCH THING IN LANGUAGE as an ABSTRACT NOUN : Although most of the Words heretofore CALLED NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE are indeed GENERAL Terms, *i. e.* they are Signs of ABSTRACT GENERA, or SPECIES, AL-

WAYS TURNED INTO SIGNS OF CONCRETES OR REAL BEINGS *by the annexation of SOME NOUN IMPLYING PARTICULARITY, or INDIVIDUALITY, express, or understood.*

There are a few Subordinate Observations ; which remain to be suggested here.

And *First*, although it is almost too obvious to require remark, I observe that, A *Single Term*, especially a *Concretive*, may serve for a *Noun Substantive by Representation*. Thus, in the expression — *He took it from ONE, and gave it to ANOTHER* ; — each of the Terms “ ONE ” — and “ ANOTHER ” amounts to a Noun Substantive, because it *involves the understanding of the GENERIC TERM* — MAN, or DOG, — or Something Else equivalent to the Name of a Genus, or a Species.

SECONDLY. It is to be observed that, there is a Class of Nouns Concretive, which do not, at first sight, convey to us the notion of Number, or Individuation, — namely — such as the Inferior of the Two Terms when we say — *French FASHION* — *English HORSE*, — *Dutch LANGUAGE*. Such Words, as these, might often be mistaken for Nouns *Specific* : but, in reality, they are *Individuating or Concretive* Nouns ; because, they refer to *Place*, and whatever refers to Place IMPLIES EXISTENCE, *actual, or supposed, past, present, or to come*. The Same Observation, obviously, holds good with regard also to such Terms as — BACONIAN, — NEWTONIAN, — ARISTOTELIAN, —

ALEXANDRIAN,—&c. These Concretive Terms, however, *admit Another Concretive before them*: for we say—AN *English Horse* ; A *French Fashion* ; THE *Dutch Language*. Nor is this Duplication of Concretive Terms confined to these: for we also say—A *Couple* ; A *Dozen* ;—BOTH *the Men* ;—THIS *Pair* ;—THOSE *Odd Ones* ;—SOME *Hundreds* ;—TEN *Thousands* ;—and so on.

THIRDLY. It may, at first sight, seem that, those Nouns Substantive which I have called SECONDARY Nouns Substantive—that is to say the NAMES OF ACTIONS, which, as such, must have served as SIGNS of ACTIONS, *before* they could have served as SIGNS OF AGENTS, present another Objection to the General Law above laid down. But Such Nouns as those are doubly secured from objection ; *First*, in that, Every time we employ the Word—FIGHTING—(for example) we *understand along with it Some Noun Concretive*, such as THIS fighting,—THAT fighting,—or SOME fighting: And, *Secondly*, The Termination—ING—IS ITSELF A CONCRETIVE TERMINATION ; for it implies TIME, *Relatively Present*.

It may be repeated, here, as a general observation, that ALL PLURAL Terminations of Words are meant as CONCRETIVE Terminations : although the Device is not a Logical one. And this consideration, alone, deprives a very large proportion of Words in Language of all pretension to that ABSTRACTNESS, which Mr. Tooke and All other Grammarians have attributed to the Signification of Words. And, as Every Singular Termination

in ING is, also, a Concretive Termination ; this last mentioned fact consigns *Another* very large portion of Language over to the Office of Concretive Signification, *altogether beside* the CONSTANT and NECESSARY OPERATION OF NOUNS CONCRETIVE, *properly so called*.

IN FINE ; It is not out of place, on the present occasion, to add the remark that, EVERY VERB is a CONCRETIVE, *or rather a CONCRETE, TERM*. It is so ; because SPACE *and* TIME *form the NECESSARY THEATRE of ALL ACTIONS* ; and they are implied in the expression of EVERY VERB. And here we are to remember that, a Universality which fills All Space, and which therefore is a CONCRETE UNIVERSALITY ; (such, for example, as we must conceive of the ESSENCE OF THE CREATOR ;) is a Thing *Infinitely Different* from what Logicians mean by an ABSTRACT UNIVERSALITY. Nor do I think this remark at all unnecessary ; because, I suspect, there are hardly any Two Subjects in Metaphysics, which a general reader is more apt to mistake, or confound, than CONCRETE GENERALS OR UNIVERSALS and ABSTRACT GENERALS OR UNIVERSALS. But, to return to the consideration of the CONCRETE NATURE OF VERBS ; we perceive, in this fact, *Another Very Large Proportion of Language* that is Concretive ; *altogether beside the Operation of Appropriate Nouns Concretive*, as already insisted upon.

From the whole of what has been advanced, I apprehend, the following Positions are altogether realised, agreeably with what I had suggested, and partly illustrated, in the introductory part of this work.

First. That those Words in Language BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE, (with the exception of Proper Names) are NOT NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE; *but are MERELY NOUNS GENERIC.*

Secondly. That the Words BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED ADJECTIVES, are NOT ADJECTIVES; *they being merely INTEGRAL ELEMENTS of a NOUN SUBSTANTIVE.* They are, properly speaking, NOUNS SPECIFIC, as I have already insisted.

Thirdly. That the Words by Grammarians called ARTICLES *and* DEFINITIVES, are NOT LOGICALLY SO-CALLED: *nor is their Real Use in Language Philosophically apprehended.* Their PRIMARY OR GENERIC OFFICE IS TO CONCRETE: And, *in strict technical propriety of Logic,* they DO NOT DEFINE at all; for they only *either individuate, or particularise, or indicate;* whereas DEFINING is a process applicable exclusively to GENERA and *Species;* and to the *latter* office is properly applied that Class of Terms by Grammarians called Adjectives. So-called Articles and Definitives may, indeed, *in a loose and popular sense,* be called Definitives: But their appropriate Logical and Grammatical Appellation must be CONCRETIVES. Those of them which have been called *Distributives, Numerals, Ordinals, &c.* are

so far not illogically named : But the Appellation of NOUN must be understood, as added to them; because *Every One of them* IS AN ELEMENT OR COMPONENT NOUN IN A NOUN SUBSTANTIVE.

Fourthly. That, (as the result of the Three foregoing considerations,) There can be *No Such Thing in Language* as an ABSTRACT NOUN SUBSTANTIVE. Because it is impossible, in GRAMMATICAL Language, to feign ANY NOUN GENERIC, OR *Noun Specific*, without *either expressing or understanding Some NOUN CONCRETIVE* along with it: And this NOUN CONCRETIVE,—like the Sword of Harlequin, or the Wand of Prospero,—whenever it is understood as being annexed, CONVERTS THE THIN AIR OF THE ABSTRACT TERM, (OR TERMS) into the SIGN OF A CONCRETE OR SUBSTANTIAL REALITY, actual, or supposed.

It is a *curious and an extreme test* of this reasoning, to observe that, *even when the Object of our contemplation is in fact an ABSTRACT OBJECT*, we cannot express this Abstract Object *except under this SAME LAW OF CONCRETION*. Thus, for example, if we talk of GENERA and *Species*; we must talk of *A Genus*,—*A Species*;—*Several Genera*,—*Several Species*;—*One Genus*; *Two Species*;—and so on. And, again, We talk of UNIVERSALS, and of Generals, in the PLURAL *Number*, as well as in the SINGULAR. Now, in such cases, we are to observe that, by the employment—the *unavoidable* employment—of the CONCRETIVE Term, we EMBODY THE OBJECT *in question into a FICTITIOUS CONCRETE OBJECT of our*

CONTEMPLATION, *and* of LANGUAGE; although it is ABSTRACT, *in its own essence*.

In fine, then, I repeat once more, on account of its vast importance, that, ABSTRACT TERMS, *as they stand in a Lexicon*, are NOT *Any Parts* of the EDIFICE OF LANGUAGE: They are NOT SIGNS OF REAL BEINGS; but are ONLY SIGNS OF DEFINITIONS, and are MERELY MASSES OF LINGUAL MATERIAL, *hewn out to certain requisite and adapted Shapes and Sizes; but not yet carried away from the Quarry*: And they BECOME parts of the EDIFICE OF LANGUAGE *by the* VERY ACT OF ASSOCIATING THEM WITH NOUNS CONCRETIVE, *express, or understood, in Any Concatenation of Words*. Abstract Terms, therefore, bear the Very Same Relativeness to Language, as Types in the Boxes of a Compositor do to the Literary Subject which they form when they are brought into Syntactical Order and association;—that is to say—THEY MEAN NOTHING in Literary Expression, so long as they remain each by itself alone.—And I repeat, here, agreeably with what has already been insisted upon in a foregoing part of the work, that THE MEANING OF WORDS, *when they are arranged*, DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY UPON THE ORDER OF THEIR ASSOCIATION.

It is of the utmost importance that this last observation should be duly contrasted, with Mr. Tooke's General Doctrine of the ABSOLUTE AND UNCHANGEABLE GRAMMATICAL CHARACTER AND EFFICACY OF WORDS, IN ALL SITUATIONS; and the merits of each of these Schemes adjudged :. For

the Very Nature of Language is involved in the result.

If I have not much mistaken the ground upon which the foregoing reasonings have proceeded, in what I have called the Nounal Department of Language, the Principles now laid down must entitle this Part of Grammar to take its place in the Rank of Science, strictly speaking. And I humbly conceive that, the heretofore usual Denominations of the Parts of Speech in question, into **SO-CALLED NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE, — So-called ADJECTIVES, — So-called ARTICLES — and DEFINITIVES,**—(as apprehended and applied in Accredited Grammar,) must henceforth be regarded as manifestations of a state of knowledge in the Department of Language undeniably unscientific and barbarous, and such as could be tolerated by none but a Nation extremely unenlightened in this direction. In order to furnish an adequate comparison of the Subject, such as may enable the general reader to form a tolerable conception of its merits; I suppose that, the Old and Exploded Nomenclature in Chemistry exhibited a state of Knowledge in that Department far less discreditable to Philosophy, than is exposed in that Nomenclature of Grammar which I have thus proposed to discard.

It may be equally curious and expedient, here, to pause for a moment and take a transient view of the change which results, in the Department of

SYNTAX, from adopting the Principles which have been laid down with regard to the Nature of both Nouns and Verbs, in the various parts of this Work, as contrasted with the rules and tenets of Accredited Grammar.

This change amounts, in the first place, to the following reciprocal metamorphoses.

First.—In Accredited Grammar, *A Whole String of Distinct and Complete Verbs are confounded INTO ONE, and are PARSED AS ONE VERB made up of a Number of Component and Supposed Incomplete Verbs.* Whereas, it has been shewn, on the contrary, in the foregoing analyses, that a **REAL VERB IS NEVER ANY OTHER THAN SIMPLE:** and the Word which occupies the place on Each Side of it, *although this Word should be a VERBAL, serves at that moment NOT AS A VERB, but as a SYNTACTICAL NOUN,* and performs the Office of *either the Nominative or the Accusative* to the Verb in question.

Secondly. Upon the other hand, we are called upon to observe that, Whereas in Accredited Grammar a SO-CALLED NOUN SUBSTANTIVE *is a SINGLE Noun;* A **REAL NOUN SUBSTANTIVE,** on the contrary, is **NEVER ANY OTHER THAN A COMPOUND Noun** made up of *Several Simple Nouns*—namely—a **GENERIC,** a *Specific,* and a **Concretive**; or, at least, a **GENERIC** and a **Concretive,** express, or understood.

Thus, as an example in the case of **VERBS,**—in the expression—*He might have been taken to London,*—The Whole Four Distinct Verbs—

(*namely*—"might, have, been, taken,") are parsed, in Accredited Grammar, as ONE SAME VERB. Whereas, (including the Minor Verb—"to,") we have here No less than FIVE COMPLETE VERBS, each operating of and by itself, distinctly and severally from all the others, and Every One of them serving in this sentence, ALTERNATELY, AS VERB, and AS NOUN, agreeably with the Law of Alternation already laid down and illustrated.

Again, as an example in the case of NOUNS,—in the expression — THE *Black Man*; THE *White Man*;—or Any Other Such expression—the accredited method is to parse it into an "ARTICLE," an "ADJECTIVE," and A "SUBSTANTIVE:" Whereas it has been shewn, above, that the *Whole Three Terms*, taken together, go to form the NOUN SUBSTANTIVE in question; and that, the NOUN SPECIFIC and NOUN CONCRETIVE (*i. e. the So-called ADJECTIVE and So-called ARTICLE*) must be parsed *Subordinately*, as being COMPONENT SYNTACTICAL ELEMENTS of this Noun Substantive.

If it cannot be denied that what has now been stated is a true logical solution of the Subject; it will not be disputed that Grammar has been, hitherto, sunk in a state which calls loudly upon the intellectual pretensions of the present age, to wipe away its reproach.—Nor can the advances which have been made by the present generation, in other directions, have any effect with regard to the subject of Language, except to heighten the

contrast, and excite the deeper sense of our deficiency in this department. — With what truth has Mr. Tooke, in the outset of his *Speculations*, affirmed of *Accredited Grammar*, — (a truth far more extensive and onerous than Mr. Tooke was enabled to discern,) — that, — AFTER THE MENTION OF THE NOUN, ALL IS DARKNESS! — With what force, also, has he, at the same time, reminded Philosophers that, — “LANGUAGE IS “THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH ALL THEIR “MOST PRECIOUS LIQUORS MUST FLOW!”

SECTION SECOND.

OF THE ACCIDENTS CALLED NUMBER AND GENDER.

OF the Two Accidents of a Noun which are proposed for consideration in this article, very little needs be said besides what is incidentally advanced concerning them in different parts of the Work: Although it is unquestionably requisite to advert, appropriately, to these, in every enumeration of the Parts and Modifications of Grammatical Expression.

OF NUMBER.

And *First*, with regard to NUMBER; I have already intimated that this Accident, in a Language constructed in the most Logical Form, ought not to be expressed by an Inflection of the Noun. As, for example, the Noun—MAN—ought not to be expressed *One MAN*; — *Two MEN*; — and so on; But it ought to be expressed *One MAN*; — *Two MAN*; — *Ten MAN*; — *Many MAN*; and the LIKE; — in every instance whatever of signifying the Plurality of this Species. The Noun—MAN,—and every such Noun,—is either a GENERIC or a *Specific* Noun; and each, alike, is an ABSTRACT Term. And it is illogical, and therefore unphilosophical, to modify ANY ABSTRACT Term into *Two Different and Heterogeneous Natures*; the ONE of which is an ABSTRACT; while the OTHER, absurdly, as well as inconsistently, usurps the Nature of a CON-

CRETE. Besides which, the violation of Reason in this case is the more intolerable, inasmuch as there is a Distinct and Great Class of Signs, whose Proper Office it is to Concrete All the Abstract Terms of Language—namely—those Words heretofore called **DEFINITIVES**, and which, accordingly, are entertained in the present work under the denomination of **NOUNS CONCRETIVE**.

It may, however, merit consideration, whether there is not something gained, in return, by the **VARIETY** which the Plural Forms of Nouns give to a Language. And all, perhaps, that can be desired, in any Language in which this sort of variety exists, is that, it should be understood, as a Principle belonging to the Philosophical Grammar of that Language, that the Plural Forms of Nouns are as much **ABSTRACT** Signs, as the *Singular* Forms : Whereas, as these Plurals have heretofore been understood, they inconsistently and absurdly signify **CONCRETES**, in as much as they express **PLURALITY** OR **NUMBER**.

Plural Forms to **INITIAL PRONOUNS** are manifestly requisite in Language. But these Words being **CONCRETE** Signs ; their Plurals involve nothing illogical.

OF GENDER.

The Accident of a Noun called **GENDER** is an Inflexion, or a Modification, of that Noun, in order to distinguish either the **SEX**, or the **WANT OF SEX**, of the Subject which the Noun represents. It is, manifestly, a very useful and requisite device

in Language: And it only demands that we should ascertain the PRINCIPLES upon which it is to be employed; especially, as it has happened that a great and general degree of illogicalness has been evinced, by different Nations, in their *application* of this distinction.

It is a self-evident truth that, all the Different Objects which make up the Universe divide themselves, in this particular, (that is according to our apprehension of them,) into THREE CLASSES—namely—MALES ;—and FEMALES ;—and Things which are NEITHER *Male nor Female*. It is equally manifest that, the Two first-mentioned of these Species comprehend all the Objects which we suppose to possess LIFE, in the Physical or Natural Sense of that word. And the Class of Neuters makes up All the Objects in the Universe which we suppose to possess No Such Natural Life. It is upon this Real Basis that the Accident of Nouns called GENDER is founded. But, although the foundation is real; the Superstructure reared upon it may be, and very extensively has been, illogical and visionary.

It is a disposition that runs through the whole Natural History of mankind, both savage and civilized, to assign life to inanimate things, that is to things which, in our more deliberate moments, we conceive of as being inanimate. This propensity is a cast of the Phantasy; And it is referable to Poetry or the Language of Passion. Hence, it has happened that, a vast multitude of inanimate Objects (that is to say Objects inani-

mate in the apprehension of men during their ordinary avocations) have in the hours of imagination, and owing to some supposed *analogy*, been assigned to either the Masculine or the Feminine Gender; and have, *in consequence*, had this visionary stamp impressed upon them, in order to *designate them*, PERMANENTLY, IN LANGUAGES. And, accordingly, a MODIFICATION OF NOUNS, for this purpose, forms an appropriate Mechanism in Some LANGUAGES.

A deformity of reason has arisen out of this propensity; which has made extensive ravages in the Logicalness of those Languages. For, not only is it illogical to stamp Objects, in Speech, with a mark or character which we do not in the least believe to belong to their real nature. But, over and above this initial consideration, the truth is that, mankind have never been able to hit upon *any rational basis, or principle of agreement*, with regard to the Classification of those Inanimate Objects which they designate as Masculine, and those which they contradistinguish as being of the Other Sex. The Same Objects which one Nation has fancifully signified as being Masculine, have by another been written down as Feminine: And, thus, the Nouns employed by those Nations exhibit, when compared together, a chaos of conceptions, which war with one another and expose an utter want of rational foundation for those fanciful distinctions.

How much, then, is the reflecting mind relieved

in turning from this Scene of Metamorphosis and Deformity, and contemplating the sober and true device of designating Every Object as being either Masculine,—or Feminine,—or Neuter,—according to the Character which it happens to possess in its Natural History, altogether apart from any fanciful or figurative conception which, in any other mood, or sense, we may ever incline to indulge concerning it. Nor is this ALL the advantage, or claims, of such a procedure: For the natural designation of Objects, with regard to Sex; and, especially, that of inanimate objects, in the ordinary signification of them, including Abstract Things; leaves open the means of giving a peculiar animation and force to Figurative designation, when, either in Poetry or in Eloquence, we desire to invest them with life.

In this part of the Structure of Language, therefore, and in the Sound Natural Reason which is evinced in the conception of it, the English Tongue displays a remarkable superiority, over those Languages the inventors of which have indulged in a licence of superstitions and chimerical conceits, worthy only of a barbarous age and of the lowest state of human speculation.

SECTION THIRD.

OF THE ACCIDENT BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED CASE.

IN whatever point of view we consider the subject, the invention of that supposed affection of Nouns which has been called CASE is altogether fallacious and unphilosophical in a very high degree. It was; in its origin, a rude conceit; although adopted, first, by an acute and refined people. And the absurdities which it involves render it, perhaps more than any other device in accredited Grammar, unworthy of an enlightened community. The *imagined analogy* which gave origin to this figure, in the minds of the Greek Grammarians, has no foundation except in a visionary conception: For Language, as it proceeds from a Speaker, cannot with any propriety be said to FALL, whether it be *Obliquely* or *Directly*, except only in that forensic, or other sense, beyond the Pale of Grammar, in which we say that, a person has *let fall this, or that, remark, admission, or assertion*. Far differently from this; Language, in a double sense;—that is, both as it *proceeds from the mouth* of one man to the ear of another and as it is *in reality* a SERIES of CONNECTED BRIDGES forming a CHAIN OF SIGNS OF NATURAL OBJECTS ARRANGED in a NATURAL ORDER;—must be considered as preserving, at

all times, an *Unbroken and Undeviating Horizontal Concatenation*, in which No Line can EITHER FALL or be LESS DIRECTLY extended than another. It will readily appear, therefore, that nothing but the total blindness of the Ancients, with regard to the *Concatenated Structure of Language*, could ever have given rise to a conception, the adopting of which has entailed, upon the Languages called *LEARNED*, that monstrous amalgamation of the Two Most Different Parts of Speech—the Noun and the Verb—into One Same Assumed Word under the Denomination of a Noun in *this*, or *that CASE*: Which Irrationality has given birth to a piece of Grammatical Mechanism, necessary to and worthy of itself; and which obtains in these Languages, under the well known title of the *INFLECTION of Nouns*.

The progress of art in the present day, in its application to the advancement of public amusement, especially to that of Dramatical Exhibition, has furnished us with a striking and correct simile of Language; which the inventors of the Device called *CASE* did not possess. One of our recently-invented moveable Stage Panoramas, as it unfolds a *Scene of Successive Objects in a Horizontal Progression*, is not only a correct ANALOGY of Language as it proceeds from the mouth of a Speaker; but it is, in fact, NO LESS THAN A NATURAL LANGUAGE; and it would be no more difficult to *PAINT* such a Picture, than to do the like by any portion of Written or Oral Speech. The same, indeed, may also be said of ANY Picture in which

a Scene of Different Objects is exhibited ; such, for example, as a Landscape or a Battle Piece ; provided the eye were to begin at One side of the Picture, and move gradually over to the other. It is to be observed, however, that ; if the Greeks had possessed such an Image, as this, it would have availed them nothing ; because they entertained no conception that Language is a Chain of Signs, connected in the way which has been demonstrated in the foregoing analyses. The FALLING of a Word, whether in a *Perpendicular* or in an *Oblique direction*, is vastly and altogether unlike the SITUATION, or OFFICE, of a PIER of a Bridge as it comes into view in the unfolding of a Panoramic Scene, which is a true simile of Language.

It would be an unavailing cavil, here, to pretend that the inventors of the FALLINGS did not intend to adopt them in a *literal* sense. For, either they did so intend, or they did not. And, if they did so intend, it is certain they fell into a monstrous fallacy of conception. But, if they did not ; they have thereby proclaimed their ignorance of the Real Nature of Language, by NOT employing a Simile in a LITERAL sense ; which, I affirm, they MIGHT have done by appealing to the Picture of a Procession, or of Any Other Such Train of Objects ; which (I here repeat) is *No less than a GRAVEN NATURAL LANGUAGE* ; and which may be PARSED, *as such*.

It is here to be finally and particularly pointed out and distinguished that, the *real* and great fallacy of that View of the Subject entertained by

the inventors of Cases consisted in their assumption that, *Some* of the Expressions of Language are LESS DIRECT than *Others*—that is in the assumption that while *Some* Words proceeded, *in some sense or other*, DIRECTLY from the Mouth or Mind, Others proceeded INDIRECTLY or OBLIQUELY. And, in this assumption, we discern, it matters not whether Words be supposed to FALL, or to RISE; to MOVE, or to be put forth IN ANY OTHER general manner; since the ESSENCE of the Device called Case consists in the supposition that ALL WORDS DO NOT proceed in ONE SAME DIRECTION or CONTINUATION; but that *Some Words* TURN OFF, from the Main Stream of Language, like branches which grow obliquely off from the Parent Trunk of a Tree. Now, that such a Scheme exhibits a monstrous misconception of the Nature of *Language*, is a truth which has been very amply demonstrated in the course of this work. Unless, therefore, it can be shewn that the Simile of a CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF BRIDGES is untenable for that of Language, the Device called CASE must be as discreditable to Philosophy, as the lowest jargon would be in the mouth of the most accomplished man of letters; because it is altogether void of reason.

It follows from what has been said, although I should be uniformly unwilling to propose any violent or unnecessary innovation in the *Nomenclature*, any more than in the *Principles*, of Grammar, that there is a logical necessity to suggest the expulsion of the very NAME OF CASE from the

Science of Language, along with the CONTRIVANCE which it serves to designate. The propriety of this suggestion, however, will depend upon the following considerations.

The real Foundation in which the device called Case has been darkly laid by its inventors, is no other than the NECESSARY RELATIVENESS, or CORRELATIVENESS, of EVERY OBJECT, or SUBJECT, IN THE UNIVERSE, to EVERY OTHER OBJECT, or SUBJECT. This Foundation, moreover, is extremely simple in its GENUS; although it is infinitely diversified in all its Different *Species*. For Every Object, or Subject, in the Universe,—that is Every Thing that is signified by a *Noun Substantive* or *Syntactical Noun*, and which alone is an Object of Language,—must be considered as being a Co-AGENT, that is either a LEADING RELATIVE, or a CORRELATIVE to this Leading Relative. Infinitely diversified as is the scope and variety of the *Particular* or *Individual* Objects of Speech; they all resolve themselves, strictly speaking, into these TWO SPECIAL OBJECTS, together with that THIRD OBJECT—a LINK of CONNECTION, between these Two Special Objects, which LINK is that thing we call ACTION, and which is Necessarily signified by the Part of Speech called the VERB. I have already repeatedly (and, I now hope, sufficiently,) inculcated the Principle that, there is No Other Use or Employment of Language whatever, except to signify or express Relative and Correlative Objects, or Subjects, considered as LOGICAL Co-AGENTS, ACTING

against, or upon, or in some manner in connexion with, EACH OTHER.

From this view of the Subject, it is plain that, if the *Device*, OR EVEN THE NAME, of Case could be entertained at all in Grammar; there could not, in strictness, be more than Two CASES;—namely — That supposed “*FALLING of Words from the Mind*” by which we express the STATE of a LEADING Relative or Noun, and that other supposed “*FALLING*” by which we express a FOLLOWING Relative, *i. e.* a CORRELATIVE to the former: And these Two NOUNS manifestly answer to the *Nominative* and the *Accusative CASE* of the Latin Language. The analogy, moreover, upon which I ground the Terms—“*Leading and Following Nouns*” — is, obviously, that of a BRIDGE; which Thing we pass by entering *first* upon the NEAR Bank or Abutment, and *afterwards* upon the FAR or OFF Bank or Abutment. Hence, the Terms—NEAR NOUN and OFF NOUN might perhaps be not illogically substituted for *Leading Noun* and *Following Noun*. But, with a view to the Phraseology of the Logician, I imagine the Terms SUBJECTIVE and OBJECTIVE *Naun* may be more appropriate than those last mentioned, or than those of *Nominative* and *Accusative* as already noticed.

The Supposition of FALLINGS, together with their Modifications of *Direct* and *Oblique*, being indisputably foreign, and altogether hostile, to any Analogy of Language; we are imperatively called upon, under a Logical Necessity, to ex-

punge the very NAMES of them from the page of Philosophical Grammar, unless, indeed, we are content to forego all true logical pretension, for the sake of wearing a Badge of ignorance solely because this Badge happens to be a conceit entertained by the Greeks and Romans. And we are, by the Same Necessity, called upon to substitute whatever Device is found to accord with REASON, in the Subject. Such a Device, at the same time, readily presents itself, with claims against which, I think, there can be no objection, unless it be taken for an objection that we must lose the long-cherished SOUND of the Word —“ CASE,”— and must submit the ear to a sound that is a little different. Thus, whereas, in the foregoing part of my work I have asserted that, EVERY VERB must be supported by *A Noun in the Nominative*, and *Another Noun in the Accusative CASE*, One of these being on either hand; I now, in order to introduce the suggested alteration, assert that, Every Verb must be supported by a *Noun in the SUBJECTIVE OR LEADING*, and *Another Noun in the OBJECTIVE OR FOLLOWING STATE*: For we are constrained, *by a strict logical necessity*, to CONSIDER and to NAME *Every Syntactical Noun*, (during the process of PARSING,) as being in some STATE of RELATIVENESS, or CORRELATIVENESS, to the *Other Syntactical Noun* which is connected with it. And this, I conceive, is the true FOUNDATION and REASON of that Accident which Grammarians have considered as a FALLING of Nouns in a *Direct*, or *Oblique*, Position or Direction: Than

which, no Chimera of the Imagination could be more intolerable to that TRUTH to which all Real Science must conform.

That GENUS of Affection which I call the GRAMMATICAL STATE of a Noun, together with its TWO PRINCIPAL *Species*, being thus defined and determined; and the Manner of expressing these *Two Species* being explained, as consisting MERELY IN THE ASSOCIATED POSITION of a Noun Substantive with respect to ANY VERB which it contributes to support; We are next to consider the *Various Lesser Species* of Relative State, of Any Substantive Noun; and the *Respective Modes* in which these are to be signified in Language.

And here, in the *First* place, I am brought again to advert to the *Primary* Utility of that Part of Speech which I have shewn, at sufficient length, to consist exclusively of MINOR VERBS, but which have heretofore been called PREPOSITIONS, and are by all Etymologists affirmed as being made up of All Sorts of Words. In expressing ANY SPECIAL ACTION, or ACTING; the *Primary* Use of a MINOR VERB is to *define*, or *determine*, the MANNER in which *this Special Acting* EFFECTS *either the OBJECTIVE or the SUBJECTIVE Noun Substantive*: Which it always does, or may do, by either *terminating*, or *beginning*, in *Some Action* MORE SPECIAL than the *First*.

Thus, in expressing the SPECIAL ACTION of WRITING; we may indeed say, elliptically,—*He*

WRITES *English* : But this in reality means—*He WRITES IN (INNING) The English Language* : And the Minor Verb—**INNING**—is the *Name and Sign* of a **MORE SPECIAL Acting**, which defines, or determines, the **MANNER** in which the **LESS SPECIAL Acting** of **Writing** affects the Substantive Noun—“*The English Language*”—in the **OBJECTIVE STATE**.

Again, in the case of such an expression (now almost obsolete) as—“*He is A COMING Here ;*”—or, “*He is A GOING There ;*”—the “**A**,” which means **ON (i. e. ONEING)** is a Minor Verb and is the **Sign** of a **MORE SPECIAL Action**, which defines, or determines, the **Manner** in which the **LESS SPECIAL Action** of **COMING, OR GOING, BEGINS** from the Pronoun, “*He*”—in the **SUBJECTIVE STATE**, *understood as repeated after THE Verb “IS :”* Thus, *He is in Time, or in Place, He A coming.*

At the same time, however, that I have stated this last example, for the sake of illustrating the Principle in which it is founded ; it is to be observed that, the Whole Scope of the Employment of Minor Verbs, in expressing **BEGINNING Actions**, is extremely limited owing to the Nature of Things ; and is, comparatively, but of small utility : Whereas, the Field for the employment of the Signs of **TERMINATING Actions** is vastly extensive and various. Thus, in the case of the Action of *Writing, alone* ; we not only say—*He WRITES IN English, or IN the English Language ;*—But we also say—*He WRITES ON Grammar ;*—*He WRITES OF Other Subjects ;*—

He WRITES TO *His* *Father* ; — *He* WRITES DURING *The* *Day* ; — *He* WRITES THROUGH *The* *Night* ; — *He* WRITES AT *All* *Hours* ; — *He* WRITES WITH *Difficulty* ; — *He* WRITES UNDER *Disease* ; — And so on, if we were to repeat all, and many more than all, the MORE SPECIAL *Modifications* of the LESS SPECIAL *Action* of *Writing*, which were, for a similar purpose, enumerated in a former part of this work.

In the *Next* place, it is to be suggested, that, Although there *can* be ONLY TWO SPECIES OF RELATIVE STATE of *Any Syntactical Noun* — namely—the SUBJECTIVE and the OBJECTIVE— as already described ; — it is expedient, or requisite rather, that ONE of these should be subdivided into *Two Lesser Species* ; or, in other words, that the OBJECTIVE STATE should be distinguished into the MERE *Objective* and the DEFINITIVE, or the DEFINITIVE *Objective* : of which distinction, the following is the Rational Foundation.

The Objects of the Universe are distinguished, in our conception of them, sometimes, and very often, by their PERMANENT QUALITIES ; as for example, when we say — the *Black Man*, — the *White Horse*. But these Objects are, also, at other times, and very often, distinguished by us, NOT by *Any* PERMANENT Quality ; but, by SOME ACT (*i. e.* ACTING) which we perceive, or assume, them to be, or to have been, engaged in : As, for example, When we say — *John* OF *Gaunt* ;

—which means *John OFFSPRINGING Gaunt* :—Or, *The Actor FROM London* ;—which means *The Actor BEGINNING London*, i. e. the Place he *began to act at*, or where he had previously attained his *celebrity*. In this manner, if we should say—*THE NEW ACTOR from LONDON is to personate A BLACK MAN* ;—we should, in expressing the *Special Action of Personating*, describe the *Actor* by an *ACTION*, and *The Black Man* by a *PERMANENT QUALITY* ; and each with equal propriety. And the recurrence of such cases is very frequent, and continual, in the affairs of Language.

Founded in the Cause just mentioned, therefore, we have the *Secondary Utility* of So-called *Prepositions* or *Minor Verbs* : And this *Utility* is almost as *VARIOUS*, as it is *FREQUENT*. Thus we have not only very frequently, and continually, to make use of such *Descriptions* as *JOHN of GAUNT* ;—*GARRICK from LONDON* ;—*JOURNEY to BATH* ;—*HOUSE by THE ROAD* ;—and a host of such more ordinary and hacknied expressions : But we have, also, very frequent need to describe *Grammatical Agents*, or *Co-Agents*, by *Other and Very Different* Sorts of *Minor Actions* : As, for example, in the case of *One Single Subject*, we may have occasion to express,—

A Man UNDER Difficulties.

A Man ABOVE Misfortune.

A Man WITHOUT Guile.

A Man AGAINST Reason.

A Man DOUBTING All Things.

A Man BELIEVING *Nothing*.

A Man HATING *Evil*.

A Man LOVING *Good*.

A Man TRUSTING IN *Providence*.

A Man THROUGH *All Trials*.

And here we are to observe that, Every One of the Syntactical Nouns, which follows a Minor Verb in the above string of examples, is a Noun in the DEFINITIVE *Objective State*, or, we may say, simply, a NOUN IN THE DEFINITIVE STATE.

And here, also, we are called to observe WHAT IS THE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE OR DIFFERENTIAL CIRCUMSTANCE, which distinguishes a MERE *Objective*, from a DEFINITIVE *Objective State*; which is this:—A DEFINITIVE OR NOUN IN THE DEFINITIVE STATE means ANY PRIMARY *Syntactical Noun*¹ which happens to be placed as an *Objective Noun to Some MINOR VERB that Defines Some Prior MERE Objective Noun*; Whereas a MERE Objective Noun is a Noun in the Objective State *with respect to Some MAJOR VERB*, whether this Major Verb has Any Minor Verb to Define it, or not. Thus, if we say—either—He CONVERSED *with A Man*; or, He CONVERSED *with A Man of Wisdom*;—The Primary Syntactical Noun—"A MAN"—is in the MERE *Objective State* with respect to *both the Major Verb*—

¹ The term PRIMARY Syntactical Noun is intended here to distinguish Any Syntactical Noun that *has not previously served in the Same Sentence as a VERB*: Whereas, Any Verb may also serve, in the Same Sentence, as a *Secondary Syntactical Noun*.

“CONVERSED”—*and the Minor Verb*—“WITH;”—although, we are to recollect, these Two Verbs are to be parsed as being, alternately, *Verb* and *Noun*: But the Syntactical Noun—“WISDOM”—is a Noun in the DEFINITIVE *Objective* State, because it DEFINES *What Sort of Man* is the Object of the Major Action.

From this statement, we discern that MINOR VERBS, in their PRIMARY Office, *define* MAJOR VERBS, *then serving as* SECONDARY NOUNS: But, in their *Secondary* Office, they *define* PRIMARY NOUNS. Thus, if we say—He STOOD *supporting* His Friend;—The Minor Verb—“*Supporting*”—is the *Sign of a More Special or More Definite Action*, which *defines the manner in which the* LESS SPECIAL Action of STANDING affects the Noun—“His Friend,”—which last is the *Object or Noun in the Objective State*. And, again, if we say,—The Man WITH The Gun;—the Minor Verb—“WITH,”—which means *tying*,—is the Sign of an Action by which we define, or describe “The MAN.”

After what has been said, it will readily appear that there can be *No Other Species* of Relativeness, of Any Syntactical Noun, of importance sufficient to deserve the Grammatical Dignity of being classed in what is here technically called a STATE, and which Term is now proposed to be substituted for that of CASE, as heretofore employed. ALL THE ENDLESS VARIETIES, of MORE *Definite* Relativeness of Things to One another, require only to be signified by a *Commensurate Number and Variety* of MINOR VERBS: To answer which

purpose, No Less than Almost Every PROGRESSIVE Verbal in Language offers itself, as being completely illegible; — the Number of Words which can serve for So-called Prepositions being the same, or nearly the same, as can serve for Major Verbs themselves.

In a word, then, NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE, as they stand at any time Syntactically arranged in a Speech or Sentence, must be in One, or Other, of TWO, *but we may say of* THREE, STATES OF RELATIVENESS; — that is to say, — The LEADING or SUBJECTIVE; — The FOLLOWING or OBJECTIVE; — Or, the DEFINITIVE, *which last is* ONLY A VARIETY OF THE OBJECTIVE. And so much for that Accident of Nouns, the Theory of which has been called the most abstruse part of the Science of Grammar; and the effusions, or opinions, concerning which, in various instances, I have found it the hardest, not merely to assent to, but to *understand*.

It remains to say something, here, with regard to the Nature, or Form, of the *So-called English Genitive Case*; which Sign has produced so much embarrassment and diversity of opinion among Grammarians.

From what has been advanced by Dr. Murray, in different parts of his Work, it may be conclusively gathered that, our Saxon Genitive in 's — carries the very same Import that is signified by the Norman Genitive. The darkness which had

so long hung over this Sign appears to be completely removed by its being shewn, by this author, that the *es* of the Visi-gothic and Anglo-saxon Languages means *of*. As, for example, in the commencement of his *Second Volume*, Dr. Murray says —“ In Visi-gothic we find *ALLIS, HAUHIS, AIRIS, RACHTIS, SUNS, FRAMIWIGIS*. In Anglo-saxon and in old English this species of Words were numerous. *AMIDDES, BESIDES, ALONGES*, in addition to those mentioned, may serve to mark a common feature of all the Teutonic dialects. The literal sense of these words is, *of all, of high, of early, of right, of soon, of continual, of in the middle, of beside, of along.*”

It is true, if we consider Dr. Murray as a GRAMMARIAN, and NOT *as an* ETYMOLOGIST, he has alloyed this satisfactory view of the Subject, by adding (just after the above, and in other places,) the following opinion of it; “ But it has been formerly observed that the Genitive is a kind of Adjective which signifies belonging or pertaining to the sense of the Nominative.” Now it is here to be observed that, according to the view which has been taken of the Nature of VERBS by All Grammarians, (including Dr. Murray himself,) a VERB is of an Adjective Nature, and is, in fact, an Adjective to its Nominative. And, hence, as I have shewn that Every So-called Preposition is a Verb, it might, according to those Writers, be affirmed that the NORMAN Genitive—in *of*—IS ITSELF a “ KIND OF ADJECTIVE.” That it is *as much an Adjective as the*

Saxon Genitive—in *es*, or *'s*,—is an Adjective, I am fully persuaded from the whole amount of what Dr. Murray has advanced with regard to it. But the True Constitution of Language demands I should assert that, neither of these, without gross absurdity, can be called an Adjective at all, unless we are content to confound *So-called Prepositions or Minor Verbs* with a Part of Speech from which they are most foreign in their Grammatical Nature.

If, in order to invalidate this conclusion, we were to question, or deny, that the Termination in *ES*, of the Saxon Genitive, means, or originally meant, strictly speaking, the *So-called Preposition OF*, which I interpret as the *Minor Verb OFF-SPRINGING*; And if, therefore, we go back to the Source of the Genitive, as explained by Dr. Murray himself; We shall find (*Volume First, page 45.*) that he resolves it into the sense of "*pertaining to.*" He has, to be sure, given a *prior* sense of this Sign—namely—"HAVING:" But common sense discerns that, this was a most rude and clumsy device: because; How would it now sound to express the sense of "PERTAINING TO" *a Woman*, by the expression *HAVING a Woman*, or *A Woman HAVING*. The expression—"PERTAINING TO," however, is certainly both logical and fit for the purpose in question. And, let us observe, or inquire, *To WHAT* does it amount? The answer is: it is MERELY A COMPOUND OF TWO VERBALS, *substituted* (if we chuse) *for the ONE VERBAL—"OFF-SPRINGING:"*—And thus, whatever expedient we

may adopt, with a view of expressing the Genitive or Possessive STATE of a Noun ; we must do so (*if it be done logically,*) NOT BY AN ADJECTIVE AS IT IS CALLED ; *but, by a MINOR VERB*, which last must be the Sign of *Some Action assumed as existing* between the Noun in the Definitive or Possessive State and the Noun which is assumed as being in Possession.

Thus JOHN'S *Hat*—means either *John PERTAINING TO Hat* ; — or, — *John OF Hat* ; — which ever the reader may please to adopt. And each of these, alike, means either, *The Hat PERTAINING FINISHING John*,—or—*The Hat OFFSPRINGING John*.

The PRIMARY Object of Philosophical Grammar, in order to determine the Real Structure of Language in the present Department, is not what PARTICULAR Verb is, or was, meant in the Sign of the Possessive, or of Any Other So-called Case : But it is to discover and settle the fact, *Whether it is a VERB AT ALL*, or a SO-CALLED ADJECTIVE, that is meant in this Sign. And that it is a VERB, or else a COMPOUND OF VERBS, that is meant, is, I trust, rendered herein sufficiently evident.

It is, no doubt, a *Secondary Object*, especially of the ETYMOLOGIST, to ascertain what PARTICULAR *Verb*, or Verbs, are meant by the Sign in question. But, in this last mentioned inquiry, ANY VERB, OR VERBS, which import *Offspringing*, or *pertaining to*, may serve equally well the purpose of the GRAMMARIAN. As an example of the truth of this assumption, we often express ourselves by saying

—*Son, or Brother, or Relative, TO (i. e. FINISHING) Such a One*; instead of saying — *Son, or Brother, or Relative, OF (i. e. OFFSPRINGING) Such a One*.: And the *former* of these expressions is a well understood; and, when viewed in a proper light, is perhaps nearly as logical; as the *latter*.

As for the Objection which has been raised, by Writers on English Grammar, that the Saxon and the Norman Genitive cannot in all cases be put, convertibly, the one for the other; it amounts to nothing, as an argument against the Virtual Identicalness of these Two Signs. And, if it has so happened, *in this or in any other instance*, that the IDIOMS of our Language have *unphilosophically shackled* the Language, in violation of the Laws of Reason; it must, in the course of time, be either freed from such absurdities, by writers who have genius and influence to effect such an amelioration; or, else, must remain, in those points, a blemish and a reproach to this Department of Philosophy.

In offering this last remark; it is of material importance that I should inculcate it as an observation requisite to be *remembered and applied in all such cases whatever*. And, doubtless, there exists, in *Every Language*, a Variety of Idioms which violate, and must be subjected to, this Principle of Universal Grammar.

SECTION FOURTH.

OF PRONOUNS.

SUBSECTION I.

Of the Words called Personal Pronouns.

THE Class of Words which fall under the above mentioned Denomination, (as is implied in their name,) constitutes *no necessary* part of the Structure of Language, if we speak with categorical accuracy. But they are at least so requisite, in order to facilitate the communication of thought, and to avoid an intolerable amount of continual *repetition*, that they form one of the most indispensable Devices, for this purpose, which have been invented with a view to attain brevity and ease, in the business of discourse. Hence, these Words, (in this respect like ADVERBS,) are well entitled to be considered as a PART OF SPEECH.

The History of Pronouns has been furnished, by Dr. Murray, with a detail of etymological evidence which seems to forbid my doubt of its authenticity, and demands that I should advert to it, here, before proceeding to any other consideration of the Subject. In the *Fourth Chapter* of his Work, he has introduced the matter in the following terms: And he has illustrated this part of his Text, in the *Notes* which refer to it.

“ The words, which were employed to signify

“ persons, were all of them such as, in one or
“ other sense, expressed possession, the simple
“ idea of which was hold, seize, sway, or have.
“ They were AG, WAG, and HWAG, move with
“ the hand, hold; THWAG, seize, take; swag,
“ sway, manage with the hand, keep. These, as
“ nouns underwent the future changes of that
“ class of words. They were at first common to
“ whatever could be called self, which was I, thou,
“ he, she, or it, in the sense of the same thing. At
“ length, like other words, they were restricted,
“ and were appropriated as follows; AG and WAG
“ to the first person, as it is now called; THWAG
“ to the second, and third, SWAG to the third per-
“ son, and to the expression of that idea con-
“ tained in demonstrative and relative pronouns.
“ AG was compounded with MA and NA. The
“ first compound, AGAMA, which signifies be-
“ longing to possession, that is, to self, is used in
“ a mutilated form for I, and me, in all the Eu-
“ ropean Languages. The other compound, AGA-
“ NA, in every Teutonic dialect, signifies belong-
“ ing to self,—or own, which is its form in mo-
“ dern English. SWAG, by composition, became
“ SWAGMA or SAMA, the same; and its simple
“ form, SWA, and SA, is the pronoun of the third
“ person; as also, the demonstrative, and relative,
“ pronoun in Old English or Saxon, in Visigothic
“ and Sanscrit. AG and HWAG, self, or same,
“ began to be used as relative adjectives; and
“ THWAG, which at first equally signified same,
“ thou, he, was limited in sense to the second

“ person, and to an occasional substitution in
“ place of SA, the, and who.”

Assuming in the *First* place, then, that the passage now given comprises a genuine statement of the Real Origin of Pronouns ; (as indeed I apprehend to be extremely probable;) it becomes a self-evident truth that, so long as the Words AG, WAG, THWAG, &c. continued to convey ONE COMMON import of SELF, or SAME, it is impossible they, or Any Arrangement of them, could serve for the DISTINCTIVE Signs of the FIRST, the SECOND, and the THIRD Person: And, therefore, SOME OTHER Device must have accompanied this expression of *sameness*. At this period of Language, accordingly, (although, I think, Dr. Murray does not advert to any such thing,) we can hardly doubt that the *Persons* were indicated as has been supposed by Mr. Harris ; that is by *Pointing with the hand*: And if this conclusion be deemed valid, it becomes manifest that, the DIFFERENT ACTS OF POINTING—to the *Speaker*,—the *Spoken to*,—and the *Spoken of*,—were VIRTUALLY THE PRONOUNS which were then employed ; and the accompanying WORD importing SAME, which was applied in COMMON to *Every One* of the Persons, was in this case *Only an Adjective Term expressive of IDENTITY*, just as if we were now to say—*I the SAME,—Thou the SAME,—He the SAME* ; which, in fact, is an Idiom still preserved in our Language in the expressions—*I JOHN,—Thou PETER,—and He JAMES*. This Word, importing *Same*, accompanying each of the Three Different Sorts

of Manual Indication, appears indeed so natural, in any early stage of human society, that it casts a strong color of veri-similitude over the whole account which has been furnished by the Historian of the European Languages. And it is a fact, of some weight in the question, that we still continue, even at this day, *Another* certain Modification of this Idiom, especially in cases wherein we wish to express *Identity*, as in the expressions—*MY-self*,—*THY-self*,—*HIM-self*,—and—*HER-self*.

Secondly. But we are now to pass on, from this era of Manual or Virtual Pronouns, to that Period of Language when the *Different Forms* of the COMMON Term were restricted, and were appropriated thus—namely—AG and WAG to the FIRST Person,—THWAG to the SECOND and THIRD,—and SWAG to the THIRD. And here, then, (that is if we admit the authority in question,) it becomes plain that we have the *First Stage and Origin of PRONOUNS properly so called*—that is of LINGUAL SIGNS standing for OTHER NAMES of Persons: For POINTINGS could never have been PRONOUNS, or an ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE, in that restricted sense of the Word Language which comprehends only Speaking and Writing; of which, alone, this work has intended to treat: Although such Pointing would serve, very well, as a *substitute* for Pronouns, in Vocal Speech.

To proceed now, therefore, from the ETYMOLOGY, to the LOGIC, of the Subject; it does not appear to be involved in much difficulty; (although,

indeed, the precise import of the Pronoun of Each of the Three Persons has heretofore been buried in profound darkness :) For there appears to be hardly two roads to chuse, in assigning its certain Logical import.

We are told that, the Persons of Grammar have been styled the *First*,—*Second*, and *Third*,—on account of the supposed DIGNITY of the *First* more than the *Second*, and of the *Second* more than the *Third*. And, if this reason be admitted, there then certainly appears Two, and only Two, roads to adopt in this inquiry. But I humbly conceive that, the Primitive Inventors, or Employers, of Pronouns, very probably, entertained no sense, or thought, of this *Grammatical “Dignity.”* And, at least, I apprehend that a much more cogent reason exists, for the Denomination in question. For EVERY SPEAKER *must be*, and ought naturally to be ESTIMATED *as being*, FIRST in the ORDER OF SPEECH : And the SPOKEN TO, and ANY PERSON SPOKEN OF, MUST FOLLOW, *in a NATURAL SEQUENCE OF TIMES*. We occasionally, indeed, and very frequently, INVERT this *Natural Order*. But, in most of these instances, the sentence is *elliptical* ; and, in others, it is *dislocated* ; both being resolvable into the Natural Order : And, in any case wherein this cannot be done ; it is to be observed that, whenever the Order of LANGUAGE is inverted, the Order of SUPPOSED DIGNITY *must be inverted along with it* ; because, if we begin a Sentence with YOU, or HE ; the *Second*, or *Third*, Per-

son in *Dignity* becomes the *First* in *Speech*: So that, the Order of DIGNITY is here liable to the Very same Objection as the Order of LOGICAL SEQUENCE.

The conclusion to be drawn from this reasoning is simple and immediate. The Pronoun—*I*—does NOT import FIRST Person: but it imports THE SPEAKING PERSON:—The Pronoun—*Thou*—does not import SECOND Person: but it imports THE SPOKEN TO PERSON:—The Pronoun—*He*,—*She*,—or *It*,—does not import THIRD Person: but it imports THE SPOKEN OF PERSON.

If Etymology could afford us either light or strength upon the Subject; we have the express testimony of Dr. Murray, to the simple fact that; the Pronouns were appropriated, he does not say, *unqualifiedly*, “to the *First* Person,” &c.; but, “to the “*First* Person AS IT IS NOW CALLED,” &c.: Which qualification amounts to his implied opinion that, it was *first* SO CALLED at some epoch AFTER, (most probably LONG after,) its appropriation. And, although the Ordinal Appellations — *First*, — *Second*,—and *Third*,—are doubtless very proper distinctions to be employed; I think we have only one conclusion to adopt—namely—that the *more primary*,—and by far the *more logical*,—import of the Three Pronouns is that of *The Speaking Person*, — *The Spoken to Person*, — and *The Spoken of Person*.

In accordance with what has just been advanced, we may turn to the Theory of the *Third*

Pronoun which has been suggested by Mr. Tooke. And, although the account which he has given of this Word is not borne out, so far back as that infant stage of Language when it appears certainly to have carried only the import of *Self or Same*, as did all the Other Words of this Class; yet, it appears, from the evidence of such expressions in our Tongue as Mr. Tooke has quoted in support of his opinions, that the Speakers of English, during that nervous and sensible, if not elegant, era of the Dialect had, from natural logic, fallen into the use and acceptation of the Word **HIGHT** or **SAID**, that is fully equivalent to **CALLED**, or **SPOKEN OF**, as being the import of the Pronoun of the *Third Person*.

In order to illustrate this conclusion, I may here quote two, or three, of the examples which have been adduced by Mr. Tooke in support of it. And similar instances are to be found in Chaucer, and in other old English writers, in such numbers as leave little room to doubt that, this was the *real construction* which was universally put upon the Word in question, at a ripe and rational stage of our Language.

“The great kynge **IT** whiche Cambyses

“ Was **HOTE**.”

Gower. lib. 7.

“ Of whiche two, Arcyte **HIGHT** that one,

“ And that other **HIGHT** Palamon.

“ *Knichtes Tale*.”

“ And gan alone to bring **HIT** in the presense,

“ And took **HIT** Joseph devoutely by his bonde.

Lyfe of our Lady, pag. 27.

“ He useth not the onely tearme of womanne by

“ **HIT** self.

“ Dr. Martin's Confutation of Peynett, ch. 13.

See “ **DIV. OF PURLEY.**”

Upon the strength of such examples as these, Mr. Tooke has confidently insisted that, our **It**, the Pronoun of the Third Person, is nothing but the “ Past Participle of the Verb **HAITAN**”—and means simply, “ **THE SAID.**” And, in support of this opinion, he affirms that, his exposition “ will be found perfectly to correspond with every “ use of the word **It** in our Language.” Nor do I at present recollect any instance that contradicts his assertion ; which, if admitted, amounts to a very strong evidence in itself, and to a very conclusive one when discerned to be founded in the reason of the thing.

We have, indeed, in the Language, such expressions as,—**It is HE** ; — **It is SHE**, — &c. : In which, if **It** means the **SAID** ; and **HE**, or **SHE**, also, means the said, there is a *tautology or repetition* of the Same Sign. But any such anomaly, as this, is fully countenanced by a *Variety of other and similar ones in Language* ; and it amounts to no objection, worthy of consideration. Thus it is a current Idiom in our Language to say — *The same that* : Yet, Dr. Murray shews, with sufficient ap-

pearance of authenticity, that the Demonstrative—"That"—means "*Self*," and nothing else.

See the 1st. *Volume* of his HISTORY, *Note* 2. I.

I am inclined, at the same time, to suspect that, the Word—IT—, importing THE SAID PERSON, or THE SPOKEN OF PERSON,— became, in its *proper Origin*, the GENERIC or PRINCIPAL Pronoun of the Third Person: And that, the Modified Terms—HE and SHE—were left as *Subordinate Words*; which now probably import only *Self* or *Same*, as formerly, and serve, in some way, as *Appendages* to the Word IT.

It is here requisite to advert to a very remarkable oversight and contradiction, as well as error in doctrine, which has been advanced by Mr. Harris with regard to an assumption which he, in common with the Ancient Grammarians, has entertained—namely—That, a Personal Pronoun stands for the PROPER Name of the Person it represents.

In one of his *Foot Notes*, he says, "*Priscian* seems "to consider them" (the Pronouns) "so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, "that he does not say they supply the place of "*any Noun*, but that of the *Proper Name* only. "And this undoubtedly was their original, and "still is their true and natural use."

Yet, on the other hand, in his TEXT, and in the very same page, he reasons in the following rational manner. "Now as all conversation passes "between *Individuals*, these will often happen to

“be reciprocally *till that instant unacquainted with*
“*each other*. What then is to be done? How
“shall the Speaker address the other, when he
“knows not his *Name*? Or How explain himself
“by his own of which the other is wholly igno-
“rant? Nouns as they have been described can-
“not answer the purpose. The first expedient
“upon this occasion seems to have been *Pointing*,
“or *Indication*, by the Finger or Hand. But the au-
“thors of Language were not content with this.
“They invented a race of *Words to supply this*
“*Pointing*, which Words, *as they always stood for*
“*Substantives or Nouns*, were characterised by the
“Name of PRONOUNS.

Thus, then, we have Mr. Harris's most contra-
dictory, but rational and true theory, that PRO-
NOUNS *stand INSTEAD OF POINTING*; *which Point-*
ing, we know, stood for Names of Persons CONSI-
DERED IN THEIR MERE GRAMMATICAL CHARAC-
TER AS SUBJECTS, or OBJECTS, of SPEECH; and
NOT AT ALL FOR PROPER NAMES. And it is quite
certain that the Words called Pronouns,—as sig-
nifying *The Speaker, the Spoken to, and the Spoken*
of,—would not be the less efficient, or useful, if there
were No Such Sign as a *Permanently Personal*
Name in the world; or, if no such Sign had ever
been invented.

And here I am led to signify that, in my opinion,
SO-CALLED PROPER NAMES, THEMSELVES, require
to be classed under the Head of PRONOUNS. The
Name—CHRISTOPHER—, for example, stands for

THE MAN CALLED *Christopher* ; — The Name *Bucephalus* — stands for THE HORSE CALLED *Bucephalus* : And the name *BRITAIN* — stands for THE ISLAND CALLED *Britain*. I think it is quite manifest that, this construction rests upon the very same basis, as that which I have put upon the *Pronoun of the Third Person*—HE, SHE, or IT : Each of which Modes is an *Abbreviated Sign*, standing for the Name—THE PERSON SPOKEN OF, or, THE SAID PERSON.

To insist farther upon this, it is certain that, as forming One of the Objects or Things in the Universe, the *Logical and Philosophical Name* of a MAN,—that is ANY MAN—is no other than a MAN : And, of a HORSE, is no other than a HORSE. Now, when we wish, on ANY PARTICULAR occasion, to point out One certain Individual of this Species; we put in the *Demonstrative*—THE,—and say, for example, THE *Man with the Gun*. And, when we wish to demonstrate this certain Individual by one *invariable* mark, which will distinguish him PERMANENTLY OR ON ALL OCCASIONS to those who know that this mark has been assigned to him ; we call him JOHN, or PETER, or by Whatever *So-called Proper Name* he may have borne in his community. Hence, Every So-called Proper Name of a Man is only an *Abbreviated Sign* standing instead of the Name—A MAN, or THE MAN, with the addition of Some PECULIAR designation.

I do not here overlook that, this mode of reasoning may be carried farther. For example, it

may be said that, the expression—A MAN—means A *Man* ANIMAL; and that of A HORSE means A *Horse* ANIMAL. And, again, A MAN ANIMAL—means A *Man Animal* THING or BEING: And A *Horse* ANIMAL means A *Horse Animal* THING or BEING. At this rate, it would seem to follow that, nearly all our So-called Nouns Substantive; which, (as Mr. Tooke has justly asserted, are only ADJECTIVE Names whose Substantive Names have been lost through the natural progress of elision;) are only a Species of Pronouns. But there is this difference, which places an indisputable logical barrier between the Two Subjects; namely—that the Name—a MAN, or a HORSE, or ANY OTHER SUCH NAME, is the Philosophical Name of an Individual of a certain determined GRAMMATICAL SPECIES, or GENUS RATHER; and it can be the Sign of *Nothing except* a MAN, or a HORSE; it can never be made to stand for a DOG, or a PIG: Whereas, the Name POMPEY, or CÆSAR, is not only a Sign totally foreign, in either its Oral or its Graphic Appearance or Character, from the Name—a MAN, or a HORSE; but, farther, it may stand for a MAN, a DOG, or a PIG, or for ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL Animal, or Thing, to which we may chuse to apply it. I conceive, therefore, that this distinction, with good reason, stamps the Name—POMPEY, or CÆSAR, for a PRONOUN; while the Name—a MAN—or a HORSE—must remain accredited for a NOUN.

In fine, with regard to the distinction now as-

serted; As an Appropriate Appellation is requisite for the Class of Pronouns heretofore called Proper Names, I apprehend they may with some propriety be called CONVENTIONAL;—Every So-called Proper Name being an Abbreviated Sign AGREED UPON, between those who employ it.

It may, perhaps, be objected to this Denomination that, the *Personal* Pronouns—I, Thou, He, She, It,—are Conventional or Agreed upon. But to this I reply that, CONVENTIONAL Pronouns are ALSO PERSONAL: and, hence, it follows that, PERSONAL PRONOUNS consist of TWO CLASSES—namely—Of those which may be called INITIAL, and of those which I have called CONVENTIONAL. I conceive, indeed, that the Appellation of INITIAL may, with great propriety, be applied to the Pronouns I, THOU, HE, SHE, IT; because it has been affirmed, by Dr. Murray, that these Signs were in use *when there were no, or very few, Proper Names*; and because, as a higher consideration, it is certain, at least of the Two Former of these, that they are *Prior in Reason* (as Names of The Speaker and The Spoken to) to Any So-called Proper Name.

Upon the strength; therefore, of what has been advanced, I here give notice that, I shall henceforward consider the Words called PERSONAL Pronouns as being entitled to the Appellation of INITIAL Pronouns; and the Words called PROPER NAMES as being CONVENTIONAL PRONOUNS. At the same time, it will have to be re-

collected that, each of these Appellations is *Only a Specific Name*; and that, the Name of PERSONAL PRONOUN is a GENERIC TERM, which comprehends *both species*.

SUBSECTION II.

Of Repeating Pronouns, by Grammarians called Relative Pronouns or Relatives.

THE Accredited Denomination of Words of this Class is founded in a mistake; which, in a logical point of view, cannot be passed over as a matter wanting in importance. A So-called RELATIVE Pronoun is a Word which stands for Some ANTECEDENT Noun, or Pronoun: And the reason why it is called a RELATIVE is, obviously, implied in its very Name; it being on account of a supposed RELATIVENESS, (that is what all Writers have, by a vast absurdity, called a "RELATION,") of a *Following* Pronoun, to That which went before it. But it is a Fundamental Axiom in Logic, which admits of no evasion in reason, that NOTHING CAN BE RELATED TO ITSELF: From which it follows that, ANY WORD which *stands in the place of an Antecedent is*, (inasmuch as it is *virtually that Very Antecedent under another shape*,) NOT A RELATIVE PRONOUN, but is a REPEATING PRONOUN.

It must be a self-evident truth, although it may require here to be pointed out, that, Any Number

of Different Names which successively *represent or stand for* One Same Name, such, for example, as *Paul, Peter, Church, or State*, cannot be RELATED to this Name ; for they must be considered as being *This Very Name Itself* REPEATED, and which, we know, is repeated in Another Form for the purpose of convenience in continuing a discourse. And it is equally self-evident that, *Every Point of Grammatical Identity* makes the Repeating and the Antecedent Noun, or Pronoun, the Sign of ONE SAME SUBJECT, although it be under *Different Forms* ; just as a Man is the Very Same Man or Moral Person, although his Dress, and Body, be never so much, and so often, changed to a *Different Appearance*. Nor is there Any Grammatical Reason which could make Any Following Pronoun RELATE to its Antecedent ; *unless* the Following Pronoun could be assumed to represent SOME DIFFERENT SUBJECT from the Antecedent.

If this view of the Subject be admitted as valid ; then, Pronouns of this Class are to be considered NOT as ANTECEDENTS *and* RELATIVES ; but as ANTECEDENTS *and* REPEATERS ; or, *as* LEADING PRONOUNS *and* REPEATING PRONOUNS.

It is here for the Logical Grammarian, whose Object it must be to erect the present Field of Knowledge into the State and Dignity of a Science of its own Kind, to observe that, the *Grammatical Identity*, of Any Sign, does not consist in a Specific Identity of SHAPE, or Sound ; or, in a REPETITION of either of THESE. In perfect correspond-

ence and reciprocity to this, I have insisted, in a foregoing part of this work, that, the Very Same Sort of Sound, or Shape, in two different situations, must make two Different Sorts of Signs; as it does, for example, in the NOUN *Love* and the VERB *love*. It follows, by parity of reason, that Any Two Different Shapes, or Sounds, may make Only One Identical Sort of Sign, that is provided the Different Forms in question convey identically *One and the Same Sort of import*. Upon this Principle, therefore, I affirm that, the Different Pronominal FORMS—HE—THAT—and WHICH,—may serve to REPEAT the Very Same Subject which, perhaps, went before under the Form of WILLIAM, CHRISTOPHER, or THE MAN IN THE RIDING COAT. And these FORMS cannot, certainly, be assumed to be MERELY RELATED to the Subject, when they are the VERY SUBJECT ITSELF, CALLED UP AGAIN in *Every Successive Form that is expressed*.

Not to point out and insist upon the illogicalness and absurdity of entertaining, in Grammar, a Sort of Signs as being RELATIVES to *Antecedents*, when these Signs are demonstrated to be nothing but a *signification over again of the Antecedent Subject itself*, without any change or variation in this SUBJECT, but only exhibiting a change in the FORM OF ITS SIGN; (although the insisting upon this distinction may, to the ordinary or unphilosophical reader, appear to be a matter of no very momentous account;) would be a dereliction of that great Object, which myself and my readers,

alike, must hold primarily in our view, in a work of the present description. To think of making Universal Grammar not a Rational Edifice, founded altogether in the Principles of a Sound Logic ; but, on the contrary, to feign it as being, like a Patch-Coat, made up of alternate rags of reason and blotches of absurdity ; could furnish only a Spectacle, upon which the Philosopher of a more Logical Age would look down with no less derision than astonishment.

Before I quit the Subject, it appears requisite to advert to the circumstance that, according to Metaphysicians in general, **IDENTITY ITSELF** is considered as being a **RELATION**. I believe it can seldom be charged to me that, I have digressed in order to entertain any metaphysical consideration which has not appeared necessary to the Principal Subject. But the matter to which I here allude, if not duly adverted to, might, very probably, prove a mischievous stumbling-block, to some readers at least : And I deem it therefore proper to indulge it.

I begin by stating that, by considering **IDENTITY AS A RELATION**, is meant, by all Logicians and Metaphysicians that **ANY OBJECT** *perceived at One time*, may be **COMPARED WITH ITSELF** as perceived at *Another time*. Now while this enormous fallacy, (in the sense in which it has been understood,) has been entertained in the Logical Creed of the learned ; it is curious to remark that,

Metaphysicians have never dreamt of Any Such Thing as RELATION, *as it is demonstrated in the Introductory Part of this work*—namely—AS A THIRD THING—that is A LINK OF LOGICAL CONNEXION, by the INTERVENTION of which LINK EVERY TWO RELATED SUBJECTS IN THE UNIVERSE are *chained together*, and which LINK, *therefore*, is THE CAUSE *that* MAKES Related Subjects of the Things in question. Contrary to this Scheme, or to any thing like it, all that is meant in the Accredited Doctrine of Identity is that, a Thing perceived at One time is called IDENTICAL in Virtue of its being supposed to be COMPARED WITH, *and to be* RELATED TO, ITSELF as perceived at Some Other time,—a Doctrine which is immediately in the face of that primary and indisputable Axiom of Logic that, *Nothing can ever be related to itself*.

Upon such a blot in the Chart of Human Understanding, as that just adverted to, it may be of service to remark, by the way, that FIGMENTS, of Various Sorts, are doubtless tolerable, and indeed almost indispensable, in Science: And these, therefore, do not discredit the intellectual pretensions of the Species; but, on the contrary, they rather advance them, provided only that they be KNOWN *as Figments*, and EMPLOYED AS SUCH. But when Any Fiction is entertained owing to *ignorance* and a belief in its *Scientific Truth*; and when no evident utility results from its being tolerated; Philosophy, in such case, is bound to expunge it from the doctrines of the day.

And here we are to observe that, there is *No utility, in Grammar* ; nor in any other Science, so far as I know ; in tolerating such a fallacy as that of assuming Any Thing as being COMPARED WITH, AND RELATED TO, Itself: And, far less is there any TRUTH in this assumption. And the real Metaphysical Truth in question, (although it has been profoundly mistaken) is that, we NEVER DO, NOR CAN, compare Any thing with Itself — that is KNOWING IT TO BE ITSELF. We only, in any case of doubt, compare A THING PERCEIVED NOW, with a thing which we suppose we may have PERCEIVED AT SOME FORMER TIME ; *in order to discover WHETHER or NOT* it is the Same Thing : And, the MOMENT WE DISCOVER, OR CONCLUDE, that it is the SAME OR SELF Thing, the COMPARISON *becomes of necessity* ANNIHILATED ; *the possibility of DIVERSITY, and therewith the possibility of RELATIVENESS AND OF RELATION, CEASING IN, AND BY, THE VERY ACT OF OUR DISCERNING IDENTICALNESS.* As, for example, if I see a Person walking before me, whom I think is much like an old acquaintance ; I compare *this, to me questionable person*, with my Friend ; until, at length, I discern *Some mark* which proves it to be *him*. Up to this moment of certainty, I am *not, to my knowledge*, comparing my friend with himself: And the moment I find it is my friend, all comparison ceases. Thus the proof of IDENTICALNESS (usually called *Identity*) destroys the possibility of RELATIVENESS, OR RELATION.

Upon this ground, it is an incorrect and an

erroneous phraseology, *as matter of reason*; although it has been so expressed by Mr. Locke; to say that Any Thing is the *Same Thing* WITH ITSELF, at any one instant of time: The words —“ WITH “ ITSELF”—form an illogical addition to the expression that *a Thing must be the Same Thing*, at any one moment; because these words imply PLURALITY, while they are put as asserting UNITY. It is certain, moreover, that Any Thing, by enduring a Thousand Years, or Any Other Length of Time, does not become MORE ITSELF, than it was in the first moment of its existence. IDENTITY or SAMENESS is Not a Property GAINED IN TIME: and it differs in nothing from the SELFNESS of a Thing; which, it is impossible, even in idea, to separate from the *Thing*. IDENTITY, therefore, is NOT *either a RELATION* or a RELATIVENESS, or even a QUALITY of *Any Thing* ITSELF. It is NOTHING BUT a SUPERADDED NOTION; which an Intellectual Being attaches to Any Thing, AS A MARK, in order to RECOGNISE *this Self or Same Thing* AS HAVING BEEN PERCEIVED OR KNOWN AT SOME FORMER TIME. When we say that Any Thing is the IDENTICAL Thing, or SAME Thing, which we knew before; we thereby annex NO NEW QUALITY, or IDEA WHATEVER to this Thing, *except the idea that we KNEW IT BEFORE*.

Metaphysicians have found great and insuperable difficulty in treating of the Nature of Identity: which, however, they have classed under the Category of RELATION. The subtilty lies in our

being, in ordinary, obliged to compare WHAT APPEARS TO BE, OR WHAT MAY POSSIBLY PROVE TO BE, *Two Different Objects*; and which, therefore, we compare AS BEING *Two Different Objects*; although, in the result, they often become resolved into ONE SAME OBJECT. Now, if the Thing in question be thus resolved; it becomes IDENTICAL; and, then, all question of Relativeness and Relation ceases. And, if it be NOT so resolved; it is, then, NOT IDENTICAL, but is ONLY A LIKE Thing, and is therefore a RELATIVE OR RELATED Thing to the Thing which it *resembles*.

These Observations belong, appropriately, to some materials which were intended to form part of the *Second Volume* of a work which will, now, never be matured: although they apply very appositely on the present occasion. So far, indeed, do I suppose this discussion to be out of place, here, that I venture to believe it will be found to furnish some evidence that, no person can ever be competent to attempt a Treatise on Universal Grammar, who has not made the study of the Structure of our Ideas a very considerable object of his life.

To resume, now, the Subject of REPEATING PRONOUNS; It affords a very remarkable accordance with my former observations, that Dr. Murray has confidently affirmed the English Demonstrative and So-called Relative—THAT—to mean no other than SAME; which is equivalent to IDENTICAL.

Mr. Tooke has, with equal confidence, affirmed that, **THAT** means the So-called Past Participle—**THE SAID**—**TAKEN**,—**ASSUMED**; and that, **THE** means the Imperative **SEE** or **TAKE**. He says

“**THE** man **THAT** hath not musicke in himselfe
‘Is fit for treasons,’ &c.

means

“**TAKE** man (or **SEE** man) taken man hath not
musicke,” &c.

“**SAID** man, or **TAKEN** man is fit for,” &c.

But Dr. Murray, who is certainly incomparably a higher authority in this case, has insisted on the contrary; as may be seen more particularly in *Notes 2 H. and 2 I. of his First Volume*; where he asserts, in different places that, the Words—**THAT**,—**THIS**,—**WHO**,—**WHICH**,—and **WHAT**,—are all of One Identical import, and mean merely **SAME**. To which Class, doubtless, may be added the Word—**THE**. Thus it appears ascertained in the fullest manner, upon etymological authority, that the Inventors or Early Speakers of Language were perfectly rational in adopting Words of **DIFFERENT FORMS**, whose **COMMON import** is that of **SHEER IDENTITY**; which Words were employed to **REPEAT** the Foregoing Subject of discourse, to make it form the Subject of *Some additional Verb*, so as to avoid both Circumlocution and Monotony. Accordingly, therefore, in the existing Form of our Language,

The Man **WHO** hath not ;
 The Man **THAT** hath not ;
 The Thing **WHICH** hath not ;
WHAT Man, (or Man **WHAT**) hath not ;
 all equally import
SAME Man, or Thing, hath not.

And All these Pronouns, I say, are **REPEATERS OF THE SUBJECT**, *differing* only in *Sound* ;—a Difference invented, or adopted, (I suppose,) for the sake of that two-fold utility, to which I have already ascribed it.

As the Words—**THAT**,—**THIS**,—and **THE**,—are Mere Modifications of One Same Sign ; it becomes proper to observe that, this Word **CANNOT** be accounted an **ARTICLE**, even according to the Accredited System of Grammar : It must, on the contrary, be recognised for a **DEMONSTRATIVE** (Repeating) Pronoun meaning **SAME**.—

THAT, **THIS**, or **THE**, Man who hath not music,
means

SAME Man **SAME** hath not music.

The **ONLY ARTICLE**, therefore, which we have in English, for Any Individual, is **A**, **AN**, **ONE**, or **ANY**. And the Only Use of the *Demonstrative* is to describe an Individual, when the Article could not do so. Thus, — **THE** Man in the Corner did it ;—means—**SAME** Man in the Corner did it. And, when we wish to express the **Very Same Sense**, but only more emphatically, we say

—**THAT** Man in the Corner did it. Owing to custom, alone, we cannot say—**THE A** Man or **THE AN** Man : But we can virtually say the very same thing—namely—**THE ONE** Man. We say **THE SAME** Thing ; which means **SAME SAME** Thing. But this is one of many Tautological Idioms which obtain, and *will* obtain, in Language.

In the present day, **THAT** and **THIS** have *Plural Forms*, as well as Singular. But Mr. Tooke has shewn from examples that, in the time of the Old English Writers, **THAT** was applied to Plurals, as well as to Singulars.

WHOSE, which is the Genitive of **WHO**, means **OF WHO**. Dr. Murray has shewn that the **ES**, in the Sign of the English Genitive, and in the Visigothic, means **OF**.

In fine. The **PRINCIPLE** of Repeating Pronouns, in the English Language, — namely — the **RENEWING** of the Word importing **SAME**, in **DIFFERENT FORMS**, constitutes, I apprehend, a Model in its kind : Although, perhaps, *some greater variety* in Forms might be desirable,—especially as the existing frequent recurrence of the Forms—**THAT** and **WHICH**,—in long and complex Sentences, occasions some irksomeness. Such expressions as—**The Man WHAT** went—**The Gun WHAT** won't go off;—although these expressions are now sunk under even the lowest vulgarity, are nevertheless good English : And, although the *taint* can never be removed from those in question ; any practicable enlargement of the pre-

sent variety would, perhaps, be an improvement of the Language.

When **WHAT**, **WHICH**, and **WHO**, are employed *interrogatively* ; the Logic of the import of **SAME** may, at first sight, appear questionable. But when we say—**WHO**, **WHICH**, or **WHAT**, *did this?*—we mean—I *desire to be told* **THE SAME** that did this.

To these observations it may merely be added that, the **VARIETY**, in the Forms of the Sign importing **SAME**, has a *subordinate* use, quite beside that of avoiding circumlocution and monotony. In the First place ; it serves to distinguish the import of *Moral, or Intellectual*, from that of *Instinctive and Inanimate*, Beings : As, for example, the *Mode*—**WHO**,—is employed to denote the *Former* ; and—**WHICH**,—to express the *latter*. And, Secondly, in the case of being employed *interrogatively* ; When we say, **Who** did this ? we signify that we refer the Action to Some *Moral* Being unknown to us : But when we say **WHAT** did this ? we signify a reference to Some *Inanimate* Being unknown. And, lastly, when we say **WHICH** did this ? we evince that we refer the Action to *One* of a Number of *Known* Beings ; and, therefore, the Word **WHICH**, which is equally applicable to Rational and to Inanimate Objects, is sufficient for our purpose, without the distinctive Sign — **Who**, or **WHAT**. These Subordinate Devices, however, can have no effect upon the *Primary Grammatical Constitution and Identicalness* of the Signs in question, through all their Variety of Forms.

Mr. Tooke, who has attempted none of the Pronouns except the Word—It—and its Modifications; but who, nevertheless, acknowledges the importance of the Subject; affirms, at the close of his *First Volume*, that, whoever undertakes the Pronouns, must be contented to follow the Etymological path which he has traced out. His prediction in this case, however, I have shewn was not well founded, in so far as regarded So-called PERSONAL Pronouns: For the solution of which, we have *No Etymological* guide, but must trust to REASON ALONE: Although Etymology has been more fortunate in the case of SO-CALLED RELATIVE Pronouns. We have seen that Dr. Murray, with all his Etymological light, has not shewn, nor attempted to show, UPON WHAT LOGICAL PRINCIPLE the Word importing SAME was RESTRICTED to import, PECULIARLY, EACH OF THE THREE DIFFERENT PERSONS.

Here closes the analysis of Pronouns, in so far as has appeared to me to be their Nature, either in their ETYMOLOGY or in the REASON of the thing; the last mentioned of which considerations must not only be taken in, but must be held as paramount and decisive, in case there were any difference or clashing between the two authorities: Which sort of clashing, however, there fortunately is not, to any amount that has not appeared to be reconciled in the reasonings which have been advanced.

And here, while I am yet speaking with regard to So-called RELATIVE Pronouns, I deem it may not be improper, in case I may have omitted to remark the circumstance in any former part of the work, that wheresoever I have used the Term RELATIVE, *or* RELATIVES, I have never, unless for some special purpose, intended by this a So-called Relative PRONOUN: On the contrary, the Word "RELATIVE" (*singular or plural*) is, throughout this work, always meant in the LOGICAL, *as contradistinguished from the* ACCREDITED GRAMMATICAL sense; that is, as importing ANY SUBJECT, *or* OBJECT, *that is* RELATED to Any Other Subject, *or* Object. This explanation, indeed, must be wholly unnecessary to any reader who is at all in the Subject of Logical speculation. But it may not be without use to the general reader; who must naturally, in perusing a work on Grammar, be apt to suppose the Word RELATIVE to refer to PRONOUNS.

Here, also, closes what I had proposed to myself to offer, on the analysis of that Portion of Language which is denominated the NOUN including therewith All the Elements, Modifications, and Appendages, which I have considered as being proper to this Department.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE WORDS CALLED CONJUNCTIONS; — AND
OF LIMITED SILENCE CONSIDERED AS AN ELE-
MENT OF LANGUAGE.

SECTION FIRST.

OF WORDS CALLED CONJUNCTIONS: AND ESPECIALLY
OF IMPERATIVES.

Part First.

IN logical strictness, it might appear proper to entertain the Subjects of this Chapter next after the consideration of Minor Verbs, inasmuch as the former, as well as the latter, form a SPECIES OF CONNECTIVE. But two collateral reasons have influenced me in the adoption of a different arrangement:—Namely,—*First*, It was requisite to treat of REPEATING PRONOUNS in their proper place,—that is in the Chapter of Nouns,—previously to considering them in their Office of CONJUNCTIONS: and, *Secondly*, It may have a subordinate utility to treat of that Species of Connective called CONJUNCTIONS, as *far apart as possible* in the order of arrangement from that OTHER AND VASTLY DIFFERENT SPECIES OF CONNECTIVE—THE VERB, — *including the Minor Verb*.

Having assigned my reasons for the method here pursued; I proceed, in the first place, to consider the Nature of that Species of Conjoiner

which, when viewed in a certain light, may in one sense be considered as being by far the most important of any So-called Conjunction in Language; inasmuch as it will be found not only to be of the most frequent recurrence and utility in its *express enunciation*; but, also, to be an *implied and requisite Conjoiner* in almost Every Junction of Any Two Sentences, or Clauses, whatever: I allude, now, to the Words called IMPERATIVES.

As preparatory to this, I shall here subjoin an enumeration of the Various Classes of Words, of which the Part of Speech called Conjunctions, in the English Language, is composed. From which, a reader, as he proceeds, may be furnished with a general conception of the bearing of the Signs called Imperatives, upon those Classes. The Words in question, then, appear to consist in the following varieties.

1.—IMPERATIVES :—Of which Sort are such Words as—AND,—IF,—BUT,—SAVE,—EXCEPT.

2.—REPEATING PRONOUNS :—Of which, are such Words as — WHO, — WHICH, — WHAT,— THAT.

3.—ADVERBS :—Of which, are such Words as — THEREFORE,— WHEREFORE,— THEN,— SO,— AS,—&c.

4. — SO-CALLED PAST PARTICIPLES : — Of which, is the Word—SEEN.

5.—So-called ADJECTIVES : Of which, are such Signs as the Words—EITHER and Or ; and their Negatives—NEITHER and NOR.

Of the Various Classes of Signs which have now been enumerated, it would be a sufficient reason for selecting, for precedence, that which is first mentioned, to remark that, it has been by IDENTIFYING THE CLASS OF IMPERATIVE CONJOINERS (*in his own imagination*) WITH PREPOSITIONS ; and by attempting to carry this fallacious View of the Subject so far as to insist that, in some instances, *The Very Same Word* can serve, convertibly, *as a Conjunction and as a Preposition* ; that Mr. Tooke has, through the influence of his name, so very seriously darkened the prospects of Grammar, by impressing deeply, in the public mind, a most mistaken opinion concerning this Part of Speech : Nor has he been contradicted, upon GENERAL ground, by Dr. Murray, or by any other Writer, so far as to have left open a possibility that the Philosophy of Language could ever have seen the light, under the joint operation of their researches.

With regard to *particular instances*, indeed, (I have repeatedly observed) Dr. Murray *has* contradicted the derivations asserted by Mr. Tooke, to a degree, in point both of number and importance, which must be contemplated with a proportionate impression by every person who has the advancement of Grammatical Science at heart ; inasmuch as the fact must dispel those

mists, which the reputation of the Philologer of Purley had thrown over the true Origin of those particular Words ; and which, perhaps, THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF REASON ALONE COULD NOT have dispelled, in the general opinion.

It will, for the present occasion, afford an impressive example of the fallacy which I have here ascribed to the Views of Mr. Tooke, to extract, and duly to comment upon, the following passage of his Treatise.

In his *First Volume*, page 215, he says that, “ BUT “ (as contradistinguished from *Bot*) and WITH- “ OUT have both exactly the same meaning, that “ is in modern English neither more nor less than “ *Be out*. And they were both originally used “ indifferently either as *Conjunctions* or *Preposi- “ tions*. But later writers having adopted the “ false notions, and distinctions of Language “ maintained by the Greek and Latin Gramma- “ rians, have successively endeavoured to make “ the English Language conform more and more “ to the same rules. Accordingly, WITHOUT, in “ approved modern speech is now entirely con- “ fined to the office of a *Preposition* ; and But is “ generally, though not always, used as a *Con- “ junction*.”

Now, in the first place, with regard to the fact asserted in this passage ; It appears, indeed, that a Use of Two Words of nearly One Same Sound, the *One being an IMPERATIVE* and the *Other a PREPOSITION*, did formerly obtain in our Language, — namely — the Two Words BE-out and

WITH-out ; the Former of which has become worn down, by attrition, to our So-called CONJUNCTION—BUT ;— while the latter has passed from the Form of WITHOUTEN, to that of WITH-oute, —and, lastly, to WITHOUT. But, here, instead of admitting, for a moment, the groundless charge of this result's having followed from a false notion of *imitating the distinctions of the Greek and Latin Grammarians* ; I deem it, on the contrary, AS EXHIBITING A TEST OF THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY which the Speakers of our Language found themselves progressively under, of *distinguishing, as belonging to Two DIFFERENT PARTS OF SPEECH, Two Words* which, from the great similarity of their original or early shapes and sounds, have too often, and too long, passed for ONE SAME WORD ; and have thus been a cause of confusion in Grammar, from their leading to a belief that, this Same Word served, convertibly, for BOTH AN IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTION *and* a PREPOSITION.

That Mr. Tooke has been mistaken, in the identicalness which he has so boldly affirmed with regard to the Two Words now in question, will appear in the most satisfactory manner from the following explanation by Dr. Murray ; which, also, was quoted in a foregoing part of this work ; who says, of the Word,—WITH—“ that, it is not “ directly from the Verb WITHAN, *to join* ; and “ never signified WITH until it had denoted *turned toward*.” He adds — “ It was little used until “ MID became obsolete.” Now “ Mid.” (says Dr., Murray, Vol. 2. page 30) “ is from *to gather* ;

“*compress, unite, mix.*” “Whithan” (he adds) “is the ordinary ancient form of WITH; a Noun derived from Wig’d turning, going.” Thus, we find that, WITH (and of course WITHOUT) is derived from the VERBAL NOUN—TURNING, GOING; and is therefore a Word duly fit for a Preposition or Minor Verb: which it certainly could not be, had it been an IMPERATIVE.

Having furnished the above example, which I trust will have its due weight here; I proceed to an exposition of Mr. Tooke’s GENERAL Doctrine that CONJUNCTIONS *and* PREPOSITIONS ARE ONE SAME PART OF SPEECH:—a fallacy which lamentably confounds the most distinct barriers of Grammatical Logic.

In his *First Volume*, page 324, his Fellow Dialogist says to him. “According then to your explanation, the *Preposition* WITHOUT is the very same word, and has the very same meaning, as the *Conjunction* WITHOUT. Does not this in some measure contradict what you before asserted, concerning the faithfulness of words to the standard under which they were originally enlisted? For there does not appear in this case to be any melting down of two words into one by such a corruption as you before noticed in some of the Conjunctions. And yet, here is one and the same word used both as a Conjunction and as a Preposition.”

To this weighty objection, Mr. Tooke replies, “There is nothing at all extraordinary, much less

“contradictory in this; that one and the same
 “word should be applied indifferently either to
 “*single words* or to *sentences* (for you must ob-
 “serve that the apparently *different application* con-
 “stitutes the only difference between Conjun-
 “tions and Prepositions). For I may very well
 “employ the same word of direction, whether it
 “be to add a *word* or to add a *sentence*: And
 “again one and the same word of direction will
 “serve as well to take away a *word* as to take
 “away a *sentence*.”

Now I cannot help thinking that, a passage more made up of unfounded assumptions, than the one which is here last quoted, was never exhibited in the face of a Treatise of Grammar. In order, however, to render this sufficiently evident, it is necessary to divide the objections under two heads; and to occupy some extent in illustrating them.

FIRST, therefore, I object that, the ready and off-hand answer which Mr. Tooke gives to his Fellow Dialogist — namely — that “There is
 “nothing at all contradictory in that one and the
 “same word should be applied indifferently either
 “to *single words* or to *sentences* :”—(Which assumption he also illustrates by adding—“For I may
 “very well apply the same word of direction,
 “whether it be to add a *Word*, or to add a *Sen-
 “tence*: And again one and the same word of
 “direction will serve as well to take away a
 “*Word* as to take away a *Sentence* :”)—I say, I object to this position for two distinct and collate-
 ral reasons: Which are, because I propose to

show that it is founded in a demonstrable fallacy, from the Nature of Speech ; and because I shall prove that the *Supposed Single Words*, which are at any time connected by a Directing Speech, are NOT IN CONSTRUCTION SINGLE WORDS, but are the REPRESENTATIVES OF WHOLE SENTENCES. The proofs and illustrations of this first Objection, however, I shall reserve for the Second Part of this section.

SECONDLY, then, I have farther to object that, in the position of the Subject which Mr. Tooke has laid down, he *calmly assumes, as if it were a thing already demonstrated and placed beyond question*, that PREPOSITIONS (as well as Imperative Conjoiners) are Words which DIRECT : Whereas, I trust with the fullest confidence in the belief that, no writer of Grammar, who shall previously examine the analysis of the Subject which has been laid out in the Chapter of Minor Verbs, will ever for a moment indulge a fallacy which has been so largely confuted as this assumption. A SO-CALLED PREPOSITION, (it has been shewn at sufficient length) NEVER DIRECTS *any thing* ; nor yet ever indicates or points to any Word, or Event, either backward or forward : It is a Word *expressive of an Action, signified only as actually existing* AT THE TIME BEING, between Some Two Other Words or Names of Grammatical Co-Agents.—AN IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTION, on the contrary, is what Mr. Tooke, in one sense, very justly says it is—namely—“a Word” (in fact it is a WHOLE

AND A COMPLEX SPEECH) "OF DIRECTION" TO US, *concerning a FUTURE EVENT*; which is, to command, or desire us to connect, in Speech, Some Word, or Phrase, which follows it, with Some Other, or Others, which went before it. No writer, therefore, who shall ever enter at all into a Logical consideration of the Subject, can possibly confound the different Offices of Two Parts of Speech of such vastly different characters; always recollecting that, when I at any time call an Imperative a PART of Speech, I do so only to save circumlocution, and not as being the Name that properly, or logically, belongs to it; since, in point of fact, the difference between a So-called Preposition and an Imperative is no less than that which exists between a PART of Speech and a WHOLE Speech. Nor must I forget to insist, here, that it is *Not a Simple Speech* that any Imperative is ever the Sign of: For, on the contrary, every such sign must involve the import of a *Complex Speech*, i. e. of Two Whole Simple Speeches taken together. Thus the Word — Go, — (which must mean GO TO SOME OTHER PLACE,) involves the expression I COMMAND, DIRECT, or DESIRE YOU, *that, YOU GO to London, to Bath, or Elsewhere*. Can any thing, then, be imagined more humiliating, than that such a Complex Speech, as this, should be confounded as being of One Same Grammatical Nature with that of a WORD which is merely the *Sign of an Action*,—that is, of a *Verbal Link* which connects Two Other Words together by *Its Own Intrinsic Grammatical Power*.

At the same time, it is proper I should notice that, the *Imperative Power* DOES NOT RESIDE in the Word—(or Verb) CALLED THE IMPERATIVE. As, for example, if we say—Go to LONDON; the Imperative Power, in this case, does not reside in the Word Go; for it resides in the IMPLIED ELIDED VERB—I COMMAND, DIRECT, or ADVISE, *You*. THUS AN IMPERATIVE (*as it is called of ANY VERB*) is nothing less than a GREAT ABBREVIATION: And it is ONLY THE SIGN of an Imperative, or Command to Some Agent, to perform Some Action; while the IMPERATIVE ITSELF, *of which it is the SIGN*, is signified by an *implied Verb not expressed*.—To call an IMPERATIVE, therefore, ANY PART of a Verb; Or, to call ANY PART OF A VERB an IMPERATIVE; can be nothing but a manifestation of the most pitiable darkness in Grammatical Science. The distinction, and the consequent change of Nomenclature, which appears here to be indicated, as necessary to be made in Grammar, with regard to this point, is to call the SO-CALLED *MODE of the Verb*, now in question, NOT *the MODE*, NOR yet the FORM,—but *Only the SIGN*,—of an Imperative.

From what has been said, it is manifest that, the *Specific Difference*, between an Imperative and a So-called Preposition, considered as Two Sorts of Connectives in Language, is no less than, (and may aptly be compared to,) the Logical Difference between a FETTER of Iron or Other Material which, by its PROPER PHYSICAL POWER, holds a Prisoner fast to the Wall of his Dungeon; and

the WARRANT of a Magistrate which, by its MERE MORAL INFLUENCE, *without any PHYSICAL POWER AT ALL*, has led to his being conveyed there. To confound the Grammatical EFFICIENCY, therefore, of a Preposition, with that of an Imperative, must be a confusion of the Objects of our Logical Apprehension no less deplorable, than that which would confound the PHYSICAL *Efficiency* of the AXE that deprives a Prisoner of life, with the MORAL INFLUENCE of the SENTENCE which led to his decapitation.

Here, however, it must not be understood that I deny there is an *Act of the Understanding necessary to give operation to a So-called Preposition*; as well as there is to do the like to an *Imperative Conjoiner*. All that I insist upon is that, the Two Acts of the Understanding in question, when rightly discriminated, are *Vastly Different in our logical apprehension*; because (I repeat here what has already been sufficiently demonstrated) NO WORD IS EVER A PREPOSITION *until AFTER the COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION* of that Act of the Understanding by which we view it as being the Grammatical Link that *actually connects Two Nouns*: Whereas, Any So-called Imperative Conjunction is NO ACTUAL Conjoiner of itself; but is only a DIRECTOR TO US, TO CONJOIN One Sentence with Another; and, consequently, it performs its office of directing BEFORE we perform that *Mental Act of conjoining* which it directs. Hence it is that, I say, the Power of a PREPOSITION is GRAMMATICALLY INHERENT, or what may be termed GRAM-

MATICO-PHYSICAL : While that of an **IMPERATIVE** I consider as being **ONLY MORALLY INFLUENTIAL** in Language, *how useful, or requisite soever, it may be* to **OBEY** the command it lays upon us.

From what has been advanced upon the whole, it becomes plain that, the Efficacy of a So-called **Imperative Conjoiner** is **NOT STRICTLY GRAMMATICAL AT ALL** : On the contrary, it appears to be, in strict logical apprehension, **ONLY LOGICAL AND EXTRA-GRAMMATICAL**. This Species of Conjoiner is certainly a Necessary Portion of *Any Long Chain of Signs* : And, on this account, it has heretofore been considered as an **ELEMENT**. But, indisputably, it is **NOT A PART of Speech** : for it cannot be resolved into **ANY MERE GRAMMATICAL ELEMENT**.

Part Second.

To return, now, to the *First* head of Objection, which I proposed to urge against this part of Mr. Tooke's Theory ; I must advert, here, to the unfounded assertion, that " There is nothing at all " extraordinary in this, that one and the same " word should be applied indifferently either to " *single words* or to *sentences* : For you must " observe" (says he) " that the apparently *different* " *applications* constitute the only difference between " **Conjunctions and Prepositions.**"

Here, therefore, in the first place, I ask ; Is it not astonishing Mr. Tooke should believe

that, the Only difference between a Preposition and a Conjunction consists in the FORMER's *being applied to connect WORDS*, and the LATTER to *connect SENTENCES*; when it is notorious, to all, that the MANNER in which each of these Signs *performs its Connective Office* is So DIFFERENT, that, a PREPOSITION possesses the Universal and Infallible Power of throwing Any Word, which follows it, into the So-called OBJECTIVE CASE; whereas an IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTION, on the contrary, can never throw the word, which follows it, into Any Case, or State whatever, except the Same as that of the Word which precedes it: that is, in other words, an Imperative Conjunction possesses *No Government, or Power whatever*; while a Preposition, universally, inherits the *Power and Government of a VERB*. Is it not, then, wonderful that, a Grammarian of Mr. Tooke's distinction, with such a momentous difference as this full in his view, should affirm, in so many words, that the ONLY DIFFERENCE between the Two Classes of Signs in question is that, Prepositions are applied to SINGLE WORDS, while Conjunctions are *applied indifferently either to SINGLE WORDS or to SENTENCES*?

Other Grammarians, following the footsteps of Mr. Tooke, have asserted that the Only difference between Prepositions and Conjunctions consists in this;—namely—that the Former connect Words, *and have a Regimen*; while the Latter connect either Words or Sentences, *and have No Regimen*.

And this ONLY difference, of the writers in question, has thus much in its favor, that it is NOT A SIMPLE difference, like that assumed by Mr. Tooke; but it is a COMPOUND difference, made up of *Two very distinct Reasons*: And, certainly, it comes a vast deal nearer the truth. But this Scheme is still untenable in two very important Considerations: For, *First*, I conceive it will be found, in that scrutiny to which I shall presently resort, that Imperatives connect ONLY SENTENCES, and NOT SINGLE WORDS. But, previously to this, I must advert to the fact that, the STYLING of the mighty difference, between *the having* A REGIMEN *and the having* NO REGIMEN, as being PART OF THE “ONLY” difference between Imperatives and Prepositions, evinces an egregious misapprehension of the *Real Magnitude* of this difference: because I do not know a GREATER DIFFERENCE THAN THIS, between the Natures of Any Two Parts of Speech: and, consequently, this difference, of itself alone, is sufficient to stamp the Two Signs in question as being no less different than any Two Kinds of Words in Language. A PREPOSITION (as already described) connects Two WORDS by a *Grammatically Intrinsic Power*; which may be compared to that of a FETTER which connects Two Prisoners. AN IMPERATIVE, on the contrary, connects TWO SENTENCES, (*and Not Single Words*) NOT by any *Grammatically Intrinsic Power*; but by a *Grammatically Extrinsical Mere Moral Power*, which Power may be compared to the ORDER

of a Magistrate, *consequent to which* the FETTER WAS PUT UPON the Prisoners. So great, indeed, is the Difference between the Two Things in question, considered as Two Objects of our Logical apprehensions, that, as I have already asserted, an Imperative, taken in Logical strictness, is NOT A GRAMMATICAL Connective at all: For, AS IT IS NOT ANY OF THE PARTS of Speech, it is impossible it can be a *Grammatical* Connector of Any PARTS of Speech; since nothing can *grammatically* connect *Parts* of Speech, except a *Part* of Speech.

But, to proceed to the Principal Objection, intended for illustration here; I apprehend that the character which I have thus assigned to Imperatives may be offered as a general reason—*a priori*—why they can connect SENTENCES ONLY, and NOT WORDS. Because it appears self-evidently contrary to reason that, Any Whole Speech should be divided into *Two Fragments*; and these Two FRAGMENTS be *grammatically connected together by THE Medium of a WHOLE SPEECH, and NOT BY A PART of Speech*. It is moreover congruous and necessary in reason that, ONE WHOLE SPEECH must END, *before Another can BEGIN*. We may, indeed, utter such a Speech as the following; —*My Mother* (OH THAT I LIVE TO TELL IT) *died before me*. — But, in this expression, the Sentence in the parenthesis is NOT SUPPOSED to connect the Parts of the Sentence which involves it; and it has certainly *No Grammatical*, but only a *Mere*

Dialectical Connexion with this Sentence. In ALL Other Cases ; with the exception of *One* peculiar case which alone could have led Grammarians to believe that an Imperative can connect *Single Words*, and which case, I shall show, affords no solid reason of exception ; we find that, One Complete Sentence Always ends, before Another that is connected with it by an Imperative begins : Although it is a very common case that, One, or MORE SENTENCES is *represented by a SINGLE WORD* ; which Single Word is *not parsed AS A SENTENCE*, though it ought to be so considered.

Thus we say, — elliptically, — *John, Peter and Christopher struck him* : Which means — *John struck him AND Peter struck him AND Christopher struck him*. Again, when different acts are to be expressed of different Nominatives ; and, therefore, Elision is not practicable ; we observe that, an Imperative neither divides, *nor appears to divide* Any Sentence. As, for example, in the expression *Peter struck him ; BUT (BOT i. e. ADD) John ran away*.

To advance, now, to the ONLY case which can be brought as an argument, to show that an Imperative can connect *Single Words* : It consists in Complex Speeches of the following Structure ; wherein that Imperative called the COPULATIVE is employed.

Two AND Two make Four.

This AND That are a Pair.

He gave it to Jane AND William.

A Man of wisdom AND virtue is a perfect character.

Now the argument for assuming, in all these instances, that the Imperative connects *Single Words*, is an assumption that, we cannot resolve **Any Such Expression** into **Two SENTENCES**, connected by the Imperative: As, for instance, we cannot express the *same import*, as that of the above examples, by saying — *Two are Four AND Two are Four*; — *William is a Handsome Couple AND Jane is a Handsome Couple*;—and so on.

But supposing, for the moment, the objection, as it has thus been stated, to be valid; I apprehend, it may be obviated and rendered a complete nullity by **Two Different considerations**: each of which, of itself alone, is sufficient for our purpose; and each resting upon a logical basis quite distinct from that of the other. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, this case of the employment of the *Copulative Imperative*, which has been the cause of insuperable difficulty and dissension among Grammarians, is a matter involved in a greater depth of subtilty, and requires a logical scrutiny of a more critical nature to bring it into light, than perhaps most other Considerations in the Whole Chain of Language. It may seem, perhaps, that the full elucidation of the case requires a more elaborate investigation of it than some readers might think it deserves. But no Philosopher will ever admit that, a blank ought

to remain over this, or any other part of the Chart of Language. And, besides this, the real importance of the Subject is of a far greater magnitude, than an ordinary reader can appreciate.

THE FIRST of those considerations which have just been proposed consists, then, in my belief that, Every Speech of the Structure in question is *in reality an Ungrammatical Expression*, brought into practice and universally established as an Idiom of Language under what may be called a practical necessity of employing this Species of Elision, by reason that the true grammatical enumeration of the designed import would involve a most tedious circumlocution, which would be recurring almost every instant in discourse. As, for example, if instead of saying—

“ *Two AND Two are Four ;*”

we were to say—

If you add Two to Two, the Sum is Four :

or,

Two added to Two make together Four.

Either of these, or Any Such expression, denotes the import intended GRAMMATICALLY : But it would be intolerably tedious to employ this grammatical structure continually, or so often as this import is required to be expressed.

Let us, upon the other hand, now observe what

is the result when, in order to avoid this inconvenience, we use the following Idiom—*Two AND Two are Four*.—In the *first* place, we gain the desideratum of BREVITY : And this, certainly, is a very material gain. But we shall find that, the FULL import signified by this Elliptical Expression is NOT SO BRIEF, as either of those before mentioned. This full import is—*Two, I DIRECT YOU THAT YOU ADD TWO TO THE TWO FIRST EXPRESSED, and THE SUM OF THESE TOGETHER is Four.*

Moreover, As for the GRAMMAR of the above expression—namely—“*Two AND Two are Four.*” —or, at least, as for the CONSTRUCTION put upon it by GRAMMARIANS ; — I insist that it is in reality a profound misconception : Because I affirm that, the *First NOUN*—“*Two*”—(in *Every Modification of the Speech*—“*Two and Two make Four*”—) is the *Representative of a WHOLE SENTENCE.* The truth is, either it means — *I desire you to SUPPOSE, or ASSUME TWO,*—or,—*I myself SUPPOSE OR ASSUME TWO* :—The remainder of the expression means—*I direct you that you ADD Two to THIS Two, and the Sum of these together is Four.*

As a practical example of the truth of what I now assert ; I observe that, if one person were going to pay to another the Sum of Twenty Pounds, in Two Bank Notes of Ten Pounds each ; He would, in placing down the Notes, one after the other, say — *There ARE TEN ; and TEN make TWENTY.*

It is an argument founded in Mathematical Logic itself when I assert that, we MUST either

CONCEIVE, *or* ASSUME, *or* SUPPOSE, the Number *Two*, before we can predicate the Arithmetical Result of adding it to any other Number. And, hence, the Word *Two*, in the above example; *or* Any Other Word in a similar predicament; is *Not in reality a straggling or insulated SINGLE WORD*, as it appears to be; but it is equivalent to a WHOLE SENTENCE. It is at the same time manifest that if instead of an Example from Mathematics, we had taken one from Ordinary Subjects,—such, for instance, as the expression—“*William AND Jane are a handsome couple;*”—we must herein *First assume the existence of William, and likewise of Jane*, before we can connect them thus by the Copula.

SECONDLY. To pass on, to the *Other* consideration, which was proposed for this argument; I observe, there is a *peculiarity* in the case of Every Two Subjects which are coupled together by an Imperative in the manner of the Examples which have here been given for illustration,—a peculiarity arising from the INSUPERABLE NATURE OF THINGS, especially in the STRUCTURE OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES *and* RELATION,—which WILL NOT YIELD; and which, in various particulars, CANNOT BE EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE *except through the agency of Some FIGMENT*, *or*, sometimes, by an INDIRECT HINT, *or* SUGGESTION, intelligible to the understanding.

It is by means of one of these devices, alone, (for example,) that we can SUGGEST the Notion

of a FUTURE, or, even, of a PAST Action: Because it is IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPRESS ANY ACTION DIRECTLY, except Action expressed AS BEING PRESENT, *i. e.* AS EXISTING, *at the moment it is expressed.*

It is Another of these Figments; which actually expresses not only a falsehood, but along with this a manifest absurdity; when a person, sitting still and not walking at all, says — I WALK *every day*. In which, is meant to be signified that, I PRESENTLY WALK *on days* PAST, *on THIS day*, and *on days* TO COME. And, yet, we could not in any better manner express the PRACTICE of *walking daily*, (which is the thing that is here intended to be signified,) without being obliged to resort to a most intolerable *circumlocution*. By this indispensable Figment, therefore, the expression of Any Present Action is made to signify also its Past and its Future existence, by *means of Additional Signs*, appropriate to the Past and to the Future.

It is Another of these Figments, and it comes directly home to my argument; (while also it is as current an Idiom of our Language as any other that I know;) to express ourselves as follows:—*When Two Things are united* THEY ARE ONE,—*i. e.* ONE THING. But this expression, nevertheless, signifies as gross an absurdity as can be imagined: because the PLURAL Verb “ARE”—and the PLURAL Pronoun “THEY”—cannot without gross absurdity be annexed to ONE Subject. The Rational way of expressing the intended import would be

to say—*When Two Things are united, they* CEASE TO BE TWO and BECOME ONE Thing.

Analogous to this last example, then, I confidently affirm, there is a DEMONSTRABLE ABSURDITY involved in Every Expression wherein we employ the Copulative AND, in the following Structures :—

He gave it to Jane AND William.

A Man of Virtue AND Wisdom is Perfect.

Jane AND William are a Handsome Couple.

Two AND Two make Four.

I am, at the same time, far from intending to condemn this device. And, if it were otherwise, I am aware that the Idiom in question is so stamped in the favored tablets of our imagination, and so united to our Organs of Speech, that all the REASON in the world could weigh nothing against the practice. I have, moreover, repeatedly inculcated the Principle that, the Use of Figments and Devices in the EXPRESS FORM of Language is certainly allowable when practical utility indicates their adoption. And the only thing that can be discreditable to Human Understanding, in such case, is *when these are entertained through ignorance and a belief in their Rationality.*

As it would be a humiliating blot on the Chart of Philosophical Grammar, to leave the Real Nature of the Copulative Imperative under any cloud; and this a cloud, too, of such consequence as to lead Grammarians to break down that great barrier

which ought for ever to divide Imperative Conjoiners from So-called Prepositions ; I would have the present considerations duly attended to, as I cannot help believing that they remove all the difficulty of the Subject.

The conclusion which results, upon the whole, is that, IMPERATIVE CONJOINERS *connect ONLY SENTENCES*; and NEVER CONNECT SINGLE WORDS.

Having thus adverted to the Subject of Imperative Conjoiners ; I shall postpone the consideration of the Several Other Species of So-called Conjunctions—namely—Pronouns, —Adverbials, —and So-called Participles,—in order to enter previously upon an investigation of the Nature of LIMITED SILENCE, (and of its Representative—PUNCTUATED SPACE)—considered as an ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE : Because it will appear, in this investigation, that the INTERVALS BETWEEN WORDS, one and all of them, are of a Connective Character ; and that, those of them which admit of *Any Point* possess the CHARACTER AND OFFICE OF IMPERATIVES. I consider it, therefore, as being a Logical Arrangement, to entertain this Subject next after the Section which treats of Imperatives or Directing Speeches.

SECTION SECOND.

OF LIMITED SILENCE, CONSIDERED AS AN ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE; AND OF THE CONJUNCTIVE NATURE OR OFFICE OF POINTS, IN THEIR VARIETIES.

GRAMMARIANS have at all times busied themselves much, in attempting to treat of SOUNDS and their Properties, in the communication of Ideas. But none of them appear to have adverted, in any tolerable manner, to the necessary existence and operation of SILENCE, considered as an Element of Language; Although no writer of a Grammar can ever omit saying something of what have been called the "PAUSES, or RESTS," which take place between Words, in discourse: Of which sort of notice, the following may serve as being no mean example:

"PUNCTUATION" (says Bishop Lowth) "is the art of marking in writing the several pauses or rests, between Sentences, and the parts of Sentences, according to their proper quantity or proportion, as they are expressed in a just or accurate proposition."

This statement, it may be observed, so far as it goes, is a very true and fair one with regard to PUNCTUATION." And, along with this, it is as profound and logical an account of the matter in question, as any with which I am acquainted. But, even in the little that is herein expounded, the terms—"Pauses, or Rests,"—appear rather to

imply a mere consideration of the **ORGANS** *employed in speaking* ; than a contemplation of **LIMITED SILENCE** *considered as a NECESSARY COMPONENT* in Language. And, at any rate, a more deplorable inadvertency to the **COMPONENT ELEMENT** in question could not be manifested, than is exhibited in the passage which I have here quoted.

I shall proceed, without farther preface, to lay it down, as a Self-evident Necessary Truth, that **LIMITED SILENCE** (*No less than ARTICULATE SOUND*) is an **ELEMENT** of Vocal Language; since, without the intervention of the *Former* between Every Two Sounds, or Words, the *Latter* must be impossible. It is upon this Necessary Principle and its consequences, therefore, that I propose to insist, in the present article.

Two certain considerations, under this head, are the first that appear to claim our attention ; and these are, both of them, extremely obvious to remark :—namely — *First* That, the Interval of Silence, between any Two Elements of Vocal Language, is *longer in proportion as the Sense is more distinct* ; Which Principle, if *not necessary*, is at least *natural*, since all Nations appear to understand and agree in it: And, *Secondly* That, An Interval of **SILENCE** in *Vocal* Speech is represented by an Interval of **SPACE** in *Graphic* Speech ; this last being the natural and the only analogy, by which the latter can be made to call up the notion of the former.

The next matter which occurs, in this Subject,

is to suggest that, the Element of Language now in question is *not of a Simple Nature* ; but it consists in a Nature made up of *Two Different Elements* : In other words ; it is NOT MERE SILENCE that performs the Office, of which I am now treating : but it is SILENCE *rendered significant by LIMITATION* ; and *this LIMITATION DENOTED, and VARIED*, by means of POINTS, which serve as the Signs thereof.

It must be evident that, in consequence of the Principle just mentioned, *Graphic Language* must possess a very remarkable advantage over *Vocal Language*, in the precision with which it is capable of expressing the Various Lengths, or Limitations, of Silence required in Speech ; inasmuch as, in the former there is a Visible Medium of directing, with mathematical accuracy, all the intended measures of interval between Words ; which precise sort of measure Oral Language does not possess. This Medium, in Graphic Language, is what is universally known in Grammar by the name of PUNCTUATION. And it is manifest that it must possess a vast superiority over any Measures of *Silence*, as applied to the capability of the Ear to discern with precision the length of Interval intended, even if we assume that a Speaker has observed the due distinctions, in his utterance ; which, very generally, is far from being the fact.

But, previously to treating of those Measures of Silence in Language which are denoted in writing by Punctuation, it is requisite to take into con-

sideration a Mode of this Element which, from its Primary and Peculiar Nature, claims the first rank here. The thing to which I allude is that **SHORTEST MODE OR MEASURE OF SILENCE, BETWEEN ANY TWO WORDS**, which has already been adverted to, in a foregoing part of this work, and is recognised in Grammar, under the name of **APPOSITION OR GRAMMATICAL CONTACT**.

It being in the first place self-evident that, Any Interval of Silence in Speech, at the same time that it is a **DISJUNCTIVE** of Two Words, is also a **CONNECTIVE** of those Words; It will, consequently, be manifest that, Apposition or Grammatical Contact, between Any Two Words, is a Species of Connective which is **NECESSARY**: Whereas, Any of the Intervals which can be denoted by **ANY SORT OF POINT** must be classed as being a Connective that is **Not NECESSARY**, but **NATURAL ONLY**.

Thus the Interval (for there *must be some* Interval) between a *Verb* and its *Nominative*; — a *Verb* and its *Accusative*; — an *Adjective* and its *Substantive*; — or a *Christian Name* and its *Surname*; is a **NECESSARY** Connective, inasmuch as neither of these Parts of Speech can be what it is called, *unless they be viewed as being connected by the Interval in question*: While also, we are to observe, this Interval is so much of the Nature of **CONTACT** that, it cannot admit either a Word, or even so much as a **POINT**, of Any Sort, between the Two Words which it connects: Whereas, upon the other hand, Any Member, or Clause, of

a Sentence ; (which Portion of Language always admits of being connected with a preceding one by the NOTATION OF A POINT ;) does not depend, for its existence, upon that Point ; as a Nominative, a Verb, an Accusative, or an Adjective, depends, *in strictness*, for its existence upon an APPPOSITION, WITHOUT ANY INTERVENING SIGN.

From what has been said, it will be evident that, SPACE between Words is the Graphic Representative of SILENCE : While a POINT, of *Any Sort*, is a Sign of the MEASURE AND LIMITATION of that Space. These Two COMPONENT ELEMENTS, therefore, form that Department of Grammar which we have under our present contemplation.

The FOUR VARIETIES of Point, which form the several usual divisions of the subject in accredited Grammar ; and which, together with the Dash, I conceive, may be sufficient for all the ordinary purposes of Language ; claim our next consideration. And here, in the First place, we are to observe that, EVERY SUCH POINT, with exception of the Period or Full Stop alone, is a Sign that SOME FARTHER Portion, of the SAME Chain of Speech, is to be CONNECTED with *that which* WENT BEFORE : Because, if no Speech were to follow it, a COMMA, a SEMICOLON, or a COLON, must be a FALSE SIGN, instead of answering the definition assigned to it. This Principle, therefore, manifestly amounts to the fact that, EVERY ONE OF THE POINTS IN QUESTION, whensoever it occurs,

is a VIRTUAL IMPERATIVE; that is, it is NOT a Sign which *by its own Intrinsic Grammatical Virtue* connects One Member, or Clause, of a Sentence with Another; but it is a Sign which DIRECTS US to connect two such Portions of Languages.

For a Dissimilar, but an equally cogent Reason, a FULL STOP, also, amounts to a Virtual Imperative: Because it DIRECTS US *to add* NO MORE, GRAMMATICALLY, to what was previously expressed: And, if it did not do this, it could not answer its Definition of a FULL STOP.

From this reasoning, moreover, it is evident that, a FULL STOP *is the* ULTIMATE LIMIT OF GRAMMAR, *in Any Chain of Language*: Because, Any Speech that may follow a Full Stop must be connected, with Any that precedes it, by a Vinculum that is MERELY LOGICAL *and* EXTRA grammatical, such, for example, as a *Natural Connexion between the Subjects* of the preceding and following passages. Every Point, except the Full Stop, amounts to an Abbreviated Sentence, — *i. e.* — to an Imperative — which always says — ADD *this, or that*: — And, Every Full Stop amounts to an Imperative, which says — ADD *No More*.

It follows, from this view of the Subject, that the Sort of Interval between Any Two Words which is here called APPPOSITION OR GRAMMATICAL CONTACT, is a Connective Analogous to that of a VERB; which is that also of a MINOR VERB OR SO-CALLED PREPOSITION: While Every Interval that is rendered significant by ANY POINT is a

Connective amounting to a Virtual Imperative, strictly speaking.

In thus raising the Grammatical Principle of LIMITED SILENCE to its due rank as an ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE ; and in introducing it to its place in the System of Signs, instead of suffering it to lie sunk in the darkness of the doctrine of " PAUSES *and* RESTS ;" I suppose the Science of Language is cleared of a discreditable blot in this Department ; and the Foundation is laid for any improvement therein, to which time and circumstance may lead.

And here, by way of illustrating the reasonings which have been advanced, I may state the following ordinary examples of their operation : Which examples prove that they have already found their way into the *practice* of Graphic Language ; although they have not given birth to any regular and enlightened *theory* of the Subject.

Thus we may write in either of the following forms of expression, with equal grammatical propriety ; and the IMPORT *is the SAME*.

Peter *and* James *and* John *and* William WENT.

Peter, James, John *and* William WENT.

Peter, James, John, William, WENT.

Now the Imperative—"AND,"—in the *Second* Example, shows that the Two Commas which precede it, in the same Speech, are Signs representative of it, and to which it refers. And,

again, the employment of these Commas without an “*and*” at all, in the *Third Example*, confirms this Principle: While the insertion and use of the *Three “ands,”* in the *First Example*, exhibit what the full Form of Speech would be if they were always employed; and prove to us that, it is merely to avoid their sententious and tedious verbosity and its other inconveniences, that the *Intervals*, which they ought to occupy, are filled up with *Points only*.

As it is in the above examples, in the expression of NOUNS or *Signs of AGENTS*; So it is with VERBS or *Signs of ACTIONS*. Thus

Peter ate *and* drank *and* laughed *and* sang.

Peter ate, drank, laughed *and* sang.

Peter ate, drank, laughed, sang.

If, now, instead of a COPULATIVE Imperative, we have to employ what is called a DISJUNCTIVE or Alternative; the Same Law holds, with only such Modification as the import necessarily demands. Thus we say—

Peter ate, OR drank, OR laughed, OR sang.

Peter ate, drank, laughed, OR sang.

The Word—“OR”—being in its sense *exceptive*; we cannot here express a *Third Modification* or Example, as in the two former cases.

It follows as a Rule, from the examples here afforded, that Any Imperative which is employed

in this way after a Point, or Points, possesses a GOVERNMENT over those Points, and *converts* them into IMPERATIVES OF ITS OWN SORT, as in the case of either AND, or OR.

Having thus considered the GENERAL Principle, of Limited Silence considered as an Element of Speech; it remains that I should offer a few observations upon the Grammatical use, or operation, of its Signs.

First, therefore, I remark that, Of all the transgressions which are to be found in writing, (although many may be more important,) there is none which appears so common or frequent as those which arise in Punctuation. Not only are there, perhaps, scarcely any two original writers who point their Language in the same manner: But, more than this, scarcely any one writer can be found consistent with himself in this particular, or who would point the very same passage of his work, a second time, in the very same manner. The reason of this want of consistency, however, appears to lie bedded and hidden in that General Principle upon which I have just insisted. For, Every Point, alike, being neither less nor more than an Imperative Conjoiner or Directing Speech, signifying that something is to be either *added* or *substituted*; (the last mentioned of which, in a Grammatical sense, means ADDED;) it follows that the only differences, in import, between the *Comma*, the *Semicolon* and the *Colon*, consist in the *DIF-*

DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF INTERVAL which they denote ; which differences of Interval are Signs of *different degrees of distinction*, indicative of either a greater distance between the Natures of the Subjects, or a greater interest, or deliberation, which we are desired to feel with regard to them.

As, for example, when one Complex Member is to be expressed within the body of another Complex Member ; the former is distinguished from its own *Clauses*, as well as from those of the Other Member, by a *Semicolon*, instead of a *Comma* : Although, if it were requisite only to express the *Distinct Clauses* of Any Complex Member, we *might* employ *either* a COMMA, a SEMICOLON, or even a COLON, with equal propriety ; and the difference would only render our diction the more, or less, emphatic.

From this, therefore, it readily appears why almost all writers, at the same time ; and the same writer, at different times ; in consequence of numberless different moral and physical influences and accidents, will point their language in a different and a very irregular manner. Hence the general complaint, hitherto, that there are no certain rules for our guidance in Punctuation : And, perhaps, not much *practical* amendment, in this department, can speedily be expected. It is not, however, for the *Speculative* Grammarian to despond, in any such case. And it is his business to solicit the attention of those concerned, to a department of the Subject which, in its present state, cannot certainly be regarded as being other than

a deformity and a reproach in the Philosophy of Signs. And, whatever may be the result, it is not to be overlooked, or confounded, that, a *practical* slovenliness in *actual writing* is ONE thing; and a veiling of the DIRECTIVE AND CONNECTIVE OFFICE of Punctuation, by holding up to us the dark doctrine of "PAUSES, and RESTS," is quite ANOTHER. It is to suggest and illustrate this certain and important distinction, that I have here primarily directed my attention: And, having thus insisted upon introducing the PRINCIPLE of Limited Silence as an ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE; I shall leave the subordinate considerations of the Subject to those who may have opportunity and convenience to prosecute them.

It belongs, however, to the GENERAL PRINCIPLE to add, here, that the same reasoning which has been employed with respect to LIMITED SILENCE or PUNCTUATION, will hold, in an equal degree, when applied to ADVERBIAL and to PRONOMINAL SO-CALLED CONJUNCTIONS: That is to say, In Every instance whatever, in which we connect One Sentence with Another by the Medium of Any Such Word as—WHEREFORE,—THEREFORE,—EITHER, &c.;—or Any such as—WHO,—WHICH,—WHAT;—we *must understand* THE IMPERATIVE AND COPULATIVE CONJUNCTION—AND—*as being* PREFIXED to it.—Accordingly, therefore, although the Word—AND—is VERY OFTEN NOT EXPRESSED, in Sentences of this description; we find *at least* a COMMA,—or perhaps a SEMICOLON,—(either of which is a VIRTUAL *Imperative*,)—is

usually inserted between the preceding assertion and the following one. Thus, instead of saying—*Cæsar was ambitious AND therefore I slew him*;—we may say—*Cæsar was ambitious; therefore I slew him*:—And, herein, we may observe that, the sense is expressed with far more force when the Connective of its Clauses consists in a PUNCTUATED OR VIRTUAL Imperative,—significant of an Emphatic Length of Silence,—than when we express this Imperative by a FORMAL Sign. This sort of effect is especially remarkable in the texts of SCRIPTURE; wherein it occurs very frequently with an impressiveness which would be greatly weakened by inserting the FORMAL, instead of the VIRTUAL Copulative.

The sum of the whole foregoing reasoning is that, All the Modifications of Pointing in Grammar, which represent PORTIONS OF SILENCE, are SIGNS AMOUNTING TO IMPERATIVES; and must be regarded and PARSED as such.

In fine. It happens, moreover, and this very frequently, that the use of an EXPRESS Imperative does not exclude that of a POINT ALSO. Thus we may say—*Cæsar was ambitious, AND therefore I slew him*;—Or, we may express the same with a *Semicolon*;—instead of a *Comma*: But this modification of the Subject, when strictly interpreted, amounts merely to a REPETITION OF THE IMPERATIVE; and it serves only to render the expression more marked, or emphatic. At the same time, we are to remember that, REPETITION is a very usual

Idiom in Language, and is employed in Various Parts of the Chain of Speech ; as, for example, in the use of Adverbials, and of Nouns and Pronouns, as well as of Pointings. Nor can it, on certain occasions, be called an illogical expedient ; its effect being always to render an expression more impressive.—“ VERILY VERILY I say unto you !”—Ah SON SON!—Oh Mother Mother!—WHO THAT:—THAT WHICH:—and such like expressions ;—are equally Grammatical and Rational ; and, by parity of reason, an *Imperative* and a *Point amounting to an Imperative* may come together, with effect and propriety.

It only remains to add that, the *Strict Form* of an Apposition between Two Words is *sometimes violated*, for the sake of IMPRESSIVENESS. As, for example, in the expression which I have just now employed — namely — “ VIOLATED, *for the sake of impressiveness ;*”—which means—VIOLATED, *foring or fronting* the sake of impressiveness.—Such a Device, moreover, is not illogical, when its true Principle is understood and it is *known for ONLY AN APPARENT violation* for the purpose of attaining a desired utility.*

* These views of the Subject have nothing to do with such Punctuation as belongs to the Department of RHYTHM. A Work on this Art, by the Rev. Richard Roe, A. B. has recently been put into my hands ; which appears to be equally ingenious and profound : But I have been altogether prevented from examining whether the views of this Author and my own have any thing in common.

SECTION THIRD.

FARTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE OF IMPERATIVES; ESPECIALLY, THE CONSIDERATION OF THE WORD OR SIGN WHEREIN THE IMPERATIVE EFFICACY IN REALITY RESIDES.

IN the First Section of this Chapter, I adverted briefly to the Principle that, the Imperative Power or Efficacy does not reside in the Word usually called an Imperative. And, as I conceive this matter to be of sufficient importance, in the Logic of Signs, to demand some farther consideration, than was in that place afforded to it; I subjoin the following observations with a view to supply what was wanting to the subject: although these are so few, and brief, as not to deserve the distinction of an appropriate Section.

In the first place, therefore, I repeat the position, which was already asserted,—namely—that, any such Word as EAT, or DRINK, when simply named, and intended to be of an Imperative import, ought not to be considered, or called, an IMPERATIVE; or, yet, the FORM of an Imperative: But it ought to be considered and called, what it certainly is, that is MERELY THE SIGN of an Imperative; *because the Imperative, which it stands for, is not in any part expressed.* As, for example; The phrase—EAT *bread*—means—I command, request, or desire THEE *that*, THOU EAT *Bread*. And, in this example, I point out that the IMPERATIVE

resides Solely in the Word—COMMAND, REQUEST, or DESIRE; and *not at all* in the Words “EAT BREAD,” or in the Word EAT: because, in the case of this and of Every Other Imperative, the Action of COMMAND and the Action that is COMMANDED TO BE DONE do, and must, form *Two different Actions*; BOTH of which require to be distinctly expressed, *or understood*; and BOTH in the INDICATIVE MODE. Thus, “*I COMMAND thee,*” is the expression of the Action of COMMAND: To which Action, an Answer in the Form of a Question is, or may be, naturally understood—namely—You command What?—(Or, else, the DEMONSTRATIVE—THAT—serves instead of this Question.) And the rejoinder is,—“THAT, THOU EAT BREAD.” Now, in PHILOSOPHICAL Grammar, the expression—“THOU *eat Bread*”—is as much an *Indicative* as—I *eat BREAD*.

Here it is quite undeniable that, the *Command* or *Imperative* resides in the VERB of the FIRST of the Two Simple Sentences necessary for its utterance: Because the VERB in the SECOND Sentence only expresses the *Action that is commanded to be done*; And, although this naming of the Action commanded is *necessary*, since we cannot command without commanding SOME Action, just as we cannot utter a VERB without uttering SOME Accusative, (as well as Some Nominative,) to that Verb; yet, *the Action commanded* is no more a part of the Command or Imperative, than an *Accusative Noun* is part of a *Verb*, or than a *Bank* of a *River* is part of a *Bridge* which necessarily rests against it.

REAL Imperatives, therefore, ought to be recognised as a Set of Verbs which are employed impliedly (without being expressly) in connexion with Any Other Verb expressive of Some Act that is commanded, desired, or wished, to be performed. A So-CALLED IMPERATIVE, on the contrary, is, strictly speaking, ONLY A PRONOUN, or a SORT OF ADVERB, *of a very peculiar description*; it being the SIGN adopted to represent a COMPLEX SPEECH COMPOSED OF TWO, OR MORE, SIMPLE SENTENCES, the full proper enunciation of which would express an ACT OF DIRECTION, *to Some Person*, to perform Some OTHER ACTION.

If this view of the subject be deemed conclusive; then, What are we to think of the logicalness of the doctrine, heretofore universal in accredited Grammar, that an IMPERATIVE *is a VERB*; or, a CERTAIN FORM, or CERTAIN MODE, of a Verb? And What, also, is to be thought of the Philosophy of that doctrine, which has grown out of this accredited doctrine of Imperatives;—namely—that, SOME PREPOSITIONS *are IMPERATIVES*?

Nothing (I should suppose) ought to be so conducive to a speedy and general change, in the views of Grammatical readers, as to place such enormous fallacies as these in the strongest possible lights, for their attention.

SECTION FOURTH.

OF THE RESPECTIVE OFFICES OF ADVERBIALS, OF SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES, AND OF SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES, WHEN EMPLOYED CONJUNCTIVELY.

THE Words called Imperatives having been already considered, in their Conjunctive Office : And the Nature of the Words called Relative Pronouns having also been discussed : It remains, herein, to investigate the Conjunctive Natures of ADVERBIALS, of SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES, and of SO-CALLED ADJECTIVES.

And here, in the FIRST place, with regard to PARTICIPLES ; to which I shall give the lead on account of the light which the consideration of them will throw upon the Nature of the other Signs in question, I conceive it will be the most expedient course, to embody my general view of the Subject in one certain example : and the more so, as the example which I shall chuse is a very fit and remarkable one, in its own Nature ; and which, as such, has been selected by Mr. Tooke, for the Subject of his own particular illustration.

In page 268, of his *First Volume*, Mr. Tooke says—"Accordingly SINCE in modern English is "used four ways, Two, as a Preposition ; connecting, (or rather *affecting*) Words : and Two, "as a Conjunction ; affecting sentences.

“When used as a Preposition, it has always
“the signification of the past participle *Seen*
“joined to *thence*, (that is, *seen and thenceforward*.)
“or else it has the signification of the past parti-
“ciple *seen* only.

“When used as a Conjunction, it has some-
“times the signification of the present participle
“*Seeing*, or *Seeing that* ; and sometimes the sig-
“nification of the past participle *Seen*, or *Seen that*.”

Now, in the beginning, I must particularly ob-
ject, with regard to the **DISTINCTION** which Mr.
Tooke has critically marked out, in the passage
first quoted ; (wherein he affirms that, a **PREPOSI-
TION** may “**AFFECT, rather than CONNECT,**”
Two Words;) that this assumption exhibits the
last degree of darkness with respect to the Nature
of **PREPOSITIONS** : For, if there be a Preposition
in Language that does not serve in the Office of
a **LINK OF CONNEXION** ; then, **THIS PREPOSI-
TION IS NOT A VERB**, and a Great Portion of
that Fabric of Grammar, which I have been with
so much labor striving to erect in a Rational
Science may be no better than a speculation in
the clouds.

Secondly. I must object that, in construing
the Word — “**SINCE**” — into a **PAST PARTICIPLE**,
when it is employed as a PREPOSITION ; and, into
a **PRESENT PARTICIPLE** when it is employed as
a Conjunction ; Mr. Tooke has completely **RE-
VERSED** the truth of the Subject, if I have ap-
prehended it rightly.

The truth of the matter, I imagine, is that, the Word—SINCE—is, on very many occasions, employed *elliptically*; While those who employ it *do not know* that they use it elliptically. And, hence, the true import of it is hidden from their apprehension.—Mr. Tooke, indeed, acknowledges that it is an ABBREVIATION: But he does not consider it as an Abbreviation *in the same sense* that I do. In proof of this, I will take Mr. Tooke's own two examples, in which he has employed the Word—SINCE;—first, “as a Preposition;” and, secondly, “as a Conjunction:” Though I shall reverse *his order* of these examples, for the sake of convenience to my own argument.

“AS A CONJUNCTION.”

‘If I should labor for any other satisfaction but that of my own mind, it would be an effort of phrenzy in me, not of hope; SINCE it is not truth, but opinion, that can travel the world without a passport.’

Now the true import of the Word—SINCE,—in this example, I apprehend to be that of a “PRE-SENT” Participle; as Mr. Tooke has admitted it may be: But, certainly, NOT *that of a* “PAST” Participle;—as Mr. Tooke has *also* asserted it may be. And the FULL construction of the Sentence, (which I affirm is here elliptically expressed,) I take to be—*not of hope; I SEEING it is not truth,*

&c. And here we are to observe that, the POINT (*i. e. the Semicolon*) between the two clauses (which forms a *Virtual Imperative* between them) makes the sense—to be—not of hope, ADD—I SEEING *it is not truth*, &c. And hence, we find, the Word—SINCE—is, in this case, NOT A “CONJUNCTION;” but it is a PREPOSITION, employed in an Elliptical Speech.

As a test of the truth of the exposition now given, I observe that, if instead of employing the Word—SINCE,—in the speech in question, the Writer had said—“*not of hope; SEEING it is not,*” &c.;—He would have expressed the very same import, and this in unexceptionable Grammar; always *understanding* that the Speech is ELLIPTICAL.

“AS A PREPOSITION.”

“1. SINCE; for Sithence, or Seen and thence—forward.

“Such a system of government, as the present, has not been ventured on by any King SINCE the expulsion of James the Second.”

This example, I conceive, is of a Structure precisely the Same as the former; that is, the Word—SINCE—is herein a PREPOSITION, as Mr. Tooke has called it. For this reason, therefore, it would be absurd to suppose it a PAST Participle: It is, on the contrary, the So-called PRESENT Participle—

SEEING. And the sense is — “Such a government has not been ventured on by any King “SEEING (*i. e.* *He Seeing*) the expulsion,” &c.; While this expression would read sufficiently well, even, if it be *not* considered as an *elliptical* one; although, perhaps, in strictness, it *ought* to be so considered; in which case an IMPERATIVE must be *understood* AS DIRECTING US TO CONJOIN “HE” with “KING;” though, in the rapidity of thought, the EXPRESSION OF THE IMPERATIVE becomes wholly unnecessary, and would be intolerably tedious in the course of continual repetition.

In the exposition of the Subject which has been afforded by Mr. Tooke, it cannot be overlooked that, he has not only fallen into absurdity in assuming that a Preposition may be a PAST Participle; (for, we see, he affirms that, the Word—*Since*—when employed either as a Conjunction or a Preposition may be *either* a Present or a PAST Participle;) but, he has, in this instance, once more assumed a position conspicuously INCONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN GENERAL MAXIM — namely — that, NO WORD CAN CHANGE ITS PART OF SPEECH, IN ANY SITUATION WHATEVER. At this stage of the general inquiry, however, such a procedure need not require of us to stop, to take up any time in commenting upon it: Although it could not, in justice to the Subject, be passed over altogether without notice.

But, with regard to the Word—SINCE :—which I have chosen (in concurrence with Mr. Tooke) as a Subject by which to explain the Nature of So-called Participial Conjoiners ; it is evident that, whatever has been its *original* nature, it has been for many ages employed as a **BLOTCH** in our Language, that is, as a Word to which NO PRECISE OR NEAT meaning has been attached ; although its GROSS meaning has always been that of—AFTER. It is remarkable that we have (I think) no etymological illustration of—SINCE—in that Great Light to which I have so often resorted in this work ; unless it is this Word that is meant by Dr. Murray under the Word “SUNS,” mentioned in page 6, of his *Second Volume* : in which case, it proves to be the *Genitive of SOON*. Thus, he says, SUNS means “OF SOON.” It is neither my task nor my ambition to meddle, *in general*, with Etymological probabilities. But, if this be the real origin of SINCE ; it appears probable that the progress of its *accepted* import may have been in the following manner :—Any thing that happens SINCE another event, happens OFFSPRINGING THE SOON (*i. e.* *Offspringing the EARLIER TIME*) of the Prior event. At any rate, I say, OFFSPRINGING SOON is, certainly, *not an illogical* expression to signify that One event has followed Another. If this supposition be admissible ; the Word—SINCE—is neither a So-called Conjunction, nor a MERE So-called Preposition ; but it is an ADVERB, *involving* a Preposition and an Accusative Noun.

As the Word — **SINCE**—has, manifestly, presented a Knot, for Grammarians to untie ; if it has not already appeared to the reader to be unravelled, I imagine, the following considerations may fully effect what is wanting. It is quite undeniable that this Word, whensoever it is employed, might be removed, and the Word—**AFTER**—substituted for it,—without any alteration of the sense : As, for example, instead of saying—**SINCE** that is the case ; we might as well say—**AFTER** that is the case. This being the fact ; it only remains for me to point out that, the **PREPOSITION** —“ after, ”—and its *correspondent Preposition*—**BEFORE**,—are very commonly employed (like the Word — **SINCE**) in expressions which make them **APPEAR** to be employed as So-called **CONJUNCTIONS**, that is as conjoining two **CLAUSES**, — whereas all Grammarians admit that a **Preposition** cannot connect **CLAUSES**. But the truth is that, the expressions in question are, all of them, **ELLIPTICAL** Speeches. And, when they are filled up, it becomes manifest that the Words—**BEFORE**—and—**AFTER**—are **NOT** employed as So-called **Conjunctions**, but that they connect **WORDS ONLY**, as they ever must do.

Thus, in the expression — He gave it to James **AFTER** he took it from Peter ;—the **PREPOSITION** —“ **AFTER** ”—does not conjoin the two **Clauses** : because this expression is in reality elliptical ; and the full import is — He gave it to James, **ADD**, the Act of giving **AFTERING** the **ACT** of taking it from Peter. .

What has just been said, of the manner in which the So-called Prepositions — BEFORE and AFTER — are sometimes employed elliptically ; which gives them the appearance of being employed So-called CONJUNCTIVELY, instead of PREPOSITIONALLY ; affords me a convenient opportunity of illustrating the Nature of a certain Other So-called Conjunction, of very frequent and remarkable use in our Language ; but the Nature of which, I conceive, has been greatly misunderstood. The So-called CONJUNCTION, to which I at present allude, is the Word—BECAUSE. This Word is employed exclusively as a So-called CONJUNCTION ; which appears to arise from its being construed as the Imperative BE, *i. e.* BE *the Cause*: But, I conceive, this Word is demonstrably a COMPOUND PREPOSITION, (*i. e.* TWO FOLLOWING MINOR VERBS,) whenever it is employed Conjunctively ; and it means BY-causing, *i. e.* TOUCHING *causing*.

In proof of the truth of this construction, I observe in the first place that, the Word — BECAUSE — will always admit of *Another Minor Verb* (in series) after it : Thus, it is a common Idiom of our Language to say—“ BECAUSE OF ” this, or that:—which means—*Touching causing offspringing* this, or that.

In addition to this, in the old English writers, we find the Word spelt agreeably with the exposition now given. Thus, in a quotation furnished by Mr. Tooke, in page 182 of his *First Volume*, we

find the following expression. “ And, **BYCAUSE** “ the dirthe of things be suche”—&c.

Although this Word — **BECAUSE**, however, should have been granted by Mr. Tooke to be a So-called Preposition; this could not have saved it from being enumerated among His Conjunctions; because, we find, he has included the Words **NOTWITHSTANDING**, — **EXCEPTING**, — **SAVING**, — **SEEING**, — &c. — among His **CONJUNCTIONS**; as well as introduced them among his **PREPOSITIONS**. It is remarkable, at the same time, that hardly a word is ever said concerning the Word—**BECAUSE**, — so far as I recollect, either in Mr. Tooke or in his Followers, beyond the mere mention of it.

One thing is certain;—namely—that, the Word —**BECAUSE**,—whensoever it is employed, must be employed in a Speech that is **ELLIPTICAL**. Thus, in the expression—*He went BECAUSE She came*;—the import is—He went **BY CAUSING** of the event—namely—She came.

In fine. If a **PRESENT** So-called Participle be attempted to be employed as a Conjoiner; it **MUST** be a *So-called* **PREPOSITION** *i. e.* a **MINOR VERB**, *whether* the Sentence be considered as being *Elliptical* or *Not Elliptical*: So therefore we discern that, **PRESENT** Participles are excluded from the Class of So-called “ **CONJUNCTIONS**.”

And, again, If a So-called **PAST** Participle be attempted to be employed as a Conjoiner; the

expression which contains it **MUST** be **ELLIPTICAL**; and the conjunctive virtue must lie in an **IMPERATIVE** *understood*, together with *Some Present Participle* and *Some Noun or Pronoun* as preceding the Participle: Thus, if we say—Such a course is to be followed **SEEN** that Such an event has happened;—the import of this expression is—Such a course is to be followed, **ADD I, YOU, or HE, HAVING SEEN** that such an event has happened. And here, therefore, it is manifest that, the **CONJUNCTIVE EFFICACY**, in the employment of a So-called **PAST Participle**, is in fact resident in an **IMPERATIVE** and a **PRESENT Participle** *understood*.

It may not be improper to remind readers, in this place, that whensoever a **PAST** So-called Participle follows any Verb; as, for example, in the expression — He **LAY** *dead* on the Field; the Past Participle must be parsed as an **ADVERB**, since there can be **NO SUCH THING** as a **PASSIVE Voice** in Rational Grammar. Thus, the above mentioned Expression imports—He **LAY** *inning* (*i. e. oncing*) a dead State, *oncing* the Field.

Besides this Reason of the thing, moreover; (if it could be put aside,) it is in fact a demonstrable **absurdity** to make **ONE PAST Form** of Speech *succeed to Another*, if it be done with intent to exhibit **BOTH** as **VERBS**. Because when, for example, we say—“He **LAY** *dead on the Field*;”—the Act of Death must be considered as being **MORE Past** than the Act of *lying*: that is, if it were affirmed that, *at such an hour, such an Officer* **LAY**

DEAD *on the Field* ; the meaning of the narrator must be that, *at the time in question* the Officer was *lying* DEAD : So that, the Act of LYING was PRESENT, when the Act EXPRESSED AS FOLLOWING IT was PAST, which is a manifest absurdity. Nor is the certainty of this absurdity at all affected, although it is a very current Idiom of our Language to express ONE PAST Form following *Another*. And the only way to avoid it is* to submit to that Law of Grammar which was laid down in the Chapter of Verbs, and construe *Every Such Past Form* as an ADVERB.

For a two-fold reason, therefore, it is manifest, that, a PAST FORM cannot be a So-called PREPOSITION : because, in FOLLOWING A VERB *it cannot be a VERB*.

SECONDLY. To proceed, now, to the consideration of Adverbial Conjoiners ; it is requisite, here in the first place, to be recollected that, those Adverbs which are usually employed conjunctively ; such, for example, as the Words—THEREFORE, — WHEREFORE, — and WHEN, — belong to that Class of *Simple Adverbs* which involve the import of a *Minor Verb and an Accusative Noun taken together* ; Thus, the Word—THEREFORE—imports—FOR (*i. e. fronting*) THAT ;— WHEREFORE—imports—FOR WHAT ;—and so on.

It is next to be observed that, when we employ any of these Adverbials conjunctively, at the BEGINNING of a Sentence ; this procedure is an *inversion of the terms* of the Sentence. If, for ex-

ample, we say — **WHEN** Pontius Pilate was governor the event happened ;—this, in a natural order, becomes—The event happened **WHEN** Pontius Pilate was governor ; and it is only in thus reforming the Sentence that we can discern the **Conjunctive office of the Word — WHEN**—in the present instance.

The last example will serve me for the Subject of explaining, analytically and strictly, the **NATURE OF THE POWER OR EFFICACY** by which an **Adverbial Conjoiner Connects One Member, or Clause, of a Sentence with another, — a matter which, I believe, has never been considered by any Grammarian ; nor was it indeed possible it could have been explained, since it was never suspected that the So-called Preposition involved in an Adverb must in fact be a VERB.** It being now, however, demonstrated that the fact is as here asserted ; we are thereby led clearly to discern the **Nature of the Connective Efficacy of Adverbial Conjoiners.**

Thus, in the **Natural Order of the expression—**
“The event happened **WHEN** Pontius Pilate was “governor,” — we find, the Adverb—“**WHEN**”—immediately follows the Verb—“**HAPPENED :**”
And, the Adverb in question being resolvable into the terms—*atting (i. e. touching) the time ;*—It follows that the **FULL expression of the Speech** would be—“The event **HAPPENED touching the “Time that Pontius Pilate was governor.”** And, thus, we observe, the Word—“*touching or atting,*”
when developed from its covert in the **ADVERB,**

manifests itself as a *Minor Verb*, duly following and depending upon the MAJOR VERB—"HAPPENED."

From this illustration, therefore, we discern that, ADVERBIAL CONJOINERS connect Portions of Speech by an INTRINSIC GRAMMATICAL VIRTUE, of the Same Nature as that of a VERB: Or, in other words, an Adverbial Conjoiner does NOT BREAK A CHAIN OF LANGUAGE, as must happen whenever we employ an IMPERATIVE Conjoiner; which last DOES break the Chain; and always *leaves to US* to join, what it *cannot* join ITSELF.

In fine, then, ADVERBIALS appear to be the ONLY Intrinsic Conjoiners in Language that are known under the Name of CONJUNCTIONS:

THIRDLY. It remains to advert to the Nature of So-called Adjectives, when supposed to be employed conjunctively.

The Family of Words of this Denomination, (for I suppose these to be all of One Family, including the NEGATIVES implied in some of them,)—namely—EITHER; — OR: — *and* — NEITHER; — NOR:—are, I conceive, NOT of an "ADJECTIVE," but are in reality of an ADVERBIAL Nature. At least, I consider them as being so in their present import, whatever they may have been in their origin, or at any early stage of the Language.

Thus, the expression — *Give me* EITHER *this* or

that ;—manifestly means — Give me ONE OF THE TWO,—*this* or *that*.

It is, indisputably, as *consistent* with this, that the *original* import of the Word—EITHER—should have been EACH ; as it was to apply the Word—EACH—to denote ONE, *instead* of EACH ; which last is certainly an impropriety ; although it may be excused by various *analogous* improprieties in Language.

Considered as an ADVERB ; the Word—EITHER—is employed, in the above example, in a way analogous to the employment of the Adverb—WHEN—if we say—*Give me WHEN I ask*—*i. e. Give me this, or that, WHEN I ask for it*,—which means—Give me this, or that, AT THE TIME I ask for it.

As for the Word—NEITHER ; I suppose it to mean EITHER *annexed* to a SIGN OF DISSENT, amounting to NOT EITHER.

OR and NOR, being manifestly ALTERNATIVES of EITHER and NEITHER ; and being as manifestly rendered by the Word ELSE ; may, perhaps, be accounted to mean — “OF OTHER,” which is the import given to the Word—ELSE—by Dr. Murray. If this supposition be adopted, then, Each of these Words, also, is an ADVERB. And thus, All these So-called Adjective Conjunctions are Adverbs.

In fine. It follows, from all that has been advanced concerning this Department of Grammar, that, the ONLY CONJUNCTIVE SIGNS in LAN-

GUAGE are, *First*, THE VERB *and* THE MINOR VERB, whose EFFICACY IS INTRINSICAL; and this, it has been shewn, includes ADVERBIALS: And, *Secondly*, IMPERATIVES (including herein ALL THE MODIFICATIONS OF TIME POINTS except the FULL STOP) whose Efficacy is NOT INTRINSICAL, but is EXTRA *Grammatical* and MERELY LOGICAL. It was shewn, before, that So-called ADJECTIVE Conjoiners are ADVERBIALS: And was also shewn that, REPEATING PRONOUNS must be connected with their PRIMARIES by an IMPERATIVE *understood*.

Those Smallest Intervals between Two Words which I have called GRAMMATICAL CONTACT, have not been considered in this place; because it is impossible to suppose them NOT to conjoin those Words. It may be mentioned here, however, that, the Connexion in question is Analogous to that of a VERB; because, in every such case, *The One Word* grammatically CONTACTS *The Other*.

And, now, I am not aware if there be any darkness remaining over the Science of Language in the Department of CONNECTIVES. At the same time, (it is to be noticed,) it is the business of the ETYMOLOGIST to investigate and determine under what head Every Particular Conjoiner ought to be ranked; including, if he please, those which I have employed as examples. My task, I apprehend, was only to search out and determine the

SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES of Connexion — their NATURE, and their NUMBER :—and this, I trust, has been effected.

If any future Etymological writer shall prove himself a successful GLEANER after Dr. Murray ; which is the utmost that I expect any future writer *can* be ; I do not in the least anticipate that any new light he can throw, upon a few Particular Words, can in the least degree affect that GENERAL and remarkable unison, which subsists between the great mass of ILLUSTRATIONS of Languages exhibited in Dr. Murray's Work and the General Principles of the Present Analysis. And I must finally commend it, here again, for the particular attention of readers ; HOW VERY GENERAL IS THE CONCORD NOW ADVERTED TO, if we confine our notice to the CONTINUAL AGENCY OF WORDS IN ING throughout the History of the European Languages, and do not involve ourselves in Dr. Murray's Mere Opinion with regard to PREPOSITION's *being* NOUNS and IMPERATIVES. It is impossible not to be struck by the generality of the accordance, if we adhere to Dr. Murray's MATERIALS, without reference to Some of his CONCLUSIONS : Nor do I (I believe hardly ever) impeach even those Conclusions on the ground of ETYMOLOGY ; but only on the ground of RATIONAL GRAMMAR.

CHAPTER VI.

OF ABBREVIATION.

SECTION FIRST.

1. ASSUMPTION THAT A SYSTEM OF ABBREVIATION IS REQUISITE IN LANGUAGE.—2. CONSIDERATION OF A TRUE SIMILE OF LANGUAGE, AS CONDUCTIVE TO A RIGHT APPREHENSION OF THE SUBJECT.—MISCHIEF ARISING FROM PROMULGATING A FALSE SIMILE.

1.

IF Language were in any instance full and complete in its expression ; it would, then, exhibit a Sign for Every Thought which we communicate. And, hence, that analogy which I have affirmed of it in a former part of this work—namely—that Language is analogous to a SHADOW of our Thoughts—would be altogether verified. But a full and complete *express* Language, if such a thing were ever at all effected, would prove intolerably tedious, and in fact impracticable, in the busy and multifarious scene of the Actions by which we are surrounded : And, consequently, it has happened, in every accomplished Dialect, that a Distinct Appropriate System of Mechanism has been invented, whose office it is to perform the

work of ABBREVIATION, altogether apart from that more grand, but less wieldy, System which constitutes the PRINCIPAL STRUCTURE of Language.

The practical necessity, and the consequent existence, of this Collateral and Subordinate System have been apprehended and seized upon, by Mr. Tooke, with a felicity in his conception of its GENERIC Principle, which his judgment did not attain in the course of those views which he has taken of its Various *Species*. And, upon the whole, it is upon the System of Abbreviations that he has reared the fairest portion of his fame: which, indeed, was the primary and profess object of his work. It is due to him to introduce the manner in which he has broached this Speculation: For which purpose, I shall quote the following portion of his Dialogue.

“ H.”—*i. e.* HORNE TOOKE.

“ The purpose of Language is to communicate
“ our thoughts——”

B.

“ You do not mention this, I hope, as something new, or wherein you differ from others ?”

H.

“ You are too hasty with me. No. But I
“ mention it as that Principle, which, being kept

“ *singly* in contemplation, has misled all those
 “ who have reasoned on this subject.”

After some farther talk on the subject, not necessary to be introduced here, Mr. Tooke proceeds thus :

H.

“ I imagine that it is, in some measure, with the
 “ vehicle of our thoughts, as it is with the vehicles
 “ of our bodies. Necessity produced both. The
 “ first carriage for men was no doubt invented to
 “ transport the bodies of those who from infirmity
 “ or otherwise, could not move themselves : But
 “ should any one, desirous of understanding the pur-
 “ pose and meaning of all the parts of our modern
 “ elegant carriages, attempt to explain them upon
 “ this one principle, alone, *viz.*—That they are
 “ necessary for conveyance — ; he would find
 “ himself woefully puzzled to account for the
 “ wheels, the seats, the springs, the blinds, the
 “ glasses, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere
 “ ornamental parts of gilding, varnish, &c.

“ *Abbreviations* are the *Wheels* of Language, the
 “ *Wings* of Mercury. And though we might be
 “ dragged along without them, it would be with
 “ much difficulty, very heavily and tediously, &c.

B.

“ I think I begin to comprehend you. You
 “ mean to say that the errors of Gramma-

“rians have arisen from supposing all Words
 “to be *immediately* either the Signs of Things or
 “the Signs of Ideas: whereas in fact many
 “words are merely *abbreviations* employed for
 “dispatch, and are the Signs of other Words.
 “And that these are the artificial Wings of Mer-
 “cury, by means of which the Argus eyes of Phi-
 “losophy have been cheated.

H.

“It is my meaning.”

The Generic Conception which is unfolded in the above passages; with exception only of the **SIMILE OF LANGUAGE** which they contain, and of which I propose hereafter to speak; is as just, as the classic image in which it is embodied is beautiful. And I am not behind the most ardent admirers of Mr. Tooke's genius, in at least the *will* to accord to him praise, wherever I am made conscious that it is due. It is not without a continuation of that repugnance which I have felt throughout my very extensive and general opposition to his views of the **PARTS OF SPEECH**, including their **CONNEXIONS**, that I am obliged to point out, here again, in a passing manner, One, or Two, of the Principal faults into which he fell, in the evolving of his General conception.

He sets out with laying it down that, “**ABBREVIATIONS** are employed in language in three
 “ways:”

“ 1. In Terms.

“ 2. In Sorts of Words.

“ 3. In Construction.”

And he adds—“ Mr. Locke’s Essay is the best *guide* to the *first*: and numberless are the authors who have given particular explanations of the *last*. The *Second* only I take for my province at present ; because I believe it has hitherto escaped the proper notice of all.”

In the prosecution of his plan, he has very successfully ; although, in particular examples, often not fortunately ; shewn Grammarians that, Most of our So-called Nouns *Substantive* are, in fact, Only So-called *Adjectives* whose Original Substantives have been lost. And he has shewn, with equal success, that Many of our So-called Conjunctions are Imperatives and Other Signs involving the Import of *Several Words*. He has done this, moreover, in a conspicuous manner in the case of those Words which he has (*mistakenly*) called “ Additional PARTICIPLES.” Each of these Classes of Words, therefore, are manifestly “ ABBREVIATIONS IN CONSTRUCTION ;” that is, they must be CONSTRUED *as being Abbreviations*, or, else, the Portion of Language in which they are contained cannot be logically understood. So far, therefore, Mr. Tooke has meritoriously reared a reputation, whose lustre must always be secure from being dimmed by any deduction which can fairly be made from it.

But it is at the same time to be remarked here, that, in all this Mr. Tooke was engaged, PRINCIPALLY, NOT with the MAIN Structure of Language; but *only* with a SUBORDINATE SYSTEM, *adapted to the Principal One, indeed*, but NOT FORMING ANY INTEGRAL PORTION of it. It is, along with this, to be acknowledged upon the other hand, that the course which he prescribed to himself could not fail to involve an INCIDENTAL consideration of the Different Parts of Speech: In other words; it was not possible to meddle, generally, with the System of Abbreviation, without meddling, as generally, with that Principal System to which it is subordinate: And, hence, the Views of the Main Structure of Language, which have been entertained by Mr. Tooke, have brought those conceived by me into a general opposition to them.

To speak, now, of the manner in which Mr. Tooke conducted his general plan; or, to the effect with which he fulfilled it; I observe, it is a very different thing, to show that any Sign in Language is an ABBREVIATION; (as, for example, to show that a Single Word, such as Go, or STAY, involves the Import of a WHOLE SPEECH;) and to show, *Categorically*, WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE PARTS AND CONNEXIONS OF THAT SPEECH. Now Mr. Tooke was utterly precluded, BY HIS ERRONEOUS CREED OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION, from ever attaining to any light with regard to the true Nature of the Parts of Speech: And this preclusion led him into the most profound

mistakes, even in his investigation of the System of Abbreviations.

Of these mistakes, the most important, inasmuch as it so far misconceives and veils the Principal Structure of Language; and the only one which I shall stop to notice in this place; is his having assumed that *ALL the "Indeclinable Parts of Speech" are ABBREVIATED Signs*. This fallacy, indeed, is so great and comprehensive, that a greater than it can hardly be imagined. The Principal Error which it involves, however, is Mr. Tooke's assumption (in common with his belief concerning the Nature of All the Parts of Speech in question) that *SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS are ABBREVIATIONS*. In other words; he conceived, and insisted throughout that, So-called Prepositions (at least one Great Class of them) are *IMPERATIVES*: And, accordingly, he has illustrated His Theory of Prepositions by his celebrated examples of

"A House WITH" (*which he construes JOIN*) "a Party Wall."

—and—

"A House WITHOUT" (*which he construes DISJOIN*) "a Roof."

As I trust that the nature and fate of this Theory have been made sufficiently evident in the foregoing parts of this work, it is not intended to revert to it, here, to any length of commentary: All that is designed, on the present occasion, being

duly to advert to the merit of Mr. Tooke, in his GENERAL Conception of the Nature and Importance of a System of ABBREVIATION :—But, at the same time, as duly to point to his *Specific Errors* ; and to the general confusion and darkness in which he had, through entertaining these errors, involved the PRINCIPAL STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE.

Although the Real Nature of So-called Prepositions has been so fully illustrated, therefore, it may not be unnecessary to call the attention of readers, in this place, to the fact (however manifest) that the Words called Prepositions are NOT AT ALL OF THE NATURE OF ABBREVIATIONS. On the contrary, it is certain that they INCREASE THE LENGTH OF THE CHAIN OF LANGUAGE, while they render this Chain *more definitely expressive* than it could be without them. Thus, If we would signify One Man as striking Another ; we should, in ordinary, signify this Action in the following Idiom,—*Peter strikes James*.—But if, on the other hand, we desire to express Peter as having performed the Action with a Member of his Body, in concert with the WALL, or the TABLE ; we would signify it by saying—*Peter's Head STRUCK against the Wall* ;—*Peter's Hand STRUCK upon the Table*. Hence it is manifest that the Minor Verb—“AGAINST,”—or “UPON,”—IS IN THE GREATEST DEGREE OPPOSED to the Nature of an ABBREVIATION ; for it is a DEFINING VERB, which *might often be left out when it is employed* ; but which, whenever it is employed, renders the

Speech in which it is contained *more definite*, at the same time that it ADDS TO ITS LENGTH.

To this statement is to be added that, it is NOT ONLY IN THE GRAND FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATION OF SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS that Mr. Tooke's doctrine has thus veiled the Structure of Language : Because, as a Preposition is an ELEMENT in an ADVERB ; and is in fact the *Real Connecting Link* in which the Conjunctive Efficacy of ADVERBS RESIDES ; it follows that, by inculcating the erroneous doctrine that Prepositions are Abbreviated Signs for IMPERATIVES, he has utterly veiled the Real Nature of ADVERBS ALSO. And, as Each of those Words which Mr. Tooke has called "Additional PARTICIPLES" is, in fact, a STRING OF SEVERAL DISTINCT VERBS ; it follows that, from not understanding the PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATION OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE ; and, indeed, from not having any conception of the NATURE OF A VERB AT ALL ; he has veiled the Real Nature of those Abbreviations, under the NAME of "PARTICIPLES."

But, Let not MR. TOOKE be charged with being either *solely* or *principally* blameable, in his Construction of these SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES. He has called these Signs after the Idiom, or Supposed Analogy, which had been provided for him by the Latin Language. And here, for (I believe) the first time in this work, I am brought to advert to that Grammatical Figure of the last mentioned

Language called a "GERUND." This Sign is analogous to Mr. Tooke's ADDITIONAL PARTICIPLES—namely—his—

" Potential Mood Active, Adjective ;

" Potential Mood Passive, Adjective ;

" The Official Mood Passive, Adjective ;

and

" The Future Tense Active, Adjective."

After what has been made manifest in the various foregoing analyses of this work, I trust it is put beyond the possibility of a cavil that, those Portions of Language which the Latin Grammarians have called GERUNDS *and* SUPINES are, (like the SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES just enumerated,) in reality STRINGS OF VERBS ; which, as such, MUST BE PARSED UNDER THE LAW OF ALTERNATION, in their respective Series ; — some of them having an Objective Noun annexed to them, and Some not. And those Grammarians, having entertained no suspicion, of Preposition's being Verbs ; or, yet, of VERB's *governing each other in SERIES*, one after another ; they had no shift, but to cut the knot which they could not untie ; and they have thereby, to all succeeding generations, veiled their utter ignorance of the Scientific Structure of this Portion of Language, under a DARK AND UNMEANING NAME, —i.e. that of " CARRYING ON," or whatever else

any person may chuse to say is the import of the Word—GERUND.

If long-venerated authority is good ground for us to endure an absurdity, which in the last degree humbles our pretensions to rationality ; then may a STRING OF VERBS, *operating alternately* as so MANY NOUNS *and* VERBS, be still tolerated in Language under ONE NAME, and as forming ONE PART OF SPEECH,—either as SUPINE or GERUND. But, if Mere Unfounded Authority be not good ground for such endurance ; it is vain to struggle in favor of what it is impossible to defend. No especial discredit, indeed, can attach to generations past, who have endured this, or any other such defect in Grammar, so long as the defect remained wholly undetected : Particular discredit can attach only if any person, succumbing to a prejudice which would justly subject him to the ridicule of a future generation, should attempt to defend such a fallacy, after any accident had once led to an exposure of it. I leave the matter, therefore, to the judgment of my Contemporaries : And, if they find me wrong, I refuse not to stand condemned of having labored in error. At the same time, I suppose, the embarrassments in which the Doctrine of Gerunds and Supines have involved Latin Scholars, must prove a Salutory hint, to all who are interested in the cause of Philosophical Grammar, to afford due weight to a solution which demonstrates the impossibility of SUCH PARTS of Speech, as those SO-CALLED GERUNDS *and* SUPINES.

2.

In the Simile of the Nature of Language which was furnished by Mr. Tooke in that part of his Dialogue which was quoted at the beginning of the present Section, he has fallen into a misconception, which could not fail to leave a very fallacious impression upon the judgment of those who have implicitly relied on his Theory. And so erroneous is the notion which it conveys, that I deem it of sufficient importance to require its being counteracted by a particular notice of it, in this place.

We have seen, in the part of his Work referred to, that he considered Language as being of the Nature of a "CARRIAGE," or Stage-Coach, which carries passengers along. And, accordingly therefore, like other Carriages, he supposes Language may be either with or without WHEELS: And, like other Carriages, also, he conceives it may be furnished, not only with *Wheels*; but, likewise, with all the appurtenances and trappings of "*Seats,—Springs,—Blinds,—Glasses,—and Lining, &c.*" "Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of "*Gilding,—Varnish, &c.*"

How many readers, who have thought themselves of no mean grade of intelligence, have yielded their full assent and admiration to the lively description thus laid out? Besides the GENERAL conception which it embodies; the enumeration of the *Specific Appurtenances* appear, to a superficial tact of the matter, to amount to so

complete a *juxtaposition* with the Subject which it is assumed to resemble, that, by those who could gain no deeper insight into the thing, the whole Metaphor must have been viewed as commanding an unqualified applause. The items of the supposed correspondence appear to fit so consecutively, in the imagination, that, although proved to be never so false, one would think it almost a pity they were not true. Such is the plausible aspect of many a conceit which figures in our books of So-called Philosophy; wherein, hasty conception, hardy assumption, and elegant or piquant language, exhibit to the fascinated reader a brilliant meteor, in the pursuit of which he must be no less deceived than delighted. As a single example, in point here: Have we not beheld the spectacle of a knot of Philosophers, of the very first pretensions, counter-eulogising one another upon the occasion of one of them having discovered that, Language resembles a DIRECTING WAY-POST: which it certainly no more resembles, than it does the Stage Coach of Mr. Tooke?

The Stricture which I have thus been urged to hazard, against this proceeding of Mr. Tooke, must at least be justified if that view of the Subject which I have maintained throughout be admitted as valid. It has already sufficiently appeared, in the foregoing analyses that, Language is NOT AT ALL of the Nature of a CARRIAGE; but is, on the contrary, analogous to a ROAD, upon which a Carriage; or, at least, THOUGHT, without a Carriage; may TRAVEL. These Two Things are extremely

different, in their respective analogies. And it follows, therefore, that, in the Simile which Mr. Tooke has furnished, he has misled his readers by a most fallacious Metaphor, at the very moment when (at the outset of their journey) they must have supposed he had supplied them with a Conception equally familiar and safe. It cannot therefore be of small importance to note, and to counteract, the fallacy thus inculcated.

In effecting this object, moreover, I have an opportunity of adverting to some Strictures of a very competent and respectable Critic of my *First Volume*; who has objected to the *extent or unqualifiedness* of my denial, therein, that Language is an INSTRUMENT of Thought. The Criticism, to which I here allude, is contained in an Article upon the First Part of this work, furnished under the Head of Philology, in the CYCLOPÆDIA EDINENSIS: And the tenor of the whole article is such as claims my particular respect. I shall avail myself, therefore, of the present occasion to supply, or explain, whatever may have been wanting in the part of my work to which the Strictures of this Writer apply.

In the Preliminary Chapter of the First Volume, I have, among other matter, asserted that Language is NOT, *in any sense*, an INSTRUMENT of Thought. And, in reply to this, the Writer in question; who, it appears, had advocated a contrary opinion, in a Work some years before the public; defends his position, with arguments to

which I shall have occasion to advert. Upon this point, therefore, we are at issue.

In the outset of what I have to say upon the Subject, I have no hesitation in acknowledging, that, in asserting my first position *without any qualification*, I laid myself fairly open to the objections of this Gentleman: For there are, certainly, various senses in which Language may be contended to be an Instrument of Thought. But, having made this willing offering to truth; I still affirm that the account which I hazarded of the Nature of Language, in the place alluded to, is not substantially the less true; nor the distinctions therein pointed out the less important; after the unqualified assertion has been duly deducted.

In the FIRST place, it is to be observed, I have *explained* my GENERAL assertion, by *Specific* examples which leave my meaning in no degree of doubt, or obscurity: And my Critic has expressly assented to the justice of the explanation. Thus I have said that, if Language is an Instrument of Thought, "it must *help us to think*, that "is it must serve in some such office, with regard "to thinking, as the Spade, the Plough, or the "Harrow, does in the cultivation of our Fields, "or Gardens: which office, I have shewn, it "never does, nor can do." And, in answer to this, the Writer in question says—"A similar remark "might be made on Mr. F.'s favorite substitute "for an *Instrument* and a *Vehicle*—namely—a "ROAD OR FOOT-PATH, and the *stepping stones* "thereof. These, indeed, are not Instruments

“ precisely in the same sense in which a Razor, a
“ Guitar, and a Pair of Snuffers, are held to be
“ Instruments ; but they undoubtedly both serve
“ to indicate and ascertain an interposed distance,
“ and at the same time guide us,” &c.

The real truth is that, although Language, certainly, is not an Instrument in any thing like the same sense that a Razor, or a Garden Rake, is an Instrument ; Yet, So VERY GENERIC OR COMPREHENSIVE is the Word—INSTRUMENT,—that one can hardly mention Any One Thing in the Universe, that may not, in SOME sense, be said to be an Instrument of Any Other Thing : And this reasoning applies undeniably to Language. Thus, The Breath we breathe may be said to be an Instrument of Thought ; because, if we did not breathe, we could not think. And, in like manner, the Food we eat may be included in the Same Category ; because, if we did not eat, we could not breathe. At the same time, I freely admit ; (for it would be unworthy to affect not to admit ;) that Language is an Instrument of Thought in a Sense *more proximate*, than either eating or breathing ; although, not in any sense that can invalidate that view which I intended to convey of it.

Upon the Substantial truth of my first position I may insist : because if, in like manner, I had affirmed that this Earth is not in any sense an Instrument of travelling ; I might certainly have been taken up : and, yet, What Sort of Conception could it afford any one, who had no previous notion of the Nature of the Earth, if he were only

told that it is an INSTRUMENT OF TRAVEL ? Now it was an impression of the mischief arising from the GENERALITY of the Phrase in question that urged me into the unqualified denial of the assumption it conveys : And, I think, this mischief has amounted to a magnitude sufficiently enormous, when it brought Philosophers, at length, to *identify*, in their own conception, THIS INSTRUMENT *with the THING of which it is the Instrument*, that is to identify a LANGUAGE OR NOTATION with a SCIENCE of which it is the Notation.

THE GENERALITY, however, which has ultimately led to this logical mischief, is not so pernicious in the immediate Department of the GRAMMARIAN, as the *Specialty* which Mr. Tooke has conceived and promulgated of the Subject. For, (it may be asked,) When any person wishes to gain a knowledge of the Nature of Language, in the Department of GRAMMAR ; Where will he look to find it ? And the answer is, He will not resort to the Writings of Lavoisier, or of Condillac ; any more than to those of Professor Stewart : On the contrary, he will seek for it in the Etymological Speculations of Mr. TOOKE ; because HIS Speculations were, until a very recent period, incomparably the most luminous which the World had seen on the Subject. The reader of a later date, indeed, is possessed of the advantage of being enabled to consult such additional lights as Dr. Murray, in the same Department. But, in this latter authority, I think, he will find no con-

tradiction of that fallacious Metaphor which Mr. Tooke has promulgated of the Subject, in affirming Language to be of the Nature of a CARRIAGE, which may be accelerated, or retarded, accordingly as it has, or has not, what he conceives to be WHEELS, *Springs*, &c.

Now nothing, in my opinion, could be more conducive to a right apprehension of the Structure of Language, in the mind of a general reader, than to *qualify the usual* GENERALITY ; and, along with this, to explode the conceit of a fallacious *Specialty* of the Subject ; by suggesting and insisting upon a true *Special* Conception of that Instrumentality, (since Instrumentality is indeed to be granted,) which Language in reality possesses : And, hence, I have insisted upon that of a ROAD, and of the *Stepping Stones thereof, for Thoughts to travel upon*.

And here I desire to note the apposite coincidence, which appears between this my position and a certain assertion, or phrase, of Lord Bacon : by which, in what I conceive to be one of his happiest images, he calls Language the "*Foot-steps of Reason*." As I have not looked into Lord Bacon since the commencement of the present work ; I thank the Writer, to whose Criticisms I have alluded, for having pointed out this curious concurrence.

I have now to resume my observations upon the additional remarks of the Writer last mentioned. *First*, therefore, I observe that, granting Lan-

guage to be, in a certain sense, an INSTRUMENT of Thought; still, I cannot, in strict logical technicality, admit his plea that, it is also a VEHICLE. Because I must insist that THOUGHT can never be COMMUNICATED: And this Writer, in his avowed character of a NOMINALIST, will agree with me, that COMMUNICATION cannot, *in strictness*, be affirmed of it; although, in a *loose popular sense*, the expression may be tolerated, as being both harmless and convenient.

Secondly. A consideration of much greater importance consists in this Writer's having claimed Language as being an Instrument of Thought, upon the ground (maintained by him in common with all other Nominalists) that a person cannot carry on ANY GENERAL reasoning *without the use of SIGNS*. This Gentleman, I doubt not, will be very much surprised, when, notwithstanding all the respect which I acknowledge to be due to the Talents, as well as the Numbers, of those who constitute the Sect of the Nominalists; (to the views of which Sect I have, in time past, to a certain extent, subscribed;) I here venture to express my dissent from the UNIVERSALITY of their doctrine. It follows that, I cannot admit this consideration as being an argument against my original position: although this Writer must, as a Nominalist, have thought it the most prominent argument he has advanced. But, as I intend to make this topic the Subject of an appropriate article in the sequel; I shall here postpone any farther consideration of it.

There is one small matter, however, to which I shall advert, here ; because, with regard to it, this Writer has misapprehended my meaning ; which is this : I have asserted Language to be a *ROAD for THOUGHT*. And, by this, I mean a Road for a Man who READS, *and who, therefore, THINKS AFTER ANOTHER Person*. But I do not suppose that Language is a Road for the Thoughts of the INVENTOR of that Language ; because a ROAD CANNOT *be a Road* BEFORE IT IS MADE.

In the case of an INVENTOR of Words, on the contrary, I suppose the WORDS, *which he THROWS OUT*, to be analogous to a SHADOW of his THOUGHTS, *i. e.* analogous to a MARK, or SIGN, which is *displayed attendant upon EACH THOUGHT*. And, upon the Same Principle, when ANY Man, *instead of* READING, or HEARING, THINKS WITHIN HIMSELF ; and employs Words with his Thought, as men always do, in ordinary ; I suppose these Words to be analogous NOT TO STEPPING STONES *in a Road* ; but to SHADOWS thrown out by, or with, his Thoughts, as they occur.

I trust these observations will supply any thing which may have been wanting in my first statement of the Subject. And, in concluding them, I consider it due, to the writer in question, to express my great satisfaction at his fairness, as well as his competency, in the delineation which he has given of my Views in general. From the thorough tact which he has evinced, in apprehending the details of the Principles laid down, I should be wanting in justice were I not to afford him the

acknowledgment that were there, hereafter, occasion to explain any matter in this work ; and it were put beyond my own hand to discharge this office ; I know of no Individual who, I think, could execute the task with so much probability of entering into my particular conceptions of the Subject. In rendering this avowal, however, I would not be understood as at all undervaluing some other assents, which I have received from Individuals professing in the Subject ; and who, perhaps, may be no less competent therein than the Gentleman first mentioned ; although they have not developed their concurrence with that particularity, which could enable me to compare their opinions. With regard only to the Nature of Language in the sense already adverted to, and which does not at all affect the details of the Subject, the Writer in question and myself are not almost altogether agreed. In nearly every other Point, the concurrence is precisely that which OUGHT to follow, when any matter of strict ratiocination is submitted to a second eye. And, I apprehend, the agreement may be taken for a presumptive test of the soundness of the calculation. I own that, had it been unaccompanied by any other or similar suffrage, it would have been all that I should have required, in order to satisfy my own mind upon the subject : Although I by no means desire that others should deem this test of the same weight that I do.

There is *One* ground, however, on which the test in question must be held to be of considerable

weight. Two persons may, certainly, happen to agree in a matter of ratiocination not void of error : But, When did two Authors ever agree through the Whole Tenor of a Volume on GRAMMAR ? DIFFERENCE IN OPINION has, in all time past, been at once the TEST and the OPPROBRIUM of Grammar : And, hence, any very unusual extent of genuine agreement, on this Subject, may at least be taken for a presumption that the Principles upon which it is founded differ essentially from those that are usually exhibited. The chief value, however, which I attach to the matter in question, is owing to the conviction it has afforded me that my statements are UNDERSTOOD ; and this to the utmost degree of precision. It would avail but little that Principles are true in themselves, if the manner in which they are laid down should fail to bring readers into the *same train of thinking* with their author.

SECTION SECOND.

OF BREVES, BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED ADVERBS.

THE Principal Contrivances, by which the Road of Language has been shortened, are of Two Kinds:—*First*, by ELISION:—And, *Secondly*, by WORDS, or PHRASES, which REPRESENT AN ASSEMBLAGE OF WORDS, or, Sometimes, a WHOLE SPEECH OR SENTENCE ; which Signs are called ADVERBS.

OF ELISION I do not propose to speak particularly in this place. Its Nature and Operation have been incidentally touched upon in treating of Other Grammatical Considerations : And it may be sufficient to observe, here, in general terms, that, taken in all its real extent and recurrence, it forms a very large proportion of the Whole Chain of Language. To attempt its illustration by a few particular instances, would form an inadequate proceeding : And to do the same by a lengthened display of examples would be executing a task for which there appears to be no necessity ; since, by those who will afford the matter due reflection on the hints which have been supplied, the GENIUS of Elision may very well be under-

stood without it. It may not, however, be inexpedient to observe that, the *Proportion* of Elision in Language is much greater, than would be readily imagined by those, even, who have been given to Grammatical Speculation ; unless they attend, especially, to the IMPLIED REPETITION of Words which is requisite in Construction, in the course of Speech. As a single example of this, an understood Repetition of the INITIAL PRONOUN is a requisite in Sentences, wherein those who are best acquainted with Grammar have never in the least degree suspected such a construction. This single hint may serve the purpose of setting any reader in the course of estimating the Nature, and the Quantity, of Elision, in Language.

By Some Philosophers, Language has been called an EXPRESS Image of Thought : But this, or any thing like this, it certainly is NOT. By Others, again, it has been compared to a set of SPRINGS, which serve to set our Thoughts in action. The conception of the Subject which has always struck myself is that, it may be compared to the Net of the Fisherman ; which he throws out, together with its *Floats*, as he rows his boat away and increases his distance from the First End. To the eye of a Mere Spectator, the Floats, as they show on the surface at different distances, appear to be unconnected and unmeaning : But, to that of the Fisherman, they manifest themselves as the Signs of a Contrived and Continued Chain, whose connexion and utility he thoroughly understands. In like manner, Language presents, to

the eye of a Person who does not understand its Real Principles and Structure, a Succession of Signs for whose Nature and Connexions he cannot at all account ; and his best conceptions with regard to which amount to no better than confusion and darkness : of which results, even deliberate Treatises on Grammar afford continual examples. While, to the Man who is rationally possessed of its Philosophy, it exhibits a Concatenation of Signals, whose APPARENT COMPLEXEDNESS, *but* REAL SIMPLICITY, makes up an ART, and a SCIENCE, which commands his unqualified admiration ; and the magnitude or importance of which is no less than that of the SOLE CHANNEL FOR THE PROPAGATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

2.

I proceed, now, to the consideration of the *Second* Kind of Abbreviation enumerated in the beginning of this article.

ADVERBS have been called, by Mr. Tooke, “ the common sink and repository of all heterogeneous and unknown corruptions.” And this description may, perhaps, be a just one in so far as regards those Words in time past. But it does not seem impossible to do away with this reproach, at least in a great degree, by reducing all, or most, of these Signs to Classes which admit of some tolerable definition. I shall prose-

cute this view of the Subject to a certain extent ; without, however, entertaining any intention of exhausting it, or, indeed, of going to any great length into its consideration : Which I am alike prevented from doing, by the nature and scope of the Subject itself and by the limit of application which, in the present circumstances, I am able to afford to it.

The Principal, or by far the Most Numerous, Class of Adverbs has been recognised in some measure by common consent. It has received the etymological sanction of Mr. Tooke ; or, rather, it was first etymologically explained by him : And, what is of much higher authority, it has been confirmed by the researches of Dr. Murray. “ Every Adverb ” (says this Writer, Vol. 2. page 169.) “ is an abbreviation of the phrase, or for the phrase, by which the sense of it might be expressed periphrastically.”

Again, in page 7, of the Same Volume, (and in other places,) he has explained the Particular Nature of these Signs, in the following manner : “ All Adverbs may be translated in a short phrase, of which the first words are *From, to, at, with, or in*, prepositions of related signification. For example, he ever lives,—he lives *at* all times ; they rise together,—they rise *in* a body or company ; he fights gallantly,—*in* a gallant way—*with* bravery ; he thinks carelessly—*with* negligence ;—he rises early—soon in the morning.”

In a word ; It has been luminously explained by this excellent Etymologist that, a large proportion of the Words called Adverbs, in the Teutonic Dialects, consisted of Signs each of which involves or represents TWO DIFFERENT PARTS OF SPEECH TAKEN TOGETHER ; which the Classic Grammarians of the Transpositive Languages have most deplorably confounded into ONE SAME PART, under the well known denomination of the CASES OF A NOUN ; but which, in fact, is made up of a NOUN IN SOME SO-CALLED CASE and a SO-CALLED PREPOSITION OR MINOR VERB WHICH IS THE GRAMMATICAL CAUSE of its being in that State. This Artificial Sign and Most Useful Abbreviation, therefore, I adopt, on the broad etymological authority now stated, not only because I find no reason to object to it, but because it appears to be a Device in a high degree rational, and admirably adapted to form a convenient *Portion of Substituted Mechanism*, of very frequent employment in the Structure of Language. It appears, in this case, only necessary to remind a reader that, in adopting the Class of Adverbs now in question, according to the Definition already given, the OBJECTIVE NOUN is very often, or rather very generally, although not universally, a *Composite Word* ; being made up of a *So-called Substantive*, a *So-called Adjective*, and a *So-called Article*.

It will be seen, as we advance, that there are Adverbs of Several Other Classes, that is to say whose MECHANICAL STRUCTURE is very different

from that of the Class already defined : As, for example, Words which involve, or represent, **NOT ONE** Minor Verb and its Objective Noun, but **TWO**, or **MORE**, Minor Verbs together with their respective Objective Nouns ; Each of which Adverbs forms a Very Complex Chain of Speech, comprising *Several Alternating Verbs and Nouns*, in Series. It is in order to mark and distinguish all such Classes as these, from that one already defined, that I supply this description and caution ; to the end that, their very Different Mechanism may not in any case be confounded. At the same time, I may suggest, in passing, that it is owing to this **ALTERNATING PRINCIPLE** that, we are enabled to string together **SEVERAL DIFFERENT ADVERBS**, as is the common practice of Language, such, for example, as when it is said — *The Water is VERY DELIGHTFULLY warm, or cold ;* which means — *The Water is INNING a true manner (or degree) INNING a delightful manner (or degree) warm, or cold.*

Into the Class of Adverbs first described, I conceive, must be introduced ; and this 'as a **Leading Tribe** of them, on account of their great utility and very frequent recurrence in discourse ; the Words heretofore called **POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS** — namely — *My, — Thy, — His, — Her, — Our, — Your, — Their* : And, along with these, their respective Modifications — *Mine, — Thine, — His, — Hers, — Ours, — Yours, — Theirs*. As concerning any difference, moreover, which Grammarians

have supposed to exist between these last-mentioned Forms and their Primaries. I humbly conceive, the embarrassment they have occasioned has arisen altogether from these Idioms being illogical; while they have at the same time been, perhaps unalterably, stamped upon the Language. Thus, *MY arm*, and *MINE arm*, are precisely identical expressions in import. And although, upon the other hand, we cannot, in the present Idiom of our Language say—*This is MY*, instead of this is *MINE*; yet, it is certain that—*This is MY Book*—means—*This is OF ME Book*: While it is equally certain that, to say, on pointing to a Book,—*This is MINE*—means—*This is OF ME*: And both alike mean—this is *BOOK OF ME*, i. e. *BOOK offspring ME*. In a word; Every Such SO-CALLED POSSESSIVE *Pronoun* is an ADVERB involving *the* the import of a MINOR VERB and a PRONOUN in the Objective State. It will be manifest that, the SO-CALLED PRONOUN IN THE POSSESSIVE STATE—WHOSE—is an Adverb belonging to this class.

Into the Same Class of Adverbs as that last in question, it is evident, is to be introduced that very Numerous Division of Abbreviated Signs which results from the speculation and reasoning advanced in the Chapter of Verbs: In which, it was laid down and insisted that, *Every* SO-CALLED VERB, as it stands marshalled in the *So-called Paradigms* of our Grammars, is of necessity NOT A VERB, but an ADVERB, in consequence of its not being followed by a Noun in the Accusative State,

express or understood. The very copious notice which I deemed it requisite to take, incidentally, of this Species of Adverbs, in the place already referred to, renders it altogether unnecessary that I should enter into any description of its Mechanism on the present occasion.

Into this Class, also, is manifestly to be introduced what are called the *PASSIVE Forms* of Verbs, or those Expressions which comprise the SO-CALLED *PASSIVE VOICE* ; such, for example, as the Word—*MISTAKEN*,—OR *DECEIVED*,—in the expression—*He is MISTAKEN*—*He is DECEIVED*. It was shewn, in its proper place that, a *Passive Form* is impossible in Rational Grammar. With regard to both the present and the last mentioned Tribe of Adverbs, it can be only required that I should refer the reader's recollection to the place alluded to ; and, then, proceed with such farther discussion of the Subject as was there, of course, left unprovided for.

One of the first or most striking considerations, which occurs, of this nature, is the confirmation which the evidence of the Class of what I may, perhaps, for the sake of distinction, call *VERBAL ADVERBS* (*i. e.* the Tribe of Adverbs last adverted to) affords, upon its own distinct and collateral ground, of that Principle of Grammar already so largely had in proof ;—namely—that *ALL SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS are MINOR VERBS*. And, although the aid of such additional evidence is beyond all question superfluous ; and though, in-

deed, the matter has already been incidentally adverted to in treating of Minor Verbs; it could not certainly, with propriety, be suffered to pass unnoticed in this place. The fact, to which I here allude, is the known Principle that, All So-called Prepositions, when they happen to terminate a Sentence, become ADVERBS BY POSITION. Thus, in the examples,—*He went BEFORE*;—*They came AFTER*;—*She stood BY*;—*We looked ON*;—Every One of the terminating Words, which in its proper associated position would be a SO-CALLED PREPOSITION, is here an ADVERB.

There are, indeed, Some of these Words which, owing to accidental circumstances, are seldom, and Some never, employed thus Adverbially. We do not, (for example,) say—*He went WITH*;—*They went FROM*;—&c. But it is quite undeniable that WITH and FROM are so perfectly of a Class and Analogy with IN and BY; that there can exist NO GRAMMATICAL reason why the Two former should not be Adverbs, if annexed at the end of a Sentence. And, at the same time; we know that, the true reason of their not being so employed is their *ordinary inutility* in expressing, in this way, the Common Relations between things. Thus we never say—FROM,—without saying *from* SOMETHING: And we never say—*with*,—without saying *with* SOMETHING: But these are *Mere Idiomatical* distinctions, or adoptions; without any sanction of Grammar.

Now the moment we interpret any Such So-called Preposition, at the end of a Sentence, as a Sign importing a Preposition or Minor Verb

with its Objective Noun taken together, we discern its IDENTITY OF SPECIES with that Large Division of Adverbs which Grammarians have called VERBS, when placed in a similar situation. As, for example,—

—He is fighting ;—means—He is *inning* A FIGHTING STATE.

and

—He is by ;—means—He is *inning* A TOUCHING or NEARING PLACE.

Let us here, upon the other hand, observe, in a single example, the confusion and absurdity which must occur, in innumerable cases, if we attempt to interpret an Adverb of this Class (and vastly more so if we take one of Any Other Class) as an IMPERATIVE. If, for example, we say,—He is BY ; And if the Word—“ BY ”—be here assumed to be the Imperative—BE ;—then, the import of the Sentence is,—*He is be*—that is—*He EXISTS EXIST* : Or, if the elision here be filled up,—*He EXISTS*, I desire Him THAT HE SHALL *exist* !

Such a use of Imperatives, as this, would be a reproach to all rational expression. And besides this, moreover, I have already observed, in the Chapter of Minor Verbs, where the subject was incidentally noticed, that, if any terminating Word of a Sentence can, by any usage, or force, be interpreted as an Imperative, into *any meaning* ; this Word, in fact, is NOT AN ADVERB, NOR IS A ALL OF THE MECHANISM *of an Adverb* ; but it is, on the contrary, an IMPERATIVE CONJOINER.

Let us next attend to the OTHER consequence of Mr. Tooke's doctrine,—namely—that Some of these Prepositional Adverbs are NOUNS. Now it is true, indeed, that a Noun may be employed Adverbially: But I here suggest, and shall insist upon the distinction, that a NOUNAL Adverb is of a widely different Structure, and must be ranged under a very different Class, from Adverbs formed of Prepositions; And that, No NOUN can ever serve as a PREPOSITIONAL ADVERB. Thus, if we say—He *stood* FATHER; the NOUN—FATHER—becomes here an Adverb. But, in this case, the Adverb, instead of being the Sign of ONE Preposition and its Objective Noun, is the Sign of an *Alternate Series* consisting of TWO PREPOSITIONS and *their* TWO Objective NOUNS taken together: For—He *stood* FATHER,—means—He *stood* INNING the Office OF (*i. e.* OFFSPRINGING) a Father.

Agreeably with the Principle now laid down, if we say—He went THROUGH; And if the Prepositional Adverb—"THROUGH"—be taken, as Mr. Tooke has asserted, but *erroneously* asserted, to mean the NOUN—DOOR; the Grammatical consequence of this must be that, instead of saying that the person *passed along, or over*, a passage, or door, we should say—"He went IN (*i. e.* innning) the Office OF a Door, or Passage.

Such unassailable logical barriers as these; (and they would be found to exist to any extent to which we might chuse to examine them;) would, of themselves alone, without any of the foregoing

proofs of the Subject, be doubtless sufficient to deter us from the deplorable confusion of attempting to interpret So-called Prepositions as being either Imperatives or Nouns.

Of course, also, this last reasoning applies to So-called ADJECTIVES, as well as to SUBSTANTIVES: For, if a So-called ADJECTIVE be employed, or taken, Adverbially; it is so as being the representative of its SUBSTANTIVE. Thus, if we say—He *played* A BLACK;—this means—He played INNING *the character* OF a Black MAN.

It is now to be adverted to that, besides such Adverbs as are Signs of Assemblages of Words Each of which amounts to a PHRASE, less or more complex; there are Other So-called Adverbs, each of which is the representative of a WHOLE SPEECH. Of this Species are the Words—YES—and No:—The former of which imports *I assent*: and the latter, *I dissent*.

To this Class, also, I apprehend, belongs ALL INTERJECTIONS; Every One of which is virtually a Speech which affirms some feeling of the Speaker: Although I do not consider the matter to be of sufficient importance, in my present view of the Subject, to require my enlarging with regard to it.

As, also, it is not my intention to do more than offer these observations upon a Department of Language which I believe is susceptible of very material improvement; but, for which improvement, time and occasion are yet wanted; I shall not prosecute the consideration of this, or of any other Class of So-called Adverbs.

3.

It remains here therefore, only to submit a few general observations upon the Nature and Utility of Abbreviated Signs.

And, First, I have to advert, shortly, to a Species of Abbreviation which was not enumerated at the beginning of this article,—I mean that which is effected by **TERMS**. The mention of this Species is omitted in the place referred to, because, although it is not out of the Pale of Grammar, taken in the most enlarged sense ; it is certainly beyond the Pale of Grammar in the ordinary sense. I deem it nevertheless proper, at this stage of the enquiry, to notice it, as being in point of fact the Greatest of All the Abbreviations in Language.

In the First place, therefore, it is to be observed, Every Name of a **GENUS**, or *Species*, is no less than an **ABBREVIATED DEFINITION** of that Genus, or Species. And by such means (together with the aid of *Memory*) we are enabled to bring **ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF ANY DEFINED CLASS OF OBJECTS** into the Portable Compass of a **SINGLE WORD**.

Secondly. In like manner, the Name of **ANY BOOK**, or **TREATISE** ; the Name, for example, of the *Iliad*,—the *Æneid*,—or *Paradise Lost* ; is, to those who understand it, an Abbreviation for the **WHOLE BOOK OR SUBJECT MATTER** which it designates. Nor is this last case at all different from that of the Name of a Genus, or Species :

because, for example, if we *do not know, or conceive, Some Definition* of a MAN; the Name "MAN" must be, to us, *No Sign Whatever.*

Thus, Abbreviations of the GREATEST DEGREE abound in Language. While, also, there is a pretty copious extent of Abbreviation in the Various *Small Degrees* of it with which Language is provided,—namely—in the Department of So-called ADVERBS. The Only Kind of Abbreviated Signs, therefore, which appear not to exist in Speech, are Such as could occupy a *Middle Place* in point of Degree of Magnitude; that is, such as would take a *Place between* the Abbreviated Sign of a GENUS, OR *Species*, and the Abbreviated Sign of a BOOK; in which last is manifestly comprehended the Signs of Many Genera and Species, taking these Terms to import KINDS and *Sorts* of Things.

In the *present* state of things, we are not to suppose this Mode of Abbreviation to be requisite: But, looking at the Subject prospectively, we may fairly anticipate the time when *something of the sort* may be required. If the literature and affairs of the European family should multiply during the next Three Hundred years, as they have during the last Three Hundred; it may in such case be asked, In what way will men be able to get through the most indispensable details of daily occurrences; not to advert, here, to the recording of more serious matters; and far less including the mass of writings, of more or less value and demand, which would annually issue.

from the press? Already have our principal public journals attained the magnitude of a daily VOLUME. And, in that Volume, the perusal of a great proportion of the matter is unavoidably consigned over to the province of the *Microscope*: Dim eyes, and ordinary glasses, are equally left behind; and the possessor, in great part, banished from the intelligence of the day. What, then, is to become of readers, when the perusal of an Ordinary Catalogue shall become a task of serious consideration; and that of the thousandth part of the Books which they contain impossible; without here appealing to the actual fact that, the period in question has already arrived?

If this view of the matter should be deemed overdrawn; still, it will not be denied that, such is the manifest *tendency*, and indubitable *future result*, of a continued multiplication of human concerns, produced by the advancement of all the consequences of growing civilization. In the contemplation of such a state of society, therefore, it appears natural to anticipate that *Some* Contrivance will be found requisite, and will be fallen upon, to *abbreviate* Communications by Language. It seems to be a question, therefore, for those who may be inclined to speculate upon the Subject, What expedient is likely to be proposed, or adopted, in order to facilitate the promulgation of Ideas, when the existing Mechanism for this purpose shall become inadequate to supply the demand?

It is not my intention to meddle at all, here,

with whatever may be supposed to serve as an answer to this question : It is sufficient, for my purpose, merely to suggest it. One fact, alone, I may observe with regard to it: which is that, the Rapidity of Thought is incomparably greater than that of Any External Mechanism which we can invent to EXPRESS it. And, hence, the utility and desire of Abbreviation must be an unceasing consideration in proportion as mankind advance in their intercourse with each other and with the Universe around them. In certain departments of letters, we find, the Subject has already given rise to an Art of Short-hand Writing. Are we, therefore, to suppose that this Art will be carried into the ordinary departments of Literature; Or, What Other Expedient will be invented for the purpose ?

In fine. It has appeared that, I consider all such Abbreviations, as those treated of in the present article, as demanding the Denomination of BREVES ; as I conceive the name of ADVERBS to be a very illogical Title for these expressions, and any thing other than significant of the Signs in question.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE ULTIMATE PHILOSOPHY OF SIGNS, IN SO FAR AS CONCERNS THE NATURE OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE.

SECTION FIRST.

OF THE VIEWS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHERS WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF TERMS, BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; STATED HERE AS PREPARATORY TO THE PROPOSAL OF DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES.

IF the speculation which will be unfolded in the course of this chapter should prove ultimately tenable in any considerable extent; it will substantiate the fact that, the Philosophy of Signs; or, rather, the Opinions which have been entertained by the latest and most approved Writers on the Subject; exhibit a state of Logical Knowledge very far behind what might naturally be looked for in the present age. In such case, therefore, it could demand no apology for going into an investigation which, though it may be supposed to lie beyond the NARROWEST limits of Universal Grammar, must still, in a higher or more enlarged sense, be considered as constituting a part of that Science.

Any person, who is likely to take an interest in the following discussion, needs not be informed of the GENERAL state of the question concerning the Objects of our Thoughts when we employ GENERAL REASONING, or make use of GENERAL TERMS. There is hardly a question in Philosophy that has occupied more of the attention, or called forth more of the hostility, of the opposed parties with regard to it, than this one: and scarcely one which has remained more refractory in some of its features. Among other writers, who have at different periods displayed their powers of reasoning in this field, is to be reckoned, and this at a very recent date, the name of Professor Stewart: Whose speculations with respect to it I shall single out here for consideration; not with any intention to make them the subject of particular animadversion; but only inasmuch as they of course embody all the light, or opinions, on the Subject which have been entertained by that prevalent and now almost universal Sect, with whom he has sided, and with whom, to a certain extent, I have myself also concurred.—It hardly needs be said that, I allude herein to the Sect and Doctrine of the NOMINALISTS. With this view, therefore, I shall, in the first place, transcribe the sum of what has been advanced by Mr. Stewart, as forming the merits of the Subject.

Having, in his previous statement, compared the Word "SORT" to a Number of Gloves, or Hats, or Stockings, which a Shopman has put apart in a Drawer, Box, or Envelope;—He then

says,—“ By this means the attention of his Shop-
 “ boy, instead of being bewildered among an infinity
 “ tude of particulars, is confined to *parcels* or *assort-*
 “ *ments* of particulars ; of each of which parcels a
 “ distinct idea may be obtained from an examination
 “ tion of any one of the individuals contained in it.
 “ These individuals, therefore, are, in his apprehension,
 “ nothing more than so many units in a
 “ multitude, any one of which units is perfectly
 “ equivalent to any other ; while, at the same time,
 “ the parcels themselves, notwithstanding the
 “ multitude of units of which they are made up,
 “ distract his attention, and burden his memory
 “ as little as if they were individual articles. The
 “ truth is, that they become to his mind *individual*
 “ *objects of thought*, like a *box* of counters, or a
 “ *rouleau* of guineas, or any of the other material
 “ aggregates with which his senses are conversant ;
 “ or, to take an example still more apposite to our
 “ present purpose, like the phrases *one thousand*,
 “ or *one million*, when considered merely as simple
 “ *units* entering into the composition of a numerical sum.”

See “ Elements of the Philosophy of the
 “ Human Mind,” *Sec. Ed. Vol. 1. Chap. 2.*

And, presently after the statement now quoted, he concludes by putting the following question.

“ Upon the whole, it appears to me that the
 “ celebrated dispute concerning abstract general
 “ ideas, which so long divided the schools, is now
 “ reduced among correct thinkers, to this simple

“ question of fact, could the human mind, *without*
 “ *the use of Signs of one kind or another*, have car-
 “ ried on general reasonings, or formed general
 “ conclusions? Before arguing with any person
 “ on the Subject, I should wish for a categorical
 “ explanation on this preliminary point. Indeed,
 “ every other controversy connected with it turns
 “ on little more than the meaning of words.”

The Problem, intended for present investiga-
 tion, is one concerning which I was induced to
 offer some remarks in a loose Tract which was
 submitted to the Press about ten years since, On
 the *Objects of General Terms* and the *Axiomati-
 cal Laws of Vision*. And, therein, I took my stand on
 the side of the Nominalists in so far as regards
 the great question, Whether the Object—*i. e.* the
Ultimate Object—of Any General Reasoning, or
 General Conclusion, is a CONTINUOUS General
 Idea, in the sense of the CONCEPTUALISTS; Or,
 Only a NUMBER OR ASSEMBLAGE OF CLASSED
 INDIVIDUALS, as is maintained by the Sect first
 mentioned, and is recognised by the great bulk of
 Modern Philosophers. But my attention, at that
 time, being absorbed principally by the *Second*
 Subject in the Tract alluded to — namely — the
 Laws of Primary Vision;—I did not then go into
 the subject of General Reasoning, farther than to
 adduce certain evidences which had occurred to me,
 to prove *rigorously*, by means of an argument *ad*
absurdum, that the Objects of such reasoning are
 ONLY CLASSES OF INDIVIDUALS, and NOT CON-
 TINUOUS *General Conceptions*: Which amount of

proof, either direct or otherwise, the Nominalists, in all their controversies on this question, had never been able to hit upon, and, consequently, were *never able to silence* their adversaries, however absurd the views and unsolid the foundation of the latter in reality were. And, in adducing those Evidences, I gave into that other Tenet of the Nominalists—namely—that we cannot reason concerning Classes of Individuals without the medium of a COMMON NAME, OR SIGN. But the Paper in question was hardly out of my hands, when I was impressed with a sense of the fallacy of this last mentioned tenet. And, although I hold, uniformly, in the judgment that, we can reason concerning nothing beyond Classes of Individual Objects; I nevertheless differ from the opinion of the Nominalists, so very materially and extensively, with regard to the INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES by which General Reasoning is carried on; and, with respect to the OBJECTS—I mean the IMMEDIATE Objects—of our thoughts during these Processes;—that I hardly know of a greater difference between any two schemes which regard our Intellectual Constitution. Accordingly, therefore, I shall, in the present chapter, submit those views of the Subject to which, after a long period of deliberation, I have been brought, as being the ultimate reach of my conception with regard to it.

The substance of what will be thus proposed has been for some years reserved, with intent to serve as part of the Sequel of a work already alluded to. But, as that work will never be pro-

secuted ; I humbly conceive it to be most conducive to the advancement of the Subject to introduce the thing here, as being a matter quite appropriate in a Philosophical Treatise of Language.

In order to start upon common ground ; it appears expedient, in the first place, to define and settle — *WHAT is meant by a SIGN in Language ;* and What by *GENERAL REASONING ;*—in the estimation of Philosophers, and especially in that of the Nominalists. With regard to the last mentioned of these two things, the views of the Sect just mentioned are, fortunately, coincident with my own : Which leaves no difficulty upon this head. But, with respect to the former, the case is very different ; and this difference will form the Subject of an important discussion : in the course of which, I apprehend, a great degree of laxness and confusion in thinking will appear to have obtained ; and which will require a recast of any preceding investigation of the Data, if we would dispel those mists in which the Subject has been enveloped.

1. An act of *SO-CALLED General Reasoning*, then, is admitted, on both sides, as being an act in which we consider *Any Plurality of Individuals* as resembling each other in *Any One, or More Attributes ;* and with regard to which Attributes we apply *Any Conclusion* in what is called (though

very illogically called) "COMMON." Thus an act in which we apply the Same Conclusion, alike, to Two Individual Objects, is AS TRULY, though *not as extensively*, an act of General Reasoning, as if it were applied to an *Infinite Number* of Similar Individuals.

2. To proceed, now, to the *Second* Consideration mentioned—namely—the consideration of What is meant by Grammarians, or Philosophers, when they talk of SIGNS, IN LANGUAGE. It appears not a little surprising that, so far as I know, there is no writer who has entered formally into the question : Although we are not, therefore, left at a loss to gather the meaning of writers in general, from the import of their context, in their various speculations on the Subject. Mr. Tooke, for example, (who is no mean authority on this question,) talks of Words as being the "REPRESENTATIVES" OF, IDEAS: While, at the same time, he talks, also, of IDEAS as being the REPRESENTATIVES OF OBJECTS. And subsequent writers, pretty generally, have taken up the same view of the Subject.

Nor is this all, or any thing like all, the Office which has been ascribed to Words, in the general opinion of writers. For it is assumed ; especially in the case of GENERAL TERMS, and according to the almost universal Sect of the Nominalists ; that a Word is NOT A REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SAME SENSE AS AN AMBASSADOR *is the* REPRESENTATIVE *of* a KING ; or an Assembly, the

Representative of a Nation: In either of which cases, we can THINK of the THING REPRESENTED, at the same time that we think of the REPRESENTATIVE. Quite contrary to this; a General Word is considered, by the Sect last mentioned, as being a Representative that RENDERS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US, *during the time of our reasoning*, TO TAKE INTO OUR CONCEPTION AN IDEA OF THE THING REPRESENTED. In a word; a General Term, according to the doctrine in question, is NOT A REPRESENTATIVE AT ALL: because it is *no less than a SUBSTITUTE* for the Object to which the General Reasoning may be ultimately referred: It cannot be considered in the Office of an *Ambassador*, who personates a King: but must be recognised in that of a *Militia-man*, who is hired to *serve* IN THE STEAD of another person, *without reference*; and who, therefore, is a COMPLETE AGENT in the matter. When the Battle is over, indeed, the *Substitute* may be discharged, and the *Constituent* put in his stead: BUT *all that happens DURING THE FRAY, HAPPENS TO THE SUBSTITUTE*; and the *Constituent, who is not present, has nothing at all to do with it.*

Such, I conceive, must be admitted to be a fair statement of the Doctrine of the Nominalists of the Nineteenth Century, — a Doctrine which has so far prevailed over its Antagonist Theories, — those of REALISM *and of* CONCEPTUALISM, that the last mentioned of the two, which is the only one that has not been completely driven out from

the Pale of Philosophy, retains no more than a few hardy dissenters from the universal voice.

Nor is the Doctrine in question confined to the supposed nature of GENERAL Names. On the contrary, although the matter is not maintained in such *prominent* terms in the case of *Particular* Names, yet, it may be fully gathered, from the general tenor of what is usually advanced upon the Subject, that PARTICULAR Terms, *no less than Generals*, are supposed to be SUBSTITUTES FOR the Objects which they are used to denote. And, though it is admitted by the Nominalists that, we can reason upon *Single Individuals* without the Medium of a Name or Representative: And hence, it might naturally be inferred that, when we *do* employ a Name in reasoning concerning a Single Individual—we may employ it, *at most*, as being that Sort of Representative which does *not keep the Thing represented out of our conception*. But it is certain that a different view of the Subject generally prevails; although it exists in a confused or unsettled manner. And, especially, in the case of the School of TOOKE,—which is no inconsiderable School of Language, — it will appear that, if Words be not taken as excluding a conception of the OBJECTS which they denote; they are at least affirmed to exclude that of the IDEAS of those Objects, IF THESE IDEAS BE TAKEN IN THAT SENSE IN WHICH, (IT MAY BE DEMONSTRATED,) THEY OUGHT TO BE APPREHENDED. Mr. Tooke, indeed, sometimes TALKS of IDEAS;—and of Words as being SIGNS of these

Ideas : But, in unequivocally suggesting to us to attend to the DIFFERENT SORTS OF WORDS ; and to LEAVE THE CAUSES of Language—(namely—IDEAS)—to shift for themselves ; it is clear, he considered WORDS and the OBJECTS which they denote to be the SOLE CONSIDERATIONS in this Field of research. But in this case it is proper to let Mr. Tooke speak for himself.

In the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, *Volume First*, page 23, Mr. Tooke's fellow Dialogist, under the designation of the letter B, replies to him as follows.

“ You forget, that it is some time since Words have been no longer allowed to be the Signs of Things. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Aristotle called them) the Signs of *Ideas* : at the same time denying the other assertion of Aristotle, that *Ideas* are the likenesses of Things. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.”

To which, Mr. Tooke, under the letter H, rejoins—“ This has not much mended the matter. No doubt this alteration approached so far nearer the truth ; but the nature of Language has not been much better understood by it. For Grammarians have since pursued just the same method with *mind*—as had before been done with things.”—And presently, again, he says,—“ So that the very same game has been played over again with *Ideas*, which was before played with Things,” &c. &c.

Now, as it is immediately after this last assertion that Mr. Tooke has eulogised the judicious conduct of those Grammarians who have “contended themselves with remarking the differences of Words, and have left the Causes of Language to shift for themselves;” No reader can remain in any doubt of his having, by these Causes, meant our IDEAS of Things. And however wonderful it may appear, in this case, that Mr. Tooke should have talked of Words as being Signs of our IDEAS; and have asserted that, a consideration of the *Original of our IDEAS* is the proper starting post of the Grammarian; it will be impossible for any person to pretend that he has not excluded Ideas, CONSIDERED AS BEING RESEMBLANCES OF OBJECTS, from his Theory of Language.

The Doctrine of Mr. Tooke, *with regard to the CAUSES of Language*, goes even farther than this: And we are especially called upon to notice the *extent* to which it in reality amounts. For, in the *First* place, (we have seen,) he admits the *Substitution* of “IDEAS,” for “THINGS,” as an acceptable improvement. And, *Secondly*, he sides with the Modern School of Pneumatology founded by Dr. Reid; in opposition to the Views of Philosophers from Aristotle down to Locke, inclusive, who all believed that our Ideas of Extended Objects were EXTENDED RESEMBLANCES of *those Objects*. Thus it is manifest, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that Mr. Tooke has, upon his own shewing, excluded NOT ONLY EXTERNAL THINGS THEMSELVES; — *but, also*, IDEAS CON-

SIDERED AS RESEMBLANCES OF THESE THINGS; from having any part in the Foundation of Language: And, in place of *Either of these Two* SORTS OF CAUSES; it is conclusive, he has chosen A CONSIDERATION OF MERELY THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF WORDS for his Foundation, as I have attributed to him in the early part of this work.

How, or IN WHAT MANNER, we can contemplate the *different Sorts of Words*, without contemplating the *different Sorts of Ideas* which they call up in the Mind, is what I myself can by no means conceive. But it is sufficient for me to appeal to the quotations herein given, to prove that this in reality is the Scheme suggested by Mr. Tooke. As however it is certain that the scheme of Mr. Tooke, when taken in a due consistency, amounts to the Assumption that Words are Signs of our IDEAS OF THINGS; it becomes of very momentous importance, for the sake not only of the Science of LANGUAGE; but also for that of Another Subject, of far more momentous account; that we should EXAMINE INTO THE PRETENSIONS of that Pneumatological Doctrine, into an agreement with which Mr. Tooke has fallen, in his belief that our Ideas of External Objects are NOT RESEMBLANCES of those Objects.

Having devoted a considerable portion of my life, (and this perhaps with an intensity rarely afforded by any other individual,) to the study of that part of our Mental Constitution to which the Problem in question immediately belongs; and having during a series of years been fixed in a

conviction that the Views in question are, at one and the same time, most demonstrably false and most deplorably mischievous in their tendency ; (although certainly not intended to be so by the School which, unfortunately for the advancement of our knowledge, has founded and promulgated them ;) I cannot do less than give welcome to the occasion which calls upon me, here, to state what has appeared to me to be the real truth of the Subject : to which, therefore, I shall now proceed, as being indispensably preparatory to the prosecution of the previous topic.

SECTION SECOND.

OF SO-CALLED EXTERNAL PERCEPTION; AND OF THE NATURE OF SO-CALLED EXTERNAL OBJECTS, CONSIDERED HERE AS FORMING A PART OF THE FOUNDATION OF LANGUAGE.

SUBSECTION I.

Of So-called External Perception.

THOSE who are in any degree conversant in the History of the Speculations which have been entertained, through successive ages, with regard to the Phenomena of Mind, are aware that there have subsisted very great difficulties with respect to the views which have been broached by Philosophers, concerning the Nature of those Thoughts; or Ideas, which we refer to External Things, as forming their Objects, or Causes. It is unnecessary, for any purpose at present in view, to enter into a particular account of the progress of those Schemes; farther than will form a statement comprehended within a very small compass and which may be confined, especially, to the consideration of our Ideas of Such Objects as fall under the affections of EXTENSION and MOTION. From entering into the Subject to this extent, I entertain a hope that we shall be led to form a certain conclusion that, there has existed great darkness among Grammarians with regard to the Nature of the OBJECTS OF LANGUAGE. And, I humbly con-

ceive this will form only ONE, (and this by no means the most important one,) of SEVERAL conclusions, of a very comprehensive and important nature, to which the present investigation must lead us. At the same time, I trust, the discussion will furnish a proof that, no person can ever be competent to treat Philosophically of Language, who has not previously made the Phenomena of Thought a Subject of his long and habitual study. And, collaterally with this, the result will also afford a remarkable example of a fact, which has been adverted to by different Philosophers—namely—that, there is often a Close Connexion between Two Departments of Science, which had been regarded as having hardly any relativeness at all to each other.

I proceed, at once, to the proposed investigation.

A THOUGHT OR IDEA of a SO-CALLED EXTERNAL Object, such, for example, as that of a *Man*,—a *Tree*,—or a *House*;—Or, such as a *Collision* between Two Men, or Two Billiard Balls;—has, in the opinion of all Philosophers, from Aristotle and his Predecessors down, inclusively, to that Host of Pneumatologists which immediately preceded the enterprise of Dr. Reid, been considered as being a PHANTASM (*of some sort*) of that Object in the thinking or perceiving MIND; and, as RESEMBLING the Object in the points of SUPERFICIAL EXTENSION and FIGURE. This

agreement, moreover, among Speculative men of every age and nation, has been duly adverted to, by the Founder of that Modern School which entertains a different view of the matter, as being a very remarkable occurrence in the case of a Subject so abstruse.

But, notwithstanding thus much of agreement between Philosophers in general, there has uniformly subsisted the greatest dissension, or darkness, with regard to the SUBSTANCE or MATERIAL (so to speak) of which those Phantasms, called Ideas, were supposed to consist. It was however, at least in some of the Schemes in question, believed that, these things are a *Sort of Films*: And they were, especially in the Scheme of Berkeley, supposed to flit into, and out of, the Mind, something in the manner in which Birds flit in and out of their nests, or Fish disport in water. It would be useless, here, to point out the absurdity, any more than to name the variety, of the conceits which have been thus entertained by different speculators on the Nature of Ideas. It is enough to say that, Modern Metaphysicians; and especially LOCKE, although he has been unjustly charged with the contrary; and the SCHOOL OF REID, although it has arrogated the matter to itself; have the merit of pointing to the sound,—and fortunately *now unanimous*,—conclusion that, IDEAS are NOT things made of ANY MATERIAL DISTINCT FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MIND that perceives; but are MERELY MODIFICATIONS, AFFECTIONS, or STATES, of the perceiving Mind itself, at the moment it perceives.

This conclusion is a matter now so completely settled, that no writer will ever brave the ridicule of proposing any scheme incompatible with it.

Pneumatologists having at length touched ground upon this solid conclusion ; the rationality of which is such, as only to leave it matter of astonishment that any other Scheme could ever have been seriously entertained, or broached, by men pretending to philosophical speculation ; it follows, as an identical proposition that, to *say we have a SENSATION* (which is only a *stronger sort of Idea*) of *Blue*, or of *Yellow*, in the Mind, is the *same* as to say that the MIND IS, *to a certain extent*, in a STATE of *Blue*, or of *Yellow* : And this, manifestly, is ~~to~~ to be taken in the same literal sense as that in which we should affirm that, a HOT IRON, *in so far as the heat extends*, is in a STATE OF HEAT. The only difference, in this comparison, is that, *Heat* is a State which, we know, *penetrates* whatever it affects ; while *Color* is, so far as we know, *only a superficial* affection. And it is of vital moment to note, here, that it is *ONLY in so far as Color is a SUPERFICIES* that we are enabled to make it the Subject of a most important scientific investigation.

In like manner ; To say we have a SENSATION OF VARIED COLOR, such as of *Blue*, and of *Yellow*, and of *Green*, together in our Mind ; is the same as to say that the Mind is, *so far*, in a STATE OF MIXED COLOR, as it always is whenever we perceive a Man, a Tree, or a House, not made up of One Same Shade of Color.

THUS FAR, *all is most satisfactory and most fortu-*

nate in the SCIENCE OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. And the results which arise, from legitimately following out this ground, are no less mighty, nor less comprehensive, in the Philosophy of MIND; than the celebrated Law of Gravitation is in the Philosophy of SO-CALLED MATTER. The Leading One of these results I shall merely name, in this place, on account of its vast moment: It is no less than the Conclusion that, there is NO SUBSTANCE AND NO ENERGY in the WHOLE UNIVERSE, *except the SUBSTANCE and the ENERGIES* of MIND: And it is only another enunciation of this fact to affirm that, The Whole Universe is made up of the INFINITE MIND, with the exception only of ALL FINITE MINDS, and of SPACE and TIME as forming the *Necessary Theatre of ALL Mind*.

This conclusion; to the evolution of which, I cannot deny to myself the avowal that, I cling with a satisfaction ineffably beyond what can arise from reflecting upon any other labor of my life; is one that can hardly yet be said to have met the light, so great has been the inefficacy with which it has yet been received, it being supposed, at best, too early for the present state of General Knowledge. But, of its recognition in due time, I cannot entertain the smallest doubt: And it only demands, in this place, that I should state the Principal Cause which has rendered the public mind unfitted to attend to any advance in this direction,—a Cause which, at the same time that it has deplorably darkened the Doctrines of MIND, has equally

darkened the opinions of Philosophers with regard to the *Nature of our IDEAS OF OBJECTS*; and has thereby confused men's notions with respect to the Nature of LANGUAGE. The matter in question may be gathered from the following succinct statement.

It follows, from the opinions of all Philosophers with exception of the School of Reid, that, when we entertain in our Mind the VISUAL SENSATION, or IDEA, *of a Man*, (for example,) we have then therein a PICTURE made up of SENSATIONS OF THE COLORS which compose the Dress and Features of this Man: And, along with this, as a matter of self-evident necessity, these SENSATIONS OF COLORS must have OUTLINES *corresponding to the outlines of the Dress and Features of the EXTERNAL MAN*, insomuch that the WHOLE GROUP OF SENSATIONS of Colors must be *limited by a GENERAL Outline*, which we call the SHAPE OF THE MAN. This is a matter so manifest, and so necessary, that No Philosopher, except those of the School of Reid, ever doubted the fact; although, (as before remarked,) Philosophers have differed much with regard to the MATERIAL of which the Phantasm in question is composed: In other words; No Philosopher, *before Reid*, ever doubted that, as the SENSATIONS OF COLORS, now in question, are IN THE MIND, the OUTLINES OR SHAPES of these Sensations of Colors must be in the MIND ALSO.

But, to the intended discomfiture of this last Conclusion; or, at least, to the creation of a most

unfortunate opposition to its truth ; the School of Reid has, during the greater part of a century, promulgated a doctrine of its founder, — that, **COLORS, i. e. our SENSATIONS OF BLUE, YELLOW, &c.**—(*those beautiful expanded Visions which delight our Sense when we look out upon the gay livery of nature*)—are things NOT IN REALITY SPREAD OUT ; although all mankind, Philosophers as well as the Vulgar, (Berkeleyans and Reideians accepted,) universally build on the conviction that they ARE spread out. And, hence, if this astounding assumption were true, we should be altogether at sea again with regard to the great momentous conclusion of the Spirituality of All Substance.

I shall proceed, therefore, in the first place, (as a matter which I think cannot fail to carry a very weighty impression,) to furnish a passing HISTORY of that Doctrine ; without vouchers, indeed, (which I have supplied in another place,) but the fairness of which statement, I venture to believe, will never be disputed.

Dr. Reid having, in the early part of his philosophical career, been a disciple of the Scheme of Berkeley ; of course adopted the very rare and astonishing creed that, our *Sensations of Colors* are Things NOT SPREAD OUT. But, in so doing, Dr. Reid adopted it as a matter involved in a *far more comprehensive assumption of Berkeley*—namely—that *External Men, and Trees, and Houses ; and, in short, all the EXTERNAL “ FURNITURE OF EARTH AND HEAVEN ; ”* are things NOT SPREAD OUT.

In other words; Berkeley conceived ALL SUPPOSED REAL EXTENSION OF OBJECTS,—AS WELL AS ALL SUPPOSED REALITY OF SPACE,—to be a MERE FIGMENT, OR ILLUSION OF THE PHANTASY. That there should be Minds constructed like that of Berkeley; and these, too, Minds of no mean cast in General Intellectual attainments; is a very wonderful consideration. But, although the number of such Minds is certainly very small; it is certain that *there are some such*. All therefore that remains to be done, in this case, is to give notice, as I now do, that I direct my whole reasonings, with regard to the Nature of LANGUAGE, to *such persons only as admit the existence of Things REALLY EXTENDED*; and who are convinced, for example, that an OX is larger than a FLY, that an INCH is *less* than a MILE, and an EGG *more small* than the BIRD WHICH CONTAINS IT. Those who cannot so much as CONCEIVE THE NOTION OF *Real Magnitude*, (and such appears to be the case of Bishop Berkeley; because, to *conceive* the thing is in one way to admit its reality,) may, I humbly conceive, be fairly judged as being sufferers under some unaccountable disorder of the Intellect, *how great soever they may be in other intellectual endowments*: And I conceive this upon the ground of the GREAT PAUCITY of Minds, in the Whole Human Species, that are formed upon this Structure: For, although there are Many Philosophers who, with Leibnitz at their head, deny the Reality of SPACE VOID OF BODY; it is an *extremely rare occurrence* to find an Intellect so formed, as to deny the Real Extension

of BODY. But, all that I insist upon is that, I shall be judged *by all persons who believe in the Extension of things in the ordinary apprehension of mankind*—that apprehension of the Subject which was avowed by Des Cartes, by Locke, by Leibnitz and by Newton, in concurrence with the great host of other Philosophers, in every age.

The particular case of Dr. Reid comes now to be considered: and it was this:—FROM BEING A BERKELEIAN, he *changed* to a conviction of the existence of extended things, in the same sense as was apprehended by LOCKE and by NEWTON, as well as by the great bulk of mankind. But, with an inconsistency the most glaring, Dr. Reid *refused to assign REAL Extension to our SENSATION OF COLORS*; (the Real Extension or Spreading Out of which was never doubted by LOCKE;) although, in REBELLION AGAINST THE OTHER PART of the Creed of Berkeley, he had changed to the conviction that EXTERNAL OBJECTS *are REALLY extended*. In this case, therefore, while Berkeley was AT LEAST CONSISTENT WITH HIMSELF, it is manifest Dr. Reid was MOST PALPABLY INCONSISTENT.

The question which in the first place naturally arises here, is, WHAT WAS THE CAUSE which led to so extraordinary a change in the Philosophical Views of Dr. Reid? And the answer is equally remarkable and important. Alarmed at a sceptical consequence, deduced by Hume from the “IDEAS” of Berkeley; but which consequence, it

is certain, has no reality whatever, because it is now admitted on all sides that the "IDEAS" of Berkeley, which served as its foundation, were altogether unfounded and visionary; Dr. Reid (who could not then be very old) fled over to the *Ordinary Extended World of mankind in general—i. e. to a World made up of SOLID DEAD EXTENDED MATTER*: And this (he frankly avows) he did NOT UPON ANY EVIDENCE WHATEVER, of its existence; but only because the belief in it is *an early Instinct of our Nature, which is therefore paramount in authority to any evidence of reason, and "defies all the artillery of the Logician."* In order, therefore, to give Color to this Scheme, he, by one of the most wonderful procedures that was ever witnessed in philosophy, adopted no less an expedient than an assumption to SEPARATE, FAR APART, our SENSATIONS OF COLOR from the FIGURES OR OUTLINES by which they seem to us to be surrounded: And, while he admitted that these Colors are THOUGHTS or STATES OF THE MIND,—(affections which, however, he by the same assumption DEPRIVED OF REAL EXTENSION,)—he boldly affirmed that the Outlines or Figures, which mankind believe to be the *Outlines of these Colors*, are the IDENTICAL FIGURES OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS,—*i. e. Figures existing AT VARIOUS DISTANCES WITHOUT the Mind, such as those of Real Men, Real Trees, and Real Houses.*

If now it be asked; In what way was this discovery made out, or substantiated? The answer of the Reideian is ABSOLUTE.—The fact is. UNAC-

COUNTABLE, — INSCRUTABLE. — It is asserted by Professor Stewart, in the several editions of his *Elements*; and this with a confident security which manifestly never anticipated that evidence would be found to confute the position; “that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be upon the supposition, that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever.” — “That all the steps of the process are equally incomprehensible; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between the sensation and the perception, as well as that between the impression and the sensation, may be both arbitrary.”¹

See Professor Stewart’s “*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.*” 4th Ed. Vol. 1. page 92.

¹ And yet, we have Mr. Stewart continuing to insist, against my claim to priority in the Subject, and virtually against the verdict of Public Criticism, that he *knew for Forty Years* — (I think he says before he ever heard of my name) — that, WITHOUT A VARIETY in our Sensations of Color it must be impossible to perceive Figure or Outline!

Could it be expected that I should acquiesce in having the fruit of labor, which has occupied half a lifetime, blighted by such a proceeding as this? And blighted it certainly must be, if readers in general were to be left under an impression that, an

When such a Pneumatology as THIS has occupied the arena of public attention for the greater part of a century ; and, when no other prospect has, in all that time, started up, which could relieve the revolt, or the despair, which such a Scheme could not fail to induce ; it may be asked ; Can there be any wonder that Metaphysical Speculations, at least in this department, has been in a great degree scouted from the province of literature ?

It is to be acknowledged, at the same time, that, to the laxness and want of circumspection of preceding Metaphysicians is, in great part, to be attributed that ever such a Philosophy, as that of the School of Reid, could have been projected at all ; or, could have in any degree *amused*, for it never has *satisfied* the public expectation. To instance only two of the most acute of those lax writers ; Bishop Berkeley, who never thought right with regard to the Nature of our “ IDEAS ” of Objects ; and LOCKE, who never thought wrong ; are, each alike, so faulty, both in Phraseology and in Speculation ; that any writer of the present day, who should be equally

Author of Professor Stewart’s celebrity knew the FACT for about Half a Century, *and, yet*, SAW NO IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE arising out of this fact. What reader is there, who, in such case, would not fairly suppose that I was putting forth, as my own, that which I must have known was the property of Mr. Stewart ; and that, an Ungraduated Writer, on a Subject so little understood, was employed upon some nugatory matter, worthy of nothing but of a mind wanting any occupation ?

culpable in a Treatise on any Art, or Science, would not find himself indulged with a moment's consideration. In addition to this, moreover, it is to be added, *as a very wonderful fact in the History of Pneumatology, that, owing to some fatuity or oversight, to which perhaps the Nature of the Subject itself unaccountably subjects mankind in general, the Philosophers of Mind have NEVER BEEN ABLE TO SEIZE UPON ANY MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING THE FACT that, the FIGURES we perceive as being attendant on our SENSATIONS OF COLORS ARE REALLY IN THE MIND, i. e. ARE THE TRUE AND REAL OUTLINES OF THESE SENSATIONS.*

With regard to any such proof, as that now alluded to, it rather appears that *none such was ever supposed to be wanted.* On the contrary, both Berkeley and Locke are as far from offering any hint on the Subject, as if the matter in question were a self-evident truth which was in no danger of ever being called in question. And it is certain that All Philosophers, both Ancients and Moderns, down to DR. REID, took the matter for granted, and never dreamt of separating our Sensations of Colors from the Visual Outlines we perceive when they are present.

Now it must be acknowledged that, the MERE SEEMING of the Connexion, between Sensations of Colors and Visual Outline, MIGHT POSSIBLY BE NO PROOF OF THE REALITY of the Connexion; although all preceding Philosophers, as well as all Ordinary Men, have confided, without

doubting, in the matter. It is certain, on the contrary, FOR ALL THAT CAN BE DISCOVERED BY THE ORGAN OF SIGHT, that we MIGHT labor under a deception with regard to this supposed Fact ; And, hence, whenever it suited the views of any Philosopher to DENY the matter ; and to affirm such a Scheme as that of Dr. Reid in its stead ; *his opponents* must acknowledge themselves *called upon*, to FURNISH PROOFS of the assumption ; and, if they cannot do this, his revolt from their Creed must spread dissatisfaction, and dismay, around him ; although the Scheme which he may propose, as a substitute, should be never so disgusting, or intolerable.

Such was the state of philosophical opinion, with regard to the celebrated but heretofore disastrous Subject of what is called EXTERNAL PERCEPTION, when the cast of my own mind prompted me to engage in the study of Intellectual Phenomena : In doing which, it must be confessed, I possessed only one advantage, to make up for the want of almost every other, namely—that, I had attained a maturity of understanding, and had given into the habit of contemplating the Nature of my own Thoughts, before I was initiated into a knowledge of the Various Schemes or Theories which have been broached by Philosophers with regard to this part of our Constitution. In addition to this, it happened that, the first Writer with whom it was my chance to meddle, upon this Subject, was LOCKE. And,

although the *phraseology* of the English Philosopher is far more faulty than I had then knowledge enough to judge of; his manifest apprehension of the Subject was precisely in unison with my own; insomuch that, I never, for a moment, supposed him to consider IDEAS in any of those fallacious lights which have been attributed to him. When Locke calls our IDEAS the MOTIONS, the ACTIONS, or the OPERATIONS, of the Mind; he intends to sweep away all the Various Schemes of Scholastic "Ideas" as fairly, as has ever been done by any of those who have come after him. Upon this, therefore, there is a most fortunate agreement between contending parties, in a point which, when duly put in proof, forms no less than the certain Foundation of a Most sublime Natural Theology. As for Ideas in the sense of Berkeley; as well as for Ideas in the sense of Aristotle; as I was not initiated into a knowledge of any such Schemes until my own judgment had long been used to the Subject, nothing short of the express proof of the matter could ever have enabled me to believe that, any such conceptions were ever seriously entertained by such men: Although I must suppose, from the fate of others, that an early initiation into such Schemes might have led me to embrace them. The lesson we may derive from a knowledge of the effects of early initiation, and inculcation, is beyond all price if we duly attend to it.

It remains now only that, I should furnish a statement of the results to which I have been led,

after many years of intense application to this part of our Mental Constitution, — results which are submitted appropriately, here, inasmuch as they bear immediately upon the Question already proposed in the SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE with regard to the NATURE OF *our* IDEAS OF OBJECTS.

OUR ACTS OF THE PERCEPTION OF OBJECTS through the medium of our Organs of SIGHT; (which are most fallaciously understood as being acts of EXTERNAL Perception;) are comprehended under FOUR GENERAL LAWS: Which General Facts possess this remarkable property that, they are NOT ONLY PHYSICAL LAWS, but are, at the same time, BOTH PHYSICAL LAWS AND NECESSARY PRINCIPLES, — a truth which exhibits a Conjunction of Two Natures that has never been supposed, by Philosophers, to be possible; and which, therefore, proves that, men of Science have been sounding with too short a line, or have pronounced prematurely, when they have assumed that there are NO REALLY EXISTING PHYSICAL DATA *that are fit to be Subjects of MATHEMATICAL REASONING*. The Principles, now in question, are as follows, viz.:

FIRST LAW.

NO UNVARIED Sensation of Color can ever be accompanied by a perception of *any visible figure, any line, or any point*.

SECOND LAW.

When any Two Different *unsoftened* Sensations of Colors are felt at the same time; they *must meet*, and their MEETING is that *Local Relation of Contiguity and Contrast* which we know by the name of a VISIBLE LINE.

THIRD LAW.

When any Two Different *unsoftened* Sensations of Colors are felt at the same time, and are so disposed that one of them *surrounds or embraces* the other; their *common line of meeting* must return into itself, and so enclose a space; by doing which, it must form what is called a SUPERFICIAL FIGURE, such as a *circle, a square, a triangle, or any more irregular shape.*

FOURTH LAW.

When any Two Different Sensations of Colors are felt at the same time, but are so *softened at their nearest edges* as to make them *blend into each other*, and thus leave *no sensible contrast* where they meet; in this case, the Sensations in question can never be accompanied by a perception of any *figure, or any line*, not even if their *remote parts* should be of the most opposite colors, or black and white.

It is manifest that, no Commentary upon these Laws can find room in the present work. But those who chuse may find the Subject laid out and

illustrated, with all its connected considerations, in the "First Lines of the Human Mind."

From the first aspect of these Four Propositions, it will appear very surprising that, Principles so *self-evident*, and so *simple, as well as necessary*; (Principles, too, so completely at the Foundation of our Mental Constitution, and pregnant with the most important consequences of any that can be expressed;) should never have struck the observation of Philosophers. But certain it is, from the whole History of the Subject, that there exists, in the Phenomena themselves, some subtle cause of oversight, not easy to account for. As an evidence of this; I freely confess, although I was very early struck by the **GENERIC Principle** of the Subject, it was only by progressive steps that I was enabled to evolve the **Whole Four Laws**, as above stated: Though, in looking at them as they now stand, I can by no means satisfy myself how it was possible I could have been more blind to their **SEVERAL MODES** in the first hour, than I am at this moment. The fact, however, enables me to feel the less surprised that the Nature of the Phenomena should so long have escaped the observation of all Writers in this direction. While, also, it ought to put us in mind that, we must yield **ATTENTION**, before we can be competent to such Matters. But I shall make a break at this point of the Subject, in order to give due effect to the Statement of another and very different topic, which grows immediately out of it.

SUBSECTION II.

- *Of the Theorem which terminates in the Conclusion that, the Substance of the External Universe is Spiritual.*

I HAVE now to touch upon the most momentous, by far, of all the consequences which result from the truth of the Laws of Primary Vision: Which consequence I cannot deny to myself the satisfaction of stating here, although it is certainly a consideration very foreign to the Nature of Language. The thing, to which I allude, is the Proof that the **EXTERNAL PHYSICAL INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE** of our Sensations of Colors (and, of course, of **ALL OUR SENSATIONS FROM WITHOUT**.) is a Substance (and the Energies of a Substance) that is **NOT MATTER, BUT MIND.**

The Steps of this Proof are extremely few: And they are irresistible when *competently apprehended*.—Our Sensations of Colors being admitted, on all hands, to be nothing but **STATES of the PERCIPIENT MIND**: And these Sensations being rigorously demonstrated, by the Laws of Vision, to be **SUPERFICIALLY EXTENDED AND FIGURED**: It becomes no less than an **IDENTICAL PROPOSITION** to affirm that a Mind has **SENSATION OF COLOR** and to affirm that this Mind is **EXTENDED.**

This Desideratum being once recognised; it becomes a legitimate philosophical inference, accord-

ing to the **NEWTONIAN RULE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSES** ; (although this is not the place to illustrate a matter of such moment, and of a nature so foreign to the Subject of the present work ;) that, **ALL EXTENDED SUBSTANCE IS MIND.**

In the brief and passing record of this Subject, which I thus stamp upon the face of my present labor, I must not omit the act of accompanying it with the affirmation of my perfect conviction that, a more legitimate and true conclusion exists not in the Whole Scope of Philosophy, nor one which depends for its truth upon steps more rigidly demonstrative, than that now in question. And, having pledged the most deliberate cast of my understanding to this avowal, I hardly need add that, I repose upon the Subject as forming the basis of a Most Sublime Natural Theology.

That mankind, in the present age, will seize with avidity upon this Foundation of Natural Religion, is a consequence upon which I by no means calculate. The present state of Philosophical Opinion is wholly inapt for such a result : Such Opinion having been altogether unhinged by the unfortunately fallacious premises from which Bishop Berkeley attempted to draw a Similar Conclusion ; besides the Public Mind's having been previously rendered sufficiently indisposed to listen to the thing, by the long-cherished and natural belief in the existence of **DEAD MATTER.**

The enterprise and failure of Berkeley, indeed, has had a similar unhappy effect on Philosophi-

cal Opinion, to that which follows in political matters when an unsuccessful attempt has been made to shake off a weight of unlawful power : The consequence, in each case alike, is that, the dominion complained of is only more deeply riveted, in the *latter* case upon the NECKS, and in the *former* upon the UNDERSTANDINGS, of the Nation which has rebelled against it.

The Strict Philosophical Truth of the Subject, nevertheless, is that,—CHANGE *only the* PREMISES of Berkeley—that is DISCARD or Give to the Winds HIS VISIONARY “ IDEAS ” *composed of Some Material which made them of a DIFFERENT SUBSTANCE* from that of the Mind in which they were assumed to flit ;—And, instead of that Chimerical Scheme, Substitute SENSATIONS OF COLORS *considered as being nothing but STATES of the Perceptient MIND ITSELF* ;— And, then, I would confidently adopt that very language, against the usually Accredited Assumption of a DEAD MATERIAL EXTERNAL WORLD, which Professor Stewart has quoted as being a reproach to the Philosophical Genius of Berkeley—namely—that, ‘ the existence of Matter is *impossible*, and that ‘ the very supposition of it is absurd.’—‘ The existence of Bodies out of SOME Mind perceiving ‘ them is not only impossible, and a contradiction ‘ in terms ;—but were it possible, and even real, it ‘ were impossible we should ever know it.’ The words here last quoted with single commas, are given by Mr. Stewart from. Berkeley : And, although Berkeley was accidentally thus placed in

a situation in which he was, unwittingly, proving a *truth* by means of *false witnesses* ; I will hazard, to those who shall come after us, any claim I may have to sound rationality, upon the affirmation that a more legitimate or philosophical assertion, in all its expressions, than is comprised in the passage in question, is not to be found in our books on Speculative Knowledge. I have not the least objection to adopt them as my own. I acknowledge, indeed, that, SO LONG AS NO OTHER PREMISES were resorted to than those of BERKELEY, it was a sound proceeding of Professor Stewart to inculcate the doctrine that it was equally unphilosophical to reason either for or against the question. But, the DATA BEING CHANGED ; it is for those, who are competent, to examine and judge whether, or not, the case has become one of a very different complexion.

Along with this, it is consolatory to observe that, the belief in MATTER has not been entertained without many and very illustrious exceptions. The bare mention of the Theological Creed of the Ancient Hindoos ought to serve here as a talisman, to break up the tardiness, and put in action the energies, of the European Philosopher, and make him shake off the reproach of a belief in MATTER, in an age so otherwise enlightened as the present.

One thing alone is wanted, in order to make men draw and cling, at once, to the Conclusion here set forth : It is merely that the thing were in any way convertible to men's *immediate and palpable*

interests. In proof of this ; it has been observed, with every aspect of probability that, were not the Great Truths of Astronomy—(Truths How SMALL *in comparison with THAT now in question !—*) confirmed by the *practical results and utility* of these, in the application of them to Some Such Art as that of Navigation ; they would be as much a DEAD LETTER in the Code of our Knowledge, as the most neglected, or visionary, Scheme of Pneumatology. May this consideration excite due reflection, in those who may have influence to give determination to popular opinion !

Amongst the moderns ; NOT BISHOP BERKELEY ALONE ; but he and Other Illustrious Churchmen, (besides Philosophers of different Periods,) have cast in the same direction ; and have failed of carrying conviction to the FEW, from the want only of DEMONSTRATED DATA, whereon to ground their Conclusion. What, then, ought now to hinder Churchmen from examining, with an earnestness commensurate with the Subject, Whether the requisite Data are not supplied ? And, IF THE RESULT BE PROVED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE ; What reason can any one assign, why the ARK of a SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE should not be reared upon the shoulders of those whose appropriate Office it is to bear it : Whose effect, wheresoever it moved, must be to explode that Creed which has tended, in our sight, to spread crime and misery over the face of the earth. The recognition of this Ark, indeed, could not direct the Mariner, in his way through the trackless ocean ; or enable him to bring,

from the farthest verge of the globe, the gems, the spices, and the odors, which administer to the luxury of man. But it could arrest the progress of the most dreadful incentive that exists to human wrong: And even this vast utility would be a consideration *only secondary*—*how ineffably secondary*—to that of bringing Man to a recognition of his Creator.

To the Churchman, one should think, the matter presents the most welcome aspect that could be desired. How simply and beautifully is the assertion of SCRIPTURE—(namely—that, GOD CREATED THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH—) cleared of that most revolting difficulty, of both Ancient and Modern Philosophers, the *Creation of Matter* OUT OF NOTHING,—a difficulty which Lord Bacon himself, a Christian of the largest *Calibre* of Intellect and one of the greatest of Philosophers, has pretty plainly alluded to.—If the Host of Heaven, (including the Earth,) be nothing but a PLEXUS or CONGERIES OF ENERGIES of the Creator; How rigorously true, then, is it that, God created these Things out of Nothing: For the EXERTION OF AN ENERGY, (like that of a THOUGHT,) EXISTS NOT EXCEPT SO LONG AS THE PROPRIETOR OF IT EXERTS it. It is, to be sure, a *figurative* expression in Scripture, when it says —“By the word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and all the Host of them by the breath of his mouth:”—But it is a *figure most beautifully analogous*, when viewed in agreement with the Solution upon which I here insist.

The Nature of the Subject must not here be misunderstood, so as to involve a supposition that any class of Philosophers have been remiss, or that the Scheme proposed by Bishop Berkeley was neglected and yet tenable. The contrary of this is certain. Had the Data of Berkeley been solid ; it would have been natural that the Ministers of every Religion would have embraced his conclusion with an adequate interest, unless it were such a Religion as would deter a man from inculcating the truths of the Newtonian System. There does not, indeed, appear to be a single consideration which ought to prevent Christians from embracing and wielding the conclusion in question.

As I may not have any later channel, than the present work, for committing my creed of this Subject to record ; I trust the Mere Grammarian will not murmur that I have appropriated a few pages of it, to a purpose which has occupied so much of my reflection. And I would only presume to trespass farther in the statement of the following fact :—During a Century and a half, the *Natural Philosopher* has not only been advancing towards the Conclusion with gradual steps *by the road of experiment upon body* ; but he has, some years previously to my having got to the SAME POINT *by the very different road of Pneumatology*, actually arrived at it, and proclaimed to the world, with a voice uncontradicted in his own Department, that BODY *is neither SOLID nor INERT* ; which, in other words, means that BODY IS NOT MATTER ! “ BODY or MATTER ” (says the Natural

Philosopher) “ is to us a MERE PHENOMENON !” And, in saying this, he speaks the truth.

What, then, stands between Philosophers and a most fortunate re-union on this Subject? Is it any reason more worthy of the attention of men, in the present age, than the innocent prejudice of the ploughman, when he has struck his foot against a stone, that he has struck it against a DEAD MASS?

In identifying myself with the foregoing avowals, with the intent that, if the One shall live, the Other shall live along with it; I only desire that the Nature and Scope of the work in which I now record them may be fairly adjudged. And if it be found that my views of Grammar betray a general disposition to entertain loose and visionary speculations; I cannot complain if suspicion of the like should fall upon my Pneumatological Conclusions: But if a different tendency, in any considerable degree, mark the former; I hope it may excite curiosity to examine into the latter. Professor Stewart, in one part of his writings, has pointed to Berkeley's having engaged in his Tract *On the Virtues of Tar Water*, as furnishing an argument against the profundity of his Philosophical Judgment. And it is not to be denied that, such an objection, when well founded, (as it is in so much of the Tract in question as momentarily advocates the Subject of its Title,) is a matter to which considerable weight must be ascribed when it is brought in as an *evidence to General Philosophical*

character, in a case wherein the jury are not competent to decide upon the *evidence to fact* ; which is often lamentably the case, with general readers, in very abstruse matters of Philosophy. For this reason, I would have my Grammatical Views scrutinised, with a proportionate severity, by those who would couple them with my other Conclusions. And, with this intention, I now put the reader in possession of the fact that, it was the desire of promulgating the Principal One of these Conclusions that proved the chief incentive to my going into the labor of analysing the Structure of Language. As this labor advanced, indeed, I had other and growing motives to persevere in it. And let it not be imagined that I dissemble the certain effect of self-consideration, in some one or other of its infinite modifications, in the origin of the undertaking : for this I take to be the true root of every course of human action. But the importance which I attach to the Other Subject may in some degree be measured, by the fact of my having encountered such an undertaking, as my Speculations on Grammar, principally with the hope of drawing general attention to the Problem of the External World, by drawing it first to my Views of the Nature of Language.

In a word : My fixed belief is that the first dawn of a Sound Philosophy in this department ; and of a Foundation for a Natural Theology worthy of exciting Europe ; will be when the atmosphere of a well-attended lecture-room shall vibrate with

a Pneumatological Exposition ; the Principal feature of which will be the statement of a Theorem whose chain—(a chain most wonderfully short—) shall connect our SENSATIONS OF COLORS *with the CONCLUSION OF THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE EXTERNAL UNIVERSE.*¹

If it is true, as it assuredly is, that a Lecture upon the Science of ASTRONOMY, *or* ANATOMY, is a HYMN TO THE CREATOR; then is it, in an immeasurably greater extent, true also that, an enunciation of the Theorem in question, together, with its connected considerations, would be a Hymn in His adoration : because, the Laws and the Subjects of Anatomy, and Astronomy, although the slightest conception of these fill the reflecting mind with a transport of admiration, are ONLY PARTS in the unspeakable WHOLE of the ENERGIES of the Omnipotent.

As I will not mix up the Theme of this Subject, with the consideration of Language ; I shall throw the application of the Laws of Vision, to the Nature of our IDEAS OF OBJECTS, into a short distinct article.

¹ I desire it may be distinctly understood, I intend no allusion to myself in this avowal. I have never laid myself out for that department of labor, however brilliant, and laudable, as well as in some measure lucrative, it is, or ought to be.

SUBSECTION II.

*Resumption of the consideration of our Ideas of
External Objects.*

As the demonstrated result of the Laws of Primary Vision, it has been rigorously proved that, instead of our Idea of a Man, a Tree, or a House, or that of a Collision of Two Bodies, being NOT a resemblance, in the points of SUPERFICIAL EXTENSION AND FIGURE, of the Object to which we refer it; (as is assumed, alike, in the PNEUMATOLOGICAL Scheme of DR. REID *and in the* GRAMMATICAL Scheme of MR. TOOKE;) Every Such Idea, that is EVERY GROUP OF SENSATIONS OF SUCH AN OBJECT,—is most certainly a resemblance of it in these particulars. And, in like manner, Every MERE Idea of Such an Object—namely—*Every Remembered and Every Imagined* Phantasm of such an Object,—is only a FAINTER *and* MORE IMPERFECT affection of the Mind, of a Similar Nature to that of a SENSATION of it.

From this course of proof, then, it is determined that, when we are looking at any So-called External Object, such as a Man, for example; we perceive him in a way analogous to that in which we are believed to perceive any Visible Object through a *Semi-transparent Screen or Curtain*; in which case, we perceive only a *Sort of Shadow of the Object*, and *not the Object itself*. And any Conception which we can form of the Nature of the REAL EXTERNAL CAUSE of Such a Perception,—that is any

Conception which we can form that there is actually, at some distance from us, **SOME SUBSTANCE, and the ENERGIES** of that Substance, owing to which we have the Group of Sensations of Colors in question,—is a Conception which we can ONLY GATHER BY A COLLECTION OF REASON: *because we NEVER PERCEIVE THE EXTERNAL CAUSE OR THING ITSELF*; the perception of ANY THING BEYOND THE MODIFICATIONS OR STATES OF OUR OWN MIND *being DEMONSTRATED TO BE IMPOSSIBLE.*

This result, we are here to remember, is precisely consonant to the conception of the Subject which has been entertained by all Philosophers, down to Locke and Hume inclusive. The only difference between all these has been that, Locke was the first to recognise our Sensations or Ideas as being STATES or “OPERATIONS” of the Mind: which the Ancient Philosophers, and some Eminent Moderns also, had not done. And the only difference between the Views of Locke and those entertained by me upon this Subject is that, he never fell upon, and indeed never appears to have sought for, any means of PROVING the truth of his position: Which, most probably, was because he never dreamt that the time would arrive when any Philosopher would stand up and affirm that, we PERCEIVE EXTERNAL OBJECTS THEMSELVES.

What is gained, therefore, by arriving at DEMONSTRATED DATA whereupon to build the Conclusion of the EXTENSION OF OUR MINDS, is NOT ANY NEW CREED IN PNEUMATOLOGY: On the

contrary, it is merely the attaining of a **DEMONSTRATED CERTAINTY**, by which we are *enabled for ever to close the door* against such distracting and mischievous enterprises as that of Dr. Reid ; to which evils, mankind would otherwise have always been liable, after this species of vagary had once had a precedent.

And here I am under the necessity, as a matter of vital consequence, to advert to a very exceptionable statement of Professor Stewart, with regard to the Doctrine of Locke upon this Subject. In the course of his "*Philosophical Essays*," Mr. Stewart says—that, "Dr. Reid's reply is not against the sceptical suggestions of the Pyrrhonists, but against Berkeley's inferences from Locke's principles ; or rather against the principles from which those inferences were deduced." Now the "Principles" here alluded to, are the "**IDEAS**" OF **BERKELEY** and the "**IDEAS**" OF **LOCKE**. And, in the passage in question, Mr. Stewart intends to **IDENTIFY** these **Two Schemes** of "**Ideas**," as being **ONE SAME SCHEME**.

Upon this confounding of **Two Schemes**, most essentially different in themselves ; it is not my purpose to affirm that Mr. Stewart intended any wrong. But I confidently believe that a deeper instance of Philosophical injustice, or one more pregnant with mischief in its *probable effect upon readers*, comes not within my recollection than is herein involved. At the same time, I cannot but deplore the extent of the public apathy, concerning this subject, when it is certain that not even an intelligent reader in a hundred

is sufficiently interested in it to know, of his own seeking, what are the real doctrines of Locke and of Berkeley with regard to it. Certain it is that, if Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart had successively affirmed that the Ideas of Locke were any thing that can be named, they could not have succeeded more effectually in scaring the Public from the Subject, than they have done by spreading a *vague notion of the Mischievous Consequence of "IDEAS" IN GENERAL*; and therein including those of the English Philosopher.

The "IDEAS," EITHER OF BERKELEY or of the ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, *are no more a PART or PARCEL, or yet an OPERATION or STATE, of the MIND* which they occasionally occupy, than a Swarm of Rabbits are a *Part*, or a *State*, of the WARREN in which they burrow. The "IDEAS" OF LOCKE, on the contrary, are "OPERATIONS" of the MIND ITSELF: And he affirms that THINKING is rather the "MOTION" than the Essence of the Mind. With what justice, then, could it be said that, the "Ideas" of Locke lead to the same inferences as the "Ideas" of Berkeley?

Mr. Hume's deduction, from Berkeley's Principles, was a palpable hit: Although Hume drew it more in the spirit of a Jester, than of a Philosopher; and never for a moment believed in its truth; which, indeed, stands self-confuted in his own text. In a word; Hume's celebrated deduction was NEVER WORTH A THOUGHT: And the only purpose it could ever serve was that of a *Cry of "the Wolf,"* to frighten the reading Million

into a reception of Dr. Reid's Scheme of Perception : The consequence of which has been that, the Public Mind has been wearied down to a *dismal repose*, until Atheism (the Real Wolf) is actually howling at the door.

Fully bent, as I acknowledge myself to be, upon unveiling to the general eye the great truth now under consideration ; I would not for a moment have it supposed, I aim at this by the aid of declamation : and far less by imputing improper motives to the School of Reid. I have not a doubt that Hume's Deduction from Berkeley's Principles DID alarm Dr. Reid and others of his day.¹ But I nevertheless affirm that, a more contemptible quibble than Hume's deduction, (although it was a fair hit against the Visionary "Ideas" of Berkeley) did never call up a smile in the face of a Philosopher. It ought to be enough to say, here, that, *to apply HUME'S DEDUCTION to the "IDEAS" OF LOCKE is IMPOSSIBLE.*

It is a most melancholy thing, if the public mind can suffer itself to be equally cold and dark

¹ It is not to be supposed, however, that *alarm alone* could produce the Theory of Reid. The fact is that, under his alarm, Dr. Reid happened to attend to Cheselden's case of the Youth whom he had couched : and, *profoundly misapprehending Cheselden's meaning*, he thereupon STILL CONTINUED WITH BERKELEY TO REJECT THE EXTENSION OF OUR SENSATIONS ; while he REBELLED AGAINST BERKELEY in *adopting the EXTENSION OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.* But the full statement of this has been given in another place.

upon the real merits of this question, in an era when Nature is tortured to give up her secrets in the department of every Worm, of every Weed, and every Shell, even by those who have no other view in such pursuits than to gratify what they esteem, and may justly esteem, to be a liberal curiosity.

Of the mischief that must be produced by the circulation of Professor Stewart's assertion, which confounds the Creed of Locke with that of Berkeley; I shall here offer only a single example; from which a judgment may be formed of the effect upon the reading public, of all the remarks, of a similar tendency, which pervade the writings of Mr. Stewart.

In a *Note*, in the *Second Volume of his Elements, Second Edition, 8vo. Chap. 1. Sect. 3. page 70.* Mr. Stewart observes as follows—"That Clarke would look upon the Berkeleian Theory with more than common feelings of suspicion and alarm, may be easily conceived, when it is recollected that, by denying the independent existence of both *Space* and of *Time*, it put an end at once to his celebrated argument—*a priori*,—for the existence of God."

Now, according to the confounding of the "Ideas" of Locke, with the Idealism of Berkeley, Dr. Clarke ought to have felt as much alarm at the "Ideas" of Locke (which are those Ideas that I have put in proof) as he justly did at the Idealism of Berkeley: And every incompetent reader of Mr. Stewart's writings would find in

this, and in other such commentaries, a sure train of *pit-falls*; in which his imagination must be plunged, and himself for ever blinded to the truth of Locke's Creed: or, rather, he must be led for ever to avert his eyes from any salutary examination of the subject. Whereas, the indisputable truth is that, Clarke must have embraced the Laws of Primary Vision, as a most welcome confirmation of his Argument *a priori* for the existence of God; *since* SPACE and TIME *are, alike, THE NECESSARY THEATRE* of Clarke's Argument and that of the Argument from the Laws of Vision.

What, then, ought to prevent Churchmen, of a Philosophical cast, from now seizing upon the Demonstrated Ground which has thus been secured? And while, upon the one hand, I can discern no reason to withhold this consummation; it may be very important, upon the other, to point out the beautiful congruity of the Result of the Laws of Vision with Clarke's Argument *a priori*. I think, I could not close these observations with the notice of any fact more impressive, or more stimulating.

To offer here, in the first place, a Test, drawn from the Views of Clarke, of the truth of Locke's Principles; and of the injustice which, I affirm, has been done the Latter, in having these confounded with those of Berkeley; I quote the following passage from Dr. Clarke, "*On the Attributes*,"—who, as a Pneumatologist, was of the School of Locke, *and one who wrote antecedent to the Philosophising of Reid*. "*Colours, Sounds, Tastes, and the like, are by no means effects*

“ arising from Mere Figure and Motion; there
 “ being nothing in Bodies themselves; the Objects
 “ of the Senses, that has any manner of similitude
 “ to any of these qualities; but they are plainly
 “ *Thoughts* or Modifications of the Mind itself,
 “ which is an Intelligent Being; and are not
 “ properly *Caused*, but only *Occasioned*, by the
 “ Impressions of Figure and Motion.”

Upon this passage, now, I desire to put the question: What Writer of the School of Reid has ever written *More Purely the Truth*, of the Nature of our Ideas, than Clarke has herein done UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE; or, written, *more directly against the “ IDEAS” of Berkeley?*

Have I, then, taken exception to the statement of Professor Stewart without very serious and lamentable cause? Or, Will the Public Mind suffer itself to be paralysed by such a misconception, upon such a subject?

Let us, next, listen to what Dr. Clarke says farther in the same place, with regard to the Attributes of Mind.—“ Nor will it help the Atheist
 “ if we should grant that the Mind is nothing but
 “ *Matter*. For, even supposing it to be Matter, yet
 “ he must needs confess it to be *such* Matter, as is
 “ induced NOT ONLY WITH FIGURE AND MOTION,
 “ but also with the Quality of *Intelligence* and
 “ *Perception*: And, consequently, as to the
 “ *present* question, it will still come to the same
 “ thing; that *Colours*, *Sounds*, and the like, which
 “ are not qualities of Unintelligent Bodies, but
 “ Perceptions of Mind, can no more be caused

“ by, or arise from, Mere Unintelligent Figure and
“ Motion, than Colour can be a Triangle, or
“ Sound a Square.”

CLARKE “ *On the ATTRIBUTES,*”
Seventh Ed. page 53 and 54:

This View of the Subject agrees, so exactly, with the Conclusion resulting from the Laws of Vision, namely that, SINCE THE HUMAN MIND IS EXTENDED ALL EXTENDED SUBSTANCE MUST BE MIND ; that, I cannot too strongly commend the coincidence to the consideration of readers. While it is also duly to be had in notice that, most certainly, I never calculated upon this Conclusion of Dr. Clarke, during the course of my own investigation of the Phenomena of Colors ; and, although I was, of course, aware of the concurrent nature of Clarke’s Argument, I have only been called, here, to attend to the coincidence, by the assertion of Mr. Stewart that Locke’s Principles afford a foundation for those of Berkeley.

Lamentable, indeed, will be the fate of the Subject, if it should fail to be resuscitated, from the death-like stillness in which it has been sunk, owing to a rooted tissue of misconceptions and to the want of general interest, either to understand its merits or to recognise even the most desirable ground for advancement, supposing any such to be actually had in evidence.

During the times, and the scenes, which we have witnessed, Churchmen, of the highest cast, have deemed it expedient to descend into the arena of public controversy, with Atheistical Writers of

the least dignified description. The former, therefore, will not think that any disrespect is intended them, when, as a common duty, in common cause, they are urged to examine, whether or not they possess a Bulwark which can protect the greatest of all Truths, against the raging of that Surge which otherwise, as occasion serves, will continue to inundate and destroy their fairest institutions.

In fine, with regard to GRAMMAR. It follows, from the Principles had in proof, that the Whole Subject involved in the Problem of Language consists in THREE KINDS OF THINGS—namely—EXTERNAL OBJECTS ;—IDEAS ;—and WORDS,—which last may be called Representatives of Ideas : in which Enumeration, it will be observed, BREVES OR SIGNS OF SIGNS are not included ;—these last being not Signs of *Ideas*, but only Signs of *Words*.

SECTION THIRD.

OF THE NATURE OF NAMES OR TERMS, BOTH PARTICULAR AND GENERAL: AND OF THE PROCESS OF REASONING, IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF EACH KIND.—NECESSITY OF SPACE FOR ALL SUBSTANCE.—ALL SUBSTANCE MIND.

WE have seen, in the course of what was stated in the First Section of this Chapter, that, according to the almost universal doctrine of the Nominalists, Words are held to be Signs of Ideas NOT in the same sense that is ascribed to the Word—SIGN—in the Vocabulary of the NATURAL PHILOSOPHER;—that is to say they are not considered as being ANTECEDENTS, which lead us to expect *Consequents*; or CONSEQUENTS, which lead us to infer *Antecedents*;—but, on the contrary, it is confidently upheld that, Words are (at least during any operation of reasoning) no less than SUBSTITUTES for the Objects to which they may be afterwards referred, or, rather, for which they may be afterwards *exchanged*.

By what means this View of the Subject came to be so prevalent, as it now is, appears to me to be a very surprising fact. At any rate, and notwithstanding all the weight of authority by which it is supported, I cannot refrain from hazarding a statement which will present a very extensive deviation from it.

FIRST, therefore, I lay it down, as a position which must stand, or fall, according to the reasonings by which I propose to support it, that Names, in Language, whether *Particular or General*, are Signs only in the Same Sense that is ascribed to this Term in the Vocabulary of the Natural Philosopher, that is, in the Same Sense only as *Smoke* is said to be a *Sign of Fire*, and *Impulse* a *Sign of Motion*. In other words; I affirm that, Names serve as MERE ANTECEDENTS, which call up in the Mind of a Reader, or a Hearer, the Ideas which have been, to his knowledge, annexed to these Marks; While, upon the other hand, they serve as CONSEQUENTS, which lead a Reader, or a Hearer, to infer that the Ideas which they denote HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN in the *Mind of a Speaker, or Writer*.

SECONDLY. IN CONSEQUENCE of calling up the conception of Ideas, (in virtue of their being the REMEMBERED MARKS of these Ideas,) Names become, in a certain sense, and to a certain extent, what may very allowably be called REPRESENTATIVES of these Ideas. For certain it is that, by KEEPING SIGHT OF *these MARKS, along with the IDEAS of which they ARE the MARKS*, we vastly accelerate the process of thinking; which, without their aid, would be extremely slow and tedious: Although I shall demonstrate, in the case of VERY MANY CLASSES, what is already admitted by the Nominalists themselves with regard to *Single Individuals*,—namely—that, we can reason upon these, in innumerable cases, and to a very large

extent, without the use of Any Name or Representative of them whatever.

THIRDLY. Besides this, also, I must equally affirm that, it is never true, in any case, however General the Object, or however abstruse or removed it may be from our immediate apprehension, it is never true that a Name serves, (agreeably with the doctrine of the Nominalists,) as a SUBSTITUTE for Any Object, for which it may be afterwards exchanged. For the utmost that Any Name, or Sign, in Such case can do, is to serve, for the time being, as an IMPERFECT SORT OF REPRESENTATIVE of SOME INDEFINITE OBJECT; which, although we cannot at the moment conceive it *definitely*, does nevertheless *exist in our Conception* as a VAGUE NOTION OF SOMETHING, to which the Name all along refers: And, hence, the NAME *can in strictness be no more than a REMEMBRANCER of this SOMETHING: It cannot be a SUBSTITUTE* for it, (as the Nominalists maintain it is,) because it can never keep the INDEFINITE NOTION OF THIS SOMETHING *from occupying our imagination along with the Sign in question.* In a word; I affirm that, whenever the Sign X, or Z, is employed in an algebraical process; we annex to this Symbol a *Vague Notion of Something* to which it refers, in a way analogous to the Notion which mankind form of the Nature of SUBSTANCE, which all men entertain as being the BASIS of *Accidents*, but which no man could ever define: And, upon *this* ground, I assert that, the Symbol X, or Z, is NOT EXCLUSIVELY the Object of our

reasoning in any such algebraical process. But the Case, now in question, is an *extreme* case : And we have a Whole Field of Other Cases, which come between, and must be considered accordingly.

FIRST, therefore, it is particularly proper we should examine the case which has been chosen by Professor Stewart. And, herein, I apprehend the real truth of the matter to be that, when a shopman has written the *Name of Gloves* on the outside of a Parcel of Such Wares ; or, has attached a *Glove* to the Parcel, in order to serve for the same purpose ; this Sign is *Not a Sign for the Shopman to REASON UPON*, with respect to the Articles in question : On the contrary, it is only a *Sign to DIRECT HIM WHERE HE MAY FIND these Goods*, whenever he happens to want them, in the course of trade. In so far, therefore, as it serves in *this* office, the Sign certainly may, and *usually does*, discharge the Shopman's mind of all thought of these Particulars ; and, thereby, it enables him to attend exclusively to his other business. But the moment a customer demands a Pair of Gloves ; and the Shopman places his hand upon the Parcel, in order to exhibit the contents ; and while he is yet untying the string ; he, in all probability, *CEASES* to think of either the *Name of Gloves*, or of *Any One Glove*, as the being a Sign of the Whole Number enclosed in the Parcel ; and he thinks of the *WHOLE ASSEMBLAGE OF GLOVES*, which, of

course, I here suppose him to have *seen, or handled, or at least imagined, before.*

With a view to this Whole Assemblage, moreover, he will employ a variety of *So-called General Reasonings*; and come to as many General Conclusions. Thus he will reason that,—**EVERY GLOVE** in the Parcel is a Thing made to *fit and protect a hand*;—that, **EVERY ONE** of them was made in *Limerick*, or in *Woodstock*;—that, **ALL OF THEM** are the produce of *One Manufactory*;—and—that, **EVERY PAIR** must bring him in *Half a Crown*. To pretend in this case that, the Shopman, for a moment, loses sight of his own weal so far as to reason upon *Any One Glove*, any more than upon the *Name of Glove*, when he is earnestly concerned for the **FATE** of **EVERY INDIVIDUAL PAIR, AND GLOVE, IN THE PARCEL**; is what I do not think any competent person will ever attempt, after the matter is duly placed in his attention to its real merits. And, at any rate, when we come to examine the other and similar cases, which will be stated for farther illustration of the Subject, it must set the matter in a point of view which I do not apprehend is likely to be controverted.

In order, however, to leave no room here for any doubt arising from ambiguity of expression; I affirm that, when a Shopman is reasoning upon a Dozen of Pairs of Gloves, he **DOES NOT** “*identify them all,*” as **ONE GLOVE**, in his imagination: On the contrary, he contemplates them as being **So MANY DISTINCT AND DIFFERENT CONCRETE MASSES of SIMILAR ATTRIBUTES; EACH AND**

EVERY MASS *of which forms* ONE INDIVIDUAL OBJECT OF HIS REASONING. And he applies All the Various General Conclusions, which he forms concerning them, to EVERY DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL MASS, ALIKE, of the Whole Dozen of Pairs: In doing which, moreover, I say, he MAY, *and* OFTEN DOES, completely LOSE SIGHT OF THEIR NAME; and may reason upon their NATURE ALONE,—that is upon the DIFFERENT MASSES OF SIMILAR ATTRIBUTES — according to his conception of them.

Such do I confidently apprehend to be the real process of what is called General Reasoning, in the Case of EVERY ASSEMBLAGE OF CLASSED OBJECTS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED; and this, too, whether perceived *all at once*; or *only in succession*.

Professor Stewart, in the view which he has taken of the Subject, has confounded two very different cases;—namely—a Class of Objects *actually perceived, remembered, or imagined*;—and a DEFINITION, *signified by a NAME*, which Definition happens to be that of a Genus, or Species, *whose Nature comes not within the grasp of our Conception at the moment of our reasoning upon it*. These two cases are at least so far different with respect to the Intellectual processes to which they give rise in the mind, that, it must be admitted, as has been already provided in the Third Position laid down, That we are APT TO CONSIDER the Sign or Representative as being the OBJECT of our

reasoning. But it must nevertheless be insisted upon that, **EVEN IN THIS CASE**, the grand tenet of the Nominalist is not strictly true: For if we examine the state of our own mind at such time, we shall find that we always refer either a Definition or its Name to **SOMETHING BEYOND IT**: although we cannot describe, nor conceive, this **SOMETHING**.

Mr. Stewart, in summing up this portion of his speculations, says — “I cannot perceive a single “step of the understanding, which implies any “thing more than the Notion of Number and the “use of a common name.” Now, I think, I might be safe to put the question to any Tradesman in London, Whether, when a Shopman is displaying a Paper of Gloves, he *thinks* of Nothing but of *Number* and of the *Name of Gloves*?

In this case it is to be objected that, Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in a manner altogether deficient in *explicitness*. But, in the first place, if it was his meaning to say that, he perceived no step of the understanding, except the *Notion of NUMBER, and this Notion applied to SEVERAL DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS OF OUR PERCEPTION*, (which is the real truth of nature in such processes) then, I affirm, it is a **MANIFEST CONTRADICTION OF ITSELF** when he asserts that in such case we *can only think of a COMMON NAME*, since we think at the same time of **ALL THE INDIVIDUALS** under it.

And if, upon the other hand, Mr. Stewart could mean that, in such case, we can only entertain the

Notion of NUMBER IN ABSTRACT, (*without attaching this Notion to the INDIVIDUALS of a Class,*) and, to this, *can merely add the Sign of a COMMON NAME*; then, I affirm, he argues in the face of one of the most certain facts in nature: For, I confidently insist that, the *Name never discharges* a Shopman's mind of *Any of the Individuals* which he is contemplating when he is selling a Number of Gloves. In vending his Articles, for example, the Shopman contemplates the NATURE OF A GLOVE in a Thing with LONG FINGERS, — and the NATURE OF ANOTHER GLOVE in *Another Thing* with SHORTER FINGERS,—and the NATURE OF A THIRD GLOVE in a *Third Thing* with STILL SHORTER FINGERS;—*and so on*, throughout the *Whole Number of Gloves*: And, although the things thus classed are UNEQUALS *in the length of fingers*; yet they are still contemplated as being, *in certain of their attributes*, SO MANY EQUAL AND DISTINCT INDIVIDUALS, to which, the Shopman applies One *Same SET OF EQUAL CONCLUSIONS*—namely—*their Place of Manufacture*; — *their Quality*;—*their Price*;—&c.

I do not myself think that, the real nature of the Subject can be rendered more manifest, by any addition of examples in illustration of it. But, as my own view of it appears so extensively to contradict those which uniformly now prevail; I shall furnish those which follow: though this with a view to render the fact *familiar to readers*; rather than with any belief that the truth can be rendered more certain.

Having, in the example already afforded, exhibited the fact in the case of a Number of Individual Objects perceived ALL AT ONE SAME TIME ; I shall, previously to offering other examples of this kind, afford an instance of the Same General Fact in a Case of perceiving Any Number of Such Objects AT SUCCESSIVE TIMES.

If then, for example, we had cast an hundred Musquet Bullets, successively in a Mould ; and had applied One of the Bullets in question to the Mouth of a Musquet, and found that it fitted ; we should, in this case, form One General Conclusion — namely — that ALL THE BULLETS must fit the SAME MUSQUET : And this we should do, NOT because we make the NAME (*of a Ball*) serve as the OBJECT of our General Conclusion ; and, quite as little because we take ANY ONE OF THE BALLS, *or even the MOULD ITSELF*, as a REPRESENTATIVE *of the Hundred Balls* in question ; but merely because we apply the SAME NOTION OF ATTRIBUTES, *including SIZE*, to EVERY ONE OF THE BALLS DISTINCTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY, and, (from a recollection of the experiment,) that it ATTACHES TO EVERY ONE of them, *independently of EVERY OTHER*, insomuch that, nothing could be more untrue than to affirm that we take ANY ONE of the Balls to represent Any of the Others, any more than we take the NAME OF BALL to represent the Whole HUNDRED BALLS. And, in like manner, when we have gathered all the Hundred Balls into a Heap ; or, spread them out on a Surface ; I suppose no person will deny that, we should

STILL contemplate them as a NUMBER OF DISTINCT INDIVIDUAL BALLS OR OBJECTS; to EVERY ONE OF WHICH, ALIKE, we might apply the various general conclusions in question?

Collaterally with this View of the Subject, I observe, we MIGHT, certainly, make any one of the Balls; or, even, the Mould in which it was cast; serve as a Representative of the Whole Number, IN SO FAR as to be certain that, whatever should be truly affirmed of the Representative must apply equally to the Things represented. But the error of the Nominalist consists in this: namely—He affirms that, either the *Common Name* of the Class; or, else, *Some One Individual* of the Class; forms the OBJECT of our reasoning upon the Class,—even when the CLASS ITSELF IS PRESENT; and that, this Object, of necessity, keeps the Class OUT OF OUR SIGHT: Whereas, I confidently insist that, *Any Such Representative*, IN THE CASE OF ANY NUMBER OF OBJECTS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED, OR REMEMBERED, OR CONCEIVED, DOES NOT keep the represented Objects out of our sight, or memory: Or, to speak far more correctly, Any Name, or Individual, of a perceived Class is NOT, *in strictness*, a REPRESENTATIVE AT ALL of that Class. And this constitutes one of the principal differences, in opinion, between the Nominalists and myself, upon this subject.

To proceed, now, to the Other examples, which were proposed for the illustration of the Subject. If

a tumult were excited among a mob of persons ; and, if a Magistrate were to harangue them, in order to allay it ; he might, in this case, address them as MEN, or as COUNTRY-MEN : but the next moment he would, in all probability, forget BOTH THESE NAMES, and would contemplate ONLY HUMAN NATURE, *as it stands before him* INDIVIDUALISED INTO A NUMBER OF DISTINCT CONCRETE MASSES, *and forming* SO MANY DIFFERENT THOUGH SIMILAR INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS. And to these Distinct Concrete Masses of Human Attributes he would address his *Reasonings*, and his *Conclusions*, IMMEDIATELY,—that is to EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM, ALIKE. Thus, he would utter a *Promise*, or a *Threat* ; an *Expedient*, or a *Reflection* ; directed alike to EVERY ONE of the Men within his hearing. And, at the same time, he would not think at all of Any Generic, or Specific NAME ; but would *discern and watch* the COUNTENANCE of EVERY DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL *of the Group*, in order to furnish himself with a general conclusion with regard to the bent of the mob. If the MAJORITY OF THE NUMBER OF COUNTENANCES, which he surveys, should prove pacific ; he will conclude he has carried his point : But, if the contrary ; he will then draw his conclusion that, the law must be put in force.

I have related the foregoing and following examples with a view to illustrate a Principle, which I shall now lay down, and which makes in a peculiar degree against the Doctrine of the No-

minalism;—namely — that, WHENEVER WE ARE DEEPLY INTERESTED *in Any Number of Perceived Similar Objects*, we are EXTREMELY APT TO LOSE RECOLLECTION *of their Specific Name*, and to CONTEMPLATE *them in their CONCEIVED NATURE OR ATTRIBUTES*, *without thinking of their Common Appellation*, although a recollection of this their Common Name MAY SOMETIMES incidentally occur to us during the process. In point of fact, I believe, there is nothing more frequent, in the *most ordinary* cases of reasoning upon a Number of Perceived Similar Objects, than, AT MANY MOMENTS, TO FORGET their SPECIFIC NAME, and THINK of the *Objects themselves alone*. I proceed, therefore, to examples of this case, taken from the most ordinary situations.

If a Carman were driving his Team; (and, of course, he had been, for a length of time, more interested in the INSTINCTS *or* NATURE of his Horses, than in their COMMON NAME;) and if, in this case, he had occasion to *crack his whip*, with a view to excite the exertion of his Horses; then, it is manifest, *this crack of his whip* would be the SIGN OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION in him; and the question now is, WHAT WOULD BE THE OBJECT of this General Conclusion? To this question, the Nominalist must reply; it is the COMMON NAME OF HORSE: or, otherwise, it must be SOME ONE HORSE of the Team. But this answer would be most certainly, and most glaringly, in opposition to the real fact: Because it is impos-

sible to doubt that, if the Team consists of FOUR HORSES, the Driver will certainly conclude that EVERY ONE OF THE FOUR will be intimidated, and will attend to the COMMON SIGNAL GIVEN : And, in all probability, he may crack his whip—(that is employ his *General Sign*—) a Dozen of times without once thinking of the *Name of Horse* ; his whole imagination being occupied by the NATURE OF A HORSE, as it stands here DIVIDED INTO FOUR SEPARATE CONCRETE MASSES.

In like manner ; if an Image Boy were jostled in the street ; and his whole cargo of merchandise thrown down and destroyed ; he would, in this case, not think of the NAME OF IMAGE ; nor yet would he take a Headless Venus, or a Mutilated Mars, as a Representative of all the Other Goddesses and Heroes of his Stock : But he would reason that, EVERY ONE of his Images, ALIKE, is BROKEN ; and that, the sum he shall get for EVERY ONE of them, ALIKE, is *Nothing*. They are, to him, all Equal Objects in the Attribute of being *destructible* ; and, also, in that of being actually *destroyed*.

Thirdly. If a Fruiterer perceive that, a Basket of his Peaches is in a state which will not keep from destruction during another day ; he will not dwell upon the NAME OF PEACH ; nor will he take Any One Peach, for the Object of his General Conclusions : But he will take EVERY INDIVI-

DUAL PEACH in the Basket to form his Object. And the certain *proof* that he will do this is, that, if he discern ANY ONE, or More, of the Peaches to be in a sound state, he will set them apart from the Class in question. Thus, if the case were doubtful, or of a mixed nature, he would set about a NEW PROCESS OF CLASSIFICATION: And, having set apart so many Sound Peaches, he would conclude that EVERY ONE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS is an article for *One Same Market, or Customer*; and that EVERY ONE of them will bring him in an *Equal Sum*—namely—*Six-Pence*. At the same time, also, he would conclude that, his PROFIT upon EVERY ONE OF THEM, alike, will be the SAME, namely *Three-Pence*. Will any person pretend to affirm, when a Fruiterer has picked out some dozens of Sound Peaches from a Basket, that he does not fix his *memory, and imagination*, upon EVERY PEACH which he has selected; and, thereupon, form his conclusion of their *So-called Common Value*? In pointing to such a Garbled Basket of Peaches; and pricing them at Six Shillings the Dozen; Will any one pretend that, he does not rivet his thoughts to HAVING PICKED OUT EVERY ONE of them? And, if he remember that, a few of them are specked; Will it be pretended that, he does not think of them as being liable to be rejected?

What, then, becomes of the Doctrine that the Fruiterer, the Image Boy, or the Orator, is obliged to take a Common Name, or Any One Individual of a Class, for his Object, in Every case of General Reasoning?

BUT IT IS UPON* THE GROUND OF SO-CALLED ABSTRACT NUMBER,—a ground therefore to which I now proceed,—that the Doctrine of Nominalism must meet with its most signal objection ;—not that the result can be at all more conclusive upon this ground ; but only that it is more neat and beautiful, in its being divested of the usual adjunct considerations, than that of any usual case of a CONCRETE Object. This ground, moreover, is remarkable as being that which has been chosen, by Mr. Stewart, as the purest foundation whereon to build the Speculation of Nominalism : For, he says,—“ or “ to take an example still more apposite to our present purpose, like the phrases *one thousand*, or “ *one million*, when considered merely as simple “ *units* entering into the composition of a numerical sum.”

Here, therefore, in the First place, I humbly conceive, Mr. Stewart must be at some loss for an answer, if we should ask him ; In the case of assuming each of the two Sums—“ *ONE Thousand*”—and “ *ONE Million*”—to be a “ SIMPLE UNIT ” in a numerical sum ; BY WHAT MEANS *are we to distinguish between this ONE THOUSAND and ONE MILLION, in our understanding ?*

I can have little fear in answering to this question that, ANY SUCH DISTINCTION IS IMPOSSIBLE. And I suppose that, according to Mr. Stewart’s assumption, the Several Sums—ONE,—and ONE HUNDRED,—and ONE THOUSAND,—and ONE MILLION,—must ALL OF THEM BE EQUAL SUMS *in our conception*. Dr. Reid has, I think,

jocosely observed that, the “**PUNCTUM STANS**” of the Ancients was putting a Spoke into the Wheel of Time with a vengeance. And I conceive that, this identification, by Mr. Stewart, of **THOUSANDS**, and of **MILLIONS**, into **SIMPLE UNITS EACH**, would fix the Science of Arithmetic in a manner no less notable. How another person’s Intellect is constructed, is not for me to say : But, whenever I think of One Million, or One Thousand, I have in my conception a **GREAT MULTITUDE** of **DISTINCT SIMPLE UNITS** ; and not merely **ONE Simple Unit** : And, if I had not this, I am certain, I could not tell **ONE MILLION** from the Number **ONE**. If any person will tell me that, the **DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO NAMES** can set me right, **WITHOUT ANY DIFFERENCE IN MY CONCEPTION** ; I could only smile at this mystery. I leave it, therefore, to others, to judge for themselves.

If Mr. Stewart would ask, in return, How we can distinguish a Multitude of Distinct So-called Abstract Units, in our conception ; seeing, he would perhaps affirm that, there is **NO MARK** to render Any One of these Different from Another ? I answer : There is a Mark for this use ; although it is not generally recognised : And this Mark is a **SENSE OF REPETITION** of Units. Whenever I distinguish between the So-called Abstract Number **ONE** and *Any Larger NUMBER*, I conceive *Unity* to be **REPEATED** as many times, *less one*, as the Number in question contains it : And **THIS** is the **Mark**.

to distinguish ONE, from ONE THOUSAND, in the case under consideration. By this Mark I can as certainly discriminate between TEN and a HUNDRED, as if there were a guinea, or an acre of land, attached to Every Unit of these Numbers. The Story of Nature, in this case, is told in the language of simplicity worthy of philosophic truth in the account which is given of the Subject by LOCKE: And, although he confines his account, I think, to Ordinary CONCRETES; I may affirm that, a SENSE OF REPETITION in the Mind is a Barrier of Adamant against the confounding of UNITS, IN SO-CALLED ABSTRACT.

To furnish, now, an answer to the question which has been finally put by Professor Stewart; I may safely affirm, upon a full conviction resulting from such examples as have been stated, that we CERTAINLY CAN REASON, WITHOUT ANY SIGN, upon ANY NUMBER OF ESTIMATED SIMILAR OBJECTS which we at any time *either perceive, or remember, or imagine*, provided only that our Conception of the Individuals of this Number be *Clear* and *Distinct* with regard to their *Estimated Nature*, in their *Separate Concrete Masses*.

And, in like manner, it has been shown that, we can reason upon *what are called* Abstract Numbers themselves: As a final test of which, it may be observed here, that, when we think of the *Abstract Number* FOUR; and reason with regard to ITS EQUALITY TO TWICE TWO; it must be impossible to execute this process of the

Understanding if we confounded the **FOUR UNITS** of the *First* Number, or the **TWO UNITS** of the *Second*, into **ONE "SIMPLE UNIT"** in our conception. Nor can it affect the *Generic* truth of this argument, although **LARGER** Numbers in Abstract cannot be reasoned upon without Words, or Symbols, to denote them.

With regard to Abstract Number, however, it is proper to insist that, *it is a thing impossible*; and the supposition of it is altogether absurd: *For Number is Nothing but a RELATIVE ATTRIBUTE*; and *Every Attribute* must have a *Subject*. Accordingly, therefore, While we have no other, or *More Pure*, method of conceiving Mere Number, than by a *Mental Repetition of Units*; this *Very Act of Repetition* is a *concreting act*; and it converts Every One of the Units into *Concrete* Number. Now it is for the Nominalist to observe that, the **ACTS of REPEATING** the Units, of Any *Supposed* Abstract Number, ARE MOST MANIFESTLY FATAL to Mr. Stewart's assumption that, we "identify" Every Unit in a Thousand, or a Million, into *One Simple Unit*. And, although we certainly do NOT ACTUALLY perform the operation of repeating the Units, in any large numerical sum, it is nevertheless certain that we MUST SUPPOSE the repetition as being performed, or, else, there is *no possible way* of conceiving a *Thousand* to differ from *Ten*, or *One*. It is by this **POTENTIAL REPE- TITION, ALONE**, that the Science of Arithmetic can be acquired: And, without it, that Science could only be acquired in so far as we could employ a

Number of conceived Single Units, Each One of them attached to some Visible, or Tangible Object, such as a Shell, a Pea, or a Grain of Corn.

As additional examples, here, with regard to Objects in CONCRETE; it may be suggested that, when we are deeply interested in contemplating a Number of *Very Simple* Similar Objects, such, for example, as a Number of *Cannon Balls* of One Same Mould,—a Number of *Pin Holes* in a Card,—*Similar Spots* in a Pattern,—*Similar Panes* in a Chess Board, or Window,—or Any Such Class of Things;—we frequently lose recollection, not only of their Specific Name, but also that they HAVE A NAME AT ALL: And yet, all the while, Who will pretend to affirm that we do not apply to them a *Variety of Conclusions*, in what is called “COMMON?”

The case of Any Such CLASS of Individuals is nothing different from that of a *Single Individual*, when contemplated in similar circumstances. And here, on account of its real importance in determining what is the True Structure of our Intellectual Constitution, in this department of it, I would repeat the suggestion which has been offered that, in cases of DEEP INTEREST, we are EXTREMELY PRONE TO CONTEMPLATE OBJECTS IN THEIR ESTIMATED NATURE, and NOT BY THEIR NAMES; although I do not intend to affirm that we do so *exclusively at all times*; because the contrary is often the fact. To take an example, *first*, from an Individual Object: How often do we find ourselves either actually contemplating, or thinking upon, a

justly beloved Person, in their Compages of known Attributes ; in doing which, we become so completely *absorbed*, that we never once think of either the *Proper*, or the *Specific Name* of the Object : And, if any accident call up a Name ; it, not unfrequently, *interrupts* the mood in which we had been entranced. When we are thus engrossed by the contemplation of Innumerable Exercises of a Cluster of Virtues, which command our admiration and throw the lustre of rare accidental accompanying endowments into shade ; What Philosopher will affirm to us that, we can think of the SUBJECT of these Attributes NEVER, *except through the Medium of a NAME* ?

As it is with SINGLE Objects ; so it is with a PLURALITY, provided only that, the *interest* we take in them be equally deep. When the Voluptuary, whose mind is in his drink, is occupied with the indulgence of his taste ; Will any one affirm that he thinks continually of the Object through either the GENERIC Name of WINE, or the *Specific Name of Any Particular Wine* ? On the contrary ; Can there be any doubt of the fact that, he calculates upon *Some Indefinite Number of Times* he shall delight his palate, in gulping his liquor : with regard to the Whole Number of which he will, by anticipation, draw this General Conclusion—namely—that EACH AND EVERY GULP will afford him *Distinct and Separate* delight ? The REPETITIONS of the pleasurable impression, and SOME CONCLUSIONS with regard to them collectively, both FUTURE and PAST, will

almost continually occupy this man's mind, during the whole of his debauch : while the probability is that, he may not think of **ANY NAME** of the Cause, six times, during the sitting.

In fine. I apprehend that the Doctrine of Nominalism has been shewn, in the course of a sufficient analysis of cases, to be most certainly without any foundation in the Nature of our Mental Constitution. Nor do I think it can be disputed that the **LOGIC OF SIGNS**, in this Department, will be in a very defective state, until the Real Principles of the Subject shall be generally recognised.

The following general observations are stippled here, in the hope that they may tend materially to the amendment of the views which have heretofore prevailed.

1. **EITHER, A DEFINITION, or a GENERAL NAME** which is the *Sign of a Definition*; Whether it be taken in the sense of the **CONCEPTUALIST**, or in that of the **NOMINALIST**; *alike confounds* All the Individuals, of Any Class, into One Single Individual. In this case, therefore, it is manifestly absurd for the Nominalist to reason against the certain absurdity of the Conceptualist : For, In what is it more irrational to affirm that we can conceive a **CONTINUOUS GENERAL IDEA**, than to

affirm, with Mr. Stewart, that Any Number of Classed Articles, contemplated by a Shopman, may all be identified in his mind, as being ONE SIMPLE UNIT? In each case, alike, the Mind can contemplate ONLY ONE SIMPLE UNIT. And I confidently apprehend that, this is a most glaring contradiction of the Nominalist's own position that Every General Idea is made up of the Ideas of a Number of Particulars.

2. EITHER, A DEFINITION, *or a GENERAL NAME*, is NOT EITHER *a SUBSTITUTE, or in strictness a REPRESENTATIVE*, of Any Class of Objects. On the contrary, it is MERELY A COMMON MEASURE of *All the Individuals* in its Class, in precisely the same sense as a VESSEL called a GALLON, or a QUART, is the Common Measure of Every Individual Quantity of Fluid, or Grain, which it has meted off. Consequently, therefore, EITHER A DEFINITION, or a General Name standing for it, No more keeps the Individuals of Any Class out of our apprehension, during any act of reasoning which we are carrying on with regard to this Class, than the Yard-Rule of a Draper keeps the Individual Yards of a Piece of Shirt-Cloth out of our view, when he is running the former along the selvedge of the latter, in order to ascertain how many Yards are in the Piece.

3. Every Individual, in Any Class of Objects, is to be regarded as a QUANTITY: and this quantity as being METED OFF by that LOGICAL MEASURE

called a DEFINITION. And although, in innumerable classes, the Individual Quantities may appear to us to have *No Natural Separation*; as, for example, Any Quantity of SPACE, such as a Foot, or a Mile, has *No Natural Separation* from the Other Parts of Space;—whereas the QUANTITY called a MAN,—an IDEA,—or a DOCTRINE,—is obviously separated from Every Other Individual of its Class;—it is nevertheless true that a Mile, or a Foot, of Space is, in a logical sense, a Distinct and Separate Individual of itself. And Every Thing which we may class, whether real or only fictitious, must be considered in the same manner.

4. A DEFINITION may be considered as being the PROPER NAME of a CLASS: And a GENERAL NAME as being the PRONOUN of a DEFINITION: For *Every Philosophical Proper Name* must be a NAME DESCRIPTIVE of the Object which it stands for, as I have shewn in the Section of Pronouns: And it is self-evident that, a Common Name stands, *Pronominally*, for a Definition.

5. DEFINITIONS, *like ORDINARY MEASURES*, are Some of them appropriate to ONE SORT of Quantity; and Some to *Several Different Sorts*. Thus, As a *Milk Pail*, a *Tea Catty*, or a *Snuff Box*, will call up no other conception in the Mind, than that of *Milk*, or *Tea*, or *Snuff*; so the Definition, or the Name, of *Man* will call up no conception but that of a *Human Being*. While,

on the other hand ; as a *Hogshead*, or *Peck Measure*, may call up the idea of a Quantity, either of Beer, or of Brandy ; of Pease, or of Beans ; so the Definition, or the Name, of *Animal* may excite the conception of either a Man, a Horse, or a Dog.

Now there is no Milk Maid, no Farmer, and no Philosopher, who will ever affirm that a Milk Pail, or a Peck Measure, when it is employed, can ever keep out of our contemplation the INDIVIDUAL QUANTITIES of the Milk, or the Grain, which is meted out by this contrivance. When the Proprietress of a Fruit Barrow is measuring off, to a Customer, a Dozen Pints of her “ Fine Ripe Currants ;” Will it for a moment be affirmed that, either of the Contracting Parties discharges their imagination of the Number of Individual Pints of Fruit meted off ; and *fixes her conception exclusively upon the Pewter Pot* which serves, in this case, as a DEFINITION of the Class ? Let but either of the Parties count wrong, but ONE, of the Number ; And we should soon see whether they fix their imagination upon the MEASURE, or upon the NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS MEASURED.

6. IN STRICTNESS ; all that a Definition can do is to PERFORM THE OFFICE OF AN EMPTY POT, or an UNOCCUPIED Measure : *which is MERELY TO CALL UP THE CONCEPTION* of Individuals that EITHER HAVE BEEN, or ONLY MAY BE, actually METED OFF by it. A DEFINITION, therefore, is NOT ONLY NOT A SUBSTITUTE : but it is NOT A REPRESENTATIVE ; although we may, for the sake

of convenience, be allowed to *call* it such. It is a SIGN, in the Same Sense as *Smoke* is a Sign of *Fire*, and *Motion* is a Sign of *Impulse*; that is, it is an ANTECEDENT, which leads us to expect a CONSEQUENT; and a CONSEQUENT, which leads us to infer an *Antecedent*.

7. Every Definition, like Every Other Common Measure, IMPLIES a Number of *Distinct Individuals as being separately contemplated* in its very supposition, as truly as Every Name of a Triangle implies the contemplation of *Three Different Angles*. And, along with this, it is to be noted that, SOME CONCEIVED DIFFERENCE of SPACE, or of TIME, is *necessary* to the Conception of Each of the Distinct Individuals of Every Class of Objects; For it has been shewn that, our attaching Every Unit of a Number to a Mental ACT OF REPETITION is the LEAST CONCRETE, and MOST ABSTRACT, Sort of Number that is conceivable.

8. A Class of Individuals (it is manifest) needs not be, and in most cases actually is not, made up of Individuals that are either *Altogether Equals*, or that we *estimate* as being such: On the contrary, Classes of Objects, in most cases, are supposed to be equals in *Some One*, or *More Only*, of their Attributes. When, therefore, we reason upon Such Classes of Objects, as these, we REASON IN ABSTRACT. But such PARTIAL CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTS does not, in the least, give foundation to

the Creed of the Conceptualist—namely—that *Any Attribute*, such, for example, as that of *Triangularity*, runs *continuously* through Any Plurality of Objects. We can certainly consider a Triangle, so far forth only as it is 'Triangular: But if we contemplate *Any Two*, or *Any Two Million*, of Unlike Triangles, in this One respect of Triangularity; we must contemplate *Two*, or *Two Millions*, of *Distinct and Separate Masses or Individuals of Triangularity*: which Two, or Two Millions, of Objects will be *mathematically equals to each other*; but they must, as certainly, be *Every One of them Different, in its Own Proper Individuality*, by being *viewed as residing in Some Imagined Concrete Triangle standing in Space, by itself*. The case of *Triangles* is nothing different from that of *Gloves*, or *Stockings*: in which latter, we view the *Nature of a Glove* in a Number of Different Concrete Masses of Objects, differing considerably from One Another in Size, in Shape, and in Texture.

As for the supposition that, Mathematical Subjects do not require, *nor admit*, of being considered in CONCRETE; it is absurd beyond expression. In what way, for example, could we conceive the Two Triangles of Euclid's Fourth Proposition, if we did not consider them *as being in Two Different Parts of Space*, before we proceed to the supposed act of putting them together? But if Mathematical Subjects are, (as Dr. Reid affirms them all to be,) ABSTRACT SUBJECTS, OR OBJECTS; they certainly can neither require, *nor admit* of, any conceivable Scite in Space: Because, ALL ABSTRACT Subjects

are acknowledged to be out of the Pale of Time, and of Space.

TO SUM UP, *then*,—

1.

NAMES *are* NOT THE OBJECTS of our Reasoning, in any case whatever;—a GENERAL NAME being no more the Object of our Thought when we are reasoning upon a Class of Objects, than a LADLE, which a Hungry Ploughman employs to lade so many Distinct Portions of his Pottage out of a Crock, is the Object of his Thought during that operation.

2.

AN ACT OF GENERAL REASONING *is a thing* IMPOSSIBLE; every SO-CALLED Act of GENERAL Reasoning being Only an Act of COLLECTIVE Reasoning.

The Phrase—"GENERAL Reasoning"—is an Expression adapted only to the unfounded Scheme of Conceptualism; or to that of Nominalism, which, I here insist, is also without foundation, and which, *in fact*, annihilates the *Distinct Individuals of Every Class*, as completely as is done by the Scheme of Conceptualism itself.

3.

THE HUMAN MIND is so constructed, as to be capable of reasoning upon a PLURALITY OF OBJECTS of Similar Attributes, measured by what MAY, *for the sake of convenience*, be CALLED a Common Measure, but which, in strictness, is ONLY A REPEATING Measure : And EVERY DEFINITION, and EVERY NAME OF A CLASS, is Such a Measure.

Nor must it be objected, here, that a *Repeating Measure* is, in fact, a *Common Measure*. For, although it is not my intention to deny that it is so, in itself; it is necessary to observe that, the SENSE in which the Nominalist Virtually apprehends the term COMMON is extremely different from that of a Measure which metes Individuals by REPETITION. The Nominalist will affirm, indeed, that, by the term COMMON, he means a Name, or Thing, which may be applied ALIKE TO ANY, or to EVERY, Individual of a Plurality of Objects : And this is so far true. But, What is the Creed involved in his Doctrine of General Terms ? This Creed is the Assumption that, the GENERAL TERM INVOLVES ALL THE INDIVIDUALS of the *Class* INVISIBLY in ITS OWN OBLIVIOUS WOMB, during any Operation of General Reasoning ! A So-called "COMMON" Name of the Nominalist, therefore, is, by HIS Rule, NOT A COMMON, but is actually a CONVOLVING Name ;

which swallows up all Plurality of Individuals, *without distinction.*

4.

In the case of a Great Variety of Classes, of Very Simple Existing Objects,—namely—such Objects as APPEAR TO US to be equals,—we can REASON IN CONCRETE, *that is* WITHOUT ABSTRACTING AT ALL. The MIND ITSELF, in this case, can Measure the Individuals, without any External Measure whatever; Our own IDEAS of these Objects being the Only Measure of them, because, in fact, we never perceive the External Objects themselves, and can reason ONLY upon our IDEAS of them: which Ideas, moreover, are RESEMBLANCES of these Objects in the points of SUPERFICIAL EXTENSION AND FIGURE, when the *Impressions* which they make upon our External Organs of Sense are extended and figured.

With regard to the Views which have here been submitted, of the Objects of So-called General Reasoning; they are so very different from those which have been adopted by the highest and most numerous authorities on the Subject, that, I might well fear the hazard of having staked my judgment to the consequence of asserting them, were it not that the evidences of the facts appear to myself

to be altogether irresistible. I leave them now, however, to be examined and adjudged by those who are interested in the Subject. With regard, especially, to the Writer alluded to in a preceding article ; I hope he is not beyond that age when the Human Mind is yet ductile to the impressions of new truth : because, there is certainly so much of *Corporeity* in our Mental Constitution, that, after a certain time, it refuses to give back any bend, under which it has long been contracted. I trust, also, that he is sufficiently ingenuous to admit truth, if his judgment impress him with its real existence in the positions laid down. It is not the error we happen to embrace at first ; but the truth which we reject at last ; that can stamp reproach upon our understanding : it being the duty of a Philosopher to hold himself open to judge fairly, upon every new evidence.

It remains only to observe that, some brief mark of distinction is necessary, in order to distinguish these Views from those of NOMINALISM, as well as from those of REALISM and of CONCEPTUALISM. Such persons, therefore, as shall think with me, on the Subject, will perhaps have to avow the matter under the name of PLURALISM ; unless any title more expressive shall be proposed. And, although the Name, of Pluralism, is already appropriated, in another sense ; it can run no risk of being misapprehended in treating of COLLECTIVE REASONING.

In fine. Not having been able (in furnishing the present statement) to refresh my memory by looking over any extent of what has been advanced by the different writers on the Subject; nor, even, so much as to consult my own reserved materials with regard to it; I shall only add, to what has been suggested, by extracting a certain consideration, out of that intended Sequel, before adverted to, which has been wrecked upon the shoals of untoward accident, and which cannot be subjected to light in the crude state in which I have been forced to leave it.

The Consideration to which I now allude, and concerning which I can here do no more than merely make mention, is the fact that, the Rules for Classification in the Aristotelian Logic are, according at least to my apprehension, Self-evidently Absurd: And, if so, the fallacy they involve is of more deep and extensive consequences, *to our Conception of the Nature of Things existing*, than I can here farther advert to.

The Aristotelian Rule for Classification, I think, is that, a DEFINITION (and, consequently, a SPECIES) must contain every thing that is *essential* to the Subject; AND NOTHING MORE. But, according to the Aristotelian Scheme, which also is the ABSTRACT Scheme of the Nominalist, neither TIME nor PLACE is essential to a Defined Subject: and, hence, the VERY POSSIBILITY of INDIVIDUALS, as being comprehended under a Definition, is PRECLUDED. It would be vain to attempt either to deny, or to evade, this consequence: although

I cannot at present entertain the Subject farther. It must suffice, therefore, to hint here that, the reasonings of Locke, and of Mr. Stewart ; as well as of Every Nominalist, so far as I can recollect ; fall alike under One Same Objection as that to Aristotle, in his Rules for Generalisation.

Having stated this ; I hardly need add that, I consider TIME and SPACE as the NECESSARY THEATRE OF ALL CLASSIFICATION, BOTH CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT,—the most certain absurdity being involved in every attempt to reason upon COLLECTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS, unless we assign to Every One of them a *Different Place*, or a *Different Time*. It was before shewn that, the Conception, even, of *Mere Arithmetical Number* ; which is as Abstract an Object as any that can be conceived ; is IMPOSSIBLE *without the annexation of a DISTINCT SPACE, or TIME, to Every Unit* in the Number.

TIME and SPACE (ONE, or BOTH,) FORM THE NECESSARY THEATRE or SUBSTRATUM OF EVERY THING THAT THE PHILOSOPHER, or the HUMAN MIND, CAN CONCEIVE : For OMNIPRESENCE, OMNISCIENCE, and OMNIPOTENCE, *cannot be conceived without these* ; and THOSE THREE ATTRIBUTES *must contain the Models or Exemplars of ALL POSSIBLE CONCEPTIONS*. The Supposition of OMNIPOTENCE and OMNISCIENCE, that is NO WHERE, would form One Side of an Equation ; the Other Side of which must be made up of ALL THE ABSURDITIES THAT COULD BE EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE.

The Overdrawn Speculations with regard to TIME, and to SPACE, of Some Eminent Men, both Ancients and Moderns, — Speculations which, I incline to believe, have owed their foundation to some unhappy straining, or cast, of the Intellect,— have proved one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to Sound Philosophy, and to unanimity in the Conclusions of Philosophers. But the BERKELEIAN Doctrine, ALONE, with regard to these Two Essences, could be of any fatal consequence, if it could ever be propagated: which, fortunately, there is no reason to fear it ever can; so utterly does it revolt the understanding of mankind in general. The Great Bulk of the Species, both unlearned and learned, will ever take their stand with Clarke, with Locke, and Newton, in a conviction of the Reality of that IMMENSE AND INTERMINABLE CAPACITY, whose EXISTENCE IS NECESSARY IN ITSELF, and NECESSARY, ALSO, *to the Existence of EVERY OTHER ESSENCE, and EVERY ENERGY.*

I close these reflections with the avowal of my perfect agreement in the Conclusion of Clarke, that, Absolute Space is intimately involved in the Essence of the Omnipotent. And the principal defect, which, as I now remember, I considered as appearing in the Argument of Clarke, was his having hampered his reasoning by admitting the usual assertion that, SPACE *cannot be called a SUBSTANCE*: Whereas, I conceive, it answers, most philosophically, to the Nature of a Substance; because it is the NECESSARY THEATRE OR SUB-

STRATUM of *All Accidents*. At the same time, my readers are here requested to take along with them my conviction, according to the Principles advanced from the Phenomena of Colors, that there is **NO OTHER SUBSTANCE IN EXISTENCE**, but **THAT KIND** of Substance of which Space is a Modification; *ALL the Appearances* of the Universe being *Merely Accidents* (*i. e.* the result of *Energies*) of **THAT KIND** of Substance.

To such readers as are not used to much reflection, upon these abstruse matters, the effect of such a conclusion may easily be imagined. But, to those who may have employed *some* cast in this direction, my leaving them the following query may, perhaps, be of service. **IF ENERGY, and the SUBSTANCE WHICH ENERGISES, do not exist in the INTER-STARRE REGIONS, where NO MATTER is ever, by any School, except by Hypothesis, assumed to exist; then, BY WHAT POWER are the So-called Heavenly "BODIES" chained together, into One Same Team or System? Or, Will the Philosopher of MATTER inform us, WHAT POWER is Greater, or More Wonderful, than that which, WITHOUT MATTER, chains together innumerable Thousands of Suns, and Systems?**

Let any Natural Philosopher ask himself the question, Whether the Power which chains the Planet Saturn, to the Sun, can be supposed to **RESIDE IN THE SUN**; or, in the Sun and the Planet, respectively: Or, Whether this Kind of Power must not rather reside in the Sun, and in the Planet, **AND IN THE SPACE BETWEEN**; this

Power operating in Every One of these THREE LOCALITIES, in different degrees, according to Permanent LAWS ASSIGNED to them by the ENERGISER ?

To say that BODIES ATTRACT in proportion to the quantity of MATTER which they contain, is to utter mere sound : because the only evidence we have, of the SUPPOSED QUANTITY OF MATTER, is the DEGREE of Attraction. But ATTRACTION is merely a Name given to a FACT ; and this to the Fact of a CHANGE : and, for this Change, we must infer SOME POWER EXISTING. It is rigorously manifest, therefore, that, Every Time the Natural Philosopher employs the word—"MATTER"—(in treating of attraction,) he *ought* to employ the word POWER in its stead : We may challenge the possibility of a demur to this assertion. What, then, is the conclusion which follows this truth ? It is this : namely—ALL THE HEAVENLY BODIES *are* COMPAGES OF ENERGIES of the ENERGISING SUBSTANCE : And the INTER-STELLAR SPACES are filled with Energy, Similar in Kind ; which, as it were a Chain, holds together All those Immense Masses of Concentrated Energies which we call Stars, and Planets.

If we were to embrace the hypothesis of Newton,—that Gravitation is probably caused by a *Fluid* ;—(an hypothesis which, however, we must not admit here, BECAUSE WE MUST NOT FOR A MOMENT ADMIT ANY HYPOTHESIS,—) still, it is certain, we *must resolve this* So-CALLED FLUID *into* a POWER OR ENERGY : because, if Such Fluid ex-

isted, and were had in evidence, *this evidence could be No other than that of a FACT; and a FACT is the result of POWER OR ENERGY of SOME ENERGISER.* It is most certain that this last conclusion is purely void of all hypotheses: it is paramount, and irresistible.

WHAT, then, ought to prevent us from being roused, from the deadly torpor of imposed accidental circumstances, to look the known Phenomena of BODY, and of MIND, directly in the face; and to draw, therefrom, the Great Legitimate Conclusion, which they conspire, and cry aloud, to force upon every unvitiated understanding, that shall apply itself with moderate attention to the subject?

We KNOW what is ENERGY, and what is an ENERGISER;—I say we KNOW THIS IN THE LAST DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTIMACY, because we know it in OURSELVES. And if we be asked, for our TEST of this knowledge? The answer is, the CONSTANT UNIFORMITY OF THE INTERNAL *and* EXTERNAL RESULTS, which follow our Various Modes of Energising. To the disturber, or insulter, of our Reason, who would affirm to us that this is *no certain* test; One Answer alone is due—namely—A SERENE SILENCE.¹ Such singular persons must be borne with: but it is our own fault if we are shallow enough to listen to them. What, then,

¹ As often as we see a Pyrrhonist throw himself under the wheels of a loaded waggon, we may believe him in *earnest*, though a *madman*.

is the Legitimate Conclusion which follows, according to the Newtonian rule for the assigning of Causes?—It is this : As Energy in Us is the Energy of MIND ; so, therefore, ENERGY IN ALL SUBSTANCE is the Energy of Mind.—But WE are NOT ONLY ENERGISING Substances ; for we are PROVED TO BE ALSO EXTENDED Substances : BY SO MUCH THE MORE, then, ALL THE EXTENDED SUBSTANCE IN THE EXTERNAL UNIVERSE, which subjects our Minds to Extended Impressions from without, is MIND.

Along with this unmixed philosophical statement of the Subject is to be taken, as a matter of very essential moment, the following assertion of fact : — Had Mankind COMMENCED their intercourse with the Bodies around them with the *present knowledge of Natural Philosophers*,—that is *had they known Bodies only by such Properties as EXTENSION, ATTRACTION, and REPULSION ; and known, also, that All Real Contact between Bodies, or the Parts of Bodies, is a CHEAT and a FALSEHOOD ;*—I affirm, then,—and have no fear of being contradicted by any competent judge,—that the *Human Species could never have formed such a conception as that of MATTER, as a thing EXISTING.* And, if any such Conception could have been proposed, as being that of an existing Reality ; it must have revolted the Reason of the Whole Species, as a thing equally impious and chimerical.

In a word ; The Prejudice of the existence of


MATTER is only a pitiable Badge of Ignorance worn by the reading Million, no less than by those below them; and is a belief which, when philosophically apprehended, is MOST DEROGATORY TO THE POWER AND NATURE OF THE OMNIPOTENT, because, by the very condition, it involves the assumption that He HAD NEED of such an Agent, or Medium, for the possibility of his Energising.

Let the Churchman and the Philosopher look to the real merits of this Subject. The times are pregnant. It is vain to think of *shrinking* from the inevitable progress of Opinion. Many of the most eminent Divines, with Dr. Clarke, have manifested, by their labors, their perfect conviction that RELIGION *must be built upon PHILOSOPHY, in order to make it be received by those Minds which will for ever give direction to the MORAL ENERGIES of Mankind.* And, if Religion be NOT built upon Philosophy; it is most manifest that, Atheism, BY OVERT, *and* BY COVERT, will devour every hope of Religion.

Are we, in these Countries, alive to the fact that, Three, or Four, Hundred Millions of the Human Race are sunk in the most horrible demoralisation, the fruits of an Atheism founded in the belief of MATTER,— Nations which have, for many ages, been famous for *Philosophers and Learned Men*;— most certainly mistaken, indeed; but NOT ONE OF WHOM HAS BROKEN THE APPALLING UNANIMITY OF OPINION, *that ALL IS MATTER?* Let this

result, which now flourishes in full consummation in ASIA, be compared with what is going on in EUROPE. And, Let the POLITICAL ECONOMIST OF RELIGION draw his inference from this induction.

END OF THE ANALYSIS.




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AN EXAMPLE
of
GRAMMATICAL RESOLUTION:

In which, the Same Subject is chosen that was selected by Bishop Lowth, in his "INTRODUCTION:"—the Design being to contrast the Two Different Schemes of GRAMMAR.

VERSE FIRST.

"In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius
"Cæsar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea;
"the word of God came to John the son of Za-
"charias, in the wilderness."

The above Verse transposed for Parsing.

"The word of God came to John the son of
"Zacharias, in the wilderness, in the fifteenth
"year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar; Pontius
"Pilate being governor of Judea."

PARSED BELOW, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
ANALYSIS.

"THE WORD,"—a Noun Substantive, made up of the
NOUN GENERIC—"WORD"—and the Noun Concretive—
"the:"—"OF,"—a Minor Verb, employed here without
a Major; its Nominative is "THE WORD," and its De-

finitive Objective is the Conventional Pronoun—"God :"
 —"GOD,"—a Conventional Pronoun, standing for THE
 CREATOR :—"CAME,"—a Verb, also indicating Past
 Time ; its Nomi. is "*The Word of God* :"—"TO,"—a Minor
 Verb ; its Nomi. is the Noun of Action—"Came :"—
 "JOHN,"—a Conv. Pron., standing for a Certain Man,
 serving as the Accusative to the Minor Verb—"to :"—
 "THE SON OF ZACHARIAS,"—an expletive Noun Sub-
 stantive, for which the Conv. Pro.—"*John*"—stood
 before :—"IN THE WILDERNESS,"—a Minor Verb
 and a Noun Sub. in the Definitive State ; it is a Phrase
 defining a Minor Action :—"IN THE FIFTEENTH YEAR
 OF THE REIGN OF TIBERIUS CÆSAR,"—"IN,"—a Mi.
 Verb :—"THE FIFTEENTH YEAR,"—a Noun Sub.,
 made up of a Generic, a Specific, and a Concretive
 Noun :—"OF,"—a Mi. Verb :—"TIBERIUS CÆSAR,"
 —a Conv. Pro. in the Definitive State ; the whole
 phrase defines the time of the Principal Action :—
 "PONTIUS PILATE,"—a Conv. Pro. :—"BEING,"—a
 Verb ; its Nominative is "*Pontius Pilate*,"—and its
 Accusative is *Time*, understood ; the sense is—Pontius
 Pilate EXISTING *in*ning or *touching* that Time :—
 This is the *So-called Case Absolute*—a dark absurdity :—
 "GOVERNOR,"—a Noun Substantive, put as an expletive
 of the Conv. Pron. "*Pontius Pilate*"—thus, *Pontius
 Pilate Governor* :—"OF JUDEA,"—a Mi. Verb and a
 Conv. Pron. in the Definitive State ; the Word—
 "*Judea*"—standing instead of the *Proper Name of a
 certain Country*, in which the action was carried on.

VERSE SECOND.

"And he came into all the country about
 "Jordan, preaching the baptism of repentance for
 "the remission of sins."

"AND,"—a *Directing Speech to Us*, that we should

connect what went before with what follows ; it is rather a *Logical* than a *Grammatical* Conjoiner :—" HE," an Initial Pronoun, Third Per., Sing. Num. Mas. Gen., standing for the *Spoken of Person* :—" CAME,"—a Verb :—(Here the text may be taken *two ways* ; either as—he *CAME preaching intoing* all the country ; or, as—he *came intoing* all the country he *PREACHING* : I will take it in the latter way, as differing least from the structure of the text ; though, in the *first* case, "*preaching*" is only a Mi. Verb, depending upon "CAME," but, in the last, it is a MAJOR.)—" INTO" (*i. e.* INTOING,)—a Mi. Verb, depending either upon "CAME," or upon "PREACHING," according to the Structure chosen :—" ALL THE COUNTRY,"—a No. Sub., made up of the GENERIC—" COUNTRY"—and *Two Concretives* — "*all the* ;"—it is in the Definitive State to the Mi. Verb "*intoing* :"—" ABOUT JORDAN,"—a Mi. Verb and a Definitive Substantive, the latter being represented by the Conventional Pronoun "JORDAN :"—" PREACHING,"—a Verb ; its Nomi. is HE, *understood* :—" THE BAPTISM,"—a N. S. in the Acc. State to the Verb "PREACHING :"—" OF REPENTANCE,"—a Mi. Verb and a N. S. in the Defi. State ; the phrase *defines what sort, or purpose*, of baptism is meant ;—" FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS,"—an alternating Series of Min. Verbs and Substantives, defining the *final cause* of repenting.

VERSE THIRD.

" And the same John had his raiment of camel's hair, and a leathern girdle about his loins ; and his meat was of locusts and wild honey."

" AND,"—a Directing Speech, to Us, to connect Two Other Speeches :—" THE SAME JOHN,"—a Compound Pronoun, meaning the Identical Nominative mentioned

before :—"HAD,"—a Verb, indicating also Past Time :—"HIS RAIMENT," *i. e.* HE OF RAIMENT or RAIMENT OFFSPRINGING HIM :—"raiment,"—a Noun Sub., the Concretive Noun—A—being understood ; it is in the Acc. State to the Verb "HAD :"—"OFFSPRINGING HIM,"—a Mi. Verb, and its Defi. Sub. represented by the Initial Pronoun "HIM :"—"OF CAMEL'S HAIR,"—*i. e.* ("raiment") OFFSPRINGING THE HAIR OFFSPRINGING A CAMEL,—a *Series of Two* Mi. Verbs, each with its respective Defi. N., or Pro., the Nom. of the *First* being the foregoing Pronoun—"HIM :"—"AND,"—a Directing Speech :—"A LEATHERN GIRDLE,"—a Noun Sub., made up of a GENERIC, a *specific*, and a concretive ; the words—HE HAD—ought to be understood as being prefixed :—"ABOUT,"—a Mi. Verb importing ABOUTING *i. e.* SURROUNDING—"HIS LOINS," *i. e.* THE LOINS OF HIM,—a Bridge of Speech, composed of a Noun Sub., a Mi. Verb, and an Initial Pronoun, the Noun Sub. (*i. e.* "THE LOINS") being in the Defi. Objective State to the Mi. Verb—"ABOUTING :"—"AND,"—a Directing Speech :—"HIS MEAT," *i. e.* THE MEAT OF HIM,—a Bridge made up of a Noun Sub. a Mi. Verb, and an Initial Pronoun :—"WAS,"—a Verb, indicating also Time Past :—"OF LOCUSTS,"—a Mi. Verb and a Noun Sub. in the Defi. State, the Nom. of this Verb being AT THAT TIME, understood,—thus—"meat of him was" (AT THAT TIME) "of locusts :"—"AND,"—a Directing Speech :—"WILD HONEY,"—a Noun Sub., made up of a GENERIC, and a *Specific*, to which Some Concretive must be understood as prefixed, thus—locusts and *Some* Wild Honey.

VERSE FOURTH.

"Then said he to the multitude that came forth
to be baptised of him : O generation of Vipers,

“ Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to
 “ come? Bring forth, therefore fruits meet for
 “ repentance.”

THAT IS, FIRST,—

“ He said then to the multitude that came forth to be
 “ baptised of him.” —“ HE,”—an Init. Pro., T. P. S.
 N. M. G.:—“ SAID,”—a Verb, Past Form; its Nom.—
 “ HE,” and its Acc. is the Word—“ TO,” considered
 as a Noun:—“ THEN,” a Breve or Adverb, imp. AT
 THAT TIME; to be parsed as Mi. Ver. and a N. S.:—
 “ TO,” a Mi. Verb;—its Nom. is “ THAT TIME,” under-
 stood; —“ THE MULTITUDE,”—a Noun Sub., made
 up of the Generic “ MULTITUDE”—and the Concretive
 —“ THE;” it is in the Acc. State to the Mi. Verb—
 “ TO:”—“ THAT,”—a Repeating Pronoun, standing for
 “ THE MULTITUDE;” it means—the SAME *multitude*:—
 “ CAME,”—a Verb, Past Form; its Nom. is the word—
 “ THAT:”—“ FORTH,”—a Breve or Adverb, imp. TO
 AN OUTER PLACE; —to be *parsed as such*—namely—
 CAME to (*i. e.* CAME *finishing*) an outer place:—“ TO,”
 a Mi. Verb; its Nom. is the word —“ CAME,”—serving
 now as a Noun:—“ AN OUTER PLACE,”—a Noun Sub.,
 made up of a gen., a speci., and a concretive; it is the
 Accu. to the Mi. Verb—“ TO:”—“ TO BE,”—a Sign of the
 Infinitive; it means ACT-*being*, and serves here as a
 VERB; and the Mi. Verb—FOR—must be understood
 before it, to serve for its Nominative,—thus —CAME
 to an outer place FOR being baptised:—“ BAPTISED,”—
 a SO-CALLED VERB, forming the SO-CALLED PASSIVE
 VOICE; but, in fact, a BREVE, meaning INNING A BAP-
 TISED STATE,—a PASSIVE VOICE *being absurd and im-*
possible:—“ OF HIM,”—a Mi. Verb and an Initial Pronoun
 in the Definitive State; the Nom. to the Mi. Verb is the
 Noun Substantive “ A BAPTISED STATE:”—“ O,”—a
 Breve, equivalent to a Sentence expressive of woe, or

reproach :—"GENERATION,"—a N. Sub. equi. to YE GENERATION :—"OF VIPERS,"—a Mi. Verb and a Def. Obj. N. ; its Nomi. is "YE GENERATION" (YE GENERATION *offspringing* VIPERS) :—"WHO,"—a Repeating Pro., put interrogatively :—"HATH,"—an Auxiliary Verb :—"WARNED,"—a Verb, Past Form :—"YOU,"—an Init. Pro., Sec. P. Plu. ; it is the Acc. to the Verb—"WARNED ;" the Two Successive Verbs—"HATH" and "WARNED"—serve, *alternately*, to each other, as VERB and as NOUN, —thus—"WHO"—is the Nom. to "HATH ;" and—"WARNED" is its Accusa. ;—and—"HATH"—becomes the Nom. to "WARNED,"—while—"YOU"—is *its* Accu. :—"TO FLEE," *i. e.* *for* TO FLEE, *i. e.* FOR FLEEING, *i. e.* FORING (FRONTING) FLEEING : (Who HATH WARNED you FRONTING FLEEING the *wrath to come* :)—FRONTING *fleeing* are Two Mi. Verbs in succession, each of them obeying the *Law of Alternation* ; is the Nom. of the First "YOU,"—and the Defi. Ob. of the last is "THE WRATH"—a N. S. made up of a Gen. and a Conc. :—"TO come," *i. e.* ACT-come, a Sign of the Inf., equivalent to ACT coming ; the Mi. Verb—FOR—being understood as prefixed ; and the Words—UPON YOU,—or something equivalent,—to be understood as following :—"BRING FORTH FRUITS,"—a Directing Speech, importing—I DIRECT YOU, THAT, YOU BRING FORTH fruits :—"THEREFORE,"—a Breve or Adverb, meaning *fronting that reason*, thus—BRING FORTH FRUITS FRONTING, or *in the presence of, that reason* :—"MEET,"—*i. e.* FIT :—"FOR"—a Mi. Verb :—REPENTANCE, —a Noun Generic, standing for the N. Sub.—A REPENTANCE, or A REPENTING ;—the sense is *some* FIT fruits FORING a repenting.

VERSE FIFTH.

"And as all men mused in their hearts of
 "John, whether he were the Christ, or not ; John

“ answered, saying unto them all : I indeed baptise you with water ; but one mightier than I cometh, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to unloose, he shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost and with fire.”

“ AND,”—a Directing Speech :—“ AS,”—a Breve :—
 “ ALL MEN,”—a Noun Sub. :—“ MUSED,”—a Verb Past Form : “ IN,”—a Mi. Verb depending on its Major :—“ MUSED,”—“ THEIR HEARTS,” *i. e.* HEARTS OF THEM—thus—ALL MEN MUSED *inning* THE HEARTS of THEM,—a Noun, a Verb, a Mi. Verb, a Noun, a Mi. Verb, and an Init. Pro., forming together a very Complex Bridge of Language, to be parsed under the Law of Alternation, as usual :—“ OF JOHN,”—a Mi. Verb and a Defi. Sub., forming a continuation of the Complex Bridge :—“ WHETHER,”—a Sort of Conditional Pronoun, meaning One of Two Persons supposed :—
 “ HE,”—an Ini. Pro. T. P. S. N. M. G. :—“ WERE,”—a Verbal Breve ; importing Two Verbs—namely—SHOULD and BE (*i. e.* SHOULD EXIST) *at That Time, in That Place* ; these, therefore, must be parsed by Alternation ; the Verb “ exist,” which in strictness ought to be *existing*, is here a Mi. Verb ;—and the Nomi. to “ SHOULD ” is “ HE : ”—“ THE CHRIST,”—a N. Sub. made up of a N. Gen. and a Conc. ; the Init. Pro.—HE—to be understood as prefixed ; the sense is, “ WHETHER HE SHOULD EXIST *in That Place*—HE the Christ :—
 “ JOHN ANSWERED SAYING UNTO THEM ALL,”—
 “ JOHN,”—a Conv. Pro. :—“ ANSWERED SAYING UNTO,” a Series of a Verb and Two Mi. Verbs, to be parsed by Alternation ; “ JOHN ” is the Nomi. to the First ; and the Init. Pro.—“ THEM ”—is the Acc. to the Last :—“ ALL,”—a Breve, meaning *IN A BODY* ; the sense is—*them INNING a body* :—“ I ”—a Conv. Pro. Fi. P. Si. :—

“INDEED,” *i. e.* INNING THE DEED,—a Breve meaning —*inning the fact, or truth* : — “BAPTISE YOU,”—a Verb and an Acc. Sub. made up of the Conv. Pro.—“YOU ;” the Pronoun—I—ought to be understood as *repeated* for its Nominative thus — I INNING THE DEED, I BAPTISE YOU :—“WITH WATER,” *i. e.* a Mi. Verb and Defi. Sub. ; its Nom. is “YOU”—(*i. e.* “YOU WITH WATER”) :—BUT,”—a Directing Speech :—“ONE MIGHTIER THAN I COMETH,”—*i. e.* ONE COMETH WHO IS MIGHTIER THAN I,—“ONE,”—a N. Conc. standing here for a N. Sub. —namely—ONE PERSON : “COMETH,”—a Verb ; its Acc. is TO (*i. e.* TO THIS PLACE,) understood :—“WHO,”—a Repeating Pronoun meaning THE SAME PERSON :—“IS,”—a VERB, being the So-called Verb Substantive ; it always couples its Nominative with *Time*, or *Place*,—thus — WHO (THE SAME) EXISTS IN TIME, OR IN PLACE, WHO MIGHTIER THAN I :—“MIGHTIER,”—*i. e.* MORE MIGHTY—is the Comparative Degree of a So-called Adjective ; it is therefore a Noun Specific ; but is, in fact, of a *Brevial* or *Adverbial* Nature, meaning INNING MORE MIGHT :—“THAN,”—is a Directing Speech, to put a following Speech *in comparison* with a foregoing one, — thus *Who* IS INNING *more might*, PUT, OR ASSUME, *I am innning might* :—“THE LATCHET OF “WHOSE SHOES I AM NOT WORTHY TO UNLOOSE,” *i. e.* “I AM NOT WORTHY TO UNLOOSE THE LATCHET OF “WHOSE SHOES.”—“I,”—an Initial Pronoun ;—“AM”—a Verb Sub. meaning exist ; its Nomi. is “I,”—and its Acc. is SPACE, with the Mi. Verb—IN—understood :—“NOT,”—a Breve importing I DENY :—“WORTHY,”—a Noun Specific standing for the N. Sub.—A WORTHY PERSON :—“TO UNLOOSE,” *i. e.* TO LOOSE—a Sign of the Infinitive meaning—ACT-*loosing* ;—the Mi. Verb—FOR—is to be understood ;—the sense is—I deny that I am innning a worthy state, I for (*i. e.* *fronting*) act-loosing the latchet of whose shoes :—“He,” an Initial

Pro. Th. P. Si. N. Mas. Gen. : — “ SHALL,” — an Auxiliary Verb ; its Nom. is “ HE,” and its Accusative is the Word — “ BAPTISE,” — serving under the Law of Alternation as a Noun Substantive : — “ BAPTISE,” — a Verb ; its Nominative is the Word “ SHALL,” — serving as a Noun Sub. : “ YOU,” — an Initial Pronoun, Sec. Per. Plu. Num., in the Acc. State to the Verb — “ BAPTISE :” — “ WITH,” — a Minor Verb ; its Nom. is “ YOU,” and its Acc. is “ THE HOLY GHOST :” — “ THE HOLY GHOST,” — a Noun Substantive made up of a Gen., a Spe., and a Concr. : — “ AND,” — a Directing Speech : — “ WITH FIRE,” — a Minor Verb and a Definitive Objective Noun Substantive ; the Nom. is the Word — “ YOU ;” and the FULL Acc. is SOME “ FIRE.”

VERSE SIXTH.

“ Now when all the people were baptised, it came to pass, that, Jesus also being baptised and praying, the heaven was opened, and the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape, like a dove, upon him ; and lo ! a voice from heaven saying : This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.”

“ Now,” — a Breve, importing AT THIS TIME : — “ WHEN,” — a Breve, importing AT WHAT TIME : — “ ALL THE PEOPLE,” — a Substantive : — “ WERE,” — a Verb, Past Form ; its Nom. is “ ALL THE PEOPLE,” and its Acc. is the word IN, understood from what follows : — “ BAPTISED,” — a Breve or Adverb, importing IN A BAPTISED STATE : — “ IT,” — an Initial Pronoun, standing for THE EVENT : — “ CAME TO PASS,” — a Major Verb and a Minor in the Infinitive Form ; the sense is — it CAME

passing at that time :—“ THAT,”—a Repeating Pronoun, importing SAME :—“ JESUS,”—a Conventional Pronoun for a Certain Person :—“ ALSO,”—a Breve, importing IN SAME MANNER :—“ BEING BAPTISED,”—a Verb and a Breve, importing EXISTING IN A BAPTISED STATE :—“ AND,”—a Directing Speech :—PRAYING,—a Breve, importing INNING A PRAYING STATE ; (or, it may be interpreted as a VERB, if the words—TO GOD,—or the words—IN THAT PLACE,—be *understood* to form its Accusative, thus—“ AND ” (he) “ PRAYING ” TO GOD ; or, IN THAT PLACE :—“ THE HEAVEN,”—a Sub. ; the *Point or Comma*, between “ PRAYING ” and “ HEAVEN,” serves here as a *Directing Speech* to Us, to connect the two affirmations : “ WAS,”—a Verb, Past Form :—“ OPENED,”—a Breve, importing INNING AN OPENED STATE ; the sense is—“ THE HEAVEN ” EXISTED INNING AN OPENED STATE :—“ AND,”—a Directing Speech :—“ THE HOLY GHOST,”—a Sub., made up of Three Component Names :—“ DESCENDED IN A BODILY SHAPE,”—a Major Verb and a Depending Minor, (*i. e.* “ DESCENDED *inning*,”) together with a Sub. in the Acc. State, made up of three Names *i. e.* “ A BODILY SHAPE :—“ LIKE,”—a Breve, importing IN THE FORM OF :—“ A DOVE,”—a Sub. :—“ UPON HIM,”—a Minor Verb and an Init. Pro. in the Acc. State ; the plainer order is—“ DESCENDED IN A BODILY SHAPE ” *upponing* “ HIM,” *inning the form of* “ A DOVE :—“ AND,”—a Directing Speech.—“ LO,”—a Breve, importing BEHOLD YE :—“ A VOICE,”—a Sub.—“ FROM HEAVEN,”—a Minor Verb and a Sub. in the Definitive State :—“ SAYING,”—*i. e.* SAYING TO THE PEOPLE, (the sense is—BEHOLD YE A VOICE SAYING TO THE PEOPLE ;—) “ SAYING,” therefore, is here a VERB ; its Nom. is “ A VOICE,” and its Acc. is the Word —“ TO ”—*understood*, as being necessary to connect it with the Sub.—“ THE PEOPLE ” *understood* :—“ THIS,” a Demonstrative Repeating Pronoun, meaning

THE SAME you see the Dove descend upon : — IS, — a Verb; the sense is—SAME exists in this place :—“ MY,” —a Breve, meaning OF ME:—“ BELOVED SON,” —a Substantive : —“ IN WHOM I am well pleased ;” it had better be read—I AM WELL PLEASED IN WHOM ; in which case, the Comma, after the word “ SON,” serves for a Directing Speech,—thus—“ *beloved Son,*” (i. e. ADD) “ *I am well pleased in whom :*” —“ I AM,” —an In. Pro. and a Verb, having the words—AT THIS TIME—understood to form its Accusative : —“ WELL,” —a Breve, meaning INNING A GOOD DEGREE, OR MANNER :—“ PLEASED IN WHOM,” —a Major Verb and a Depending Minor, together with a Subst. in the Accu. State meaning THE SAME PERSON.¹

OF THE PARSING OF AUXILIARY VERBS.

In the Chapter of Verbs, it was said that, Auxiliary Verbs bear a close affinity to Minor Verbs. This was expressed upon a tacit assumption that, the Affirmation of *Any Act of the Mind*, respecting ANY EXTERNAL ACT, may be considered as being LESS GRAMMATICALLY IMPORTANT than the Affirmation of the External Act which follows it : Thus, for example, in the expression — I *can* SUPPORT it, —I consider the expression of the Act of *being able* (*literally knowing*) as being *Less Grammatically Important* than

¹ It is to be noticed that, the Examples of Parsing would have taken up far less space, had it not been for the repeated and roomy explanations which it was deemed proper to furnish, in the course of the resolution.

It is also to be noticed that, Parsing occasionally admits of MODIFICATION, according to the View we take of any Bridge of Language.

the expression of the Act of SUPPORTING. In a word ; I viewed the *Act of the Mind*, in such case, as being *dependent upon the External Act*. In this last conclusion, moreover, (upon which the first one is evidently grounded,) I still hold myself justified ; because, we never employ *Any Auxiliary Act* UNTIL AFTER we have meditated the *Adjective Act* which it is to govern. I can discover no reason, therefore, which, when investigated with strict logical rigor, could justify our denying this affinity. And, in such a rigorous view of the Subject, I apprehend, Auxiliary Verbs must be classed as being *Absolutely Identical*, in Species, with Minor Verbs.

But there are, at the same time, some subordinate reasons which induce one of two consequences :—namely—Either, we must consent to parse Auxiliary Verbs as being MAJOR Verbs ; or, else, we must rigorously insist upon *doing away with ALL PAST FORMS* of Verbs : Which last improvement OUGHT, indeed, to take place ; but which it may be apprehended is a reform in Language that will not be speedily given into, if ever it shall come about at all. I consider it to be enough here, therefore, to state the merits of the case, together with its alternative. It must remain for time and circumstance to determine the event. It only follows that, if we chuse to parse Auxiliary Verbs as MAJORS ; we *ought*, then, to parse *Every Adjective Verb* (that follows an Auxiliary Verb) as a *Minor*.

It may be particularly noted ; as, I believe, has

been hinted in the body of the work ; that, the **PAST FORMS** of Verbs, which most certainly is an **Unphilosophical Idiom**, is almost the only Idiom of the English Language that, may not perhaps, be expected very easily to conform to the Principles of Pure Rational Grammar. And it may here be observed, that, if this should remain a blemish in the **EXPRESS** Form of the Language ; it will be vastly less discreditable to its Philosophy that, the real nature of the Subject should be understood.

The examples of Parsing, which have been furnished, are with a view to enable those who may be inclined, either to teach, or to write Grammars upon the Principles of the Work, to carry their design into execution without being liable to any possible difficulty. The thing is supplied, here, on the supposition that he, who invents a Machine, ought to show how it is to be put in action.

The anticipated **BRIDGE OF LANGUAGE** having been rendered quite unnecessary by the Parsing and other Illustrations ; the **TABLE OF GRAMMAR** has been furnished, as a far more general elucidation of the subject.

CONCLUSION.

IN bringing the present labor to a close; the only apology which I am conscious of owing, for the manner in which it has been effected, is a matter to which I deem it fit to advert, in order to obviate any misconception that might otherwise arise with regard to it. The fact is; it will not escape observation that, in the Etymological portion of the work, I have confined my appeals, almost altogether, to the researches of Mr. Tooke and Dr. Murray; and to the Original English of CHAUCER and of BARBOUR: In doing which, I have perhaps, in various degrees, done injustice to the Etymological labors of other Writers, who had by their industry acquired a right to have their respective opinions consulted. In so far, therefore, as I have in this way done wrong, to the claims of any Author on the Subject, I unfeignedly ask his pardon: which, I may well hope to obtain, from a consideration of the circumstances in which the whole of the task has been executed, during five years' continual, and often all but hopeless struggle against the effect of study and constitution: owing to which, it was not only impossible to embrace a larger range of authorities; but, besides this, any such labor would have been rendered nearly unavailing by the induced state of my memory.

In the existing case, therefore, I thought it was consulting the interest of my readers ; as well as yielding to my own contracted capability ; to concentrate my attention, and theirs, upon the authorities above mentioned. In so doing, I trust, there has been no material loss of GENERAL light. And it is for readers, themselves, to consult whatever particular lights are to be found in the Writers whose statements have been omitted.

It remains only to add a few words here, with regard to a consideration, in the execution of the work, of which readers ought to be apprised, when forming their ultimate judgment of its complexion.

When I first ventured to launch forth, from the Old Continent of Accredited Grammar, in search of a New World ; I was not insensible to the serious contingencies and perils of the Voyage—the long succession of rocks, shoals, and quicksands, which must be encountered, surveyed, and avoided, before it was possible to arrive at any desired Haven. Nor did the difficulty, especially in matters of detail, at all lessen for some time, as I proceeded. Yet, such was the GENERAL Conception of the Subject which I was in the outset enabled to form, in consequence of fixing my Views *entirely and rigorously* upon that Demonstrated Structure of the Category of Relation, in which I had seceded so vastly from the Accredited Scheme of All Logicians, that confidence never for a

moment forsook me, nor vacillated. And my principal doubt was, whether it would be possible to make the Illogical Idioms of any Language conform, in any great extent, to the unyielding Principles of a Grammar of Pure Reason.

When the labor had advanced in a considerable degree, however ; especially, when the Theory of Minor Verbs had arrived at a certain stage ; the difficulties began to clear away ; and it became manifest, that our own Language is eminently adapted to conform to the Principles of Pure Grammar ;—the PAST FORMS OF VERBS being the most material Idiom, in the English Tongue, which, it may be feared, will hardly give way to Reason, in the EXPRESS Character of the Language.

The fact (at any rate) to which I had desired to draw the attention of readers, in the present instance, is that, the task under consideration ; whether, or not, it shall be adjudged as having attained its object ; is not one of those labors that have been thrown off, Section by Section, in a finished state. And, indeed, I do not imagine that any talent could lead to the completion of such an undertaking, by such a procedure. For my own part, I freely confess, what has been done has been effected by a *series of approximations* ; insomuch that, the work, *as a still defective but amending whole* ; (with exception only, I believe, of parts of the Seventh Chapter ;) has been *re-written not less than ten times*. The knowledge of this fact ought to form a material consideration for the com-

petent reader, in passing his judgment upon the Principles advanced. And it is with a view to this utility that, I put him in possession of the fact. At the same time, his being apprised of the trying repetition of the labor will account for the allusions, which I have been under the necessity to make, occasionally, to bad health in the prosecution of it.

ONE of the causes, which have induced these repetitions of labor, is deserving of being particularly noticed, here, on account of its importance to the Subject. This cause was not, as might perhaps be supposed, the mere search after *Principles*: Nor, yet, the tracing of these to *Conclusions*: But, *along with these*, it was the attainment of PRECISION IN TERMS AND PHRASEOLOGY. To what extent I have succeeded, at last; is a question to be determined by the event. But those, who have any competent tact of the Subject, will not confound what is here meant, with the notion of what is understood by STYLE. And those, who might otherwise be inclined to suppose I have been, in any case, either loose or arbitrary in Phraseology or in what may be called *Philosophical Language*, may be induced, by this explanation, to consider well, as often as they pronounce me faulty in this particular; which, doubtless, I suppose, I sometimes *have* been, after all.

In fine. After such application to the Subject, I must not suffer the work to go forth under a misconception that, I was fain to compromise that completion of it, at which I had so ardently aimed in chalking out the task as the Object of my pur-

suit. On the contrary ; I trust to be pardoned in believing that, the general character of the labor must be admitted as a Body of Strict Rationated Science : in which, no greater defect will be found, than might have crept into a System of any other Demonstrative Science, at various stages of its advancement.

THE END.





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